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Abstract
This dissertation investigates land and tenancy disputes in Gedeo, southern 
Ethiopia, between 1941 and 1974. Such disputes were a deeply entrenched feature 
of Ethiopian land tenure systems until the revolution, and despite its importance 
the subject has not received the attention it deserves. Based on local court archival 
documents and oral interviews, the dissertation seeks to understand how these 
conflicts shaped agrarian relationships in Gedeo during this crucial period.
The study highlights how differential access to resources created 
disharmony within Gedeo. It not only contributed to the proliferation o f  disputes 
but also eroded community cohesion, one of the consequences of which was that 
when Ethiopia was invaded by Italy in 1935 it was too divided and weak to defend 
itself effectively from external aggression. The post-liberation period was a 
formative time in the history o f Gedeo. During this time the gabbar system was 
gradually replaced by landlord-tenant relationships. There was significant 
economic development largely due to the increasing importance o f the coffee 
trade, but also land and tenancy disputes became a dominant feature o f this period. 
Although land disputes were common in many other parts of Ethiopia, tenancy 
disputes in the south are described in the existing literature as distinctive from 
those in northern Ethiopia. The existing works mainly discuss tenancy 
relationships in the south from an ethnic perspective. This factor might have 
exacerbated the rivalries; however, it was not the main factor. This dissertation 
argues that competition for available resources was at the heart o f the problem. 
The increased polarisation of landlord-tenant conflict continued to damage 
agrarian relationships. The inability o f the government to deal with the problem 
made the situation worse and as a result tenants were obliged to find alternative
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ways to express their grievances. In February 1960 when the Michele uprising 
erupted the government rushed to intervene with the heavy use o f security forces. 
Nevertheless the tenancy problem did not show sign o f improvement until it was 
resolved finally and fundamentally by revolutionary means in 1974.
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Abstract
This dissertation investigates land and tenancy disputes in Gedeo, southern 
Ethiopia, between 1941 and 1974. Such disputes were a deeply entrenched feature 
of Ethiopian land tenure systems until the revolution, and despite its importance 
the subject has not received the attention it deserves. Based on local court archival 
documents and oral interviews, the dissertation seeks to understand how these 
conflicts shaped agrarian relationships in Gedeo during this crucial period.
The study highlights how differential access to resources created 
disharmony within Gedeo. It not only contributed to the proliferation of disputes 
but also eroded community cohesion, one of the consequences of which was that 
when Ethiopia was invaded by Italy in 1935 it was too divided and weak to defend 
itself effectively from external aggression. The post-liberation period was a 
formative time in the histoiy of Gedeo. During this time the gdbbar system was 
gradually replaced by landlord-tenant relationships. There was significant 
economic development largely due to the increasing importance of the coffee 
trade, but also land and tenancy disputes became a dominant feature of this period. 
Although land disputes were common in many other parts of Ethiopia, tenancy 
disputes in the south are described in the existing literature as distinctive from 
those in northern Ethiopia. The existing works mainly discuss tenancy 
relationships in the south from an ethnic perspective. This factor might have 
exacerbated the rivalries; however, it was not the main cause of conflict. This 
dissertation argues that competition for available resources was at the heart of the 
problem. The increased polarisation of landlord-tenant conflict continued to 
damage agrarian relationships. The inability of the government to deal with the 
problem made the situation worse and as a result tenants were obliged to find
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alternative ways to express their grievances. In February I960, when the Mechele 
uprising erupted, the government rushed to intervene with the heavy use of 
security forces. Nevertheless the tenancy problem did not show sign of 
improvement until it was resolved finally and fundamentally by revolutionary 
means in 1974.
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DAAA Darasa Awraja Administrative Archives
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Some conventions
Ethiopian calendar (EC)
The Ethiopian calendar differs from the Gregorian one. The year has twelve equal 
months (thirty days each) and one short month which is five days long (six days in 
leap years). It therefore differs from the Gregorian calendar by seven to eight 
years and the dates have a discrepancy of from anything six to eleven days. Since 
the Ethiopian New Year starts in September, there is always a disparity when 
computing its equivalent in Gregorian. For example, 2001 in the Ethiopian 
calendar is 2008/2009 in the Gregorian.
Ethiopian names
Ethiopians do not use surnames to identify an individual. The first name followed 
by their father’s name is used to distinguish a person. Additional identification can 
be made by using the grandfather’s name.
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Transliteration
There is no single standardised system of transliteration of Ethiopian characters.
In this dissertation the system developed by the Institute of Ethiopian Studies (IES) 
has been used with some modifications.
Vowels
The seven orders of the Ethiopic alphabet are represented as follows
1st order ba
2nd order bu
3rd order bi
4th order ba
5th order be
6th order be
7th order bo
Consonants
The explosive variants are given as follows
q ‘I’flA, qabale
n naft’anna
f  (into
c CEi.rfC c'afe
p' p'aulos
s' 0<itJ& s'ahai
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Glossary
abba
Afd-negiis
alaqa
asir alaqa 
as'ma rest
asrat
at’bya danna 
ato
awraja
balabat
balambaras
baldrest
baldwuldta
bdqolo
birr
bala
c'iqa slmm 
c'isdnna
daga
ddjazmach
‘father’; (e.g. abba-gdda, father of gdda) head of the elected gdda. 
(lit. ‘mouth of the king’); highest judge.
‘head of a church’ ; also in land tenure a person who was 
responsible for paying taxes for land held by group of people, 
usually siblings.
(lit. ‘head of the ten’) ; lowest military title.
land inherited from one’s ancestor’s tfs'm(bone) implies that the 
land was the inalienable right of the inheritor.
tithe, land tax.
local judge.
a title equivalent to ‘M r’.
{awraja gizat) an administrative unit below taqlay gizat.
(lit. ‘one who has a father’) government officials recruited from the 
local hereditary chiefs.
a traditional title given to low level administrators, 
owner of rest land, landlord,
lit. ‘one who did a favour’; one who served the government in a 
different capacity, usually applied in the context of land grants for 
government officials and patriots who had served their country.
maize.
the standard Ethiopian monetary unit.
a juicy substance squeezed out of qoc'o, used to make porridge.
(lit. ‘authority of the nrud’); local head man.
tenant who accessed land through a sharecropping agreement, also 
in Gedeo provided additional free labour seivices to the landlord.
an agro-ecology zone; 3000-4000 metres above sea level.
(lit. ‘commander of the gate’); a traditional title given to both 
military and political appointees of the state.
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emdt a title equivalent to ‘M rs’.
endarase
ensdt
eqnel
erbo
fitawrari
gdbbar
gdda
gesho
gasha
girazmach
goddre
golo (G) 
gossa (G) 
gult
hamsa alaqa 
hayicha (G) 
kdtdma
(lit. ‘in my place’); plenipotentiary, parliamentary representative.
ensete edule, a banana-like tree widely cultivated for food in south 
and south west Ethiopia, the main staple of the Gedeo. Known also 
as the “false banana”.
a sharecropping tenancy arrangement in which the tenant’s 
obligation was to pay half of the harvest from the land.
a sharecropping tenancy arrangement in which the tenant’s 
obligation was to pay a quarter of the harvest, but in Gedeo there 
were extra burdens such as free labour services.
(lit. ‘commander of the front’) a traditional political and military 
title.
a tribute-paying peasant either in the form of labour or produce. In 
the south it implied a major burden.
Oromo socio-political system based on age grade. The Gedeo gdda 
which is believed to have been borrowed from the Oromo was 
weaker and only had a spiritual role.
a plant grown in the back garden commonly used in the preparation 
of tala a ( traditional Ethiopian beer).
a varying unit of land measurement, normally approximately 40 
hectares.
(lit.‘commander of the left flank’); a traditional political and 
military title given to highest officials.
taro; widely cultivated for food in south and south west Ethiopia, 
it has broad peltate leaves and a large starchy edible tuber.
work party.
clan or tribe.
a tribute-collecting right awarded to important office holders 01* 
soldiers; it does not confer access to land however.
(lit. ‘commander of the fifty’); military title or rank.
village head man; a traditional title of the Gedeo political system.
town, or military garrison in the south. These later evolved into 
urban centres.
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kudad (hudad) land which was cultivated by corvee labour. 
lam fertile, cultivated or developed land.
lam t’a f  semi-fertile, partly cultivated land.
maddria land granted provisionally to soldiers and other government
officials in lieu of their salary.
mamere priest of the Ethiopian orthodox church.
mikitle wdrdda an administrative unit below wdrdda.
minzir a co-owner of rest land who paid taxes through the alaqa.
nac' labash (lit. “wearer of white uniform”); local militia.
na,
negus
(lit. “gun bearer”); soldiers of the imperial anny settled in the south 
after the incorporation.
king.
outiba (G) indigenous land tenure system of the Gedeo, an inalienable 
land right.
the lowest administrative unit.
a rope or wire used to measure land, but also used as a description 
of the process of land measurement and distribution.
qdlad
qannazmach (lit. ‘commander of the right flank’); a traditional Ethiopian
military and political title.
qoc'o processed ensdt which is used to make bread.
qoro local official below the balabat.
qunna grain measurement unit which varies greatly from place to place.
ras (lit. ‘head’); a traditional political and military title below the king.
rest a kinship-based communal land tenure system common in northern
Ethiopia. In the south it simply refers to land owned on a 
permanent basis.
resta gult hereditary gult right.
samon land set aside for the church or held by priests and other
ecclesiastical groups in their service of the church.
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siso a sharecropping tenancy agreement in which the tenant agreed to
pay one third of the harvest.
t'dbdqa legal representative or solicitor.
td f uncultivated or undeveloped land.
t’dqlay gizat administrative unit, province.
t’e f  Eragrostis te f (latin); a crop indegenious to Ethiopia used to make
Ethiopians favourite bread, enjdra.
t’into (G) a share of land given to an individual.
wabi a person who may be allowed by the court to intervene in land or
tenancy litigation upon the invitation of either of the parties, to 
guarantee the veracity of their claims,
wdkil agent (see ydrest wdkil).
wdrdda an administrative unit below Awraja.
\\>ayna-ddga an agro-ecology zone below ddga\ 2000-3000 metres above sea
level.
wayzaro a title equivalent to ‘Mrs’. [Similar to emtit]
wurs inheritance.
ydqdlad wdkil a person who represents a holder of qdlad land.
ydrest wdkil a person who represents a baldrest (landlord) and collects taxes and 
other due from the tenants on his behalf.
yat’eza margdfia a nominal fee paid by tenants before erbo assessors carried out 
their task.
zufan chelot (Crown Court) the summit of the Ethiopian judicial system which 
was presided over by the Emperor himself.
G = Gedeo
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Introduction
This dissertation investigates land and tenancy disputes in Gedeo in southern 
Ethiopia, from 1941 to 1974. The years from 1941 to 1974 represent a crucial 
period in Ethiopian history, both nationally as well as locally. The year 1941 saw 
the end of the five year occupation of Ethiopia by Fascist Italy and the restoration 
of the monarchy, while 1974 saw the outbreak of the Ethiopian Revolution which 
overthrew Emperor Haile Sellassie (r. 1930-1974), one o f the longest-ruling 
monarchs in recent history. The revolution was highly significant for the peasants 
of Gedeo as it was followed by radical land reform which abolished landlordism 
and tenancy.1
Based primarily on local court archival sources and oral interview research, 
the dissertation seeks to explain the nature of land and tenancy conflicts in this 
period. Although disputes relating to land and tenancy have not been peculiar to 
southern Ethiopia and there has also been a long history of land litigation in 
northern Ethiopia,2 Gedeo provides an excellent opportunity to closely examine 
this largely unexplored theme.
After becoming fully incorporated into the modem Ethiopian empire state 
at the end of the nineteenth century, Gedeo emerged as one of the most 
agriculturally prosperous areas of southern Ethiopia. By wisely combining food 
and cash crop production, Gedeo was not only able to sustain an unprecedented 
growth of population but also participated successfully both in the internal as well
1 Bahru Zewde, A History o f  Modern Ethiopia, 1855-199f  2nd ed. (Oxford: James 
Currey, 2.001), 178; E.J. Keller, Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People's Republic 
(Bloomington, [Ind.]: Indiana University Press, 1988), 194; R.L. Hess, Ethiopia: The 
Modernization o f  Autocracy  (Ithaca, N..Y.: Cornell U.P., 1970), 51-74.
2 Donald Crummey, Land and Society in the Christian Kingdom o f  Ethiopia: From the 
Thirteenth to the Twentieth Century (Urbana: University o f  Illinois Press, 2000), 192-194.
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as external market through its coffee trade. In this relatively short period of time 
Gedeo passed through a highly complex and tumultuous phase in its history.3
As a settled agrarian community Gedeo provided a suitable environment, 
upon which the state could impose its institutions, and it speedily became 
integrated into the Ethiopian political and economic systems. The incorporation of 
Gedeo was soon followed by the imposition of the gdbbar (tribute-paying 
peasant)4 system, which forced the Gedeo farming households to supply labour 
and produce for the maintenance of the state and its functionaries, mainly the 
naft’annas (soldiers of the imperial army) and other clerical and ecclesiastical 
groups. Naft’dnna-gdbbar became the dominant form of agrarian relationship in 
Gedeo until 1941.
Even in the 1920s the state had already moved a stage farther, from tribute 
dependency to the control of land. By introducing what was known as qalad5 
(measurement of land) the state distributed land directly to its functionaries, laying 
the foundation for the emergence of a landlord-tenant form of agrarian 
relationship, which did not evolve fully until after 1941. This phase was 
particularly relevant, because the way in which qalad was imposed and 
implemented was controversial and divisive. When the political and social
3 For the history o f  Gedeo’s incorporation into the Ethiopian Empire see Charles W. 
McClellan, State Transformation and N ational Integration: Gedeo and the Ethiopian Empire, 
1895-1935  (Michigan: Michigan State University, 1988), 13-31; see also D. L. Donham, "Old 
Abyssinia and the N ew  Ethiopian Empire: Themes in Social History", in The Southern Marches o f  
Imperial Ethiopia: Essays in H istory & Social Anthropology, ed. D. L. Donham and Wendy James 
(Oxford: James Currey, 2002), 3-48.
4 G dbbar: the basic definition o f  this term means “tribute paying peasant.” It was adopted 
from northern Ethiopia; however in the south a gdbbar  had many more obligations than his 
equivalent in the north. Chapter two deals with this extensively.
5 The term qa lad  refers to a rope made o f  leather or wire which was used to measure land 
for redistribution among state functionaries. However in Gedeo it was also used to mark a 
distinction between the indigenous tenure systems which existed earlier (such as outiba) and the 
new systems (such as madaria and samon) which were introduced as a result o f  the imposition o f 
qalad.
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implications of this began to be felt, local relationships were severely affected and 
disputes became a dominant feature. The deteriorating relationship between 
landlords and tenants made Gedeo the scene of an organised peasant protest, 
which was uncommon among southern Ethiopian peasants in this period (one 
exception being the Bale peasant uprising which was fuelled by an external 
connection).6
The way in which landlord-tenant relationships developed in this part of 
southern Ethiopia from 1941 to 1974 is interesting. Landlord-tenant relationships 
in the south, including Gedeo, have been depicted in both popular and scholarly 
works as differing from those in northern Ethiopia.7 It is generally believed that in 
the north of the country landlords and tenants belonged to similar ethnic and social 
groups, and that this prevented tenancy relationships from becoming polarised. In 
the south the dichotomy between the two was regarded as being wider, hi his 
seminal work on the rest system (a kinship based communal land tenure) in 
Gojjam, Allan Hoben has shown how tenancy in northern Ethiopia differed from 
the situation in the south, Hoben demonstrated that tenants in Gojjam did not 
constitute a particular group or class of landless people, but like other peasants in 
Gojjam could access rest land. Unlike their counterparts in the south they were not 
subjected to a multitude of demands from their landlords, such as for free labour 
services and the supply of firewood.8
6 Gebru Tareke, Ethiopia: P ow er and Protest: Peasant Revolts in the Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1991), 125-159.
7 For contrasting view s o f  north vs. south see Donald L. Donham, M arxist Modern : An 
Ethnographic H istory o f  the Ethiopian Revolution (Oxford: James Currey, 1999), 31-35.
8 Allan Hoben, Land Tenure among the Amhara o f  Ethiopia (Berkeley: University o f  
California Press, 1973).
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It is generally assumed that the type of tenancy which Hoben described 
was common in most of the rest areas of northern Ethiopia.9 Peasants entered into 
tenancy agreements because of the particular circumstances in which they found 
themselves, as in the case of young men who had to wait until they were provided 
with rest land before they married, or households with extra labour available 
which wanted to access additional land through tenancy. Understanding why 
landlord-tenancy relationships in Gedeo evolved in a somewhat different maimer 
from those in northern Ethiopia is important not only in acquiring a more 
complete picture o f the system but also for comparative purposes.
Gedeo offers a key area to test some of the prevailing assumptions 
regarding how land tenure evolved in southern Ethiopia. The dominant view 
regarding the southern Ethiopian system of land tenure is that it had evolved to a 
more private form of landownership in contradistinction to the rest system of 
northern Ethiopia, which is generally believed to be a communal kinship-based 
system .10 This has wider implications in terms of property rights, as due to the 
communal nature of the rest system peasants in the north were allowed to access 
land regardless of their political and economic status within the community. In the 
south, by contrast, because of the move towards private forms of land ownership 
many peasants became landless tenants. This view emphasises not only a private 
form of land tenure but also the ethnic dimension, because it was believed that the 
people who owned most of the lands in the south were people who had an ethnic
9 Crummey, Land and Society, 8-12.
10 For a discussion o f  this trend see Bahru Zewde, "Economic Origins o f  the Absolutist 
Stale in Ethiopia, 1916-1935," Journal o f  Ethiopian Studies XVII (1984), 1-29; and also Shiferaw 
Bekele, "The Evolution o f  Land Tenure in the Imperial Era" in Shiferaw Bekele, ed,, An Economic 
History o f  Modern Ethiopia /  V o ll, the Im perial Era, 1941-74  (Dakar: Codesria, 1995), 73-142.
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affiliation with the ruling class which was in power in Ethiopia until the 1974 
revolution.11
In general the issue of land and tenancy was the dominant discourse 
among opponents of the government of Haile Sellassie prior to the revolution. 
University students, intellectuals and other enlightened Ethiopians felt that 
Ethiopia was a deeply “feudal” society dominated by few individuals who 
controlled the greater proportion of the country’s best land. The only way for the 
country to progress was therefore by eradication of the monarchy and the 
landlords.12 Land reform in particular was given central importance, not only to 
deal with problems of landlordism and tenancy but also as a vital vehicle for 
achieving a just society through the equitable distribution of land. Hence “land to 
the tiller” emerged as the most popular slogan of the anti-monarchical 
establishment.13
The Land Reform ideas were drafted long before Emperor Haile Sellasie 
was overthrown by the military junta, who called themselves the Ddrg, in 
September 1974. In March 1975, to the surprise of those who identified 
themselves as “progressive”, the military government announced radical and 
leftist land reforms which enabled them to consolidate their power in a time of 
great uncertainty. This move by the military stunned their opponents, who
"Gebru, P ow er and Protest, 67-85; Donham, Marxist Modern, 31-35.
l2For a scholarly debate about feudalism see the following. Donald Crummey,
"Abyssinian Feudalism," P ast and Present 89 (1980), 15-138; Gene Ellis, "The Feudal Paradigm 
as a Hindrance to Understanding Ethiopia," The Journal o f  African H istory  14, 2 (1976), 275-295; 
Contrary to Ellis, Keller argues that Ethiopia was a feudal society until the early twentieth century, 
Keller, Revolutionary Ethiopia , 55-58; Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia: From A utocracy to Revolution 
(London: Review o f  African Political Economy, 1975), 3-4; Rene Lefort, Ethiopia: An H eretical 
Revolution? (London: Zed, 1983), 83-129.
13 Randi Ronning Balsvik, Haile Sellassie's Students: The Intellectual and Social 
Background to Revolution, 1952-1977  (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1985), 150-152.
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believed that it was they, as the intellectuals and educated people equipped to lead 
the country, who should take the lead in introducing radical measures such as this. 
However, land reform was crucial in maintaining the power o f the Darg\ without 
such a measure it would probably never have gained the popular support it 
enjoyed in the early years. Until land reform was announced the revolution was 
seen largely as an urban affair, but through this measure it was exported easily 
into the isolated areas of the countryside.14
The land reform measures brought all land under state control and 
eliminated the myriad tenures that had been widespread features of the Ethiopian 
land tenure system before the revolution. The reforms stated that up to ten 
hectares of land were to be awarded to all peasants who were prepared to develop 
it through their own and family labour. Peasants would enjoy usufruct rights only 
on land and tenancy and rural wage labour was made illegal. Land and tenancy 
litigation, the central theme of this dissertation, was eventually terminated by this 
radical land reform. This was probably one of the greatest achievements of the 
1975 land reform. Even today Gedeo peasants owe a great debt to the land reform 
and the Ddrg which introduced it.15
It is generally assumed that the land reform brought about by the 
revolution benefited the peasants in the south rather than in the north. According 
to this view, the whole daily life of a southern Ethiopian peasant was one of 
exploitation and coercion, and it was due to this great inequality, which was
14 Donham, Marxist Modern, 31-32; Christopher S. Clapham, Transformation and  
Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia(Cambndg&\ Cambridge University Press, 1988), 35; Marina 
Ottaway, "Land Reform in Ethiopia 1974-1977." The African Studies Review X X , 3 (1977), 79-90.
15 Interview with Taddasse Jibicho, Sisota, July 2004.
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expressed in ethnic and religious terms, that the revolution was able to gain 
ground.16
Gedeo and Southern Ethiopia: historiographical development
The most prominent issue in Ethiopian historiography is the alleged gulf between 
north and south. Northern Ethiopia, which has been the centre of the Ethiopian 
state for millennia, has a rich literary culture spanning many centuries. As a result 
of this Ethiopia’s well developed literary tradition has been celebrated as unique 
among sub-Sahara African countries. Despite their limitations, royal chronicles 
and church documents have enabled Ethiopian historians to reconstruct a 
fascinating history, thanks to excellent scholarship supported by a large volume of 
foreign literature.17 The ascendancy of political history over other fields of 
historical enquiry is evident in this context, as many of these works were written 
by people who held important positions within the power structure. These works 
have guided the development of modem Ethiopian historiography. Due to the 
origin of these sources the trend in Ethiopian historiography has been to focus on 
the themes of high politics, power, kingship, religion, wars, and diplomacy, while 
northern Ethiopia has been the focal point around which these narratives have 
been constructed. Until recently it was uncommon to undertake historical study if 
there were no adequate indigenous written sources or foreign literature. This could
16 Donham, Marxist M odem , 31.
17 James C. McCann, People o f  the Plow: An Agricultural History o f  Ethiopia, 1800-1990  
(Madison, Wis: University o f  W isconsin Press, 1995), 8-9; for a good discussion o f  foreign 
sources especially o f  travellers see Svein Ege, Class, State and P ow er in Africa: A Case Study o f  
the Kingdom ofShaw a (Ethiopia) About 1840 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1996), 9-17.
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perhaps be cited as one of the main shortcomings of modem Ethiopian 
historiography.18
Nevertheless, Ethiopia’s modem historiography has attempted to widen its 
limited horizon and there has been a commendable improvement both in terms of 
its breadth as well as depth. Peoples, cultures and geographic areas which received 
less attention in the past are now increasingly incorporated into Ethiopian studies; 
an example is the study of the Oromo.19 Similarly, themes which were overlooked 
in the past are becoming more attractive and as a result some are now common 
themes of Ethiopian historiography. This is particularly true in the case of 
agricultural, environmental and economic history.20 As new fields of enquiry have 
flourished, new ground has been charted in methodological terms by making use 
of untapped historical sources such as environmental and intellectual history.21 
However, before discussing these new trends, I would first like to show that there 
has been a longstanding interest in understanding economic history in general and 
land tenure as a subfield within this broad category.
18 Mohammed Hassen, The Oromo o f  Ethiopia: A History* 1570-1860  (Trenton, NJ: The 
Red Sea Press, 1994), 1-3.
19 Donald Crummey, "Ethiopian Historiography in the Latter Half o f  the Twentieth 
Century: A North American Perspective," Journal o f  Ethiopian Studies XXXIV, N o 1 (2001), 7-24; 
see also Bahru Zewde, "A Century o f  Ethiopian Historiography " Journal o f  Ethiopian Studies 
XXXIII, No.2 (2000), 1-26.
20 Shiferaw, "The Evolution o f  Land Tenure", 72-142; James McCann, Green Land,
Brown Land, Black Land: An Environmental H istory o f  Africa, 1800-1990 (Oxford: James Currey, 
1999), 79-108; See also James McCann, A Tale o f  Two Forests: Narratives o f  Deforestation in 
Ethiopia, 1840-1996  (Boston, MA: African Studies Center, Boston University, 1998).
21 Bahru Zewde, Pioneers o f  Change in Ethiopia: The Reformist Intellectuals o f  the Early 
Twentieth Century (Oxford: James Currey, 2002); McCann, Green Land, Brown Land, Black 
Land, 79-108.
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Until the 1960s the central focus of Ethiopian studies was the state. This 
has perhaps been largely motivated by the “the survival of Ethiopia’s 
independence” in the face of European colonial aggression.22 Hence most of the 
research effort at the time was directed towards an understanding of the dynamics 
of the Ethiopian state and how it managed to save the country from colonial 
bondage. As a result of this focus, Ethiopian historiography has been criticised for 
its lack of vigour in studying cultures, communities and modes of production 
which existed outside the dominant groups.23 This is not to say that there was no 
interest in general issues such as land tenure, economic history and similar topics. 
Although the underlying objectives of such studies was to understand the material 
basis of the state, these works made an immense contribution in preparing the way 
for the more systematic research undertaken in later years.
Joanna Mantel-Niecko’s main objective was precisely to understand the 
importance of land as the economic foundation of Ethiopia’s imperial state. She 
was baffled by the lack of academic endeavour directed towards the understanding 
of a hugely important area of economic and social history. Mantel-Niecko drew 
her inspiration from Gabra Wald Engeda Warq, who was the director of the 
Ethiopian Land Revenue department and the author of the invaluable work “The 
System of Land Tenure and Taxation in Ethiopia” (1944). Mantel-Niecko's work, 
which was published in 1975, is among the few well researched and thoroughly 
analysed contributions to the highly complex topic of Ethiopian land tenure 
systems. Like her contemporaries, Mantel-Niecko was unable to expand her
22 Crummey, "Ethiopian Historiography", 7-24.
23 For a furious attack on Ethiopian historiography see Mohammed, The Oromo o f  
Ethiopia, 1-3,
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research beyond the land tenure systems of the north as she was restricted by the 
nature of her sources.24
Prior to that, Richard Pankhurst, whose contribution to Ethiopian studies in 
general and history in particular is unparalleled, had published his works on the 
economic history of Ethiopian in two volumes. The first volume (1961) covered 
the period before 1800, while the second (1968) deals with the period from 1800- 
1935.25 Pankhurst's works have been criticised harshly for their lack o f analytical 
framework and their loose and descriptive nature. In spite of this, however, they 
have remained a major work of reference. Pankhurst’s State and Land in 
Ethiopian Histoiy, published in 1966, reiterated the contemporary view which 
stressed the importance of land in the political system of Ethiopia.26
In the 1960s more systematic and focused studies began to emerge. Allen 
Hoben’s work on the rest land tenure system in northern Ethiopian brought to 
light the deficiencies in our knowledge about the system. Hoben’s work, which 
was a result of a highly focused study of the rest system in one particular area in 
Gojjam, provides a wealth of information about the tenancy system and land 
litigation that is of particular relevance to this study.27 Weissleder’s PhD 
dissertation, “The Political Ecology of Amhara Domination” which was 
completed in 1965 is also very important, as he provides insight into the nature of
2<l Joanna Mantel-Niecko, The Role o f  Land Tenure in the System o f  Ethiopean Im perial 
Government in Modern Times (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 1980), 9- 
1 1 .
25 Richard Pankhurst, An Introduction to the Economic History o f  Ethiopia; from  Early 
Times to 1800  (London: 1961); Richard Pankhurst, Economic H istory o f  Ethiopia, 1800-1935  
(Addis Ababa: Haile Selassie I University Press, 1968).
26 Richard Pankhurst, State and L and in Ethiopian H istory, M onographs in Ethiopian 
Land Tenure No. 3 (Addis Ababa: The Institute o f  Ethiopian Studies and Faculty o f  Law, Haile 
Sellassie I University in association with Oxford University Press, 1966).
27 Hoben, Land Tenure.
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• * * 28 tenancy in the central provinces, focusing mainly on north Shawa. Dan Bauer’s
study of a broadly similar system in a different location in the north was an
equally important contribution to the field.29
A major breakthrough was only achieved in the 1990s, however, with the 
publication of a number of important books. In 1991 Gebru Tareke published his 
work dealing with three major peasant rebellions in post 1941 Ethiopia. This book 
is also of particular relevance to this study. In 1960 there was similar uprising by 
the peasants of Gedeo, which is the focus of chapter five,30 In 1994 Haile Mariam 
Larebo published the dissertation he had defended at SOAS in 1990, Its main 
focus was Italian agricultural policy in Ethiopia during their five-year occupation 
of the country from 1935 to 1941. This work gives insight into a number of 
ambitious agricultural programmes which the Italians failed to execute. He also 
provides some valuable information about land confiscated by the Italians in 
Gedeo.31 hi 1995 James McCann’s influential book People o f  the Plow was 
published.32 McCann had made his mark a little earlier with the publication of his 
first book From Poverty to Famine in Northeast Ethiopia: a Rural Histoiy, 1900- 
1935 in 1987. hi this work McCann demonstrated the important role that micro- 
level histoiy can play in tracing the socio-economic changes which are
28 W olfgang Weissleder, "The Poltical Ecology o f  Amhara Domination" (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University o f Chicago, 1965).
29 Dan Franz Bauer, H ousehold and Society in Ethiopia 2nd ed. (East Lansing: African 
Studies Center, Michigan State University, 1985).
30 Gebru, P ow er and Protest.
31 Haile Mariam Larebo, The Building o f  an Empire: Italian L and P olicy  and Practice in 
Ethiopia, 1935-1941 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 81.
32 McCann, People o f  the Plow.
33James McCann, From Poverty to Famine in Northeast Ethiopia: A Rural Histoiy, 1900- 
1935 (Philadelphia: University o f  Pennsylvania Press, 1987).
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instrumental in understanding the general crisis that afflicted many northern 
Ethiopian peasants. McCann’s political economy approach has a methodological 
relevance to this study, as it emphasises how changes in ecology and demography 
hugely affect agricultural practices and vice versa.
Since the publication of McCann's books, agricultural history is no longer 
treated as a mere backdrop to political and social history but has now earned a 
prominent position within Ethiopian historiography. McCann’s focus in the later 
book was the plough and how its use shaped the Ethiopian landscape. His chapter 
“The plow in the forest” is of particular interest to this study because it 
demonstrates the versatility and adaptability of this technology beyond the open 
fields of northern Ethiopia, which had been its home for thousands o f years, and 
into the ensdt (a banana-like tree cultivated for food) growing region of the 
south.34 However in the case of Gedeo the plough supplemented but did not 
replace the most favoured tool of the Gedeo, the digging axe.35
The most recent addition to this growing field of enquiry is Donald 
Cmmmey’s Land and Society in the Christian Kingdom o f Ethiopia?6 Although a 
social history, Crummey's book focuses on two of the most important institutions 
of northern Ethiopia, gult and rest. Throughout the book the quest is to understand 
the ways in which Ethiopian peasants sustained their rulers. This work, a 
culmination of Crummey's long career as a distinguished historian of Ethiopia, is 
of great value in interpreting the highly complex issue of land tenure and property 
rights in Ethiopian historiography. Crummey’s book, which covered the period 
from the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries, focuses on northern Ethiopia. The
34 McCann, People o f  the Plow, 147-190.
35 McCann, P eople o f  the Plow, 47-48.
36 Crummey, Land and Society.
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work has great analytical depth and is based on the hoard of archival materials 
which were products of the long Ethiopian literary tradition. The book presents 
Crummey's masterful interpretation of the findings of other Ethiopian historians 
and anthropologists such as Merid, Taddesse, and Hoben.37 In the last chapters of 
the book Crummey provides a general overview of the evolution of the Ethiopian 
land tenure system in the twentieth century. This is of great importance in 
identifying where the south in general and Gedeo in particular fits within this 
broad framework.38
Despite the great advance in our knowledge represented by these works, 
there remain huge gaps to be addressed, particularly in relation to southern 
Ethiopia. The above works are of limited assistance in understanding 
developments in the southern half of the country. The dearth of literature 
concerning southern Ethiopia, which is not restricted to agricultural history or land 
tenure, is especially acute for the period before the incorporation. The last decade 
of the nineteenth century is regarded by historians as an important landmark in the 
history of many societies in southern Ethiopia. The closing years of the nineteenth 
century marked the period when most of the southern people were incorporated 
into what came to be known as the modem Ethiopian Empire State, and this event 
has been taken as a point of departure in the study of the incorporated areas. 
However there has been a focus on the centre while the communities in the south 
have been regarded as peripheral.39 Hence the histoiy of most of the people of the
37 Merid W olde Aregay, "Land Tenure and Agricultural Productivity, 1500-1850,"
Journal o f  Ethiopian Studies 17 (1986), 115-129; Taddesse Tamrat, Church and State in Ethiopia, 
1270-1527  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, University o f  London, 1968., 1972), 98-103.
38 Crummey, Land and Society, 226-253.
39 Charles W. McClellan, "The Ethiopian Occupation o f Northern Sidamo-Recruitment 
and Motivation," in Proceedings o f  the Fifth International Conference on Ethiopian Studies, ed. 
Robert L.Hess (Chicago-USA: 1978), 513; Donham, "Old Abyssinia", 37.
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south has rarely been studied or investigated on its own terms but only from the 
perspective of the centre.40 This part of Ethiopia does not fit within the 
mainstream historiographical tradition of Ethiopia, and little research has been 
conducted, while the period before the nineteenth century has remained either 
unknown or subsumed under the histories of bigger communities such as the 
Oromo and the Sidama. 41
The Southern Marches o f  Imperial Ethiopia (1985) aimed to address this 
deficit and to bridge the gap between north and south. The work is pioneering in 
many ways oil account of its multi-disciplinary nature, and was the result of 
cooperation between historians, anthropologists and sociologists, though sadly 
none of the authors were Ethiopian.42 One of the claims made by this book is that 
it demonstrates the value of “history from below.” Most of the contributions in 
this book are about communities which are referred by historians as “peripheries” 
and had not been documented before, and is an attempt to redress the balance. 
There is an emphasis on the type of relationships the southern communities had 
had with the centre since their incorporation into the modem Ethiopian empire and 
on the differences between the core and the periphery. There is little offered 
concerning other historical ties of the two regions. The introductory chapter, 
which was written by Donliam, is provocative and insightful, and provides a
40 Bahru, A H istoiy o f  Modern Ethiopia, 60-68; Donliam, "Old Abyssinia", 17-24.
41 Ernesta Cerulli, Peoples o f  South-West. Ethiopia and Its Borderland, Ethnographic 
Survey o f  Africa North-Eastern Africa; (London: International African Institute, 1956), 118-132; 
M. F. Perham, The Government o f  Ethiopia, 2nd ed. (London: Faber and Faber, 1969), 315; 
Mordechai Abir, Ethiopia: The Era o f  the Princes: The Challenge o f  Islam and the Re-Unification 
o f  the Christian Empire, 1769-1855  (London: Longmans, 1968), 81.
42 Donald L. Donham and Wendy James, The Southern Marches o f  Im perial Ethiopia: 
Essays in History and Social Anthropo!og}> (Oxford: James Currey, 2002).
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coherent multidisciplinary background for what might otherwise appear to be an 
eclectic collection of writings.43
Charles McClellan's article 011 the Gedeo in particular is o f great interest to 
this study.44 This article was based on original research McClellan conducted for 
his PhD dissertation at MSU (Michigan State University) in 1978. Although 
McClellan's dissertation was published earlier as a monograph for the African 
studies series at MSU, the material for this work and many other subsequent 
articles was drawn largely from the same source. McClellan’s works are generally 
regarded as a major contribution, especially in the highly complex and sensitive 
area of ndftahha-gabbar relationships.
As indicated earlier, the pillar of McClellan’s work was his PhD 
dissertation published under the title State Transformation and National 
Integration: Gedeo and the Ethiopian Empire, 1895-1935.45 This dissertation set 
out to address the crucial period of Gedeo history from the incorporation up to the 
Italian invasion in 1935. McClellan mainly concentrated on the centre-periphery 
line of enquiry and as a result did not provide as much information about the 
Gedeo people themselves, and especially their early history. Nevertheless his 
work remains a major contribution to our understanding of gabbar-naft'anna 
relationships in Gedeo and has widely influenced others who wanted to 
understand the inner workings of these institutions in other parts of Ethiopia 
where there have been similar historical processes. Unfortunately, McClellan
43Donham, "Old Abyssinia", 3-48.
44 Charles W. McClellan, "Coffee in Centre-Periphery Relations: Gedeo in the Early 
Twentieth Century," in The Southern M arches o f  Imperial Ethiopia: Essays in H istory and Social 
Anthroplogy , ed. D, L. and Wendy James Donham (Oxford: James Currey, 2002), 175-195.
45 The dissertation which was submitted to MSU was entitled as “Reaction to Ethiopian 
Expansionism: The case o f  Darassa, 1895-1935” (PhD thesis, Michigan State University, 1978).
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abandoned his research on Gedeo quite early in his career in favour of 
reinterpreting studies already undertaken.
The other author who made an important contribution to Gedeo historical 
studies, as well as to wider issues of Ethiopian history, was Lap'iso G. Delebo. His 
contribution was significant in that unlike many other Ethiopian authors he wrote 
in Amharic. Lap'iso did this without the benefit of an academic institutional base. 
His chapter on the Gedeo peasant uprising was part of larger project, published 
under the Amharic title of Ydetyop'ya gdbbar siratna Jimir capitalism 1900-1966) 
(Ethiopia’s Gdbbar System and Nascent Capitalism, 1908-1974). Lap'iso used 
both archival sources and oral informants. He gave credit to the role played by 
missionaries in enhancing the peasants’ consciousness, which encouraged them to 
uphold their rights. He also argued that access to modem firearms was crucial to 
the Mechele peasants when they clashed with their landlords in 1960. We will 
examine both these issues in the last chapter of this dissertation, which focuses on 
the Mechele peasant uprising.46
In addition to the above works, which are directly related in many ways to 
this project, this dissertation has also benefited a great deal from others, both 
within and beyond Ethiopian studies, especially from Africa and Asia.47 This 
category includes Svein Ege’s down-to-earth approach in his many works about 
north Shawa (Ethiopia), 48 and also James Scott's and Samuel Popkin’s studies of 
peasant rebellion in South East Asia. The contrast between the “moral economy”
1,6 Lap'iso G. Delebo, Ydetyop'ya gdbbar siratna Jimir capitalism 1900-1966(Amharic) 
(Addis Ababa: 1983 E.C.), 174-175.
47 Laurel L. Rose, The Politics o f  Harmony: Land Dispute Strategies in Swaziland ,
African Studies Series; (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1992).
48 Ege, C lass; Svein Ege, "Land, Law and Tactics: A Case Study from Ayne, Northern 
Shawa" (paper presented at the 13th International Conference o f  Ethiopian Studies, Kyoto, 12-17 
December 1997, Kyoto, Japan, 1997), 35-56.
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and the “rational peasant” theories is especially instructive in examining the 1960 
Gedeo peasant rebellion.49
Sources and methodology used in this study
A great deal of the work for this dissertation needed to be done at a local level, not 
only for the sake of shifting the focus from the centre to the periphery, but more 
importantly because micro-level studies are the foundation and the essential basis 
of a thorough investigation. Researching history at a local level is challenging. 
One challenge relates to the scarcity of sources and their accessibility. Although 
local sources are not as scarce as often assumed, one has to hunt for them and they 
are not as readily accessible as the ones we find in university libraries or archival 
centres. Considerable effort is required to uncover and utilise these sources. Also, 
the methodology has to be adjusted according to the particular demands posed by 
local circumstances.
It is vital to establish a relationship of trust with the peasants if  reliable and 
useful results are to be obtained from informants. Any question about land could 
easily be interpreted as a government ploy to discover the exact holding of each 
peasant. When I was conducting fieldwork in Gedeo (2004) there was a rumour 
that the government was planning to issue certificates to the peasants which would 
show the exact size of their land. The peasants initially associated my work with 
the government, but they changed their minds when I started to live among them. 
They then realised that that my work had nothing to do with the government 
because they have never known a government official to stay in their villages for
49 James C. Scott, The M oral Economy o f  the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in 
Southeast Asia  (N ew  Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); Samuel L. Popkin, The Rational 
Peasant: The P olitical Economy o f  Rural Society in Vietnam (Berkeley: University o f  California 
Press, 1979).
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days let alone for weeks. The government officials themselves, who gave me a 
work permit to conduct my research in Gedeo, viewed me with suspicion in case I 
was working for the opposition.
To summarise, this study combines the use of conventional methods of 
historical research with the highly informative method of participant observation 
borrowed from social anthropology.50 Social anthropologists spend time living 
within the community they have chosen to study, eating the same food and 
observing all the various activities that a peasant household has to undertake in its 
daily life. This might sound appropriate only for contemporary studies, but in 
areas such as Gedeo this approach can be of great benefit to historians too. This is 
because although changes in the peasants' way of life have occurred over time, 
there has been also a great deal of continuity. Most importantly this method not 
only revealed my previously limited understanding of the peasant world, but 
offered the very basic tools needed to interpret and put into context information 
gathered from the written sources. For instance, after nearly one month of 
observing how ensc.it production takes place from planting to harvesting it became 
clear that an understanding of certain aspects of the peasants’ way of life can only 
be gained through first hand observation. Nothing in the literature fully describes 
how this extremely labour intensive job is accomplished. Moreover, the way ensat 
agriculture is earned out has not changed significantly between the nineteenth 
century and today, a continuity which is significant for historians.
Before settling in one village in rural Gedeo (summer 2004) many places 
were visited, most of them for the second time since conducting the initial
50 It was Svein Ege who advised me to live among peasants; as he said it was'an 
immensely rewarding way o f  learning about peasant life.
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fieldwork in 1999-2000.51 Many informants were interviewed concerning their 
own histoiy and aspects of Gedeo peasant agriculture, and living in Grissa for 
three months offered insight into the traditional Gedeo way of life. This village 
was appealing from a research point of view because, thanks to its distance from 
neighbouring towns and the difficulty of the uphill journey on foot, unlike other 
qdbales (the lowest administrative unit) in Wonago it had the characteristics of a 
remote village.52 Grissa still preserved most of its rural features, whereas the 
majority o f villages in Gedeo, especially those bordering towns and those located 
along the main road from Dilla to Addis Ababa, have increasingly been infiltrated 
by the urban culture which arrived as a result of the coffee trade. It emerged that 
Grissa had more to offer than its rural nature. For instance the village still plays a 
central role in the spiritual life of Gedeo peasants, as a meeting place for the 
highlanders from the dciga, (an agro-ecology zone between 3000-4000 meters 
above sea level) and for the peasants from the lower altitudes, the wdyna-daga (an 
agro-ecology zone between 2000-3000 meters above sea level) when the abba- 
gdda (father of gel da) conducts religious observances.53 In addition Grissa stands 
out agriculturally because of the quality of ensdt it produces.
The most interesting aspect of Grissa however is that its location is 
between the downhill areas which adjoin Dilla town and the highlands of Buie
51 I had the opportunity to visits many parts o f Gedeo before I started my research for this 
dissertation. This came as result o f  my job at Dilla College. I was also able to take students on field 
trips to demonstrate the value o f  local history and to teach them about historical methodologies in 
the use o f  oral information.
52 Adugna Kebede, field staff for the Ministry o f  Agriculture o f  Wanago Wavdda 
convinced me to do my work in Grissa. O f all the Ministry o f Agriculture workers I encountered in 
various places in Gedeo it was he who had the best relationship with the peasants, who accepted 
him as a person working for them and not only for the government. It was the trust he established 
with them which helped me to gain acceptance by them in a short period o f  time; I ow e a great 
debt to Adugna.
53 Ethiopian Mapping Authority (EMA), National Atlas o f  Ethiopia  (Addis Ababa, 1988),
4 .
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which meant that only a short walk separated the two different agro-ecology zones, 
Grissa being between the ddga and the wdyna-daga. The view from the Gedeo 
highlands is spectacular and one can easily see Buie, at the summit of which was 
the most important military garrison during the early years of the incorporation of 
the region. It has a commanding position from which most of the territory of 
Gedeo can be seen and also the lowland all the way to the Lake Abaya area which 
is inhabited by Guji pastoralists. Staying in the village was also practical, because 
after visiting various places and talking to peasants during the day, in the evening 
company was provided by the host, the very knowledgeable Alamayahu, who was 
able to answer all the questions which had arisen and sometimes added 
information which he felt would enrich my understanding of Gedeo society and 
their way of life.
The oral sources used in this dissertation helped in many ways, both by 
enriching the existing written sources as well as by filling the gaps left by such 
sources. They are crucial for the study of societies such as the Gedeos where 
writing did not play a major part in their history, but should not be seen as a 
substitute for written sources. Oral sources as a distinct type of historical source 
provide an alternative path to the past, and in the case of the Gedeo the paucity of 
information means that it is impossible to comprehend the past without the use of 
such sources.
Conducting oral historical research, however, is no less challenging than 
dealing with written sources, both from a methodological point of view as well 
and in terms of the nature of the information itself. Historians need to be as 
rigorous as possible when dealing with this kind of source and they should be
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subjected to the same amount of scrutiny as written accounts.54 The information 
gathered in the process should be verified thoroughly, not only by checking and 
counter checking against the available written sources, but also against each other. 
For example, informants tended to romanticize some of their distant past, although 
the era from the incorporation until the revolution is generally regarded as a time 
of great tragedy. They are also inclined to glorify what they believe to have been 
crucial phases in their recent histoiy, for example the 1960 peasant uprising.
On the positive side, informants appear to have been highly reliable in 
relation to biographical information and family history. There was also a high 
degree of authenticity of information in relation to changes in agricultural 
practices, farming methods, labour and access to land. Informants were 
interviewed on wider issues of Gedeo history, both on a one-to-one basis and in 
groups. Although elderly people were the main focus of attention, however, in 
some cases younger informants were also found to be very valuable. Women 
informants were very rare and it proved to be very difficult to involve them as 
much as required. The only way to gain access to female informants was through 
their husbands (or other male relatives) because the men felt that women do not 
add anything of value to the discussion, hence what was given by themselves 
should be sufficient. Given the position of women within Gedeo society it may not 
be surprising that such views were also shared by women informants themselves.
54 For a critical approach to oral history in the African context see the following L. White, 
Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and H istory in Colonial Africa (Berkeley: University o f  
California Press, 2000), 51-53; Charles Van Onselen, "The Reconstruction o f  a Rural Life from 
Oral Testimony: Critical Notes on the M ethodology Employed in the Study o f  a Black South 
African Sharecropper." The Journal o f  Peasant Studies 20, 3 (1993), 494-514; For general 
methodological and theoretical discussions o f  oral history see the following: Paul Thompson, The 
Voice o f  the Past: O ral history (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 119-172; Grele J. Ronald, 
“Movement without aim: M ethodological and theoretical problems in oral history” Robert Perks & 
A. Thomson eds., The O ral H isto iy R eader (London/New York: Routledge, 2002), 38-52.
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Archival sources were used extensively in this work. Unlike many other 
African countries where the chiefs played a principal role in disputes, in the 
Ethiopian context government courts were the arena for land and tenancy disputes. 
There was no other legally recognised body which had such prerogatives apart 
from low level mediation. Hence using court archives for such a study was 
essential. The main sources of archival materials were the Gedeo Administration 
Office, the Ministry of Agriculture, the courts at different levels, the Ministry of 
Finance and the churches.
Experience gained during research in north Shawa guided the search for 
sources in Gedeo. Those investigations were somewhat frustrated, as when I 
carrying out the research for my MA thesis on a similar topic I was informed that 
all documents, even dating back to the pre-1935 period, had been destroyed during 
the 1974 revolution and in the 1991 government change.55 Gedeo and many other 
parts of southern Ethiopia were outside the war zone and I had hoped that a 
considerable quantity of documents would have survived the turmoil. However, it 
transpired that more than 98 percent of the Gedeo (Darassa until 1974) Awraja (an 
administrative unit below taqlay gizat) archives were incinerated in peace time. 
According to the archivist the office had been a base for the EPRDF (Ethiopian 
People Revolutionary Democratic Forces) army and the soldiers had burnt the 
documents because they felt that they belonged to the defunct government. There 
was only one folder which survived the destruction, which mainly consisted of a 
list of landlords who had been involved in the 1960 tenant-landlord conflict in 
Mechele and related maters. Other ministries’ documents had not been destroyed, 
but only the Awraja Court litigation documents were organised in a coherent
55 Berhanu Tesfaye, "A Historical Study o f  Land and Agriculture in Gera Midir, Manz to 
1974" (MA Thesis, Addis Ababa University, 1996).
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manner. For instance the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Agriculture still 
retained a few documents but most of the new employees had no idea where the 
bulk of the archives were kept. Therefore my effort was focused on the court 
archives.
The court documents are litigation archives either on land issues or 
tenancy matters. The majority of the archives were on tenancy matters and this by 
itself tells the magnitude of the problem. This was the only government office in 
Gedeo which still kept the pre-1974 files in some degree of order.56 Court 
documents are very valuable sources of information in the detailed study of the 
history of a particular area. Since most of the cases were between individuals the 
details they contain are quite illuminating; for far too long researchers in Ethiopia 
have largely neglected these kinds of sources.57
Although they furnish useful information for historians, due to their nature 
land and tenancy dispute court cases are also complex and challenging for 
historians. In most cases the documents contain summaries of legal arguments 
rather than every detail necessary to glean a fuller picture of the issues concerned. 
In many court cases the plaintiff did not present the charges in a straightforward 
manner; also disputants had the freedom to present their evidence with different 
biases which at times made court archives unnecessarily difficult to understand.
For example, a number of court cases were initiated as tenancy disputes cases but 
later changed course and evolved into disputes about land rights or inheritance
561 owe a great debt to the President o f  Gedeo Zone Court and the archivists who helped 
me to access the documents without restriction by opening their offices including during weekends.
57 There are few exceptions to this which utilised this category o f  sources extensively. 
Examples are Tekalign Wolde-Mariam, "A City and Its Hinterlands: The Political Economy o f  
Land Tenure, Agriculture and Food Supply for Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (1887-1974)" (PhD thesis, 
Boston University, 1995); Tim Carmichael, "Approaching Ethiopian History: Addis Ababa and 
Local Governance in Harar, C.1900 to 1950" (PhD thesis, Michigan Stale University, 2001).
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matters. This was further complicated by the fact that the courts did not impose 
any restriction on procedural grounds; rather they simply followed developments 
as they unfolded. However in later decades, especially after the 60s, there were 
developments whereby the court insisted that the plaintiffs or the defendants 
should be more specific about their case, and state its nature, be it land or tenancy. 
In spite of that the court documents clearly show the evolving nature of 
government bureaucracy during this period and also from a historical perspective 
they represent a very vivid transition from a semi-oral/written to a fully fledged 
written world.
Aim and structure of the dissertation
The aim of this dissertation is to understand the nature of land tenure and tenancy 
relationships in Gedeo. Rather than describing and analysing these as separate 
institutions, both were examined from the perspective of disputes. Disputes were 
not only an overriding feature of both but also provided insight into how these key 
institutions operated in that specific place and time, hi this way a clearer picture 
could be gained of the inner workings of the society at local level.
As both land and labour are crucial resources for a peasant community 
such as the Gedeo, any problem associated with these was disputed vigorously. 
Conflict by nature engages both parties passionately; apart from fighting for 
resources of great importance, there is also a large socio-psychological element to 
the struggle. Losing a court case not only had repercussions from an emotional 
point of view for the individual involved but also affected his/her own standing 
with the family and community. Consequently, when we closely examine court 
documents, we see that a great deal of effort was expended in winning cases.
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Marshalling all available evidence was the norm. Thus in land and tenancy 
disputes both parties involved in the dispute reveal the historical family 
background, using all kinds of evidence to help them to prove their point and 
ultimately triumph in court. Wining a court case, be it a land issue or a tenancy 
matter, was not only about evidence, but about evidence supported by the 
historical context.
The dissertation is organised into five chapters plus an introduction and 
conclusion. Although this study is mainly focused on land and tenancy disputes in 
Gedeo between the 1941 and 1974, in order to set the scene as well as to 
understand the general context the period before this has been briefly discussed. 
Also, since history does not occur in a vacuum, it is important to have a sense of 
the place. This is gained by examining the ecology and other physical aspects of 
the region which have significantly shaped its histoiy. In the first chapter there is a 
discussion not only of the ecology of Gedeo, which is fundamental to any 
agricultural history, but also of the early history of the Gedeo people themselves 
as told from their own viewpoint, including information about social organisation 
from domestic level upwards.
After Gedeo was incorporated into the modem Ethiopian empire state the 
imposition of the gdbbar institution, and the evolution of what is normally known 
as a ndft 'ahna-gabbar relationship were major historical developments. Soon after, 
with the introduction of qdlad, Gedeo entered into another phase of history as a 
kind of dual tenure system evolved. In these formative years the seeds of 
protracted disputes were sown. These issues are dealt with in chapter two. In 
chapter three, which is mainly about land disputes, the focus is on court disputes.
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These are mainly between individuals, although there were some attempts by the 
state to recover land “hidden” among various individuals for various reasons.
The main focus of chapter four is the issue of landlord and tenant disputes. 
As in the preceding chapter, this is based mainly on the examination of court 
archives. This chapter discusses tenancy issues which were a fundamental 
problem for most Gedeo people in the qdlad zone. In addition to examining the 
evolution of tenancy and tenancy relationships during this period it also explains 
the circumstances which led to a short-lived uprising in the Mechele area of 
Gedeo in 1960. hi the final chapter the uprising is examined not as a mere incident 
but as a culmination o f the long-standing acrimonious relationship between 
landlords (ndft’anna) and tenants.
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Chapter One
Environmental and Historical Background of the Gedeo
The aim of this chapter is to provide information about Gedeo’s geographical and 
historical background. By discussing its patterns of settlement and ecology it 
shows how Gedeo provided an ideal milieu for the Ethiopian state to successfully 
implant its institutions and extend its influence. At the turn of the nineteenth 
century, when Gedeo came under direct Ethiopian administration, its agricultural 
system was well developed. Gedeo’s ecology, which shares much in common 
with the northern and central Ethiopian cool highlands, became attractive 
settlements for soldiers from the imperial army who were known as naft'annas}
It was not only its agricultural potential which made Gedeo attractive to 
the Ethiopian administration; equally, its social and political institutions, which 
were products of the long history of the Gedeo people, made integration into the 
Ethiopian state straightforward. The dynamic nature of Gedeo history can be 
demonstrated by the existence of a number of institutions which encompass the 
economic, social and political life of the community. The Gedeo possessed 
important institutions such as the gdda (age grade system) which had a political as 
well as a spiritual role in the community. In addition to the gdda system, they also 
had an elaborate and complex system of administration which functioned across 
their seven clans.2 The abba-gada (head of the incumbent gdda) served as a
1 McClellan, State Transformation, 13-31; For a general discussion o f  Ethiopia’s 
expansion into the south see Donham, "Old Abyssinia", 3-48,
2 Interview with Kole Solale, Sugale, 15 June 2004.
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symbol of unity by overriding the deeply fragmented clan politics which 
characterised the histoiy of the Gedeo before the system’s incorporation.
Previous academic research has focused mainly on the larger southern 
communities, such as the Oromos, and there has been little attempt to investigate 
the history of small communities like the Gedeos, This chapter will attempt to 
understand the history of the Gedeo people from their own viewpoint. Many 
Gedeos have a deep and corroborative knowledge of their historic past and discuss 
it with vigour and enthusiasm, regarding themselves as having a common origin 
and destiny. Equally of note about the Gedeos’ understanding of their history is 
that their distant past was intricately connected with their neighbours, particularly 
the Oromo and the Sidama.4
However, the role of human agents in the development of agriculture is 
only one part o f the story because agriculture has been shaped as much by natural 
factors as by human actions. In order to understand the distinctive nature of Gedeo 
agriculture it has to be examined within the given ecological and environmental 
parameters.5 hi what kind of physical environment were the Gedeo peasants 
fanning? How are Gedeo peasant farming systems suited to the environment, to 
the nature of the soil, and to the landscape in general? The Gedeo had a stable
3 When Hinnant first went to Gedeo in the early 1970s to study their g a d  a  system, he felt 
that due to the growth o f  coffee farming and commercialisation the system had changed 
significantly, and instead he decided to study the Guji gdda  system which he thought was much 
more intact and had preserved many o f  its original features. John T, Hinnant, "The Gada System o f  
the Guji o f  Southern Ethiopia". (PhD thesis, University o f  Chicago, 1977), i.
4 M ost Gedeo believe that they are related to their neighbours, particularly the Oromo. 
Some informants trace a very long genealogy which they have in common with som e Oromo clans. 
Despite this claim, the Gedeo show a strong sense o f  identity as Gedeos. The Gedeo also have an 
open society which has had a very amicable relationship with their powerful neighbours, the 
Oromos. According to them, the recent conflict which took place in the 1990s happened due to the 
new ethnic boundary drawn up by the present government. Interview with Kole Solale, Sugale, 15 
June 2004; and Badesse Rufo, Grissa, C'abicha, 9 July 2004.
5 John Tosh, T he Cash-Crop Revolution in Tropical Africa: An Agricultural Reappraisal’, 
African Affairs, 79, no. 314 (1980), 80.
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agricultural system, and, as a result, the drought and famine which afflicted many 
peasant communities did not occupy a place in the history of Gedeo. The 
ecological niche which enabled the Gedeo to develop their particular form of 
agriculture set them apart from the Guji pastoralists whose economic system was 
more fragile. Although nature determines what kind of crops can be cultivated as 
well as what kind of fanning methods to employ, the role of human beings in 
making these decision should also be recognised within this context.6
As in any peasant community, an understanding of the Gedeo peasant 
household is vital in order to appreciate how decisions were made, not only in 
tenns of what to cultivate for domestic consumption and what to grow for the 
market, but also the delegation of work and how to respond to demands by outside 
agents, such as the modem state, or the clan chief (before the incorporation),7 As 
Gedeo society entered the twentieth century important changes began to take place 
which probably stretched the Gedeo household to its limits and required 
adjustment to new conditions as the state made increasing economic demands. 
Gedeo was transformed from a small farming community contained within a 
narrow mountain range to a relatively large area with more potential for 
agriculture. By doing this, the Gedeo were able to integrate into the domestic as 
well as the wider international markets.
6 For a discussion o f  relations between ecology and agriculture see the follow ing works: 
McCann, People o f  the Plow, 5-7; David M. Anderson & Douglas H. Johnson, ’Ecology and 
Society in Northeast African History' in The Ecology o f  Survival: Case Studies from  Northeast 
African H istory , ed. Douglas H. Johnson & David M. Anderson (London: W estview, 1988), 1-24; 
Paul Richards, Indigenous Agricultural Revolution: Ecology and F ood Production in West Africa 
(London: Hutchinson, 1985), 10-17.
7 For the labour process o f  African agriculture see Elias C. Mandala, Work and Control in 
a Peasant World: A H istory o f  the Lower Tchiri Valley in M alawi 1859-1960  (Madison: University 
o f  Wisconsin Press, 1990), 3-12.
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Early history of the Gedeo
Little is known about the early history of the Gedeo. Other than a few references 
in some of the literature there has never been a systematic study o f the Gedeo 
before the twentieth century. The study of the Gedeo, like many other small ethnic 
groups in the south, is either unknown or subsumed under studies of the Sidama; 
in fact the name Sidama appeared to have been used for a long time to describe 
the cultures and histories of the diverse communities in this part of southern 
Ethiopia.8
The name Darassa (the former name of Gedeo) rarely appeared as a 
distinct name to describe the Gedeo community. As the main focus of enquiry was 
on the major ethnic groups such the Oromo or to a lesser extent Sidama, the 
literature attempted to complete the gaps of knowledge about the small ethnic 
groups by extrapolation rather than in-depth study.9 For instance, E. Cerulli (based 
on Abba Bahrey’s account of the history of the Oromo) claimed that the western 
boundaries of the Kingdom of Bali in the sixteenth century must have extended as 
far as the River Gallan (which finally enters Lake Abaya west of Gedeo) and 
beyond. From this assumption she deduced that the kingdom of Bali must have 
included groups such as the Sidama, Darassa, Gamo and others.10
The antiquity of the region could be demonstrated by the presence of a 
number of remains of ancient times, but unfortunately due to the absence of a 
coherent study, historians are still unable to integrate the results of the
5 Ernesta Cerulli, Peoples o f  South-West Ethiopia and Its Borderland , Ethnographic
Survey o f  Africa North-Eastern Africa  (London: International African Institute, 1956), 118.
9 J.Spencer Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia  (London: Frank Cass, 2008), 179-185;
Trimingham says that before the Oromo invasion the whole o f  the southern part o f  Ethiopia was
inhabited by the Sidama.
10 Cerulli, Peoples o f  South-West, 118.
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archaeological studies that have been conducted in the south into their work. 
There are a number of places of historic importance; Tutufalla in Gedeo where 
approximately 400 steles (an upright stone) were found is an example.11
Despite their close historical ties with both the neighbouring Oromos and 
the Sidama, the Gedeos express a strong sense of identity. The name Gedeo itself 
is a new invention which was introduced after the 1974 revolution in Ethiopia.12 
The name Darassa has more historical significance than Gedeo, because according 
to Gedeo oral information it was derived from the word Darasso, which was the 
name of the founding father of all the people of the Gedeo. Although there is some 
degree of variation in accounts of the early history of the Gedeo, the most 
commonly accepted version says that Darasso had seven sons who were born to 
his two wives.13 Their names were Darasha, Gorgorsha, Hanoma, Dooba’a (from 
Abbo) Hemba’a, Logoda and Bakarro (from Akichu). These names later became 
the names of the seven clans (gossa) of Gedeo (although some informants claimed 
that there are more than seven clans). Each of these clans was also associated with 
a defined territory which gradually disappeared due to the changing nature of 
settlement patterns. The clans were organised into two groups or houses which 
appear to have corresponded to the mothers who gave birth to the seven sons of 
Darasso; the four house (Darasha, Gorgorsha, Hanoma, Dooba’a) and the three
11A French archaeological team has been working on this site for a long time, although 
the results o f  their research are still not accessible.
12 The revolutionary government encouraged such changes to help in redressing past 
oppression. Unfortunately some Gedeos have not been impressed by the change. To them the name 
Gedeo does not have any meaning other than being the name o f  a remote geographic place; it does 
not sufficiently express their historic or cultural identity. But what is not clear and what most o f  
them do not know is that the way in which this particular word was chosen as a name for the 
community as a whole. Interview with Hayicha  Danbela Abe, Andida, 30 April 1999; he related a 
less well known meaning o f  Gedeo, which means the people who originated from three directions.
13 Interview with Bagajo Bonja, C'i 5'u, 28 November 1999.
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house (Hemba’a, Logoda and Bakarro ) .14 Clan membership was hereditary, and 
since marriage was outside one’s clan, a wife had to come from a different clan, 
but she would remain member of that clan. Her children belonged to their father’s 
clan, however.15
The seven clans (gosa) o f the Gedeo were not always in mutual agreement 
in many respects, particularly concerning land ownership. This was the main 
source of tension, especially between Hemba’a and Darassha. Hemba’a’s clan 
was mainly concentrated in the Dama and Michelle areas; Darasha’s however was 
west of Michelle on the highlands towards the core areas of Gedeo territory. They 
had a history of both conflict and cooperation; during times of outside threats they 
cooperated for defence puiposes. Finally, the two were able to put aside their 
differences, and as a result, the reconciliation concluded in a traditional ceremony 
where a number of cattle were slaughtered to seal the agreement.16
Although the different clans had a chequered history in terms of the 
reconstruction of their past, they all agree on a common origin and identity. They 
all claim that they were born from a single father, as explained above, and have a 
strong sense of identity. Before the Gedeo expanded into their present territory 
they appeared to have been limited to the highland regions in what is now north 
eastern Gedeo. From the highlands the Gedeo gradually descended down into the 
south and south west in search of more land.17
14 Interview with Kole Solale, Sugale, 15 June 2004; Klaus Wedekind, Generating 
narratives: interrelations o fb iow ledge, text variants, and Cushitic focus strategies (Berlin:
Mouton de Gruyter, 1990), 22.
15 McClellan, State Transformation, 29.
16 Interview with Gote Badasse, Andida, 28 April 1999.
17 Berhanu Lameso, 'Alabdu-Sidama Relations: A Historical Review, C. 1850-1974’ (MA  
Thesis, Addis Ababa University, 1993), 28.
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As they moved down along the mountains of present day Buie they began 
to occupy a defined territory, mainly along clan lines. It was after this that they 
began to quarrel among themselves on the issue of land as the land they occupied 
was not equally suitable for agriculture or big enough to accommodate the later 
high growth of the population. As a result, some of the larger clans needed more 
space and conflict became inevitable and more frequent in the later years of their 
history. However, the movement of the Gedeo was gradual and small scale 
compared with the large scale movement of the Oromo.18
According to linguistic classification, the Gedeo belong to what is known 
as the East Highland Cushitic language group. Linguists classified the Gedeo 
language as one of four others; Hadiyya, Kambata, Sidama and Burji. These 
people were all found in south-central Ethiopia along the rift valley running from 
north to south.19 The study of linguistics has helped to elucidate their history but 
has also left a number of questions unanswered. Linguists have not yet clearly 
established the direction of these peoples’ movement; whether they moved from 
south to north or vice versa. The most viable theory was based on the study of 
shared features between the five language groups. For instance, the Gedeo shared 
a number of linguistic features with the Sidama. The Burji, who are a close 
neighbour of the Gedeo, spoke a language which had more in common with the
18 Interview with Gobiina Sole, Tumticha, 29 April 1999; For a historical study o f  
population movement in southern Ethiopia see Merid Wolde Aregay, 'Southern Ethiopia and the 
Christian Kingdom 1508-1708, with Special Reference to the Galla Migrations and Their 
Consequences' (PhD thesis, University o f  London, 1971).
19 Grover Hudson, 'The Highland East Cushitic Family Vine', Sprache im d Geschichte in 
A fr ik a l  (1981), 97-121.
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Sidama. Similarly, Kambata shared many linguistic features with the Sidama
* 20 despite being many kilometres away.
By studying such features, linguists produced the theory that Sidama must 
have been the point of dispersal both northwards (Hadiyya and Kambata) and 
southwards (Gedeo and Burji); this tallies well with oral information from the 
Gedeos. One informant described the movement of the Gedeos Irom their place of 
origin to their present settlements as follows:21
First they set out from a place called Harssu Hawofa. They moved on 
to another place called Haro Walabo and then they settled at Worqa, 
then they moved down to Malgicha. After that, Kara Gudeba was the 
next destination, then they moved to Shebo Banti, and then they came 
to a place called Dalao. At Dalao they set up a shango (assembly) and 
agreed on the names of the seven clans, and then dispersed in different 
directions.
Some of theses place names are located on the top of the highlands which
are normally regarded as the core areas of the Gedeo people. From the above
description as well as from other related references the place which is cited by
most Gedeo elders as their place of origin (i.e. Harssu Hawofa) is probably
located outside the present territories of Gedeo. This is also depicted in one of the
Gedeos’ traditional songs. The qcitala (a sort of thanksgiving) is among the many
ceremonies held annually with the presence of the abba-gada:
Harsumaye Hawofamaye 
Manamano Ja’loye Dufe22
20 Grover Hudson, H ighland East Cushitic D ictionaiy  (Hamburg: Buske, 1989), 3; 
Wedekind, Generating Narratives, 15-37.
21 Interview with Kole Solale, Sugale, 15 June 2004.
22 Interview with D oye Biftu, Sisota, 24 July, 2004. This is one o f  the traditional 
ceremonies that the Gedeo still hold. The celebration was held at Grissa. During the celebration my 
informant told me that in the previous year they prayed because there was a devastating coffee 
disease which threatened production. The abba gdda  was approached to hold prayers and few  days 
after the qcitala took place there was heavy rain. The rain, which came as result o f  the prayers, 
washed away the webs that the spiders had woven around the coffee trees. The spider pest was also
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We came from Harssu 
And we crossed Hawofa 
And we came here
This particular piece of verse clearly depicts the Gedeos’ belief that they 
originated from Harssu Hawofa and serves as a powerful and constant reminder of 
their history. This particular festival has a long history, much associated with the 
gada system of the Gedeo, and the Gedeos attend the ceremony when they 
encounter farming problems which would result in a poor harvest such as ensat 
disease or a short and irregular rainfall, mainly affecting the coffee harvest, hi 
such circumstances the incumbent abba-gdda has a responsibility to organise an 
assembly of Gedeos in one of the shdngos (assembly) with the help of the lower 
officials such as the hayicha (village head man) to summon elders from each 
Gedeo clan to make sacrifices and prayers. Although there are no clear indications 
as to whether the Gedeo abba-gdda had played any political role in the past, after 
the incorporation his role has undoubtedly been restricted essentially to spiritual 
matters.23
Thus, although the Gedeo clans competed with each other over land 
occupation, they also shared many aspects of life. The seven clans of Gedeo 
recognised the abba-gdda as their spiritual head. From existing sources we 
understand that the Gedeo appear to have had only one gdda system whose 
membership was open to all seven clans based 011 the rules of the age-grade
destroyed by the heavy rain, the coffee trees revived, and the peasants managed to harvest their 
beans. Therefore, the reason that another qatala  was held at this time was to thank God for his 
beneficence in the previous year. Meanwhile, during the ceremony I learned that there was some 
concern that year as well because the rain was unusually late.
23 Tsehai Berhane Selassie, 'The Balabat and the Coffee Disease: Politics and Ritual in Darasa', 
in Working P apers on Society and History in Im perial Ethiopia: The Southern Periphery From the 
1880s to 1974, ed. D.L.Donham and Wendy James (African Studies Centre, Cambridge: 1980),
202 .
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system.24 Although the gdda system of the Gedeo had a lot of similarities with the 
Oromo gdda system, it is not clear how the Gedeo adopted the system in the first 
place. Informants claimed that the Gedeo adopted the institution from their 
neighbour, the Guji Oromo.25 Guidi believed that the gdda system of the Gedeo 
had an important role in the life of the Gedeo community; unfortunately he did not 
provide details other than describing rituals and symbols.26
A political, military and judicial officialdom existed within the community. The 
most well known were roga, ja  ’Iqaba, ja  ’laba and hayicha. The hayicha, which 
still survives as an honorary title, no longer has any privileges for the office holder 
as its function has been curtailed significantly in later years since the Gedeo have 
been fully integrated into the Ethiopian system of administration. Such an 
elaborate system of military, political, judiciary as well as spiritual infrastructure 
had to be supported economically by the rest of the farming population. As most 
of the officials were required to provide services to the community, others had to 
carry out their agricultural work. Even now it is common to give some kind of gift
24 Cerulli described in some detail the seven age-grades based on the study o f  the German 
anthropologist Jensen who studied the gdda  system o f  the Gedeo in the 1930s. The seven grades 
are 1) Lumasa 2) Raba 3) Luba 4) Juba (Yuba) 5) Kolulu 6) Gudurru and 7) Cowoji. Guidi, an 
Italian geographer who stayed for about eight months in Gedeo during the Fascist occupation o f  
Ethiopia, claimed that there are only four age-grades and the first two last for eight years while the 
remaining three last for four. Cerulli, Peoples o f  South-West, 124; see also Asmarom Legesse, 
Oromo Dem ocracy: An Indigenous African P olitical System  (Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 
2001); For the Guji gdda  system see Hinnant, T he Gada System o f  the Guji o f  Southern Ethiopia1, 
and also Joseph Van de Loo and Kola Bilow, Guji Oromo Culture in Southern Ethiopia: Religious 
Capabilities in Rituals and Songs, Collectanea Instituti Anthropos (Berlin: Deitrich Reimer Verlag, 
1991), 15-18; and also G.W.B. Huntingford, The Galla o f  Ethiopia the Kingdom s o fK afa  and  
Janjero  (London: International African Institute, 1955), 41-65.
25 Interview with Morkate Jarsso, Andida, 28 April 1999; and Jibicho Galano, Dama, 30 April 
1999. See also Tsehai Berhane Selassie, 'The Balabat and the Coffee Disease: Politics and Ritual in 
Darasa'; 199.
"6 Guido Guidi, 'Nel Sidamo Orientale', Bollettino D ella R.Societa G eografica Italiana  IV, no. 
VII (1939), 372-384.
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to the elected abba-gdda, which harks back to old practices. However, as there is 
no evidence to suggest that the Gedeo gdda system organised warfare to loot other 
weaker communities it would have been able to support its members by gifts
7  7donated voluntarily by the community.
Patterns of settlement and ecology
The history of the Gedeo people reveals it to be the product of a long and complex 
interaction with their neighbours. As the available evidence shows, geography has 
greatly influenced the way history has unfolded in this part of the region. Gedeo 
is located at about 370 km south of the capital Addis Ababa and lies on the south 
east of the Ethiopian Rift Valley which runs north to south, bisecting the country 
approximately in the middle. A rugged and beautiful country, green throughout 
the year, it occupies over 5890 sq. km. The density of the population in Gedeo is 
among the highest in Ethiopia at 420 per sq km (against the national average 
which is 62.4 per sq km), according to a population census taken in 1984. The 
people of Gedeo have lived for centuries on the high mountains and hills 
overlooking Lake Abaya towards the west. The highlands of Gedeo are a very 
hospitable place because of their cool climate and rise imposingly over the 
lowlands which border them.28
The highlands, which contain both Sidama and Gedeo, descend in a north- 
south direction and the Gedeo live in the southernmost section of these highlands. 
The Sidama not only occupy a similar landscape to the Gedeos but their northern
27 McClellan, State Transformation, 28-31.
28 Office o f  the Population and Housing Census Commission, Population and Housing 
Census 1984: A nalytical R eport on Sidamo (Addis Ababa: 1989), 35; According to Guidi’s 
estimate the density o f  G edeo’s population in 1937 was 40 to 45 per sq km. Guidi, 'Nel Sidamo 
Orientale', 377.
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neighbours share ties in cultural, historical and linguistic terms. The Gedeo also 
share borders with others; the Guji in the south and south west, and the Jamjam 
(another branch of the Oromo group) in the east. The Gedeos also claim that like 
the Sidama they do not simply share a physical space with the Oromos but also 
share many other things, which are deeply embedded in the long and complex 
histories of both communities.29
The narrow protruding nature of Gedeo means that it is squeezed between 
two major Oromo clans; the Jamjam in the east and the Guji in the south and south 
west.30Before the twentieth century most Gedeos settled at the top of the highlands 
and settlement in large numbers in the lower zones only began after the 
incorporation and the subsequent imposition of qalad in the 1920s.31 However, 
some informants interviewed in the lower zones pointed out that settlements began 
in these areas well before the incorporation.32 As we shall see later in this and 
subsequent chapters, the earlier settlers were forced out of their original home in 
the highlands mainly due to demographic pressure.
29 Interview with Morkate Jarsso, Andida, 28 April 1999; Van de Loo and Bilow, Guji 
Oromo Culture in Southern Ethiopia , 14-18; Donald N. Levine, G reater Ethiopia: The Evolution 
o f  a Multiethnic Society, 2nd edn. (Chicago: The University o f  Chicago Press, 2000), 162,
30 Every year between October and December the Jamjam Oromo have to pass through 
the Gedeo highlands to obtain a vital mineral known locally as bole  for their cattle from inside 
Guji territory which is located between Dilla town and Lake Abaya (they believe that this mineral 
which is salty in nature is nutritionally important for their livestock). The way the Jamjam travel 
across Gedeo is very colourful activity. They travel in huge numbers singing and chanting a 
traditional Oromo song throughout the journey, mainly at night to avoid the day time traffic and 
the scorching sun, especially in the lowlands. The volume o f  the caravan increases dramatically 
when the moon becomes full; visibility is good and travelling is easier. The long caravan mainly 
consists o f  horsemen and footmen armed with spears looking like a traditional army marching to a 
war front. This practice has continued for centuries and Gedeo has been served as the main 
gateway to accessing this vital resource for the Jamjam.
31McClelIan, 'Coffee in Centre-Periphery Relations', 188-191.
32 Interview with Doye Biflu, Sisota, 24 July 2004 and Kole Solale, Sugale, 15 June 2004. 
Kole traces his genealogy back to Darasso who was believed to be the father o f  all Gedeos. I 
interviewed him at Sugele near Wonago and he claimed that they all came from an upland place 
called Delao and the present settlement at Sugele was quite recent, a phenomenon o f  the twentieth 
century.
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The threat from the neighbouring communities, especially the Gujis and 
the Sidamas, combined with the inhospitable nature of the lower zones, had 
previously discouraged settlement by the Gedeos. Relations with the Sidama along 
the Lagadara River had also been problematic. The Sidama, who probably had a 
similar problem of a lack of territory for expansion, clashed with the Gedeo over 
their attempt to settle across the river. The Gedeo were only able to establish a 
boundary with the Sidama after the incorporation.33 The political incorporation of 
the region meant that conflict between the different ethnic groups, particularly 
over the issue of land and other resources, gradually diminished as the state began 
to interfere forcefully in defusing these tensions. Other than resolving ethnic 
clashes, incorporation also enabled some groups, particularly of the Gedeo, to 
have more living space by eliminating major threats from their powerful 
neighbours.34
The green and fertile landscape of Gedeo gives the impression that it has 
been settled recently, in contrast to the northern Ethiopian landscape. Gedeo huts 
and villages are not easily visible because they are hidden by tall ensdt and big 
trees. As a result of this, an outside observer might gain the impression that Gedeo 
is an undeveloped and thinly populated region. This is far from the truth and the 
Gedeo ‘forest’ is largely shaped by cultivation and has a long and complex history. 
It demonstrates a well developed system of agriculture which has supported one of 
the densest populations in Ethiopia. The only flat and open space to be seen is in
33 Interview with Morkate Jarsso, Andida, 28 April 1999. According to him, until the 
1920s both Sidama and Gedeo had different claims regarding the boundary between the two 
groups; the Sidama claimed that their land extended as far as Chuchu which is inside Gedeo. The 
Gedeo on the other hand claimed that Beqoqa which is within Sidama territory marked the limit. It 
was DdjaZamach Balcha who finally decided that Legadara would be a common boundary. The 
peace deal was then made and cattle slaughtered to seal the reconciliation.
34Berhanu, 'Alabdu-Sidama Relations', 15-16.
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places like Buie which is on the top of the plateau but even that terrain is 
punctuated by irregular features. The altitude of Gedeo is as high as 4000 meters 
above sea level on top of the plateau near Buie and in contrast drops low (1580 
meters) near Dilla town which is the capital of Gedeo, all within a distance of no 
more than 60 kilometres.35
The ecology of Gedeo is very suitable for agriculture and particularly the 
growing of ensat. The region could be classified into two major agro-ecological 
zones, the daga, 3000-4000 meters above sea level, and the wdyna-daga, 2000- 
3000 meters above sea level respectively.36 The ddga agro-ecology zone is found 
on top of the highland which covers most of what is known as the Buie Warcida 
(an administrative unit below the Awrajci). In this zone, peasants predominantly 
grow ensat although cereal products such as barley are also important. The wdyna- 
ddga area on the other hand is the zone below the ddga and it is here that most of 
Gedeo’s coffee is grown. It is also in this zone that settlement began mainly in the 
early twentieth century. The concentration of population is much higher here than 
in the historic settlements in the highlands, which are classified as ddga according 
to this inventory. One of the attributes of ensat is that it grows easily in both zones; 
the only difference is that the yield differs from one ecology zone to the other. 
For instance, the quality as well as the quantity of ensat in Grissa, which is a ddga 
area, is superior to both that which grows on the plateau and the lower zones, but 
it requires more time to mature.37
35 EM A, National Atlas, 4
36 EMA, National Atlas, 4; Temperature in the ddga  zone ranges from 15.1 to 17.5 
degrees centigrade, while in wayna-ddga  the variation is from 17.6 to 20 degrees centigrade.
37 Interview with Doye Biftu, Sisota, 24 July, 2004; and Taddassa Jibicho, Sisota, 7 July, 
2004. My informants in the lower zones claimed that the quality o f  ensat from Grissa is much 
superior and households in the lower zones were buying land there for that reason.
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Figure I. Typical Gedeo landscape, Grissa, August 2004. Photograph taken by 
the author.
Figure 2. Young ensat crop ready for transplanting, Grissa, August 2004. Photograph 
taken by the author.
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Figure 3. A typical ensat farm, Grissa, August 2004. Photograph taken by the author.
The description used by William Shack in relation to the Gurage is just as 
applicable to the Gedeo. Like the Gurage, the Gedeo are “people o f the ensat
o
culture” . The Gedeo as an agrarian community have been dependant on ensat for 
long time. There are suggestions by archaeologists and historians that ensat is 
among the earliest food crops cultivated in Ethiopia. This is not to say that the 
Gedeos were among the first people to adopt the cultivation o f ensat, but rather to
■>Q
show that the Gedeo have a well developed system o f agriculture. Gedeo
agriculture has always been dynamic and changes in farming patterns have
frequently occurred. However, ensat has been cultivated throughout the long
38 W illiam  A. Shack, The G urage: A P eop le  o f  the E nsete Culture  (Oxford: Oxford U .P., 
1966), 57-67; A lso see D essalegn Rahmato, R esilien ce and Vulnerability: Ensat Agriculture in 
Southern Ethiopia’, Journal o f  E thiopian S tudies XXVIII No. 1 (1995), 25.
}q Steven A. Brandt, N e w  Perspectives on the Origins o f  Food Production in Ethiopia’, in 
From H unters to Farm ers: The C auses an d  C onsequences o f  F ood  P roduction  in Africa  
, ed. J. D. Clark and S. A. Brandt (Berkeley: U niversity o f  California Press, 1984), 248-252.
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history of the Gedeo, and the Gedeo claim that they have been mainly dependent 
on the cultivation of ensat as their staple food for a long time. Unlike other ensat 
cultures, the Gedeo do not mix cultivating ensat with rearing livestock, which 
increases their dependence on it.40
The cultivation of ensat has been associated with the growth of population 
in Ethiopia,41 although it is not clear whether it was chosen as a farming strategy 
by peasants confronted with an unprecedented growth of population or it occurred 
by coincidence.42 We do know that the Gedeos have cultivated ensat for a long 
time and as well as providing a secure source of food it has also enabled the land 
of Gedeo to sustain one of the densest populations in the country. However, the 
issue of density of population has to be treated cautiously because it is 
misleading,43 For instance, within Gedeo there is a huge variation in terms of 
population per square kilometre. Regions which were settled later have now 
become more populated than the old settlements, showing how demographic 
patterns shift over time with changing economic opportunities 44
40Helmer Smeds, 'The Ensete Planting Culture o f  Eastern Sidamo, Ethiopia " ACTA 
GEOGRAPHICA  13, No 4 (1955), 15-28; For a broader discussion o f  ensat farming see S. A. 
Brandt, 'The Evolution o f  Enset Farming' (paper presented at the Ethiopia in broader perspective: 
papers o f  the 13th International Conference o f  Ethiopian Studies, Kyoto, 12-17 December 1997, 
Kyoto, Japan, 1997), 843-851; S. A. Brandt, 'New Perspectives', 173-190.
41D.R. Jones, 'Introduction to Banana, Abaca, and Enset', in D iseases o f  Banana, Abaca 
and Enset, ed. David Jones (Oxon: CABI Publishing, 2000), 32; According to this author, about 
20% o f  the Ethiopian population (10 million) depend on ensat for food.
42 Thomas Hakansson, 'Social and Political Aspects o f Intensive Agriculture in East 
Africa: Some M odels from Cultural Anthropology', Azania XXIV (1989), 12-20.
43 David Grigg, Population Growth and Agrarian Change: An H istorical Perspective , 
Cambridge G eographical Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 20-28; For a 
discussion o f  intensification o f  crop production see Mats Widgren et ah, Islands o f  Intensive 
Agriculture in Eastern Africa: P ast & Present, Eastern African Studies. (Oxford: James Currey, 
2003), 1-17.
44 See chapters three and four for more about this issue. For a general discussion o f  
agricultural change and population pressure see Ester Boserup, The Conditions o f  Agricultural 
Growth: The Economics o f  Agrarian Change under Population Pressure (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1965), 11-14.
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Gedeo receives plentiful rain throughout the year and although records 
began relatively recently there is sufficient evidence to show that there is a 
favourable rainfall distribution throughout the region. The two meteorological 
stations in Gedeo began record keeping during the 1950s; the earliest records are 
from Dilla and the data gathered shows that in general Gedeo receives the highest 
amount of rainfall in the region, especially in the higher area. The second station 
which is located in the coffee growing part o f Gedeo, Yirga C'afe, which has an 
elevation of 1840m above sea level, has records which show that the annual 
average rainfall was 1,970.2 mm for the years 1966-8 and 1970-3. The fact that 
Dilla received less than Yirga C'afe might be due to its lower elevation which is 
1,580 meters above sea level; nevertheless it still has one of the highest rainfall 
figures in the region. Gedeo also has a very good distribution of rain throughout 
the year. The region receives most of its rainfall in April and May and the rainfall 
is similar in the months of September and October. Unfortunately, the figure from 
the two meteorological stations may not reflect the overall pattern of rainfall 
throughout Gedeo because the two stations are located within the same agro­
ecology zone, Dilla and Yirga C'afe have been selected to monitor rainfall and 
other vital data due to their importance as coffee growing areas in Gedeo. 45
Despite the abundance of rainfall in Gedeo there are no major soil erosion 
problems, although most of the Gedeo landscape is characterised by steep slopes, 
and in some places the land is almost vertical, which makes fanning difficult and
45 Daniel Gamachu, A spects o f  Climate and Water Budget in Ethiopia  (Addis Ababa: 
Addis Ababa U.P., 1977), 7; T.J. Kingham, ’Rainfall Records o f  the Southern Rift Valley, Ethiopia’ 
(Surbiton: Ministry o f  Overseas Development Land Resources Division, 1975), 265-266.
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dangerous.46 The Gedeos also do not employ other soil conservation methods such 
as terracing to protect their soil from erosion by rain or wind. What is apparent is 
that farms in Gedeo are never left barren without ensat or other forms of 
vegetation, meaning that the soil is not exposed which would result in erosion, hi 
addition, ensat leaves also protect the soil, serving as an umbrella to shelter it 
from hail and heavy rain. By facilitating the absorption of water into the soil it 
enriches its moisture content,47
It was also common to allow mature trees to remain on cultivated 
farmland.48 According to fanners, leaving such trees within their farm was 
important as some of the big trees, in addition to serving as shades, also have the 
ability to conserve moisture in the soil, which is advantageous for ensat and other 
plants, especially when rain is in short supply.49 The leaves of some of these trees 
also decompose quite quickly and that serves as a fertiliser for the soil. Above all 
the Gedeo believe that the key to maintaining soil fertility is that ensat helps to 
improve the soil by conserving moisture and nutrients around the roots.50
46 Hermann Amborn, ’Agricultural Intensification in the Burji-Konso Cluster o f  South- 
Western Ethiopia', Azania  XXIV (1989), 79-80.
47 Interview with Gobana Latiti, Grissa, 15 July 20. Allan Hoben, 'The Cultural Construction 
o f Environmental Policy: Paradigms & Politics in Ethiopia' in The Lie o f  the Land: Challenging 
R eceived Wisdom on the African Environment, ed. Melissa Leach and Robin Mearns (London: 
International African Institute in association with James Currey, 1996), 190-191.
48 Interview with Gobana Latiti, Grissa, 15 July 2004.
49 Informants, for example, compare ensat with coffee, which only began to be grown in 
Gedeo in the first half o f  the twentieth century and has the effect o f  drying the soil while ensat 
restores moisture to the soil and as result o f  this the farm land where ensat is grown w ill always 
remain moist and fertile. Interview with Taddassa Jibicho, Sisota, 7 July, 2004; and Hirba Qorc'e, 
Grissa, 14 July 2004.
50 Interview with Woke Bado, Grissa, 14 July 2004. Conversely, the peasants are aware o f  the 
adverse effects o f  some plants on soil condition and productivity. For instance, bamboo, which was 
the most visible forest structure in Gedeo, has gradually disappeared and been replaced by 
eucalyptus trees. Peasants claim that the leaves o f bamboo are adverse for coffee growing; in 
addition it requires a great deal o f  water which means it competes with coffee and ensat plants. 
Likewise, although the eucalyptus tree had the advantage o f being useful for construction, it is now  
seen by farmers as an enemy as it needs a large amount o f  moisture.
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Land use in Gedeo is dictated mainly by ecological factors. The soil in 
Gedeo is generally of very good quality and well suited to the cultivation of ensat. 
Although many peasants survived on a subsistence level, due to the reliability of 
ensat agriculture the Gedeo have never experienced a crisis in food supplies, and 
as a result informants never recalled times of famine, even in the distant past.51 
However, peasants should not be seen as purely concerned with a risk aversion 
strategy. The history of agriculture in Gedeo has shown that the land use system 
has been very dynamic in terms of expanding into a different ecology zones and 
adopting new crops.52 Although the people of Gedeo claim that land scarcity has 
been one of the characteristic features of their agricultural system, they have 
nevertheless managed to produce a surplus which has enabled them to engage in 
trade transactions with their neighbours.53
The predominance of ensat in Gedeo agriculture meant that there was little 
enthusiasm for adopting new technologies such as the plough, which is not suited 
to ensat production, McCann suggested that the Gedeo like the Gurage or other 
southern and south-western societies might have adopted the plough because the 
elites preferred cereals such as t’e f  ( a crop indegenious to Ethiopia used to make 
Ethiopian bread, enjara ) over their traditional diet of qoc’o (processed ensat 
which is used to make bread). Given the limited role the plough has in Gedeo 
farming practices, this is incorrect. Although the Gedeo did come into direct 
contact with the technology of the plough after the region was incorporated into
51 Mesfin Wolde Mariam, Rural Vulnerability to Famine in Ethiopia, 1958-197  (London: 
Intermediate Technology Publications, 1986), 150.
52 James C. McCann, M aize and Grace: Africa's Encounter with a New World Crop, 1500- 
2000  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 86.
53 Interview with Hordofa Gadico, Wonago, 24 November 1999,
64
the Ethiopian empire, even today the plough has a very limited usage within 
Gedeo, the digging axe being the single most important farming tool for the 
majority o f Gedeo households. The main reason is that the plough is not suitable 
for the cultivation o f perennial crops such as ensat upon which the Gedeo are still 
highly dependant. Since ensat farms are by nature intensively cultivated, and 
because ensat is harvested in stages, it is impractical to use an ox drawn plough. 
Also the Gedeo landscape is not ideal for the technology o f  the plough due to its 
rugged nature. In addition, adopting the plough would mean that the Gedeo would 
have to lose whatever forest cover they have which serves as a shelter for their 
ensat and coffee trees. The Gedeo do however use the plough where it is 
appropriate.54
Figure 4. Golo (work party); the digging axe is still the favoured farm ing tool, 
Grissa, August 2004. Photograph taken by the author.
54 McCann, P eop le  o f  the P lo w , 45-50.
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Domestic and labour organisation in peasant households
As in any peasant community, Gedeo peasant households existed as units of 
consumption and production within the context of the Gedeo agricultural system. 
One of the challenges for historians is to find reliable historical sources to allow 
us to reconstruct the nature of Gedeo peasant households before the advent of the 
Ethiopian state. However, imprecise they might be, our only sources are family 
histories narrated by Gedeo elders. From such sources it is possible to understand 
that Gedeo households played an important role in every aspect of the life of their 
members. Although they manifested many social changes over the years, 
households also represent a great deal of continuity in many aspects.55
The need to understand what sociologists called ‘the morphology of a 
household’ is important because within Gedeo households there was a clearly 
delineated allocation of responsibilities.56 It is essential to understand the roles of 
members of the household, both from the perspective of labour division as well as 
such areas as property rights and decision making processes. It must also be noted 
that kinship groups and neighbours provided reciprocal assistance during 
harvesting and planting seasons.57
A typical household in Gedeo was normally formed by a married couple, 
headed by the husband who also owned most of the perishable as well as non- 
perishable forms of property that belonged to the household. This included land,
55 In the area o f agricultural technology, for example, there have been few changes, 
especially in the production o f  ensat.
56 Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, A Modern Economic H istoiy o f  Africa. Vol. I, the Nineteenth 
Century (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1993), 12.
57 Dena Freeman, Initiating Change in Highland Ethiopia: The Causes and Consequences 
o f  Cultural Transformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 52-65; for a 
theoretical discussion o f  the role o f  kinship and family structure see Claude M eillassoux, Maidens, 
M eal and Money: Capitalism and the D om estic Community, Themes in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 8-32.
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as land in general was exclusively owned by men. Although households obviously 
varied across time as well as within a given time, a peasant household in Gedeo
• • ■ 58was composed of members of the family who made differing contributions.
Like many other societies, household formation in Gedeo through 
marriage was either constrained or encouraged depending upon the prevailing 
political economy. The timing of the formation of a household was determined by 
a number of factors, but chiefly access to land. Marriage was crucial for Gedeo 
peasant household formation and survival because the cultivation of ensat in 
particular required the labour of women. Women were the backbone o f the Gedeo 
household economy; they played a number of key roles which enabled the 
household to function smoothly as a viable economic and social unit. Other than 
their biological and domestic roles, women played a crucial role in ensat 
production, which was why Gedeo men did not start independent life before 
marriage. A man never expected to gain access to land through marriage, as we 
shall see in the next section; conversely, the monopoly of property rights by men 
meant that women would only be able to gain access to land and its fruits through 
marriage and their labour.59
Informants pointed out that the conditions under which marriage took 
place varied, not only from one household to another, but also changed over the 
years according to the prevailing political economy. This means that, for example, 
land-rich households tended to let their sons m any earlier, while households who 
were short of land might be forced to delay the marriage o f their sons. Although
ss Wally Seccombe, A Millennium o f  Family Change: Feudalism to Capitalism in 
Northwestern Europe (London: Verso, 1992), 83.
59For a comparative view  o f  property, inheritance and women see Jack Goody, 
"Inheritance, Property and Women: Some Comparative Considerations," in Family and  
Inheritance: Rural Society in Western Europe, 1200-1800 , ed. Jack Goody, Joan Thirsk, and E. P. 
Thomson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 10.
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historically access to land played a crucial role in determining the formation of 
new households, this has been a relatively recent phenomenon in Gedeo history, 
because, before the Gedeo felt the demographic pressure, in the second half of the 
nineteenth century access to land was not a limiting factor. In fact, some argue 
that labour was perhaps more crucial, especially in the early years of the Gedeos’ 
expansion into new territories when households with extra labour resources 
developed land by claiming it from the forest. In some cases, households with 
sufficient land but a serious shortage of labour allowed their sons to m any at a 
young age in order to enable them to import additional labour power to their work 
force. Such pressures were more intense on households where death or ill health 
had taken their toll, and hence, to remedy the situation, a young Gedeo boy who 
was the senior son might be encouraged or pushed into an early marriage to fill the 
gap left by his deceased father.60
Marriage was not allowed within the clan and a wife usually had to come 
from a different clan. Rival clans also did not allow the exchange of wives due to 
a past history of animosity.61 Gedeos normally regarded their daughters as 
liabilities and some of them even describe them as outsiders. As we shall see in 
another section, as a result of this, land was always given to sons rather than 
daughters, as a precautionary measure developed by the Gedeos to prevent land 
from being accessed by another clan member via marriage. Therefore, a Gedeo 
man did not expect to access any form of landed property through marriage.62
60 Interview with Baqala Walda-Tsadiq, Shigado, 6 July, 2004; and Worassa Bushe, C'i 
6'u, 30 November 1999.
61 Interview with Turi Boko, C’i5’u, 29 April 1999; and Badecha Leko, Tumticha, 29 
April 1999.
62 For marriage customs in Christian northern Ethiopia see Ege, Class, 55.
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Marriage was not only the first and most important step in gaining access 
to parental land, but it was also the most straightforward route to gaining property 
rights. A young married couple were not usually given land as soon as they got 
married. In the first year of their marriage the couple were normally considered to 
be part of the main household and would continue to work and eat in the parental 
home, at least for the first six months. During this time they would construct a 
small hut near the family house which could eventually be the site for their future 
house. The wife would continue to help his mother in all types of work, especially 
the harvesting and transportation of ensat. She had to carry out all work under her 
mother-in-law’s direction and as the new household took shape she had to juggle 
her time between both houses. This was one of the reasons why a son was always 
preferred to a daughter.63
Another feature of the Gedeo marriage system was the prevalence of 
polygamy. Unlike in Northern Ethiopia, which is mostly Christian and where 
marriage is restricted to one spouse, in Gedeo polygamy was permitted. 
Informants pointed out that in the nineteenth century it was common for warriors 
and clan leaders to marry between eight to fourteen wives. As mentioned 
elsewhere, unlike other agrarian systems, especially that of the plough culture 
where the labour of the male is more dominant, female labour power is crucial in 
ensat agriculture. Having two or more wives was not a luxury for men to enjoy, as 
some informants argued. They claimed that polygamy was a necessity because of 
the immense challenge posed by the agricultural requirements of a Gedeo
63 Interview with Fayisa Bado, MSkonisa, 18 June, 2004.
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household.64 As a result, polygamy has been a norm, practiced by many peasants, 
though it has declined significantly in recent years.65 According to the views of 
my informants, the increasing economic difficulties made polygamy unsustainable, 
especially as access to land became more challenging. Since polygamous men 
were more likely to have more children than their monogamous counterparts they 
came under enormous strain when their sons formed a household, because it was 
the fathers’ responsibility to give land at marriage.66
The social role of a woman was very crucial in rural Gedeo, as well as her 
reproductive and agricultural role. The decline of polygamy did not change or 
improve the status of women as we shall see in due course, especially as ensat 
production required a great deal of labour input from them. Despite their crucial 
role, the Gedeo, like most societies, displayed a sexual hierarchy and showed a 
preference for boys. I asked informants why boy children were preferred despite 
the fact that a boy received family land and thus depleted its size, whereas a girl 
received no parental wealth even in the form of dowry payments. The typical 
reason given by informants is that this had been perceived as a preventive measure 
developed to protect land from being accessed by an outsider. A married son 
stayed with the family and constructed a house nearby so that the name of the 
family as well as their land would be preserved and honoured, whereas upon 
marriage a girl had to move to her husbands’ place, and as a result, could not
64 Interview with Morkate Jarsso, Andida, 28 April 1999; Bora Hessa, Grissa, 13 July 2004. 
Bora justified why he was polygamous by saying that it is even difficult to “get something to eat 
when your w ife has small children.”
65 Interview with Kole Solale, Sugale, 15 June 2004.
66 Interview with Aragashe Hojamessa, Grissa, 20 July 2004; Turi Boko, C ’id’u, 29 April 1999.
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provide much needed support for her parents. A married son and his wife 011 the 
other hand provided support for his own weak and elderly family.67
Divorce was the highly stigmatised outcome of a failed marriage, and 
women were mostly blamed for it. The most usual reason was the failure to 
produce a child. Bearing only girls could also be disastrous. For some, the 
practice of polygamy might come to a barren wife’s rescue, as there was a 
likelihood of gaining a son from the later marriage, but nevertheless informants 
cited examples of women who were divorced by their husbands because the 
woman was unable to bear a child.68
Informants, both women and men, believed that the division of labour 
within the household was as old as ensat agriculture itself. This shows that the 
way in which the allocation of roles between the sexes that takes place within a 
specific farming community is largely shaped by the type of agriculture which that 
community has adopted. In Gedeo the role of women and men in ensat production 
has its own features, which may not necessarily be the case in other economies. It 
requires the involvement of both men and women at different stages in its 
cultivation, being labour intensive and needing constant attention, particularly 
from women.59
Before the twentieth century, Gedeo households mainly depended on ensat 
production, not only as their main source of food, but also to exchange for other 
products which were difficult to obtain in Gedeo. Other crops such as barley, and
67 Barbara Miller made similar observations in India in the 1960s, regarding the transmission 
o f family property and name and economic support for the parents when they grow old or disabled. 
Barbara D. Miller, The Endangered Sex: N eglect o f  Female Children in Rural North India  (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1981), 160.
68 Interview with Badesse Rufo, Grissa, C'abi£a, 9 July 2004.
69 Interview with: Eten&se Alamayahu, Grissa, 18 July, 2004; and Tafara A yise, Grissa, 14 
July 2004.
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vegetables such as cabbage, goddre (taro) etc. only played a supplementary role.70 
The main use of labour therefore was in ensdt cultivation, especially in harvesting 
and processing for human consumption. One of the distinctive features of ensdt 
agriculture in Gedeo is that the agricultural seasons are not as distinct, as is the 
case in other crop production. Ensdt, like other crops, can only be planted in one 
season, but is harvested at any time of the year depending on the food 
requirements of the household. As a result of this, a farm always has some ensdt 
trees which are in the process of reaching maturation.71 When ensdt trees were 
harvested, replacements had to be planted so that the family would not run short of 
food. Peasants calculated in advance to ensure that there was always a sufficient 
amount of ensdt to be harvested, and because of the perennial nature of ensdt, 
plans were made six to eight years ahead which is the average time for the ensdt 
tree to mature.72
One of the great attributes of ensdt is its versatility. Ensdt provided a staple 
food, materials for shelter, and was used in herbal medicine and ceremonies. The 
wide and long fronds of the ensdt tree were used as thatch when they built their 
huts. It was also used in the wrapping and packaging of qoc'o, meat and other 
products to transport either home or to market. Other than serving as animal 
fodder, it was also used as an umbrella for humans during heavy rains. The fibre
70 Interview with Badecha Leko, Tumtida, 29 April 1999; this informant claimed that barley 
ceased to be grown because o f  a shortage o f  land, and its place was taken by coffee,
71 Jones, 'Introduction to Banana, Abaca, and Enset', 33-34.
72 Interview with Gobana Sole, Tumticha, 29 April 1999; and Gobana Latiti, Grissa, 15 July 
2004. Gedeo peasants cultivate different varieties o f  ensdt trees. According to informants, among 
the varieties identified locally, ganticho  is the most important. This type o f  ensdt is valued most by 
peasants because its qoc'o (yield) is much higher than the other varieties. A stara  is another variety, 
but it is less common as it is mainly planted for its medicinal value. Taricho and dambicho are 
other common varieties which are cultivated widely by many households because they require less 
labour and time to process than ganticho.
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which is one o f the by-products o f ensdt was used for various purposes, such as in 
the building o f huts. It also had a ceremonial function, especially when the abba- 
gdda conducted his prayers. A long stretch o f green ensdt leaves had to be laid on 
the ground (like a red carpet) for him when entered the special hut, which was 
constructed for the occasion.
Figure 5. Matured ensdt tree ready fo r  han'esting, Grissa, August 2004. 
Photograph taken by the author.
73 Interview with Taddassa Jibicho, Sisota, 7 July, 2004.
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Men start the process of ensdt production by preparing the soil using a 
digging axe, either by forming a work party (goto) or by using labour from the 
household and close kin.74 Historically it was the men’s responsibility to add to 
the stocks of the household’s cultivatable land by claiming it from the forest. 
Ensdt is propagated vegetatively because the seeds of ensdt are sterile. Men carry 
this out by selecting a few well grown ensat trees (about three years old) from the 
farm and cutting the pseudostem about 50cm above the ground.75 The remaining 
part on ground level is divided into four to eight parts and they are covered with 
grass so that they would receive sufficient moisture and warmth. After a few 
weeks, hundreds of young ensdt shoots are produced which are called funfa  (buds). 
These suckers are transferred to another nursery and planted up separately to 
enable them to grow faster.76 They have to stay in the nursery until finally being 
planted on the main farm where they grow to full maturity and are harvested for 
food.
Thus, the men’s job has to be conducted according to the agricultural 
calendar by following the seasons, whereas the women’s task of harvesting takes 
place at anytime throughout the year. The women’s job is also onerous because 
unlike the Gurage,77 who harvest and store the product for a long period of time 
(by burying the qoc'o in a pit), the Gedeo have not developed any kind of storage
74 In the subsequent section where I have described ensdt production in some detail, note that, 
although, written in the present tense, the process has varied little over centuries from that which I 
was shown during my research field study.
75 Interview with Gote Badasse, Andida, 28 April 1999.
76 Jones, 'Introduction to Banana, Abaca, and Enset', 33,
77 For a detailed discussion o f  ensdt agriculture among the Gurages, including harvesting and 
processing it for human consumption see Shack, The Garage, 50-82.
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system, and as a result, the Gedeo women spend more time processing ensdt on 
their farm than their Gurage counter parts.78
Figure 6a.
Photographs (6a-e.) showing how' both the roots and trunk o f  the ensdt tree are 
processed into qoc'o, Grissa, July 2004. Photograph taken by the author.
8 Judith Olmstead, T he V ersatile Ensete Plant: Its U se in the Gamu H ighland’, Journal o f  
E thiopian Studies, XII, N o. 1 (1974), 149.
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Figure 6b.
Figure 6c.
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Figure 6d.
Figure 6e.
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Figure 7. Transporting qoc'o (processed ensdt) to the market, Sisota, July 2004. 
Photograph taken by the author.
In short, households in Gedeo have a clear division o f labour along gender 
lines. Gedeo men are only involved in ensdt agriculture from the propagation 
stage until it is about three years old and able to withstand weeds. After that, the
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men might not visit the farm. Women are also involved in ensdt cultivation 
during the propagation season where their role is mainly restricted to transporting 
the small plants from the nursery to the main farm, usually by carrying them on 
their backs. Once the ensdt is planted, the main task for men is weeding and this 
normally continues during the vulnerable first three years o f  the tree’s growth.80
70 Interview with Alamayahu Baqate, Grissa, 15 July 2004.
80 The control o f  farm pests has also been a task preformed by men. The most devastating 
enem y o f  ensdt, w hich are very difficult for peasants to control are rodents ( f ilf ii l). The rodents
78
Deciding which enscit tree should be cut down to process for food, or in 
some cases exchanging qoc'o for household necessities, was mainly the 
responsibility of the women. The processing of ensdt for food is a painstaking and 
highly labour intensive task. It has traditionally always been the exclusive 
responsibility of women to undertake the harvesting of ensdt. Since it is taboo for 
Gedeo men to set foot on the farm while ensdt is being processed, households 
might carry out the task by forming a work party. Converting an ensdt tree into 
either cjoc'o or bula (a juicy substance squeezed out qoc'o), forms which are 
suitable for human consumption, cannot be done overnight; it requires several 
weeks of hard work, and women as the domestic managers decide when to start 
processing the ensdt by calculating the needs of the household before the family 
runs out of supplies.81
The labour intensive nature of ensdt production has necessitated cohesion 
and mutual cooperation between married partners.82 Men and women have needed 
to work together, not only to run a common household, but also as production 
partners. The household’s food requirements were the overriding concern when 
deciding how many ensdt trees had to be harvested and when it should be done, 
and the men had to plan for the future and plant sufficient trees. One of the 
advantages of ensdt is that it can be harvested throughout the year.83
live underground and attack the ensdt plant’s roots; because o f  this, peasants som etim es do not 
discover the problem until some o f  their ensdt trees are badly damaged. Controlling rodents is a 
most difficult and time consuming task as they have to dig deep down either to kill them with 
spears or suffocate them with smoke. Interview with Damaro Sabora, Sisota, 9 July 2004.
81 Interview with Etenase Alamayahu, Grissa, July, 2004.
82 For theories o f  the intensication o f  African agriculture see Mats Widgren, 'Towards a 
Historical Geography o f  Intensive Farming in Eastern Africa', in Islands o f  Intensive Agriculture in 
Eastern Africa , ed. Mats Widgren & John E.G. Sutton (Oxford: James Currey, 2004), 1-18,
83 Interview with Etenashe Alamayahu, Grissa, 18 July, 2004.
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The processing of ensdt for food involves a number of stages. Most of the 
work is carried out on the farm before it is transported home for immediate 
consumption. Firstly, women cut down selected ensdt trees using machetes. If 
many women are involved in the process some begin pulverising the root (to turn 
it into a powder-like substance known locally as gamamma) which has been 
separated from the pseudo-stems. Others remove the fibres from the trunk by 
decorticating it, and the starchy juice which remains {qoc’o) is stored separately 
from the powder produced from the root (gamamma). The ensdt leaves are used to 
cover the substances to hasten the fermentation process as the leaves prevent air 
from circulating in the qoc'o and gamamma. After two weeks the women return to 
the farm to mix the two products, qoc'o and gamamma, together. The gdtnamma's 
main role is to speed up the process of fermentation. Then it will be left for some 
more weeks on the farm, covered tightly with ensdt leaves, although in the interim 
women might returned to the farm to check the level of fermentation.84
At least twice in the following two weeks, the qoc'o and gamamma 
mixture has to be thoroughly remixed by the women, and when doing this they 
have to move it to another location within the farm and place fresh ensdt leaves 
over it. Then, after leaving it for about three weeks they return to the farm in order 
to prepare the fermented qoc'o for transportation, either to home or to market. 
This is essentially the women’s job, and is immensely taxing due to the rugged 
and inhospitable nature of the Gedeo landscape. Some more prosperous 
households who could afford a donkey or mule were not able to use them to 
transport qoc'o the entire distance; women needed to carry the qoc’o to a
84 Interview with Alamayahu Baqate, Grissa, 15 July 2004.
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convenient location so that it could be loaded onto pack animals for the remainder 
o f the journey.85
After arriving home the qoc'o has to be processed in several stages before 
it is ready for human consumption. Qoc'o can be prepared in different forms but 
the most common use in Gedeo is in baking bread. To do this it has to be initially 
cut to the size required. Then it has to be squeezed by hand so that it loses most of 
its moisture before it can be used for cooking. Children, especially daughters, are 
helpful from this stage onwards. Bread prepared from qoc'o is the main form of 
food for the Gedeos, though sometimes bula, another by-product of ensdt, is used 
to prepare porridge. Qoc'o supplemented by daily and meat products forms a 
balanced diet.86
Gedeo households have never been self sufficient in everything they 
require for their livelihood. Although food production was their overriding
concern and most of their land and labour was dedicated to this effort, they also
related to their neighbours in an economic symbiosis. The Gedeos’ inability to 
mix ensdt fanning with animal husbandly due to the scarcity of land meant that 
diary products had to be sourced from elsewhere, and the production of surplus 
ensdt played a crucial role. The exchange of qoc'o for milk and butter from the 
Guji, and to some extent the Jamjam, has been one o f the ancient fonns of 
transaction which still survives on a limited scale.87 The Gedeos’ long term 
dependence on imported diaiy products can be demonstrated by the presence of a 
well developed market system which supplied a variety of products including
85 Interview with AlamayShu Baqate, Grissa, 15 July 2004.
86 Interview with Gobana Latiti, Grissa, 15 July 2004.
87 Interview with Dadu Dukale, C'i tS'u, 2 December 1999.
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meat. Informants recalled that dried meat used to come to Gedeo markets from as 
far away as Arusi via Sidama. Although the market place served as a meeting 
point to facilitate transactions, for instance with the Guji neighbours, the Gedeo 
described how food transactions also took place at different levels. A Guji or a 
Jamjam woman would come to Gedeo with ajar  of butter or cheese and in return 
would take back qoc'o. This was especially common during dry seasons where 
food shortages were high.88 hi the west, the Gedeo exchanged their qoc’o for cloth 
which came particularly from the south Omo region (Gofa) across Lake Abaya. 
The Garbicho in Lake Abaya were very active in this trade.89
Although coffee became one of the most important products of Gedeo, this 
is a relatively recent development which took place after the region was fully 
incorporated into the Ethiopian political and economic system. It is not clear how 
coffee was introduced into the region; however, there is no evidence to suggest 
that the Gedeo cultivated it before the incorporation.90 hi fact when we examine it 
from an ecological perspective, there was no opportunity for the Gedeo to 
cultivate it before the 20th century as their settlement was restricted only to the 
higher altitude zone (dago). Unlike ensdt, coffee is more sensitive to ecological 
conditions, and the Gedeo were only able to grow it after the 1920s when a 
suitable area was opened up for settlement, as a result of what was known as the 
qdlad measurement of land by the government. The lower altitude zone, the 
wdyna-ddga, is more suitable for crop diversification than the daga (higher
88 Interview with Gute Bedessie. He said that the Gedeos had never considered cattle rearing 
as part o f  their agriculture. Ensdt was and still is the single most important crop which the Gedeo 
relied upon. Meat, milk and butter have always had to come from somewhere. The Gedeo women  
have to take worqe (qoc'o) to market to exchange for these items and the Guji and the Jamjam 
Oromos have been the main suppliers; the Sidama also had been another sources to a lesser extent.
89 Arnold Hodson, 'Southern Abyssinia', The G eographical Journal, LIII No. 2 (1919), 68.
90 McClellan, 'Coffee in Centre-Periphery Relations', 188-191.
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altitude); as a result the Gedeo agricultural system became more dynamic as their 
settlement was expanded into new areas. The next chapter will show how 
incorporation and the qalad measurement of land laid the foundation for Gedeo to 
emerge as a principal coffee producer.
The production of surplus was not pursued for the sake of accumulation; 
rather the main objective as shown above was for exchange and trade. This is in 
no way undervalues the role wealth played within the community. Wealth was 
normally measured by the amount of land one owned and the number of ensat 
trees one planted. If the ensdt trees were tall and fat it meant that the owner was a 
hardworking and skilful farmer. The number of wives also gave an indication of 
how wealthy and successful the person was. Informants pointed out that in the 
Gedeo tradition a person who could afford many wives was one who had 
developed more land to support them, hi later generations however, some men 
practiced polygamy as a status symbol with little or no regard to their economic 
status.91
Outiba: the indigenous land tenure system of the Gedeo
Land has been a central concern in the life of the Gedeo peasant community; 
unlike some other peasant societies whose economy has a degree of diversification, 
the Gedeo depend heavily on agriculture. Understanding the indigenous tenure 
system of the Gedeo is therefore vital because the way land was accessed, 
controlled and passed on to the next generation has never been consistent. 
Moreover, the cultivation of long term crops such as ensdt requires security of
91 Interview with Kole Solale, Sugale, 15 June 2004; Interview with Gote Badasse, Andida, 28 
April 1999.
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tenure as such crops take years to mature.92 As the land tenure system of the 
Gedeo has rarely been a subject of investigation, there is very little information 
about it and that which is available is generalised. The most common descriptive 
term applied to the indigenous land tenure system of the Gedeo is “communal”,
93without specifying the rules governing the way land was administered.
The Gedeos use the term outiba to describe land which they occupied 
before they were incorporated into the Ethiopian empire. This term was not 
applied to land which was later classified by the government as unsettled and 
undeveloped forested land. In the 1920s this land (non-outiba) was decreed to be 
government land and subsequently measured and distributed to soldiers and other 
functionaries in lieu of their salaries (madciria). It came to be known as yaqalad 
maret (meaning land measured and distributed by a rope called qalctd). This will 
be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. Therefore, land referred to as 
outiba is clearly distinct from land which was occupied by naft'dnnas as a result 
of the distribution of land by qalad. Although the concept of outiba is crucial to 
an understanding of the indigenous tenure system of the Gedeos, it has never been 
discussed in previous studies.94
What is important here is that outiba, like any other type of land tenure, 
had its own principles which had evolved over the years. Factors such as 
demography, coupled with a shortage of land, had shaped the way land had been
92 Hans Ruthenberg, Farming Systems in the Tropics, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980),
259.
93 Charles McClellan in his many studies o f  the Gedeo discussed their indigenous land tenure 
system in some detail. However, like many other authors who studied southern Ethiopia, he 
preferred to apply the term “communal” for the indigenous land tenure system o f  the Gedeo. He 
rarely used outiba  as a system o f  land tenure which had its own rules and principles. McClellan, 
State Transformation , 25.
94 McClellan, 'Coffee in Centre-Periphery Relations', 176.
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transferred from generation to generation. However, of prime importance for 
Gedeos was the fact that outiba had provided a sense of security for generations to 
those entitled (mainly men), even when land was in short supply.95
Before examining how individual families and households had been 
exploiting outiba land over the years it is important to examine how land was 
acquired initially by most Gedeos. Access to farming land before the 
incorporation existed at two levels, i.e. at a clan level and at a household or 
individual level. It has been suggested that clan leaders played an important role 
in land acquisition and distribution to their members and also engaged in the 
overall management of land. 96 However, the sketchy nature of available 
information means that it is difficult to know exactly what role they played and 
the full extent of their power.97 The role of clan leaders appears to have been 
restricted to negotiating the acquisition of new territories; when the various clans 
of the Gedeo acquired new territory either from another clan member or from 
another rival ethnic group, decisions as to how the land was to be distributed were 
made at a higher level. Clan leaders did not intercede on a domestic level whereby 
parents passed their landed property down to their offspring following specific 
rules.98
The history of Gedeo has been dominated by the struggle for the available 
land, both internally as well as externally. The Gedeo managed to retain the 
highland plateau of Buie for a long time and then began to expand into the
95 Interview with Bagajo Bonja, C'i £'u, 28 November 1999.
96 Interview with Taqabo Sota, Sisota, 29 April 1999.
97 Interview with Hayicha Danbela Abe, Andida, 30 April 1999; Also see John W.Bruce, 'Do 
Indigenous Tenure Systems Constrain Agricultural Development ?', in L and in African Agrarian  
Systems, ed. Thomas J. and Crummey Bassett, D. (Madison: University o f  W isconsin Press, 1993), 
35.
98 Interview with Hayicha  Danbela Abe, Andida, 30 April 1999.
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adjoining territories, particularly westwards where there was room. Although we 
do not know when they started to move out and what other factors drove them, the 
most obvious reason appears to have been demographic pressure, which pushed 
the population away from the core areas. The Gedeos’ attempt to acquire land in 
the lower zones, particularly in areas used by Guji herders, was a very slow 
process and was not a coordinated effort on the part of the clan leaders to occupy 
new territories, but rather an undertaking by enterprising individuals."
As land in the top highlands become scarce and fertility declined after 
many years of fanning, the Gedeo began to expand into areas where there was the 
potential for ensdt fanning under less competitive circumstances. These areas, 
although fertile, were not of interest to their neighbours the Guji because the 
nature of the landscape was not suitable for cattle grazing, although they came to 
the area occasionally for them to feed. Most of these areas were claimed by the 
Gedeos through a slow process of encroachment rather than war.100
In the north east, along the Laggadara River, the Gedeo battled with the 
Sidama who were claiming territories across the river, a war waged until the end 
of the nineteenth century when the incorporation of both groups by the Ethiopian 
state finally put an end to the struggle for land. Since then, the River Laggadara 
has been established as the boundary between the Sidama and Gedeo ethnic 
groups.101 In some places, clan leaders appeared to have played a significant role 
in relation to the distribution as well as the protection of territories. When a new 
territory was acquired under the clan leadership, the land was divided among the
99 Interview with Kole Solale, Sugale, 15 June 2004.
100 McClellan, State Transformation, 75-77.
101 McClellan, State Transformation, 75.
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clan members. We do not know how this was implemented or whether people who 
actively participated in the war were given an extra share of land for their services. 
For instance, one informant told me that the land on which he and his family lives 
(in a place called Shakwa) was originally given to his grandfather by the clan 
leaders. According to this informant, the reason for this was that since his 
grandfather was a well-known warrior he was strategically instated by the clan in 
order to protect the area from Sidama incursion.102 What we do know is that since 
the earliest times, Gedeo has not been a land-abundant society; rather land scarcity 
and a struggle to gain territory have been a major part of its history.103
Over time, access to farm land became increasingly more challenging.104 
Individuals who were either in conflict with their kin from the highlands or who 
were enterprising and wanted to expand their domain were given approval by their 
clan leaders to acquire new land wherever possible. For instance, the story of 
Woke, as described below, provides an insight as to how, through hard work, 
enterprising individuals were also able to bypass the established system to access 
land. Doye’s grandfather Woke managed to obtain a huge amount of land by 
clearing the forest and becoming the first settler. He and his other neighbour Dolo, 
who was a well known hunter, joined forces in order to survive in the difficult and 
hostile environment. This invited jealousy and animosity from his own kin in his 
original settlement in the highlands who demanded to have a share of his newly
102 Interview with Bagajo Bonja, C'i 6'u, 28 November 1999.
103 Interview with Maryam Falaqa, Shakwa, 23 July 2004.
104 Thomas J. Bassett, "Introduction: The Land Question and Agricultural Transformation in 
Sub-Saharan Africa," in Land in African Agrarian Systems, ed. Thomas J.Basset and Donald 
E.Crummey (Madison, Wisconsin: The University o f  W isconsin Press, 1993), 3.
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acquired and well developed land, which was much larger and more fertile than 
their depleted and congested land in the highlands.105
At an individual household level we can find precise information 
concerning how land was accessed, controlled and disposed of by individuals. We 
realise from oral sources that outiba was not a simple system, but rather a system 
which had developed a number of control mechanisms whereby access to land 
was governed by a set of rules. The most important principle of the Gedeo tenure 
system is inheritance; that is, every married son was entitled to a share of land 
whatever the size might be (although not an equal share). According to Gedeo 
elders “what the father had eaten, his children should taste,”106 which means that 
every son was entitled to a share of land from his father’s plot. A newly married 
son would receive land from his parents as a gift (we can assume daughters are 
excluded; their main concern was to gain a marriage partner). The land gained 
from parents as an endowment to start an independent life was crucial for many 
households because land acquired this way was the main source of their livelihood. 
This does not mean that there were 110 other ways to acquire land; rather it shows 
how inheritance was the most important form of land acquisition for the Gedeos 
and one which has shown a great deal of continuity.107
The distribution of land to sons did not take place at a set time, however. 
After the son married he would be allowed to construct a house near the parental 
home and then when they felt that it was an appropriate time to allow the young 
married couple to be independent they would be assigned land with some mature 
ensat plants on it, so that the new household would not run out of food before their
105 Interview with D oye Biftu, Sisota, 24 July, 2004.
106 Interview with Jago Jilo, Grissa, 22 July 2004.
107 Interview with Bagajo Bonja, C'i £'u, 28 November 1999.
main crop was ready. That is why in Gedeo most people were still settled on land 
which was originally acquired by their grandfathers or great grandfathers and most 
villages in Gedeo are an outgrowth from a single homestead.108
The basic principle of inheritance remained the same, even in a 
polygamous household, although there were some variations in the way 
inheritance was implemented in practical terms. Normally, Gedeo men assigned 
ensdt farms to each wife if  they had more than one; this was because women 
spend more time in the farm than men, and when a son married he was only 
allowed to inherit land which had been tended by his biological mother. Since the 
initial land allocation to each wife was not made uniformly it would have an 
impact on the size of the share each child would receive at marriage. It was 
common, therefore, for children who were bom from the same father but different 
mothers to inherit land of different sizes. There was also a practice which could be 
equated to primogeniture whereby one son could receive more land than the others. 
Informants insisted, however, that this did not always apply, because parents made 
decisions based 011 other factors such as loyalty, honesty, responsibility and other 
similar qualities which a father might feel should be possessed by the son who 
succeeded him.109
The land tenure system of the Gedeo was not only concerned about access 
and control but also about protecting that which had been acquired. The Gedeo 
practiced what was known as “wife inheritance”, which meant that a brother was 
entitled to marry his sister-in-law if her husband died. According to informants, 
this as a long standing tradition had been practiced more in earlier decades than in
108 Interview with Gote Badasse, Andida, 28 April 1999.
109 Interview with Morkate Jarsso, Andida, 28 April 1999; and Bfidecha Leko, Tumticha, 29 
April 1999.
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the present.110 Tracing its historical genesis was very difficult; however, Gedeo 
elders pointed out that the basic rationale for such a practice was to prevent land 
being accessed by an outsider; if the widow remarried outside the husband’s 
family, the chance of losing the land to that individual was high. Some also argued 
that other than protecting land there was an additional factor which upheld this 
practice as a morally sound undertaking; if a brother died, leaving behind many 
children, it was in their best interest that their uncle stepped in as a father figure so 
that both their wellbeing and their possession of the land could be safeguarded.111
This is a generalised view of what appears to have been a common practice 
among Gedeo households over a long period of time. As pointed out earlier, 
access to land was subjected to various changes, but when some options ceased to 
be viable, new ones presented themselves depending upon shifts in the political 
economy. Clearing the forest to acquire new land, which was a common practice 
in the nineteenth century, was no longer a possibility in the twentieth. However, 
as will be discussed in the next chapter, new forms of access to land emerged after 
the 1920s with the emergence of sharecropping tenancy. In short, the above 
picture does not take into account the possibility of other ways of accessing land 
for those people who were ambitious, or who had originally received a small share 
of land due to the small size of their own parents’ land.112
110 Interview with Hayicha Danbela Abe, Andida, 30 April 1999; and Kole Solale, Sugjile, 15 
June 2004.
111 Interview with Alako Wadari, Grissa, 16 July 2004.
112 Donald L. Donham, Work and P ow er in Maale, Ethiopia, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia 
U.P., 1994), 70; The practice in Maale according to Donham was that the eldest son received the 
largest share, and although a similar situation existed in Gedeo, informants pointed out that this 
should not be assumed to be a universal norm. There had been circumstances whereby younger 
sons received a larger share due to a decision made by their father. Interview with Hirba Kalecha, 
Grissa, 14 July 2004; and Hirba QorC'e, Grissa, 14 July 2004.
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Nevertheless, what was evident was that at the turn of the nineteenth 
century the position of the Gedeo household changed dramatically because of 
pressure from the state. Although this did not have a direct effect on their land 
tenure system, the household economy, whose principal existence was mainly the 
maintenance of its members, came under a huge strain as it struggled to support 
the state and its functionaries. Now, extra labour and produce had to be generated 
by households to meet the new demands. As the next chapter will show, 
incorporation was not wholly negative; it also brought some benefits by bringing 
to an end the pre-incorporation period of rivalries which dominated the region and 
had been a particular menace for small communities such as the Gedeos.
Conclusion
Gedeo5s well developed agricultural economy was very attractive for the 
Ethiopian empire which was expanding aggressively in the south in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century. The ecology as well as the infrastructure of 
Gedeo provided an essential framework for the Ethiopian state to impose its 
institutions. Although politically Gedeo was characterised by deep division and 
fragmentation, the institutions which had been developed by the Gedeos were also 
a useful means for the Ethiopian government to impose its system of 
administration. They enabled the collection of tribute for its soldiers and 
functionaries from the Gedeo farming households in an orderly manner and on a 
regular basis. As the next chapter will show, the mobilisation of mass labour for 
the construction and clearing of forests for building settlers’ garrison towns 
(katamci in Amharic) was executed efficiently and smoothly, mainly through these 
elaborate indigenous institutions.
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The Gedeo had weakened themselves by years of internal rivalry, and as a 
result, when the Ethiopian state arrived in the area no clan had managed to 
establish ascendancy over the others. Their relationship with their neighbours was 
equally fraught and territorial disputes dominated external relationships with them. 
However, ties which connected them to both the Sidama and the Oromo were far 
more complex than simple territorial disputes. Although the phase following the 
incorporation was traumatic because of the extra burden imposed upon them 
through the institution of gab bar, the state also improved security by controlling 
clan rivalry. Hence, as the next chapter will demonstrate, the period from the 
incorporation until the Italian invasion was a formative one, which shaped 
Gedeo’s history until1974.
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Chapter Two
From Incorporation to the Italian Occupation: the Political 
Economy of Gdbbar and Qdlad, Access to Land and Controversies
1890s-1941
The incorporation of Gedeo into the modem Ethiopian empire state was 
accomplished as part of a grand scheme by Menilek (1889-1913) in his attempt to 
create a unified empire under his leadership. Menilek, who is also commonly 
known as the chief architect of the modern Ethiopian empire state, conducted a 
series of military campaigns in order to bring the diverse peoples and cultures of 
south, southeast and southwest Ethiopia under his control. Menilek’s expansion 
into those regions was multifaceted; he had economic as well as territorial 
ambition.1 After Gedeo was fully incorporated within the Ethiopian administration 
it passed through various stages, this chapter being concerned with the gdbbar and 
qdlad phases of development, which shaped the history of the region until the 
1974 revolution.2
During the period from the incorporation until the introduction of qdlad in 
the 1920s there was a tribute dependency whereby Gedeo peasant households 
supported the soldiers and other functionaries of the state in all their needs.3 By 
the 1920s, the system had moved a step beyond this and land began to be allocated 
directly to the ndft'dhm  and other groups of people who were associated with the 
government. Before discussing the imposition of qdlad it is useful to discuss the
For a comprehensive treatment o f  Shawa, Ethiopia and Menilek see the following works 
R.H.Kofi Daikwah, Shewa, Menilek and the Ethiopian Empire: 1813-1889  (London: Heinemann,
1975); Harold G. Marcus, The Life and Times o f  Menelik Ii: Ethiopia, 1844-1913  (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1975).
2For the history o f  the creation o f  the Modern Ethiopia Empire State see Bahru, A H isto iy  
o f  Modern Ethiopia , 60-68; Also see Donham, "Old Abyssinia", 3-50.
3 McClellan, 'Coffee in Centre-Periphery Relations', 184-191.
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nature of the gdbbar system in Gedeo in some detail in order to understand how it 
had failed to provide for the state’s requirements, and thus why it was deemed 
necessary to introduce what was known as qdlad as an additional means of 
resource extraction and allocation.4
The gdbbar system is generally viewed in a negative light. Undeniably it 
was highly exploitative and burdensome for the peasant households upon which it 
was forcefully imposed.5 However, this is an incomplete picture of the system 
and allows little discussion as to why it was successfully imposed in large areas of 
the south;6 the use of force alone does not explain why the system was able to 
operate, because without protecting at least some of the interests of the local 
people the system would have been impossible to maintain.
This chapter will demonstrate that the gdbbar system was not as negative 
as traditionally portrayed.7 In fact, as will be shown in subsequent chapters, 
sharecropping tenancy, which was considered superior to the gdbbar system, 
made Gedeo peasant households even more vulnerable and insecure; whereas 
despite the burdensome nature of the gdbbar system, households were more stable
4 Charles W. McClellan, 'Land, Labour, and Coffee: The South's Role in Ethiopian Self- 
Reliance, 1889-1935', African Economic H isto ty  no. 9 (1980), 70-71; For a more detailed study o f  
the process see McClellan, State Transformation, 81-100.
5 For a discussion o f  the conditions o f  gdbbar  in the eyes o f  Ethiopia’s pre-war 
intellectuals see Bahru, Pioneers o f  Change, 124.
6 Bahru, A H isto iy o f  Modern Ethiopia, 92; For instance, Bahru cited the opinion o f  a 
foreign based newspaper, The Times o f  London, which described the system as ‘a far worse evil 
than slavery’; the problem with this kind o f  view  is that we do not know on what basis this 
particular journalist arrived at that conclusion. Teshale Tibebu, The Making o f  Modern Ethiopia 
1896-1974  (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press Inc., 1995), 33-36.
7 For a traditional view o f  the gdbbar  system see John M. Cohen and D ov Weintraub, 
Land and Peasants in Im perial Ethiopia: The Social Background to a Revolution  (Assen: Van 
Gorcum, 1975), 37.
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because their right to land was recognised.8 As will be shown in this and 
subsequent chapters, the reason the Gedeos did not rise against the system during 
the heyday of gdbbar was not, as often assumed, due to a lack of access to modem 
firearms, but rather because it implied an assurance that their rights to their 
property would continue in the tradition which had been in existence prior to the 
incorporation.9 Thus, despite the exploitative nature of the gdbbar system, Gedeo 
households were not only able to survive but had also managed to transfer their 
land to their children without interference from any outside power, in accordance 
with the rules laid out in the outiba tenure system. I argue that this pragmatic 
attitude on the part of the state was the key factor in the success of the system by 
preventing mass opposition from the local people.
In the 1920s when qdlad was introduced in Gedeo, the idea was not to 
replace the gdbbar system but rather to increase die exploitative potential of the 
state and its military and ecclesiastical groups, by extending the system into areas 
which had not been previously reached. The introduction of qdlad not only 
expanded the resource base of the state and the elite but also enabled them to 
maximise the exploitation of the labour forces by bringing a wide and fertile area 
into their domain. Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated, the introduction of qdlad 
was not a smooth process and there was opposition to its implementation. The
8 Guluma Gemeda, 'Land, Agriculture and Class Formation in the Gibe Region, South 
western Ethiopia', in Land, Literacy and the State in Sudanic Africa, ed. Donald Crummey 
(Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2005), 152.
9 McClellan, State Transformation, 73; McClellan thought that the main reason the 
Gedeos did not rise in mass rebellion against the settlers was because o f  the latter’s superiority in 
firearms.
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main opposition however came not from ordinary Gedeos, but from the elite 
(balabats) who were recruited by the state as local administrators.10
As in the case of the gdbbar system, the process of the measurement and
distribution of land by qdlad has not been investigated adequately. As a result, our
understanding of the process is based on generalisations.11 Qdlad has been
presented as a process whereby land was removed from the local people and then
distributed to the ndffdnnas as a madaria land in lieu of salaries from the
1 0government, to whom they were in service. If the qdlad was a process of land 
seizure, what kind of land was seized and from whom and on what grounds? The 
basic assumption regarding the imposition of qdlad that it was an underhand act, 
whereby the state engaged in a systematic reallocation of resources to its loyal 
followers, has never been queried. There has been little effort to establish whether 
the state confiscated land which was held at the time by local people, or whether 
land which was not owned by anyone before the introduction of qdlad was 
distributed. Previous research has not ventured away from the dominant and 
established paradigm and examined exactly what was meant by land alienation.
10 McClellan, State Transformation, 81-100; There is no concrete evidence regarding the 
opposition to the imposition o f  qdlad  from ordinary Gedeos. McClellan suggested that this type o f  
resistance against qdlad  was minimal and mostly indirect, such as destroying posts intended to 
delineate boundaries and so on.
11 For example Addis Hiwet describes the process from incorporation to the introduction 
o f qdlad  as follows “... After the conquest and the effective occupation and incorporation o f  the 
south, south-west and south-eastern areas, a classical system o f  Feudal Serfdom was established. 
An extensive process o f  land confiscation and enserfment o f  the indigenous peasants took place”. 
By Feudal Serfdom he meant the gdbbar  system and qdlad  is referred to as the process o f  an 
extensive confiscation o f  land from the local people. Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia, 31-32.
12 For a similar process in Jimma see Guluma Gemeda, 'Land, Agriculture and Society in 
the Gibe Region; South western Ethiopia, C. 1850-1974' ( PhD thesis, Michigan State University, 
1996), 186- 190.
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Firstly, however, it is essential to understand the nature of the gdbbar system in 
Gedeo in some detail.13
Incorporation and the imposition of gdbbar
Expansion and conquest were not new developments in Ethiopian history; in 
modern Ethiopian history, Tewodros (1855-68) aspired without success to unify 
Ethiopia,14 Yohamiis (1872-89) had some successful ventures in this regard; 
however, Menilek finally achieved what his predecessors, the kings of Shawa, 
attempted over a long period of time.15 Menilek’s expansion was made in direct 
response to both internal and external challenges. Internally there were competing 
interest groups although the defeat of Negus (King) Takla-Haymanot of Gojjam at 
the battle of Embabo in January 1882 had removed one of the barriers to Menilek 
becoming emperor of Ethiopia. This development also gave Menilek uncontested 
and unlimited economic access to the rich regions of southwest Ethiopia.16
Finally, the death of Yohannis IV at Matama in 1889 while fighting the 
Mahadists of the Sudan gave Menilek a chance to assert his claim to the Ethiopian 
throne.17 The elimination of internal competitors meant that he was able to realise 
his dream of being crowned King of Kings in Ethiopia as no serious protagonists
13 For a detailed discussion o f  qa lad  and gdbbar  see Mantel-Niecko, The Role o f  Land  
Tenure, 93.
14 Sven Rubenson, The Survival o f  Ethiopian Independence, Lund Studies in International 
History; (London: Heinemann, 1976), 172-287.
15 For the history o f  Shawan expansion see Ege, Class, 191-220; A lso see Abir, Ethiopia: 
The Era o f  the Princes, 144-182; Merid W. Aregay, 'The Early History o f  Ethiopia's Coffee Trade 
and the Rise o f  Shawa', The Journal o f  African H istory 29, 1 (1988), 19-25.
Ic Bahru, A H isto iy  o f  Modern Ethiopia, 62.
17 Zewde Gabre-Sellassie, Yohannes Iv o f  Ethiopia: A P olitical Biography (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1975), 238-249; Also see Izabela Anna Orlowska, 'Re-Imagining Empire: 
Ethiopian Political Culture under Yohannis Iv, 1872-89' (Ph D thesis, University o f  London 2006, 
2006), 212.
97
remained. However, he had yet to fulfil his other objective which was territorial 
expansion. The main challenge for him was the growing interest of European 
powers in Ethiopia and the Horn. Menilek responded to their challenges 
systematically through a combination of war and diplomacy. He succeeded in 
curbing both French and British imperialism with skilful diplomacy, often by 
playing one against the other, whilst he was obliged to use force against the 
Italians. After he scored a resounding victory against the Italians at Adwa in 1896, 
it was clear that he was a force to be reckoned with, and despite their distaste, the 
European powers were obliged to recognise Ethiopia’s importance in world 
politics.18
His expansion to the south, southeast and southwest was met with varied 
resistance, and the reactions of the local people depended largely on their own 
level of development and organisation. In places where there was strong 
leadership expansion he was met with fierce resistance and the reaction of the 
Ethiopian forces was equally uncompromising. Superior force was used to break 
local resistance and in some places violence was the norm. This also determined 
what followed; in places where resistance had been strong the system imposed 
later was usually repressive. Two examples in this category were the Kingdoms of 
Walayta in the south and Kaffa in southwest. The former was finally incorporated 
in 1894 after a major military campaign launched by Menilek himself. The 
massacre and devastation of Walayta set an example to others who might want to 
offer resistance, and was repeated three years later when Kaffa was incorporated.
18 For a detailed treatment o f  this period see R. A. Caulk and Bahru Zewde (ed.), 'Between 
the Jaws o f  Hyenas: A D iplom atic H isto iy o f  Ethiopia, 1876-1896' (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 
2002).
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It took almost nine months and three major military campaigns to weaken and 
finally break the resistance of this highly organised ancient kingdom.19
In contrast to the above, some local leaders felt that offering resistance was 
costly and pointless and opted to negotiate; in this case Menilek not only refrained 
from sending in his army but also gave them internal autonomy providing that 
they fulfilled his obligations. Jimma was a famous example of this approach and 
its ruler Abba Jiffar enjoyed a great deal of autonomy. As a result, his kingdom 
thrived as an important trading centre, mainly for slaves and coffee. The case of 
Gedeo differed from both of these contrasting scenarios. Because of its 
fragmented political structure it was unable to put up strong resistance, but also 
the absence o f a well organised leadership denied them the ability to negotiate 
what sort of system might be imposed.20
However, local sources provide two different narrative versions regarding 
the final incorporation of the Gedeo into the Ethiopian empire.21 One version 
claims that resistance was offered against the Ethiopian forces at the initial stage 
of the incorporation. However, the invading power was mighty both in firepower 
and organisation, and therefore the Gedeo were overwhelmed and defeated.22
The other version is rather different. According to the information 
provided by one of my informants from a place called Sisota, the incorporation of 
Gedeo was not only peaceful, unlike in many other cases, but also the Gedeo took
19 Bahru, A History o f  Modern Ethiopia, 64.
20 For the history o f  Jimma see Herbert S.Lewis, Jimma A bba Jifar, an Oromo Monarchy: 
Ethiopia, 1830-1932  (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 2001). Also see Guluma, 'Land, 
Agriculture and Society in the Gibe Region', 145.
21 McClellan, State Transformation, 21-31; McClellan only recognises the forceful 
conquest o f  Gedeo. Interview with Doye Biftu, Sisota, 24 July, 2004.
22 Interview with Morkate Jarsso, Andida, 28 April 1999; Kole Soliile, Sugale, 15 June 
2004.
99
the initiative. The presence of another powerful force in the area was regarded as 
potentially useful because the Gedeos were in danger from external incursions. At 
the time of the incorporation the Gedeo not only had troubles with the 
neighbouring communities of Gujis and Sidamas but also internal conflict among 
the seven clans of the Gedeo. This informant claimed that it was his grandfather 
who first brought the “Amharas” (sometimes the Gedeo use this word to mean 
Ethiopians) to Sisota. He said that due to the problem of kin rivalry his 
grandfather was experiencing difficulty in protecting the large tract of land which 
he had developed himself by clearing the forest before the arrival of Ethiopian 
forces in the region. He said that since the Ethiopian force had already camped at 
Shesha (an early garrison town, in what is now called Sidama) the Gedeos were 
already well aware of their presence before being formally incorporated into the 
empire.23
As part o f reconnaissance activity the Ethiopian army had been conducting 
occasional raids against the elusive but more powerful Oromo pastoralists in the 
lowland below the Gedeo territory. The grandfather of this informant travelled to 
Shesha, which was a military base for the Ethiopian army, to inform them that the 
Gedeo were in need of the establishment of law and order. The invitation was 
well received and a force was sent to stabilise the area. His grandfather was thus 
not only able to protect his land from being taken over by rivals but also earn 
himself the position of qoro (a local authority below the balabaf) within the 
government in recognition of his contribution. This is of course only one 
individual’s account of the process of the incorporation of Gedeo. It does suggest
23 Interview with D oye Biftu, Sisota, 24 July, 2004. Most o f  these early garrison towns in 
the south later evolved into important urban centres. As will be discussed below, the first garrison 
town for Gedeo was Buie which is still the capital o f  Buie wcirada.
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however that the conquest of Gedeo was easier to accomplish than, for instance, 
that o f Walayta, discussed above.24
The conditions within Gedeo were also conducive to domination by the 
Ethiopian army. At the time of the Ethiopian advance, the Gedeo were loosely 
organised and without any cohesive unity which would have enabled them to 
defend themselves from outside attack. They had already been weakened from 
years of internal division and rivalry, both among the seven clans but also with 
other neighbouring ethnic groups. This left the Gedeo with little bargaining power 
in negotiating with the Ethiopian forces regarding the type of structure to be 
imposed on them. Information is lacking about the initial stages of the 
incorporation and, as indicated elsewhere, the official sources are silent about 
Gedeo. What we do know is that the gdbbar system which followed the 
incorporation was very oppressive.25
Dajazmach (lit. commander of the gate) Lulsagad was Menilek’s general 
who held responsibility for the incorporation of Gedeo.26 He was the governor of 
the vast region known as Sidamo. The incorporation of Gedeo was not conducted 
as a separate undertaking but would have been carried out along with other 
communities which were later administered by the Sidamo province. The gdbbar 
system was implemented immediately after the Gedeo came under Ethiopian 
administration. Local leaders such as the abba~ gada (highest religious authority 
of Gedeo) and heads o f the various Gedeo clans were contacted and given 
instructions regarding cooperation with the Ethiopian forces. We do not know
24 Marcus, The Life and Times o f  Menelik li, 190.
25 Haile Miriam, The Building o f  an Empire, 41.
20 McClellan, State Transformation, 22.
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how long it took for the system to be introduced throughout Gedeo, but by the 
time Lulsagad was replaced by Dajazmach Balcha in 1908 it is believed that the 
gdbbar system had already been firmly established.27
The ndft'anna- gdbbar relationship in Gedeo
As discussed above, the ndft'anna-gdbbar 28 system was introduced in Gedeo 
following the incorporation of the region into the Ethiopian empire in the last 
decade of the nineteenth century.29 The term “ndft'anna-gdbbar” and “gdbbar”30 
are used interchangeably in most of the secondary works. For the sake of 
simplicity I will refer to the “gdbbar” system from here onwards. In this section 
an outline of the main features of the gdbbar system which played such a pivotal 
role in the history of the Gedeo will be provided, and by doing so we will attempt 
to clarify its nature. The analysis will be from the perspective of the peasant 
households upon which it was imposed. In addition, this will give an opportunity 
to re-examine and challenge previously held assumptions about the system, most 
of which resulted from inadequate analysis.
The gdbbar system was the political and economic system imposed 011 
Gedeo after it was incorporated into a larger state. It was not only about the 
collection of tribute (as the term “gdbbar” implies, meaning “tribute-paying
27 Tsehai Brhaneselassie, 'The Life and Career o f  Dajazmac Balca Aba Nafso', Journal o f  
Ethiopian Studies IX, no. No. 2 (1971), 180-184; Pankhurst, State and L and in Ethiopian H isto iy , 
143.
28 McClellan, 'Land, Labour, and C offee’; Charles W. McClellan, 'Perspectives on the 
Neftenya a-Gabbar System: The Darasa, Ethiopia', Africa (Rome) (1978), 426-440.
29 Bahru, A H isto iy o f  Modern Ethiopia, 92.
30 See the following works Cohen and Weintraub, Land and Peasants, 37; Also see 
Patrick Gilkes, The D ying Lion: Feudalism and M odernisation in Ethiopia  (London: Julian 
Friedmann, 1975); 105-106.
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peasant”) but also those granted gdbbar rights were expected to discharge certain 
duties towards the state, mainly security and judicial. The first to gain from the 
new system as recipients were soldiers of the Imperial army, normally known as 
ndft'dnnas (literally “rifle men”) who were mostly drawn from the north, but were 
not necessarily Amharas, coming from various different ethnic groups; Guraghe, 
Oromo and others. These were the people who were instrumental in incorporating 
the south firmly into what has come be to be known as modem Ethiopia.31
The gdbbar system enabled the state to administer the newly incorporated 
areas in a pragmatic way. As a method of tribute collection, the system did not 
require the Gedeo peasant households to reorganise production or to produce new 
crops in order to fulfil their obligation, either towards the state or to the grantees 
(mainly ndft'dnnas), but only demanded what was available from them. This 
minimised the level of opposition from local people. It also relieved the state of 
the chore of transporting cash or other forms of payment to its soldiers and 
officials in the newly expanding areas. A low level of infrastructure was needed, 
which was advantageous because as the empire stretched physically across a wide 
geographic space, the challenge of supplying an army would have been great. The 
ndft'dnnas were freed from the burden of supporting themselves and their families 
by farming the land and would become professional soldiers.32
The gdbbar system was introduced in Gedeo relatively easily. This can be 
contrasted with the more problematic issue of qalad (land measurement and 
distribution), the introduction of which was opposed by the local balabat (local
31 McClellan, State Transformation, 37-53; Also see his other work, McClellan, 'The 
Ethiopian Occupation o f  Northern Sidamo', 521.
32 Gabra-Wald Engeda-Warq, 'Ethiopia's Traditional System o f  Land Tenure and 
Taxation', Ethiopia Obsen>er Vol. V, no. No 4 (1962); 306.
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officials who were selected by the state from among the Gedeos) and as well as 
the peasants. There were a number of reasons for its relative success which will 
be highlighted in this section.
The gdbbar system was implemented successfully because it did not 
attempt to revise the traditional land ownership rights of the communities as the 
peasants were allowed to retain their indigenous land tenure systems. Since the 
system was only about tribute collection and control, communities grudgingly 
accepted the system as long as it did not interfere with the fundamental issue of 
land rights. There was no outright opposition to its implementation. This is 
contrary to the commonly held view about the imposition of the system which 
claims that force was the main reason behind its success, derived from the 
assumption that as the south had been incorporated by force, likewise the gdbbar 
system was maintained by the use of force. However, a number o f compromises 
were made both on the part of the peasants and the balabats.33
In order to understand the internal workings of the gdbbar system it is 
firstly essential to identity the groups who were directly involved in the system. 
The three important groups were the n a ff anna, the balabat and the ordinary 
Gedeo peasants or gabbars34 A harmonious relationship between these three was 
essential for the system to operate smoothly, and each of these groups had 
interests as well as obligations within the system. Although the ndft'dnnas were 
the most privileged within the gdbbar system, followed by local balabats and
33 Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia, 31.
34 Tsehai Berhane Selassie, 'The Balabat and the Coffee Disease: Politics and Ritual in 
Darasa', in Working P apers on Society and H isto iy in Im perial Ethiopia: The Southern Periphery 
from  the 1880s to 1974  ed. D. L. and W. J. Donham (Cambridge: Cambridge, African Studies 
Centre), 197-202.
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qoros (local officials below the balabat), even the Gedeo peasants who were at the 
bottom of the hierarchy (i.e. gabbars) had some of their rights protected.
The ndft'dnnas were among the key beneficiaries of the system. They had 
an obvious interest in making the system more effective because their survival 
was dependent largely on its existence. The rapid expansion of Menilek’s empire 
meant that the territories which were annexed in the south were far removed from 
the military’s home base, and since the government had neither the resources nor 
the infrastructure to supply the army with essentials, the army’s survival had to 
depend on resources drawn from local areas. Since the soldiers were not paid 
salaries by the imperial government for their services, a mechanism had to be 
developed through which resources were generated locally to support them.35
Thus, the gdbbar system provided a means to achieve Menilek’s grand 
goal of empire building. Gdbbar as an institution was not at all new in Ethiopia. 
It had had a long period of existence, probably as old as the land tenure system of 
the north in the heartland of historic Ethiopia.36 Therefore, as the empire expanded 
further to the south, southeast and southwest it was not necessary to invent a new 
system to deal with the situation, but rather to adapt age old institutions which 
were flexible enough to accommodate these new circumstances. By these means 
the ndft'dnnas not only managed to support themselves by collecting tributes from 
the newly incorporated areas but also began to send asrat (tithe) tax to the capital, 
Addis Ababa.37 According to the practice, each naft'dnna was allocated a certain
35 For an historical discussion o f  the association o f land grants for military services see 
Taddesse Tamrat, Church and State, 98-103.
36 In his recent study, Crummey traced the origin o f the term gdbbar  in the reign o f  Iyasu 
the Great, Crummey, Land and Society, 225.
37 Gabra-Wald, 'Ethiopia's', 302-339; Mahtama-Sellassie Walda-Masqal, 'The Land 
System o f  Ethiopia', Ethiopia Obsen>er v o l.l , no. N o 9 (1957), 295.
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number of peasant fanning households, and in order for the household to be 
allocated, it had to posses land and to be able to function as a fann household 
from which to draw support.
The process of enumeration and classification of households in order to 
allocate each to a ndft'ahna was made through the balabat and qoros. These, as 
we shall see, were important groups who fonned the bridge between the Ethiopian 
state and the local people. Gdbbar was allocated to individual ndft'dnnas 
depending on their status and merit.38 There is no accurate information about the 
number of gabbars who were given to each ndft'dnna. However, McClellan 
confirmed that the information reported by his informants and field data he 
collected from Gedeo corroborated the following general fonnula; “300 gabbars 
for a shambal [commander of the thousand], 100 for a meto aleka [commander of 
the hundred], 50 for a hamsa aldqa [commander of the fifty] and fewer for 
common soldiers.” Usually local variations also occurred, but the reasons for this 
are not clearly indicated.39 It is also not possible to tell whether the family 
requirements of the ndft'dnnas were taken into consideration.40
We know very little about the nature of Gedeo households during the time 
of the imposition of the gdbbar system. As a result, it is not clear on which criteria 
each was assigned to a ndft’dnnas or other functionary of the state. There are a few 
indications that assessments were made individually. McClellan has touched upon 
this issue and pointed out that some of the poorer were counted as half a gdbbar,
38 McClellan, State Transformation , 64.
39 McClellan, State Transformation, 64-65; See also Marcus, The Life and Times o f  
Menelik Ii, 192; Marcus pointed out that, according to information gathered from an informant 
who claimed to have been a ndft'aha in Sidamo during the governorship o f  Ddjazm ach  Balcha a 
private soldier received seven or eight gabbars. Although Gedeo was within Sidamo province it is 
not clear whether they were from Gedeo or other districts.
40 McClellan, State Transformation, 65.
106
and only required to fulfil half of what is required from a full gdbbar. However, 
we know with some degree of certainty that a functioning household with land 
and sufficient labour was the pre-requisite for the system to work.41
Whatever the status of the ndft'dnna within the army, the Gedeo household 
which was allocated as gdbbar was expected to fulfil the needs of the ndft'dnna 
and his family. A few civilians and priests were also given gdbbar households for 
their maintenance; however there is no quantitative data which shows how many 
officials gained this privilege. The proportion of gabbars to ndft'dnna is also 
relevant in understanding the impact the system had on individual households. 
From existing sources we understand that the process of assigning gabbars to 
ndft'dnnas (soldiers or civilian functionaries of the government) was based not 
only on rank but also 011 m erit42 Therefore, the government used the system not 
only as payment for their seivices but also to reward those who had made extra 
contributions. This had important implications for the gabbars, because since 
there were no clear rules to regulate how many seivices baldgdbbars (owner of 
gdbbar) were allowed to request from their respective gabbars, beyond doubt the 
system was open to abuse.
For reasons of simplicity, tribute collected from gabbars in Gedeo can be 
categorised into two types; either tribute in kind, mainly produce (qoc'o, 43 grains, 
chickens, eggs, or honey) or tribute in the form of labour. Some informants also 
reported that as part of the gdbbar’s obligation they were required to accompany
41 McClellan, 'Coffee in Centre-Periphery Relations’, 180.
42 MahtamS-Sellassie Walda-Masqal, Zekra N agar (Addis Ababa: 1962 E.C.), 114.
43 Helmer Smeds, 'The Ensete Planting Culture o f  Eastern Sidamo, Ethiopia' ACTA 
GEOGRAPHICA  13, No 4  (1955), 23-25.
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their master when he was ordered by the government to go to war.44 Since there 
were no rules which governed the mode of relationship between a ndft'dnna and 
his gabbars it was assumed generally that the law was in the hands of the superior. 
The absence of a detailed study about the conditions under which gabbars were 
exploited makes it very difficult to acquire a general picture. Countrywide, the 
system was not uniform. There were variations according to regional and other 
factors but even the way in which the gabbars were exploited varied from 
individual to individual. In Gedeo for instance, informants pointed out that 
balagabbars did not all treat their gabbars in the same way; some were kind and 
considerate but most of them were very harsh and cruel.45
Regarding the conditions of gabbars in Gedeo, what we do know is that 
the system was onerous and undermined their morale. It is worth taking note of 
the most common obligations which a gdbbar was expected to discharge to his 
superior. An English traveller, Boyes, who passed through southern Ethiopia at 
the turn of the 19th century, observed the conditions of the gabbars when he 
visited Balcha in Sidamo.
This country was... governed by the Abyssinians, who 
seemed to have a very good time, apparently having nothing 
to do but drink tej, while the Natives did all the work - 
building houses, cultivating the crops, herding the cattle or 
anything else their masters required. In fact, the Natives 
were practically in a state of slavery, and I was told that in
44 Interview with Wordofa Qumbi, Mechele, 5 December 1999. He said that as a part o f  
fulfilling one o f  the obligations o f  a gdbbar  his father was ordered to follow his master {ndft'dnna) 
to the “GondSr Zamacha” (probably the battle o f  Dabra Tabbor). Wordofa was only ten years old 
at the time when he accompanied his father to the campaign by carrying provisions.
45 Interview with T'et'o Ganale, Bufi'essa, 5 December 1999; Shat'at'o Bariso, Shegado, 6 
July, 2004; and Worera C'umburo, Shegado, 6 July, 2004.
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addition to providing their lord with food and drink, they 
were taxed five dollars per head per annum.46
Labour services were the most onerous burden for the gabbars in Gedeo. 
As described by Boyes and others, there were no restrictions concerning the 
amount and nature of work a gdbbar could be asked to carry out for the ndft'dnnas. 
Households that did not fulfil other requirements, such as the provision of tribute 
in produce form, were required to make up the deficit by providing manpower. 
Such households were the poorest and the most vulnerable and they were the ones 
who were liable to flounder under such pressure. It is also known that tax from a 
Gedeo household was rarely collected in cash 47 This is not surprising owing to 
the fact that money had a limited role in the overall economy in this period; it was 
from a practical viewpoint that households were required to pay in kind. There is 
no evidence however to show that attempts were made to force peasants to pay 
dues in the form of commodities which were unavailable in their area for 
ecological reasons, and which they had difficulty obtaining.
The labour seivices of a Gedeo household, which had become a gdbbar of 
a ndft'dnna, were not necessarily restricted to the head of the household.48 
Previous studies referred to women as having a very small role in the gdbbar 
system. For instance, on a number of occasions McClellan refers to work 
connected with growing and collecting ensdt, coffee, firewood, transporting 
produce for marketing, grinding grain and so forth, but he does not note who did
46 John Boyes, My Abyssinian Journey, A Journey through Abyssinia from  the R ed  Sea to 
Nairobi in 1906 in the D ays o f  Emperor Menelik (Nairobi: n.d), 33; Quoted also in McClellan,
State Transformation, 57.
47 McClellan, State Transformation, 67.
48 Interview with Salo Dube, Segado, 6 July, 2004; and Wudo Jibicho, Grissa, 21 July
2004 .
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what task. 49 hi reality it was the women who carried out most of this work. 
Hence, the wife of a gdbbar and in some cases their children were not excluded 
from exploitation. Informants pointed out that the women’s burden might be more 
onerous than that of the husband. The wife of a gdbbar would participate in most 
activities, which ranged from domestic to key agricultural tasks.50 The most 
challenging work for the wife of a gdbbar was ensat processing which requires 
much painstaking hard work. After processing ensat the women might also be 
required to transport the heavy qoc'o on their backs to the towns where most of the 
ndft'dnna lived.51
The gdbbar system was successfully imposed on Gedeo thanks mainly to 
the balabats and the qoros who were recruited from the local population.52 They 
played an important role by bridging the gap between the state and the local 
people. Both the balabats and the qoros also played a crucial role in implementing 
the system because their knowledge and influence 011 the community was of great 
assistance. Balabat was not a new concept; its introduction in the south was in 
keeping with other notions and institutions which were brought to the south 
through the process of incorporation. However, the creation of such offices was 
crucial because local knowledge and influence made the process much smoother.53
49 McClellan, State Transformation, 66-77.
50 Interview with Shat'at'o Bariso, Shegado, 6 July, 2004; and Kole Solale, Sugale, 15 
June 2004.
51 Interview with Shalo Dube, Shegado, 6 July, 2004; and Shat'at'o Bariso, Shegado, 6 
July, 2004.
52 Balabat was the highest office given to the Gedeo elite and the first person appointed to 
this position was Shunde. B elow  him there were several qoros who were selected according to the 
clan structure o f  the Gedeo; thus there was one qoro  for each clan. For a further discussion o f  these 
concepts see McClellan, State Transformation, 23.
53 See Tsehai, Balabat, 198.
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Gedeo’s first balabat was a man called Shunde who appeared to have 
come from the same clan who held the office of the abba-gada (head of the 
incumbent gada) for the whole of the seven clans of Gedeo at the time of the 
incorporation.54 Following his appointment to the new office the blessing from 
the abba-gada earned him the required legitimacy and recognition among his own 
people in accordance with the Gedeo tradition.55 In the initial stages there was no 
attempt to impose the gdbbar system. Tributes were simply gathered collectively 
using the newly created roles of the balabat and qoros. The initial stages of 
Gedeo’s annexation were executed from a nearby military base at Shesha in 
Sidama. After the Gedeo’s submission was secured Ddjazmach Lulsagad decided 
to establish a base inside Gedeo. He chose Buie because of its topography (on the 
high peak of the Gedeo highlands) which had an imposing character over the 
surrounding lowlands. Buie had great strategic importance in overseeing the 
surrounding Oromo pastoralists who were more difficult to control than the Gedeo 
and other settled agrarian communities, and the first task of the newly appointed 
local officials was to mobilise the Gedeo people to clear the land and establish 
Buie as a military base.56
The appointees as office holders of a government post were expected to 
collect tribute from those under their jurisdiction, hi return the state allowed them 
certain rights. They were permitted to retain a third of the tribute collected from 
the gabbars within their gult. As a result, they were also known as siso-holders
54 McClellan, State Transformation, 23.
55 Interview with D oye Biftu, Sisota, 24 July, 2004.
56 McClellan, State Transformation, 23.
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(one third).57 Although it is not easy to exactly define the role of the balabat and 
the qoros within the structure of the newly formed system, their status in the 
hierarchy was as intermediaries between the gabbars (the Gedeo peasants) at the 
bottom and the ndft'dnna and other civilian and religious functionaries of the state 
at the top.58
If the gdbbar system was onerous, harsh, and highly exploitative how were 
Gedeo peasant households able to accommodate it? As shown earlier, the key to 
the success of the gdbbar system lay in its recognition of a household’s rights to 
their land. The indigenous land tenure system of the Gedeo was not affected by 
the imposition of the gdbbar system. Since the gdbbar system had nothing to do 
with land tenure and its main concern was tribute extraction and the control of 
households, the traditional outiba system of the Gedeo continued to operate under 
the gdbbar regime. This indigenous land tenure system of the Gedeo has been 
overlooked by previous studies, because gdbbar was assumed to encompass 
everything including land.59 hi fact, the gdbbar system did impinge on land issues 
as it was a system by which the government supported itself and its functionaries 
by diverting the resources of readily exploitable functioning households. There 
was no desire on the part of the government or the ndft’dnnas to control land 
directly at this stage.50
Not all households coped well with the burden imposed by the gdbbar 
system. There is evidence which indicates that some gdbbar households were
57 Addis Hiwot, Ethiopia, 30-48; McClellan, State Transformation, 60.
58 John Markakis, Ethiopia: Anatomy o f  a Traditional Polity  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1974), 115-116.
59 Yeraswork Admassie, Twenty Years to Nowhere: Property Rights, Land Management 
and Conservation in Ethiopia (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2000), 100.
60 Guluma, 'Land, Agriculture and Class Formation’, 152,
112
forced to flee their homes and property as a result of the heavy handed nature of 
the baldgdbbar. McClellan has argued that the exploitative nature of the 
ndftannci-gabbar system forced many Gedeo peasants to migrate to the nearby 
forest zones. He also described how similar processes in the neighbouring areas 
such as Burji and Borana caused the disintegration of many households. 
According to him the Burjis had settled in Moyale in Kenya as a result of such 
forced migration. This indicates the onerous nature of the system and the fact that 
some households were unable to assimilate the duties imposed 011 them as a result 
o f the gdbbar system.61
In the 1920s Balcha decided to introduce qdlad in Gedeo with the idea of 
widening the resource base of the system rather than replacing it altogether.62 
Dajazmach Balcha, who was the governor of Sidamo (including Gedeo) 011 three 
separate occasions (1898-1908, 1910-1914 and 1917-1928), was especially know 
for his forceful imposition of qdlad in the face of opposition. Although Balcha 
was the chief architect of qdlad his successors, Ras (lit.head) Biru Walda Gabrael 
(1928-1931) and Ras Dasta Damfaw (1932-1936), also promoted similar policies 
in Sidamo in general.63 However, it is important to emphasise that the system 
differed historically and geographically in that gdbbar was introduced in the core 
settled areas of Gedeo whereas qdlad was imposed later in the unsettled and 
uncultivated parts of Gedeo.
In both cases the objective was to extract resources from the local people. 
The method differed from a practical point of view. The main focus of the gdbbar 
system was a fanning household, which was capable of providing reliably for all
61 McClellan, State Transformation , 74.
62 McClellan, 'Coffee in Centre-Periphery Relations’, 184.
03 McClellan, State Transformation , 82.
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the needs of the baldgdbbar, whereas in the case of qdlad the system only allowed 
the holder to have direct access to land. The owner of qdlad land had to arrange 
labour independently in order to develop it, as a result of which a sharecropping 
tenancy was evolved. Before discussing the details of how qdlad was introduced 
in Gedeo there are a number of important factors which should be mentioned to 
place the introduction of qdlad in its historical context and show how it was the 
next logical step for Balcha to take.
The imposition of qdlad and opposition to its implementation
The introduction of qdlad was a major initiative taken by the state and had a 
number of consequences for the history of Gedeo. Other than expanding the 
resource base of the state it was an essential governmental undertaking for a 
number of reasons. Although the gdbbar system had transferred the cost of 
running an expanding empire onto the peasants, it was neither economically 
beneficial for the settlers nor a viable source of revenue for the government. 
Although the gdbbar system enabled the state to support a large army at the 
expense of the local people, it soon failed to satisfy the needs o f an increasing 
empire and a demanding settler population.64
The number of settlers in Gedeo had never been static and had increased 
over the years, particularly at times when one governor was removed and another 
appointed in his place. There appeared to have been a general tendency among the 
governors to bring a large number of their followers with them into the new area 
they were appointed to govern. For instance, when Balcha was transferred from
64 Pankhurst, Economic History o f  Ethiopia, 1800-1935 , 15; Also see Charles W. 
McClellan, 'Articulating Economic Modernisation and National Integration at the Periphery: Addis 
Ababa and Sidamo's Provincial Centers', A fica n  Studies Review  33, No. 1 (1990), 33.
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Sidamo to Harar, he was replaced by Ras Biru, Biru, as was customary, brought 
with him a huge number of his followers from Wollega to Sidamo. As a result 
some of them finally settled in Gedeo, which, being a settled agrarian community 
was a favoured destination. Similarly, although Balcha would have taken some of 
his followers to Harar, nevertheless most remained behind. Thus the burden on 
the local population increased over time since the settlers had to be provisioned 
locally.65
Even before the coming of additional numbers of ndft'dnnas to the region, 
the gdbbar system had reached its full capacity by the 1920s, and was insufficient 
to accommodate the growing number of soldiers, followers and their families. 
Few gabbars could have been reallocated when their previous grantees left the 
area.66 The evidence is slim on this issue, but informants or their descendants who 
are now in Gedeo indicated that they came into the area as followers of one of the 
governors earlier appointed to the region. The number of ndft'dnnas who left the 
area when their governor was transferred from the region however appeared to 
have been small. This did not ease the demand for more local resources to support 
the new settlers, especially in the case of Balcha who was returned to Sidamo 
within a short period. The father of one of my informants came from Wollega to 
Gedeo in 1928 with Ras Biru, who replaced Balcha as governor of Sidamo, and 
according to this informant his father’s intention was to gain qdlad land and settle 
in Gedeo. In his own words; “My father, as a ndft'dnna and follower o f Ras Biru, 
came from Wollega in the hope of acquiring qdlad land, however, by the time we 
arrived there was nothing left, the land having already been distributed among
65 Interview with Baqala Walda-Tsadiq, Segado, 6 July, 2004.
66 McClellan, 'Perspectives on the Neftenya-Gabbar System’, 438.
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Balcha’s followers, in particular to the Agamjjas.” 67 Therefore, the idea of 
acquiring qdlad rights seems to have been abandoned by this time. This statement 
which was corroborated by many informants demonstrates the fact that it had 
become increasingly difficult to accommodate latecomers to Gedeo into the 
system as well as to satisfy the land ownership rights of earlier settlers by 
distributing the available land68.
In the 1920s, the political system achieved stability and Gedeo as a settled 
agricultural community provided ideal conditions mider which it could flourish. 
Certainly the gdbbar system was more entrenched in Gedeo than in other 
communities whose livelihood was mainly based on animal husbandly, as 
exemplified by the failed attempt to establish a similar system among the nomadic 
pastoralists of the Guji Oromos. Although tribute in cattle had been collected, 
either peacefully with the cooperation of local chiefs or by conducting occasional 
raids, the pastoral area which is adjacent to Gedeo continued to be difficult to 
administer for some time until systematic exploitation was instituted.69
Tribute appropriation from gabbars had limitations for the ndft'dnnas. 
Since tribute in the early years of the period was only collected in two forms (i.e. 
either in labour or produce), such tribute had to be utilised immediately. For 
instance, the most common form of produce collected from a Gedeo household 
was qoc'o. Food was useful for the ndft'dnnas ' own consumption; however, it was 
difficult to store for future use or to sell or exchange in the market for other goods. 
In the light of this limitation some gdbbar right holders appear to have encouraged
67 Interview with Baqala Walda-Tsadiq, Shigado, 6 July, 2004.
68 Intervew with Baqala Walda S'adiq, Shegado, 6 July, 2004; Gobana Latiti, Grissa, 15 July 
2004; and Dogola Dagoma, C'abicha, 9 July 2004.
69 Berhanu, 'Alabdu-Sidama Relations', 26.
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their gabbars to pay in the form of cash, but we do not know how well the Gedeo 
responded to this, and how widespread this practice was, given the very limited 
role money had in the overall economy at the time.70
As the ndft'dnnas or settlers did not own land at this time, the labour 
services from their gdbbar were normally used for non agricultural purposes. 
Thus, before the introduction of the qdlad system, labour services were mainly 
restricted either to domestic services for the ndft’dnnas such as constructing 
houses, and fencing, or communal works for the government such as constructing 
churches, clearing forest for the establishment of katama (settler towns) and so 
forth. There was no opportunity for the gdbbar holder to use this critical resource 
(free labour) for productive activity as was the case later when the qdlad system 
was introduced.71
Owning land provided the ndft’dnnas with one of the most important 
incentives in promoting loyalty to their superior and ultimately to the system. 
Although we have not studied the background of the ndft’dnnas, especially the 
ordinary soldiers, most of them appeared to have relinquished their claim to land 
in their birth place. Owning land for such people was therefore of fundamental 
importance both from a social as well as economic standpoint.72
Despite his longstanding association with the region, Balcha did not begin 
the measurement and distribution of land until the third term of his governorship 
of Sidamo. It is not clear whether the process started before Balcha, but we know 
from later archival sources as well as people’s testimonies that Balcha was the
70 McClellan, 'Coffee in Centre-Periphery Relations', 181.
71 Interview with Fayisa Bado, Makonisa, 18 June, 2004; and Galgalu Wasse, Grissa, 22 July 
2004.
72 McClellan, State Transformation, 48-53.
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chief architect of the qdlad system in Gedeo.73 Balcha is well remembered as a 
governor of Sidamo and it was the qdlad dispute in particular which made his 
regime more eventful than others,74 One source from the former Gedeo Awraja 
administration, which contains lists of land owners in this area, claimed that the
7  Sland was originally given by Balcha between 1905 and 1908.
The government in Addis Ababa ordered the regional governors to carry 
out the measurement and distribution of land; probably similar orders were made 
to other parts of the country, with the aim of generating more resources which the 
capital needed. Qdlad was not intended necessarily as a land distributive 
mechanism but as a tax allocation regime. In the case of Gedeo, the main intention 
was to distribute resources, particularly land; however, the government did not 
clarify how such resources would be exploited and channelled to the capital. 
Unlike under the gdbbar system, where an asrat (tithe) payment was collected for 
the state from each gdbbar household by local officials, in the case of the qdlad 
system the local people who carried the burden of taxation were alienated from the 
process.76 If the land which was measured was given to the ndft'dnna and other 
state functionaries as madaria (land granted in lieu of salary) how was the state 
going to generate the resources it required? In other words, the people who 
seemed to have benefited from the process were people who already had many 
privileges and were exempt from paying various taxes to the state; it was unclear 
how the state was going to benefit.
73 Seme WaldS Yohannis V. Seme Nagaya, DACCA, 14/61 (Dilla, 1961 E.C.).
74 Nationally Balcha was one o f  the most distinguished heroes o f the battle o f  Adwa.
75 DAAA, 60/52 (Dilla, 1952 E.G.).
76 Mahtama-Sellassie, Zekra Nagar, 131.
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The land, was measured and redistributed either as madaria for the 
ndft'dnnas or other civilians, or samon to award the clergy for their services to the 
church.77 There is also the suggestion that land was made available for sale 
through the qdlad system, but this is another area about which we lack detailed 
information. There were some contentious issues; for instance, some of the 
ndft'dnnas appear to have been unwilling to receive qalad land as madaria 
because it was not suitable for development. In contrast there were apparently 
people who were interested in buying such land from the government despite the 
problem of labour supply, but this is difficult to confirm from available archival 
and oral data. Even later documents do not give an insight as to whether such 
land was originally bought from the state. However, this does not mean that land 
sale was unknown in pre 1935 Gedeo; land sales among individuals were very 
common as can be seen from a number of court records.78 However, we do not 
know whether such lands were originally bought from the government or from 
other individuals. The available sources do not provide adequate information 
concerning how the process of land measurement and distribution actually took 
place. We lack details of how much land was available through the process, who 
gained what, and what rules were laid down for the distribution and allocation of
*70madaria lands.
77 Gabra-Wald, “Ethiopia’s 306.
78 See chapter three for more details; Asaged Endala V. Tirunase Tassama, DACCA, 17/42 
(Dilla, 1942 E.C.).
79 McClellan, State Transformation, 82.
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Which areas were affected by qdlad?
Theoretically the areas which were affected by the qdlad system were areas which 
were designated as undeveloped, uncultivated or unsettled before the 
incorporation.80 This was mainly applied to the downward-sloping area between 
the highlands of Gedeo and the present Dilla town in Wanago warada, a long 
stretch of land bordered on the east by the core areas of Gedeo and by the Gujis on 
the west.
One of the challenging issues at the time of the implementation of qdlad 
was the absence of clearly defined boundaries between the Gedeos and 
neighbouring ethnic groups. The reason for this is that ethnic boundaries had not 
been delineated between these groups before the incorporation. The nature of such 
boundaries before the nineteenth century was very fluid, and this remains the case 
in contemporary times.81 A recent attempt to impose a fixed boundaiy between the 
Gedeo and the Guji resulted in bloody conflict between the two, despite there 
being no history of such conflict. Therefore, it is problematic to try to understand 
the history of these groups within the framework of fixed boundaries because 
historically the boundaries have been shifting constantly between them, depending 
011 a number of internal as well as external factors. It is important to take this into 
account when one talks about land alienation, because the process of land 
alienation was not as straightforward as commonly assumed due to the complex 
nature of ethnic boundaries. When we refer to the land alienation which took place
80 Haile Mariam, The Building o f  an Empire, 41; Gilkes, The D ying Lion, 111; Gilkes 
confused gdbbar  and madaria.
81 Malcolm Shaw, Title to Territoiy in Africa: International Legal Issues (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986), 27-30; Shaw argues that the notion o f  fixed European-style boundary was 
not known in Africa before colonialism.
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it is difficult to determine to which ethnic group, the Gedeos, the Gujis or the 
Sidamas, the land had belonged.
The importance of the introduction of qdlad was that the ncift 'cinna- 
gabbar system was extended further into areas beyond those where it had existed 
during the early years of the incorporation. It consolidated the system by 
expanding the areas of effective control, although immediate economic benefit 
had yet to be realised. In addition, many areas which had not been developed 
before this time now became habitable and became productive agriculturally. 
This was not the case until qdlad was introduced due to the limitations inherent in 
the gdbbar system for which settled farming households were a pre-requisite. Its 
complete reliance on tribute payment meant that it was by nature confined to 
settled agrarian communities, which was why it was not introduced with an equal 
degree of success among itinerant pastoral communities.83
The process of land measurement and distribution had never been smooth; 
it was hampered by disputes, sabotage and lengthy legal battles which came 
mainly from the Gedeo balabat C'umburo Shunde, who succeeded his father, 
Shunde, in 1910. From the outset, the concept of land measurement was resented 
by the Gedeos. Due to the complex nature of the issue it is difficult to clearly 
establish the source of contention between the naft'dna and the local opponents, 
led by C'umburo. What we do know is that C'umburo Shunde resisted because he 
felt that the land which was being measured and distributed was outiba, which 
means it belonged to the Gedeo people, hi other words, even if  it was forested it 
should not be regarded as “no man’s land”. Thus, the qalad system became a
82Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia, 31-32.
s3 McClellan, 'Coffee in Centre-Peripheiy Relations', 184-190; A lso see Donham, Work 
and Power, 34-3 8.
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source of controversy between the naft'annas who were led by the governor 
Balcha and the Gedeo balabat C'umburo who had the backing of his own people 
but was not in a powerful position to win the battle.84
From Balcha’s point of view, the land which was the subject of qalad 
measurement was unsettled, uncultivated and lay beyond the traditional 
boundaries of the Gedeo. C'umburo Shunde opposed him by arguing that the land 
formed part of Gedeo territory and as outiba land it was no different from the core 
area and should not be the subject of qalad measurement. To the Gedeo people 
outiba land was inalienable because it was handed down to them by their
85predecessors. An interesting piece of evidence which was found in a post-war 
legal land dispute describes the process of land measurement in a vivid manner. 
The witness for this case was called to testify in court to establish the ownership 
of the land since the time of qalad. The witness explained that:
When the surveyors came to our village to measure land the villagers 
came out in force, preventing them from doing their job. The villagers 
explained to them that this was outiba land and they should not 
measure it. The surveyors asked if there were elders in the village 
who knew about this; the elders were invited and testified on behalf of 
the villagers, which ended the confrontation and the surveyors 
returned to where they had come from.86
This shows that the process of land measurement and the imposition of 
qcilad was not without its problems. The statement also underlines the fact that at 
least theoretically the distinction between outiba and unsettled land had already 
been made. Therefore, it is possible to assume that when qalad was introduced in
84 McClellan, State Transformation, 81-100,
85 W/Gabre’el Mangasha v. Gobana Abe, DACCA, 232/56 (Dilla, 1956 E.C.).
86 Gamada Diko v. Kabada Wondimu, DACCA, 10/42 (Dilla, 1942 E.C.).
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Gedeo the outiba areas, which were the original settlements of Gedeo, were not 
affected. There were insufficient guidelines indicating where the boundary of 
outiba land should be drawn and this confusion caused problems with the local 
people.
Gedeo informants also claimed that the “Amharas” used tactics to convince 
them that the land which was measured by qalad had belonged to Gujis rather 
than the Gedeos from the outset. Thus, they managed to persuade a gada official 
from the Gujis to confirm in writing that the land belonged to the Guji and thus 
the Gedeo had no rights, a tactic devised by Balcha, according to my informants.87
The areas which were not recognised by the government as outiba lands 
were not totally devoid of settlements. McClellan used the term “squatter 
population” to describe those settlements.88 According to the local informants 
such settlements had already been created much earlier, before the area was 
incorporated into the Ethiopian state. Sisota Dayo, who still lives on land 
originally cleared and occupied by his grandfather, said that Woke, his grandfather, 
had done this in cooperation with his neighbour Dolo some time before the 
gdbbar system was introduced into the area. A similar story was also told by an 
informant in Sakoricha, where the informant’s great grandfather was reported to
87 Some informants claimed that the government did not approve the imposition o f  qalad. A 
few o f these informants also pointed out that Menilek was aware o f  Balcha’s action and told him to 
restore the land to the Gedeos. Interview with T'aqabo Shota, Sisota, 29 April 1999; and Taddassa 
Jibicho, Sisota, 7 July, 2004.
88 McClellan, State Transformation, 91; this description does not take into account the way 
land had been accessed by many Gedeo households and clans since earlier times. As there had 
never been a fixed Gedeo boundary it is difficult to describe this group o f  people as “squatters”. 
Land in Gedeo had been acquired by a multitude o f  methods, and as shown in chapter one, an 
enterprising individual could acquire land elsewhere either with or without the sanction o f  their 
clan authority.
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have been established by the clan leaders to protect the boundary from Sidama 
incursions.89
The ethnic boundary between the Guji and the Gedeo in the west of Gedeo 
was difficult to delineate. Due to their pastoral way of life the Guji tended to 
travel in and out of the area, and thus it was difficult to define their territorial limit 
in relation to their neighbours. Before the incorporation and for a few years after, 
territorial disputes continued to flare up between Guji and Gedeo, and at some 
point Balcha was forced to intervene to settle the issue.90 This provided Balcha 
with an excuse to start the process of land measurement and distribution in order 
to eliminate the contention between the two. Few Gedeo today like to speak about 
this area as Guji territory, other than a group of informants near Wonago town 
who admitted that all the fertile land on which they were now settled had belonged 
to the Oromo of Guji before the incorporation.91
There are no surviving written documents for the pre-1935 period which 
indicate direct opposition to the qalad system in Gedeo. Since there was no 
attempt made to confiscate land which the peasants owned, opposition to the 
measurement of land by qalad was confined to marginal areas which lay between 
the core areas and the forest zone, and was not as powerftil as it had been later in 
the 1960s. The land which was now alienated by qalad had been an area of 
contention between the Guji and the Gedeo for some time before the area came 
under direct Ethiopian rule. Settling on a permanent basis on this land was 
unthinkable before this period because of the threat from their powerful neighbour
89 Interview with Maryam FSlaqa, Saqua, 23 July 2004: and Doye Biftu, Sisota, 24 July, 2004.
90 Berhanu Lameso, 'Alabdu-Sidama Relations', 27.
91 Interview with Kole Solale, Sugale, 15 June 2004; Butica Biliqe, Sugale, 15 June 2004; and 
Arareso T ’aro, Sugale, 15 June 2004.
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the Guji; however, this did not stop the Gedeos and Sidamas using every 
opportunity to expand into these areas when the Guji had problems such as 
draught or famine. However, large scale alienation by the government only 
happened after qalad was introduced into the area; pre-qalad settlement of Gedeo 
in these areas had been gradual and had not affected the pasture lands of the Gujis. 
After previous attempts to impose the gabbar system had failed, the Gujis had 
retreated deep into the lowlands and therefore the area was now underutilised by 
both ethnic groups. Thus, qalad was imposed on contested land which did not 
constitute the core of Gedeo territory.92
Opposition to qalad was minimal and mostly indirect and unorganised. The 
only sustained opposition came from the elite of Gedeo led by the balabat, 
C'umburo, who had been excluded from both the consultation concerning the new 
system and its implementation. It is not clear why their services were not required, 
as being government officials their role was vital to the success of the process of 
qalad measurement. Although there was insufficient reason to launch a sustained 
legal battle against Balcha and other regional officials, the alienation of the Gedeo 
from this land was a major source of concern for C'umburo, fermenting his 
opposition to the system. The Gedeo peasants themselves had a suffered serious 
land scarcity problems in the core highlands and therefore demographic pressure 
was the root of their opposition.
C'umburo’s opposition to the implementation of the qalad system was 
through legal means and he took his extended legal battle to the highest authorities,
92 Interview with Wordofa Qumbi, MicTle, 5 December 1999; and Turi Boko, C’ic’u, 29 April 
1999. A number o f  informants claimed that the boundary between Sidama and Gedeo was the 
Qabado River (which is now well inside Sidama territory) before Balcha decreed that it should be 
the Lagadara River.
93 See chapter five for the 1960 uprising.
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although he achieved little. In fact, although orders from Addis Ababa released 
him from prison, they did not however save him from being publicly humiliated 
and even given 40 strokes of the lash by Ras Bira who was the governor of 
Sidamo at the time. His courage and determination was described by one 
informant as a case of “never mind my back, you can lash my belly as well”.94 As 
balabat C'umburo was expected to have allied himself with the ruling elites to 
protect his own interests. However, he decided to take a different course of action 
which earned him popularity and fame among his people and he is regarded as not 
so much a government official but as their hero.
Although informants claimed (which is difficult to corroborate from the 
available sources) that the government in Addis Ababa told Balcha that the land 
should be restored to the Gedeos, nothing changed.95 Meanwhile, the Gedeo 
perpetuated their legal fight against the imposition of the qalad. They appealed to 
Empress Zawditu, Menilek’s daughter, who ruled 1916-1930. The only positive 
response to the Gedeo’s long-standing appeal was that a fact-finding mission was 
sent during Zawditu’s time with the objective of investigating how qalad had been 
imposed. It is not clear who ordered it and who the investigators were but the 
committee did not find any anomalies in its implementation. Finally, after a 
decade and a ha lfs  duration, the battle against the qalad system ended 
unsatisfactorily, to the disappointment of many Gedeos, with the death of the 
leading opponent, C'umburo Shunde.96
94 Interview with Bdgdjo Bonja, C'i c'u, 28 November 1999.
95 Interview with Taddassa Jibicho, Sisota, 7 July, 2004; and T'aqabo Shota, Sisota, 29 April 
1999.
96 Interview with Morkate Jarsso, Andida, 28 April 1999.
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The downward sloping areas which were measured and distributed to 
n a ff annas and other settlers were suitable for a variety of crops but later became 
the main coffee growing area of Gedeo. It is difficult to attribute the change of 
land use to any particular development. McClellan identifies Balcha5s short stay 
as the governor of Harar as an important period in which he came to the 
conclusion that Sidamo’s best interest lay in promoting coffee as a cash crop. He 
also pointed out how individual na ff annas or northern settlers encouraged the 
Gedeo fanners to clear the forest for coffee plantations. McClellan added another 
dimension to his account of the transition to coffee production; the dwindling of 
wildlife in the region due to unregulated hunting practices by northerners, 
combined with the relative fall of revenues for the central government, created the 
need to subsidise the shortfall by introducing coffee as an alternative source of
97income.
The settlers who had land use rights on the qalad lands had the authority to 
choose what to plant and could find their own sources of labour. This is the main 
distinction between the qalad and the gdbbar system which has not been explored 
in depth by previous studies.98 It was also assumed that the settlers who came to 
Gedeo in the early years of the incorporation had already been granted the services 
of gdbbars, so when they later received qalad lands they had the human resources 
to develop them. Since the gdbbars continued to give them food and other 
products they were in a better position to develop their new land acquired through 
the qalad system. However, in later years, after all gdbbars had been allocated to
97 McClellan, 'Coffee in Centre-Periphery Relations', 175-195.
98 McClellan, State Transformation, 48-53.
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the n a ff annas, there was a shortage of labour sources for those who received only 
qalad land.
Starting the production process on qcilad land was time-consuming, mainly 
owing to the nature of Gedeo agriculture which required the qalad owner to wait 
for years to reap any benefit from his crops. McClellan has pointed out that 
naff 'annas preferred to be granted gabbar rather than qalad land. Some were even 
forced to abandon their qalad due to lack of labour, and were forced to wait until 
gabbar land was available. Access to free labour was no problem for those who 
already had gabbar rights as well as qalad land. As some of the evidence shows, 
the gabbar holders transported their gdbbars from distant places to work 011 their 
plot in another locality. In one post-war court document, a witness was called to 
give evidence concerning a land dispute between two individuals. The witness, 
who was called to establish the ownership rights of the plaintiff, confirmed that he 
knew that the land was owned and cultivated by the plaintiff using his gdbbars, 
including those from a distant place called Galalicho."
This was perhaps an early example of the beginning of the practice of 
using the labour of gdbbars for direct agricultural purposes, rather than for 
domestic work. Using the labour of the gdbbars on farms, which were mainly 
located at some distance from their homes, was an extra burden for the peasants 
which in most cases would impinge on their own personal agricultural obligations. 
As one informant reported, his parents used to travel to Fesha Ganat, roughly 
50kms from their home in Grissa, to work on the qalad of a n a ff anna. They had 
to carry provisions which would enable them to survive for weeks until they had 
finished the task assigned to them. Sometimes women were obliged to accompany
99 Wote Ejo V. Falaqa Yizbat', DACCA, 133/44 (Dilla, 1944 E.C.).
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men and the wives would also help with food preparation and some of the 
agricultural work. If the work required more labour, gdbbars from other areas 
could also be ordered to come and work. The big naft'annas had a representative 
ydgdbbar aldqa (head of gdbbars) who would organise the nature and duration of 
the gdbbars ’ labour.100
Although a tenancy relationship appears to have started before the war, it 
began to evolve in a dynamic way in the post-war period, as we shall see in 
subsequent chapters. In the early years, conditions appear to have been less harsh 
than normally assiuned; the inability of the settlers to attract sharecroppers to farm 
the newly acquired qalad land was a testimony to this fact. The gabbar system 
was a relatively superior one for the Gedeo peasants, despite overcrowding in the 
core areas and the relatively poor yields which resulted from over cultivation. 
They were more secure than peasants in the qalad lands where tenants lived under 
a constant threat from their landlords who had the power to evict them.
In 1935 when Ethiopia was invaded by Fascist Italy, naft'anna-gabbar was 
still the dominant form of agrarian relationship in Gedeo. As will be discussed in 
the following section, the legacies of both gabbar and qalad were to be felt more 
as invasion was looming. The way the southern people viewed the Italian 
incursion and the part they played in both the conflict and in the resistance 
movement was largely shaped by these historical developments.
100 Interview with Alako Wadari, Grissa, 16 July 2004.
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The impact of the Italian invasion on Gedeo 1935-41
The period following the battle of Adwa in 1896 until 1935 was generally 
peaceful. Menilelc had achieved what he set out to accomplish and Ethiopia, at 
least in her modem history, had become a unified empire under one leader. The 
European powers which surrounded Ethiopia, namely Britain, France and Italy, 
had recognised Ethiopia as an independent state. However, internally there was a 
great deal of uncertainty surrounding Menilek’s succession to the throne. At this 
time, due to ill health, Menilelc was inactive in Ethiopian politics and in fact 
virtually absent from it between 1909 and 1913 when his death was made public. 
Successive rulers failed to bring any stability to the central authority.101 Finally,
Ras Tafari Makonnen emerged from the long internal power struggle which had
101dominated the internal political scene of Ethiopia for over two decades. hi 
1930, Tafari finally realised his longstanding dream of being crowned Emperor 
Haile Sellassie of Ethiopia; however, only five years later his country had fallen 
prey to an invading foreign power.
Ethiopia’s long history of defending itself against external aggression 
came to an end with the Fascist invasion of the country in 1935. Ethiopia was
101 The power struggle started with T'aytu who was Menilek’s wife. She was an extraordinary 
woman who shaped Ethiopian policy during Menilek’s time in many ways. She was famous for a 
number o f  events in Ethiopian history, in particular her sharp and critical stance against the 
Wuchale treaty which was the source o f the major controversy between Ethiopia and Italy which 
finally precipitated the historic battle o f Adwa in 1896, However, the inactivity o f  Menilek left her 
with little influence, and as a result, when she lost her bid to control the government, directly or 
indirectly, she withdrew altogether in 1910. Iyasu, who was Menilek’s grandson and designated 
heir to the throne, came to power in 1911. However, his controversial reign was ended abruptly 
and tragically in an orchestrated coup in 1916. He was succeeded by Zawditu, M enilek’s daughter, 
who became empress o f  Ethiopia until 1930. Tafari was made designated heir to the throne and 
when Zawditu died in 1930 he finally became emperor o f Ethiopia. For more details see Bahru, A 
History o f  M odem  Ethiopia, 111-136.
102 Tafari, as a great-grandson o f  Negus (King) Sahle-Sellassie o f  Shawa (r. 1813-1847), 
Menilek’s grandfather, had uncontested lineage to the Ethiopian throne. His father, Ras Makonnen, 
was a leading politician and one o f  the right hands o f Emperor Menilek. Harold G. Marcus, Haile 
Sellassie I: The Formative Years, 1892-1936  (Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 1995), 3.
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forced to accept that it was confronting an immensely well organised and well 
armed European army which was prepared to spare no expense in its quest to 
conquer and rule, but also to avenge its Italy’s previous humiliation at Adwa in 
1896.103 It was a major humiliation for a country which had prided itself on being 
the only independent black nation unconquered by European powers. However, in 
1935 the situation both internally as well as externally was different to that which 
prevailed in the 1890s. Not only was Ethiopia unprepared on a military level, but 
also local relationships were extremely fragmented which made defence against a 
major foreign aggressor more difficult.104
The officials in Gedeo, who had been entrusted with the task of mobilising 
the people in the defence of the country, were confronted with this grim fact only 
after the Fascist invasion of Ethiopia had become a reality. The local community 
had already been divided because of the gabbar system and even more deeply as a 
result of the unpopular qalad imposition. The introduction of qalad had been more 
divisive because most Gedeos were excluded from the process and as a result they 
felt increasingly alienated and lost any interest in the preservation and protection 
of the state and their country. This placed the local officials in the difficult 
position of attempting to mobilise a disaffected section of the community to fight 
a major war.
Due to inequalities in land distribution there was also a degree of 
dissatisfaction within the ndftanna group. As the chief architect of the process of 
qalad measurement, Balcha had not only given the best land to his own loyal 
troops (the Barued Bet, also known as Blacha’s loyal regiment), who were mainly
103 Caulk, 'Between the Jaws o f  Hyenas', 483-564; Rubenson, The Survival o f  Ethiopian 
Independence, 399-406.
104 Bahru , A History o f  Modern Ethiopia, 159-160.
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recruited from his birth place Agamja, but also the larger share of the land which 
was made available in the process went to this group. The local resource 
allocation process was a very delicate matter and became divisive. Officials failed 
to anticipate the wider and long term repercussions on the community, which only 
became apparent when the great crisis occurred.105
The Fascist invading force capitalised successfully 011 the lack of internal 
unity among the population. The Italians also attacked the traditional Ethiopian 
institutions and especially directed their propaganda against Ethiopian agricultural 
systems. They felt that through important reforms under their rule they could 
achieve their long-standing dream of empire building. According to Fascist 
rhetoric the traditional Ethiopian agriculture system was a barrier to modern 
development, and therefore once they controlled the country they would create 
economic reforms by introducing stringent measures. In particular they targeted 
the gabbar system in the south as a major issue. They felt that gabbar was an 
outmoded institution designed by the Abyssinians to dominate and exploit the 
southern people, and argued that abolishing it was a priority. The Italians were 
prepared to exploit any internal divisions inside Ethiopia, which they though 
might assist them to advance their own interests by weakening opposition, and 
thus more emphasis was given to ethnic and religious divisions.106
Ras Dasta Damt'aw (1932-1936),107 who was the governor of the vast 
region of Sidamo at the time, was in charge of mobilising the people in the south 
against the advancing Italian anny. Ras Dasta, who was very close to Emperor
105 Interview with Baqald Walda-Tsadiq, Shegado, 6 July, 2004.
106 Haile Mariam Larebo, The Building o f  an Empire, 28-81.
107 McClellan, State Transformation, 82.
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Haile Sellassie, was also married to his daughter, Princess Tananna Warq Haile 
Sellassie. As a governor of Sidamo he is remembered for increasing the coffee 
trade by improving the infrastructure of Sidamo. In addition, he was also known 
for amassing a substantial amount of gult (tribute collecting rights) rights in 
Sidamo, some of which were located in Gedeo. On his way to the southern front 
via Gedeo, Ras Dasta passed an order that all able bodied men should gather at an 
important market place called C’uc’u in Gedeo, which is located on the outskirts 
of Dilla town. According to informants, the call was very well received and 
naftdnnasx gdbbars and tenants massed from all comers of Gedeo (although as 
C’uc’u was an important market place the huge turnout might not have been 
surprising). Ras Dasta made the passionate plea that, as their country was being 
invaded by an enemy, all those who were physically capable were responsible for 
defending it and he asked them to follow his lead towards the southern front.108
The naftannas as soldiers had little choice other than marching to the war 
front, and so the majority went to Dollo to fight the Italians, under their 
commander Ras Dasta Damt'aw.109 It is also assumed that some of the important 
naftannas went to the front accompanied by their armed retainers, but it is not 
clear whether the peasants cooperated out of fear of later punishment or of their 
own accord, having accepted the call of their governor. However, as one 
informant admitted, the Gedeo did not receive the mobilisation order with 
enthusiasm, because they did not have reason to go to war. As a result, although 
some Gedeos went to Dollo (the southern front) to fight the Italians with their
108 Interview with Fayisa Bado, Makonisa, 18 June, 2004; and B&gajo Bonja, C'i c'u, 28 
November 1999.
109 Alberto Sbacchi, Legacy o f  Bitterness: Ethiopia and Fascist Italy, 1935-1941 
(Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 1997), 173-176.
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landlord, the majority o f the Gedeos remained at home. This reality contradicts 
the national myth; when the country celebrates its past anti-Fascist struggle and 
observes liberation days, the national rhetoric boasts that all Ethiopians, regardless 
o f ethnic and religious differences, took up arms against the Italians.110
Figure 8. A Gedeo patriot w ho fought the Italians in the southern front (1935-41) 
The symbol on his earring show's that he was a patriot. Grissa, August 2004. 
Photograph taken by the author.
After the Italians succeeded in invading the country they exploited ethnic 
differences to consolidate their position, and according to Gedeo informants, this 
worked effectively for most o f the five-year period o f their occupation. Other 
than presenting themselves as champions o f the southern people against what they
110 Interview with Fayisa Bado, Makonisa, 18 June, 2004.
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termed Abyssinian or Amhara domination, the Italians began to take practical 
measures which won them great support from the local people. Their attack on the 
existing agricultural system was the most obvious and popular one. The Italians 
declared that the Gedeo peasants were no longer required to fulfil any of their 
obligations to the naftannas which had been imposed upon them since the 
incorporation,111
In addition, the Italians also used land to reward loyalty and punish 
enemies. An obvious target was land which belonged to members of the royal 
family and other important local officials. Although details are lacking, Haile 
Larebo has quoted a figure from an Italian source which claims that approximately 
49,655 hectares of land had been confiscated in Gedeo alone which later became a 
state domain. No other details are available concerning the specific location of the 
land or its subsequent use, whether it was re-redistributed to their loyal followers 
or used for the commercial farms which the Italians tried to run.112
There are also examples of the Italians’ involvement with individual land 
matters with the intention of vengeance against people who went to the war fronts 
by accepting the government’s call. As an informant in Shegado relates, his father 
went to Dollo during the invasion to fight the Italians alongside Ras Daseta, 
because his father had one gasha of madaria land (a unit of land measurement, 
about 40 hectares) in a place called Daqo (in Gedeo). He would have risked 
losing his land if he had chosen not to fight. Unfortunately, his father died in
111 Interview with Kole Solale, Sugale, 15 June 2004; Fayisa Bado, Makonissa, 18 June, 2004; 
and Bfiqala W alda S'adiq, Shegado, 6 July, 2004.
112 Haile Mariam Larebo, The Building o f  an Empire, 81; Also see Alberto Sbacchi, Ethiopia 
under Mussolini: Fascism and the Colonial Experience (London: Zed, 1985), 104; Sbacchi stated 
that the Italians confiscated Ras Dasta Damtau’s land in Sidamo, but did not specify the exact 
location.
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battle when he was only fifteen years old. The death of his father meant that he 
had to carry the responsibility for leading the household, which also meant that his 
mother wished him to marry at his young age. When the Italians discovered that 
his father had been a naft’anna and had died fighting them they took revenge by 
confiscating all the family’s land. Subsequently, his mother decided to postpone 
her son’s marriage and fight the case legally. After they confiscated the land the 
local Italian officials sold it to a Gedeo man called Badecha Wudo as a reward for 
loyalty.113
Reduced to a state of landlessness, his mother then appealed against the 
decision; having lost all appeals at a local level she had to go to Nazret (90 lan 
east of Addis Ababa and about 390 Kms north of Dilla) where the higher officials 
resided at the time. She and her son (my informant) had to stay one and half years 
in Nazret until they eventually won the appeal. When they came back to Gedeo 
they were informed that if she wanted to take her land back she had to reimburse 
Badecha Wudo for the money he had paid to the Italians when he first bought the 
land from them. She paid accordingly and the land was restored to her.114
However, the Italian policy towards many ordinary Gedeos was in general 
favourable for most of the five-year period of their occupation.115 The Gedeos felt 
that by abolishing the gabbar system the Italians had restored their rights on their 
land and recognised the fruits of their labour. The Italians had also shown a strong 
interest in coffee production and had encouraged the peasants to continue to
113 Interview with Btiqala Walda-Tsadiq, Shigiido, 6 July, 2004.
114 Interview with Baqala Walda-Tsadiq, Shigado, 6 July, 2004.
1,5 For example, Donham says that despite the forced labour policy regime which the Italians 
followed in Maale, southern Ethiopia, the Maales felt that the Italians were their liberators. 
Donham, Work and Power, 44.
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cultivate it 011 the land previously occupied by the naft’annas. The attitude of the 
Gedeos towards the Italians was generally positive and in fact contemporary 
Gedeo informants refer to the period as a time of “freedom”. However, this 
smooth relationship with the Gedeo people began to tarnish as the cost of empire 
building soared.116
The grand ambition of Fascist Italy to turn Ethiopia into an agricultural 
success was soon frustrated due to ill-conceived and poorly executed projects.117 
In Gedeo for instance, the Italians had established a cotton farm in the hot 
lowlands between Lake Abaya and Dilla town. The main challenge for the Italians 
was a lack of agricultural labourers who were willing to work in this inhospitable 
area. Labour was also needed for other projects such as road construction. In the 
early period of the projects the Italians introduced wages to attract more labourers, 
but the dangerous nature of the work deterred many people. It was especially 
difficult for them to attract people to work in the cotton plantations which were 
inside territory used by the Guji as an important grazing ground for their cattle.
The Guji herdsmen were mostly mobile and reluctant to perform settled 
agricultural work. Thus, the Italians relied on the Gedeo peasants for the work in 
the cotton farms, but that became unsustainable, as most Gedeos were unwilling to 
work there, especially during the peak season where the threat from malaria 
infestation was very high. The Italians then resorted to a forced labour regime 
whereby most Gedeo were ordered to work on the cotton farms in rotas. One 
informant in the Makonissa area said that initially when ordered by the Italians to 
work in the cotton farms they were told they would only stay for five days, but in
116 Interview with Kole Solale, Sugale, 15 June 2004; and Arareso T'aro, Sugale, 15 June 2004.
117 For a very good discussion o f the failure o f Italian plans see Haile Mariam, The Building o f  
an Empire .
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most cases they were forced to stay longer until a replacement arrived from 
another area.118 Thus, people were stranded for days without having sufficient 
provisions to survive. The forced labour regime not only failed to solve the 
shortage of labour but also soured the positive relationship that the Italians had 
previously enjoyed with the Gedeos.119
When Italy’s five-year occupation ended abruptly in 1941, their legacy 
was interpreted differently. From the governmental point of view, humiliation 
under Fascism meant that modernising the country was given greater priority. As 
a result, Haile Sellassie accelerated a programme of reforms which had been 
started in pre- war times. The radical reforms in agriculture and their impact will 
be examined in the next chapter. Paradoxically, from the point of the local Gedeo 
people, the demise of Italian rule was seen as an end to the “years of freedom”. 
From this view point, liberation meant the return of the n a ff anna and the 
resumption of an unhappy pre-war situation. Some informants claim that after the 
war the na ff annas felt more self-important because it was they who had 
dispatched the enemy. Those Gedeos who had opted not to fight were obliged to 
maintain a low profile.120
118 Interview with Fayisa Bado, Makonisa, 18 June, 2004.
119 Interview with Sao Robe, Qome, 30 June 2004; and Oudo Baqate, Grissa, 15 July 2004.
120 Interview with Fayisa Bado, Makonissa, 18 June, 2004.
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Conclusion
The gabbar system was largely successful in enabling the expanding empire to 
generate the resources which were needed for its consolidation. The system was 
crucial economically for the naft'annas because it enabled them to have free 
access to resources such as labour and produce. Socially, owning gdbbars was 
important for the status of the naft'annas. The balabat, who had some level of 
authority traditionally, were able to gain more power and economic benefits from 
the gabbar system thanks to the gult granting mechanism. However, the peasants 
of Gedeo who were made gdbbars lost a number of their rights. Coercion, 
exploitation and degradation were prevalent and there were only rare chances to 
escape from this highly exploitative system, hi spite of the onerous nature of the 
gabbar system, its recognition of their indigenous rights to the outiba land 
enabled them to survive and hand down their landed property to their offspring.
The imposition of qalad was a major development in Gedeo during this 
period. It not only consolidated the ndft'anna-gabbar system but also expanded 
the area of state domination. The Gedeo did not like the imposition of qalad from 
two perspectives; firstly they felt that it denied them their traditional right to 
expand into virgin territory. Secondly, they were excluded from having any share 
in the resource allocation process. Qalad also increased the exploitative nature of 
the system through sharecropping tenancies which became more prevalent in the 
post-war period. Nevertheless, ordinary Gedeos did not realise its impact at the 
time and opposition to it was restricted to the elite of Gedeo. The main 
consequence of qalad imposition was perhaps in further deepening the local 
divisions which had started as a result of the gabbar system. This lack of cohesion
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manifested itself more conspicuously when the country was invaded by Fascist 
Italy in 1935.
The post-liberation period was the most dynamic period of the twentieth 
century. Various developments took place during this crucial time in Gedeo’s 
history. During this period the ndft'dnna-gdbbar form of relationship gradually 
declined, to be replaced by that of landlord-tenant. As the period was relatively 
peaceful compared with previously there were significant developments in 
agriculture, commerce, urbanisation and so o n .121 The post-liberation period 
appears superficially to be a time of peace, but paradoxically the phenomenon of 
constant litigation concerning land rights and tenancy matters deeply eroded rural 
production relationships until the 1974 revolution. The following two chapters 
focus on land and tenancy disputes after 1941.
121 For the evolution o f  towns in Sidamo since the incorporation see Richard Pankhurst, 
History o f  Ethiopian Towns from  the Mid-Nineteenth Centiuy to 1935, A thiopische Forschungen; 
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1985), 196-198.
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Chapter Three 
Land Disputes and Litigation, 1941-1974
1941 marked the end of the five-year occupation of Ethiopia by Fascist Italy and 
the restoration of Emperor Haile Sellassie to the throne. One of the legacies of the 
invasion was that it increased the government’s quest for change. Haile Sellassie 
envisaged the creation of a highly centralised state through major bureaucratic 
reforms, and although the country was weakened due to the effects of the war, the 
aftermath of the conflict was however a favourable time for new initiatives.1 The 
people who were regarded as bulwarks against progress before the war had either 
died during its duration, or had experienced an erosion of their traditional power 
base, and hence the stage was set for reform.2 Haile Sellassie was quick to use 
this opportunity and he initiated many changes across a number of areas, 
prioritising agriculture.3 Such measures, regarding land and taxation, had a direct 
effect on the Gedeo rural community.4
One major change was that maddria (i.e. land granted to soldiers and other 
state officials in lieu of their salary) land holders were allowed to convert their 
conditional right into the rest form of ownership.5 This was a step taken by the
1 John M. Cohen and Peter H. Koehn, Ethiopian Provincial and Municipal Government: 
Imperial Patterns and Postrevolutionary Changes, ed. Harold G. Marcus (East Lansing, Michigan 
African Studies Center, 1980), 8-9.
2 Crummey, Land and Society, 237-240.
3For a discussion o f  the land reform laws o f the post-liberation period see Aster Akalu, 
The Process o f  Land Nationalization in Ethiopia: Land Nationalization and the Peasants(lA\n&. 
CWK Gleerup, 1982), 38-46.
4 For the 1941 Proclamation see Gabra-Wald, "Ethiopia's", 325; Harjinder Singh, 
Agricultural Problem s in Ethiopia  (Delhi: Gian Publishing House, 1987), 76-81; See also Eshetu
Chole, "Towards a History o f the Fiscal Policy o f  the Pre-Revolutionary Ethiopian State: 1941- 
74," Journal o f  Ethiopian Law  XVII (1984), 88-104.
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government in an effort to dismantle the old practice of land grants for 
government office holders under the assumption that the country could easily be 
modernised by creating a professional class who could run the bureaucracy more 
efficiently than previously. The first measure was therefore to cease the practice of 
rewarding holders of government office by the gift of a piece of land. 
Nevertheless a sizeable number of people in Gedeo already owned such land 
before 1941, so the changes failed to bring about any major redistribution of 
resources within the community. There was no change of ownership of land, and 
previous land rights were made more secure.6 When an individual was granted the 
right to change his maddria land to rest the latter became a more secure form of 
property which no longer required the recipient to provide services to the 
government in return for enjoying the benefit of land possession. As well as being 
permanent, rest lands unlike maddria lands were easily transferable in a variety of 
ways to a third person such as by selling or inheritance. However, it is not clear 
whether productivity was increased by the introduction of a more secure form of 
land ownership.
It has frequently been assumed that such changes were a major step 
towards a private form of land ownership.7 However, when we actually examine 
the nature of the edict it was not specifically designed to promote a “private” form 
of land ownership, either directly or indirectly. Therefore any change in relation to
5 See Mantel-Niecko, The Role o f  Land Tenure, 98; see also Mahtama-Sellassie, "Land 
Tenure and Taxation", 285; See also Michael Stahl, "Ethiopia: Political Contradictions in 
Agricultural Development" (Doctoral thesis, Uppsala University, 1974), 49.
6 Tekalign, "A City and Its Hinterlands", 239.
7 See Shiferaw, "The Evolution o f Land Tenure", 110; Bahru, A History o f  Modern 
Ethiopia, 191; and Bahru, "Economic Origins o f the Absolutist State", 12; There was no particular 
development as far as Gedeo was concerned which made the land tenure system private. On the 
other hand Teklaign (see above) described the land tenure systems o f post-war period as the move 
towards the Amhara form o f  land tenure. This might have been the case in his area, but the 
situation in Gedo was different due to the presence o f a multi-layered tenure system.
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land tenure is hard to attribute exclusively to measures taken by the government. 
In fact the sources do not show a fundamental change in the system in comparison 
to the pre-war period.8 This can easily be demonstrated by looking at the 
terminology used frequently by disputants both before and after the war, the most 
common of which being maddria, samort, rest, and outiba.
One of the distinguishing features of this period was the proliferation of 
court disputes, which were mainly concerned with land and tenancy issues (see 
chapter four), and there appears to have been a parallel between Gedeo and other 
parts of Ethiopia in this regard. The court cases examined in this chapter show that 
land ownership rights were highly precarious. The main threat to security was not 
the government, but individuals who were increasingly obliged to engage against 
each other in fierce competition for the available resources. Land disputes in 
general were of two types, interpersonal and government versus individuals. The 
great majority of cases were disputes between individuals; although the 
government might also have initiated legal action its motives were not however 
identical to those of individual disputants.
The right of individuals to land ownership was not always revoked, either 
by powerful individuals or the state, as normally assumed. As the archives show, 
land was not simply taken away from a person on dubious grounds or by the order 
of a certain powerful authority. Contrary to assumptions the state did not always 
use its power arbitrarily to reward some and to punish others.9 As the last section 
indicates even people who were alleged to have occupied government land 
without proper legal rights were not condemned to lose the land outright without a
8 According to Cohen and Weintraub 65% o f the Ethiopian population owned private 
land. They admitted that their data was poor and did not explain how they arrived at this figure 
however. John M. Cohen and Weintraub, Land and Peasants, 34.
9 Giimada Diko V. Kabada Wondimu, DACCA, 10/42 (Dilla, 1942 E.C.).
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“due process of law”; they had to be charged formally at court and the prosecuting 
government body had to support its allegation with evidence.
One of the most notable features of the state after the war was its ability to 
extract more resources than in previous times.10 This was achieved in many ways; 
the most effective one was by classifying land according to its fertility and 
imposing taxes accordingly.11 Before this period tax had not been properly 
assessed or collected but centralisation now enabled the state to channel more 
revenue directly into the treasury by removing power from local officials. 
Ironically, although this solved many problems for the state it also created a 
number of others which as we shall see later became a source of dispute in a 
number of land issues, and several people took advantage of loopholes in the 
system to register their names as land owners.12
This chapter will explore in some detail the nature of land disputes in 
Gedeo after the war. By using court documents and presenting examples of some 
of the disputes it will show not only the nature of the land tenure system in Gedeo 
but also how access to land was a highly contentious issue. As access to land 
became more difficult over time people used various strategies to obtain this vital 
resource. Land disputes were common among many peasant communities across 
the country; however, this study of one particular part of Ethiopia highlights their 
complex nature and the need to understand the issue at a micro level.
8 Markakis, Ethiopia, 118.
1 'According to Gabra-Wald the size o f a qalad  was about 66 to 75square metres. But this 
was not a standard unit applied throughout Ethiopia. See Gabra-Wald, 303.
12 Peter Schwab, Decision-Making in Ethiopia: A Study o f  the P olitical Process (London: 
C. Hurst, 1972), 146; Schwab cited a case in Gedeo where land assessment was very difficult 
because o f  the power o f  landlords.
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Land tenure after the war; change and continuity
The dynamic nature of the land tenure system in Gedeo continued after the war by 
embracing both change and continuity. Dualism {outiba and q a lad /3 continued to 
be the most important feature of Gedeo land tenure in this period, as it had been 
prior to 1941. For the majority of Gedeos the means of accessing land did not 
show major changes compared with the pre-war situation, but rather the process 
intensified after the war as more people needed land. As a result, most Gedeos still 
resided in the core areas where land was held as outiba under terms laid down by 
tradition. The gabbar system continued to decline and the measures taken by the 
state after the war brought about its final demise, but the pace was much slower 
than normally assumed. Also, despite changes made to the gabbar system the 
Gedeo still continued to access land in the core areas in accordance with the 
principles of outiba, although this had become increasingly challenging after the 
war due to demographic pressure.14
In 1942 and 1944 when the government announced tax reforms its 
intention was to generate more revenue and channel it directly into its treasury. By 
removing local intermediaries in the tax collection processes the government 
hoped to boost its income. Meanwhile the measures were also intended to benefit 
the gabbars who resided in the core areas of Gedeo where peasants continued to 
fulfil many obligations to their gult right holders, such as tribute and other labour
13Q alad  is not a type o f land tenure system; I used this term here in a similar way to the 
Gedeos. They apply this term when they refer the land outside o f  the core areas or outiba areas o f  
Gedeo, see chapter two for more details. These two land dispute cases for instance show the 
difference between the two land tenure systems which coexisted in Gedeo during this period; 
Ganale Tetu v. Jilo Gunayo, DACCA, 381/53 (Dilla, 1953 E.C.); and Balam barass Ababa 
Gondare v. Shoda Baresso, DACCA, 635/45 (Dilla, 1945 B.C.)
14 Population pressure was not a new phenomenon, but many Gedeo informants believed 
that settlement in the lower zone intensified after the war. See chapters one and two for more 
details. Interview with Bora Hessa, Grissa, 13 July 2004; and Worera C'umburo, Shegado, 6 July, 
2004.
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obligations, which were legacies of the pre-war period. Nevertheless there was no 
guarantee that peasants benefited from such measures, because even after the 
proclamation of the amended tax reform in 1966, its full implementation was 
doubtfiil as there were many reports that old practices appeared to have been 
continued in some form until the revolution.15
However, important changes had taken place in the qalad areas where 
most of the land had been occupied as maddria land by the naft’annas (including 
other state functionaries) since the 1920s.16 Among the measures taken by the 
government after the war was that it now allowed maddria landholders to convert 
part, and later most, of their maddria into rest.17 Most maddria landholders were 
soldiers who had fought the liberation war against Italy, and the government used 
the opportunity to reward them for their contribution during these difficult times. 
Maddria land holders who were associated with the army were no longer obliged 
to provide their services as was the case before the war. This was because the 
government had already created a professional national army which was financed 
directly by the state treasury.18 Thus the traditional practice of attaching services 
to land ownership gradually dwindled as a result of this measure. Also, when they 
were given a chance of converting part of their maddria into rest, their rights to 
that land became more secure. As rest holders they were no longer exempted from
15See the following works regarding the impact o f  these reforms; Crummey, Land and 
Society, 240-205; and Gilkes, The Dying Lion, 69; The 1966 Amended Tax Reform was especially 
important for many Gedeo gabbars because they were only required to pay taxes directly to the 
state treasury.
16 McClellan, State Transformation, 81.
17 Askale Abaye Y. Assdfa Gassassa, DACCA, 128/34 (Dilla, 1934 E.C.).
18 M. F. Perham, The Government o f  Ethiopia, 2nd ed. (London: Faber and Faber, 1969),
354 .
146
tax, and like any other land owner they were liable to pay all dues to the state. 19 
Since rest was the most secure form of property (in contrast with madaria land) in 
Gedeo the measure was very successful from the point of view of both the 
government and the madaria land holders. 20
The conversion of madaria land into rest was not always straightforward 
however. 21 The case of Adnaw Margia demonstrates the complexity of the 
process and the disparity between governmental promises and reality. When 
Adnaw initiated the process of conversion he first applied to the Sidamo T'aqlay 
Gizat (Regional Administration) to allow him to change from madaria to rest 
according to the edict introduced by the government.22 Adnaw was able to convert 
part of his madaria land in 1945 E.C (1952/3), but at this time he was only able to 
convert one third of his gasha of land. After a second edict he applied to convert 
the remaining madaria land into rest23 Adnaw was required to provide detailed 
information about the land and its location, and the individuals who had land 
bordering on his own. In addition he was asked if there were others who had a 
vested interest or who opposed the conversion into rest. He initially obtained a 
letter from a man called Gudicho Shobo, the balabat where the land was located.
This letter contained the history of the land in question. The balabat 
Gudicho Shobo said in this letter that the land was originally given to Adnaw 
Margia’s father Girazmach (lit. commander of the left flank) Margia as madaria
19 Schwab, Decision-M aking in Ethiopia, 66-67.
20 Mahtama Sellassie Walda Masqiil, "Land Tenure and Taxation", 295-301.
21 There are also some land dispute cases where litigation was initiated due to the illegal 
sale o f  m adaria  land. Damana Damssie v. Gole Halchoye, DACCA, 130/41 (Dilla, 1949 E.C.).
22 For a discussion o f post-war government land grant proclamations see Tekalign, "A 
City and Its Hinterlands", 239-245.
23 Askale Abaye v. Assafa Gassassa, DACCA, 128/34 (Dilla, 1934 E.C.).
147
land during the time of Dajazmach Balcha. He was awarded one gasha of 
madaria land because of his membership in the Barud Bet regiment, a famous 
regiment which was loyal to Balcha and had fought the Italians.24 In later years the 
land was passed on to Adnaw; he also became a member of the militia (nac' 
labash) although it was not clear that whether he was allowed to retain the 
madaria land of his father because of his own military post.25
Adnaw was also required to provide a statement from the tenants who 
actually worked on the land. The head tenant as their spokesman stated that the 
land which Adnaw wanted to convert to rest was fanned by a group of tenants. He 
further said;
 this land has been madaria land belonging to Adnaw’s father since
1928 E.C. [1935/36] After the Italians left the land was transferred to 
A to (a title equivalent to Mr) Adnaw, to whom I have paid erbo 
(quarter) for the last four years. As a result I will not claim this land as 
my rest. In the previous years after qalad was introduced the land was 
given as madaria land. I would like to confirm that I have not 
bequeathed this land to anybody else as my rest and I will not dispute 
with A to Adnaw on this land as my rest.16
The above statement was instrumental not only in avoiding possible future 
disputes, but also in providing historical insight, to show how madaria land 
evolved into rest land. The legal process of the conversion of madaria land into 
rest was very stringent as the above case shows.27 Unusually the land was not 
passed from father to son directly, but through the involvement of an authority 
which authorised the transfer of the land to Adnaw; unfortunately there is no more
24 McClellan, State Transformation, 39.
25 Adnaw Margia V. T'ilahun Worqu, DACCA, 21/62 (Dilla, 1962 E.C.).
26 Adnaw Margia V. T'ilahun Worqu, DACCA, 21/62 (Dilla, 1962 E.C.).
27 Damana Damssie V. Gole Halchoye, DACCA, 130/41 (Dilla, 1949 E.C.).
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information available to enable us to leam on what grounds the land was allowed 
to be held by him.28 In fact other evidence shows that most of the lands which 
were originally given as madaria land did remain in the hands of their family 
which raises the question of whether there was any really important difference 
between madaria and rest rights.29
The above example demonstrates how implementing governmental changes 
required energy, resources and time. As mentioned earlier, this period was 
dominated by land and tenancy issues, and courts played a central role.30 
However before dealing directly with land dispute issues it is important to 
consider the nature of the courts so that we can understand how they conducted 
their work, particularly in the sensitive areas of land and tenancy.
The role of courts in land disputes
One of the distinguishing features of the post-liberation period in Gedeo was the 
proliferation of land disputes. Government courts were the arena for land disputes 
of various kinds but despite the important role courts played during the period, our 
current level of knowledge is very meagre. The history of the Ethiopian legal
28 Schwab, Decision-M aking in Ethiopia, 66.
29 W alda Sellassie Walda Sanbat V. Kabada Mola, DACCA, 338/53(Dilla, 1953 E.C.) 
This case came to court because o f the failure o f an agreement signed between the plaintiff and the 
defendant regarding the sharing o f madaria land. When the agreement was initially signed the 
defendant agreed to share his one gasha madaria land with the plaintiff and in return the plaintiff 
agreed to fulfil some obligations towards the government on behalf o f  the defendant. When the 
plaintiff (Walda Sellassie) failed to discharge his obligations the defendant (Kabada ) took the land 
away, and Walda Sellasse retaliated by taking legal action against Kabada. Although the court 
finally decided in favour o f  Kabada it did not question the way in which the m adaria  land had 
been passed on to another individual (in this case to Walda Sellassie) without the approval the 
government, although such lands were not intended to be passed on to a third person.
30 In contrast in Swaziland, for example, government courts do not deal with land dispute 
matters, it is mainly the chiefs and the council ( the libandla) who have the jurisdiction to hear land 
matters; see Laurel L. Rose, The Politics o f  Harmony: Land Dispute Strategies in Swaziland, 
African Studies S er ie s; (Cambridge (Britain); N ew  York: Cambridge U.P., 1992), 37.
149
system has not been the subject of major historical enquiry and as a result we 
know very little about how courts dealt with complex issues such as land disputes, 
either from a procedural point of view or from other legal perspectives.31
In the government’s bid to modernise the country through centralisation 
and the bureaucratisation of its various departments legal reforms were given a 
pivotal role.32 However the codification process of Ethiopian Civil Law did not 
take place until nearly two decades after liberation33 and it was only in 1960 that 
the Civil Code of Ethiopia appears to have been formally adopted.34 Despite the 
inclusion of Ethiopian customary laws and practices the backbone of the 1960 
civil code of Ethiopia was European Romano-Germanic family law.35 Even after 
becoming formally operational its application seems to have been delayed and 
hampered by a number of factors, especially the lack of properly trained personnel 
who could interpret the law as required.36 In addition the government had 
problems with finance and administration. It is also claimed that the newly
31 Aberra Jembere, An Introduction to the Legal History o f  Ethiopia, 1434-1974  (Munster; 
London: Lit Verlag, 2000), 1.
32 Paul H. Brietzke, Law, Development, and the Ethiopian Revolution  (Lewisburg/London: 
Bucknell U.P. Associated University Presses, 1982), 67.
33 Markakis pointed out that the codification o f  law began with the drafting o f  a criminal 
law system in the 1930s, Markakis, Ethiopia , 296; regarding the codification o f  private law see 
Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European Law: The Civilian Tradition 
Today (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 14-18; See also Peter Stein, Roman Law in 
European H isto iy  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); 110-113.
34 Kenneth R. Redden, The Legal System o f  Ethiopia (Virginia: The Michie Co., 1968), 49; 
Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy o f  Late 
Colonialism  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 111-137; Mamdani belives that the 
customary law o f  Ethiopia was replaced with modem civil code only after the 1974 Revolution.
35 Aberra, The Legal History o f  Ethiopia, 10-16.
36 Redden said that in 1963 there were only 19 university- trained lawyers in the whole o f  
Ethiopia. However all 19 lawyers occupied an important postion in the government. According to 
him the problem was somewhat mitigated as “ Ethiopians are litigious by nature, the remaining 
hundreds o f  thousands o f  practicing advocates, prosecutors and judges, who serviced a population 
in excess o f  20 million, had little i f  any formal legal education,” Redden, The Legal System o f  
Ethiopia, 191.
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adopted law was not implemented fully because it was too complex to serve the 
needs of ordinary Ethiopians as it was adopted from a highly developed legal 
system.37
The archives show little evidence that the new legal system was used in 
land and tenancy disputes in places like Gedeo.38 However, it is very difficult to 
establish why it was not used by the judges in lower courts and whether it was 
because of lack of expertise 01* for financial and administrative reasons. A careful 
study of the land dispute documents reveals that there was in fact no specific body 
of law to which the Ethiopian courts adhered. This is unsurprising in view of the 
fact that courts were poorly organised and staffed by untrained personnel who had 
no knowledge of legal matters beyond basic literacy or at most a church 
education.39
Although the courts dealt with all kinds of disputes, dispute about land has 
always been at the forefront of their task. This is not because people were unable 
to resolve their problems privately through traditional mediation, as they have 
always done, but due to the highly sensitive nature of land issues, courts were 
given the power by the government to deal with them. People also felt that when 
issues of crucial importance arose between them the government courts were the 
ultimate battle ground. This does not mean that the role of traditional mediation
37 Paul H. Brietzke, "Private Law in Ethiopia," Journal o f  Ethiopian Law, 18, No. 2 
(1974), 149-167; Aberra felt that the reason why the Civil Code was not implemented was because 
o f problems associated with lack o f  resources, whereas P. Brietzke felt that it was too sophisticated 
to serve the needs o f  ordinary Ethiopians. See also Aberra, The Legal H istory o f  Ethiopia, 10-13.
38 In a very few  land dispute cases disputants did cite the relevant code from the book, but 
when they presented their case or offered their defence they did not interpret and apply the law 
accordingly. Ganale Tetu V. Jilo Gunayo, DACCA, 381/53 (Dilla, 1953 E.C.).
39 Comparing Ethiopian law with the West Brietzke claims that “ ... customary Ethiopian 
processes place a greater emphasis upon correct procedures and the persuasive presentation o f  
facts rather than complex interpretation o f  substantive rules, upon a quick, flexible, and local 
conciliation or arbitration which restores social harmony rather than the implementation o f  abstract 
concepts o f  ju stice .. Brietzke, Law, 32.
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was completely taken over by modem courts or made illegal by the law, but the 
crucial importance of land meant that the courts passed the final verdict.40
One of the obvious reasons why land ownership was a highly contentious 
area was that it was in short supply.41 Evidence shows that land became 
increasingly scarce especially after 1941 and as a result the desire to gain land 
intensified. The reason for this is that the post-war period was a time of stability 
where agriculture, commerce and trade expanded and towns and market centres 
flourished in Gedeo. This was particularly encouraged by the development of 
coffee as a cash crop (it has become Gedeo’s most important product) and the 
construction of a motorway which connected Gedeo to the international market 
via Addis Ababa, the capital. The population also increased remarkably during 
this period.
Most of the evidence which shows that population growth was substantial 
during our period is qualitative in nature. Informants claimed that their parents had 
come from the core areas in the highlands in search of land because accessing 
outiba land was becoming increasingly difficult. Some informants who were 
among the first generation of settlers said that land shortage was the main driving 
force for them to move into the lower zone. This confirms the findings of the few 
available quantitative sources which show a similar trend. The Italian geographer, 
Guidi, who spent about seven months in Gedeo in 1937, estimated the Gedeo 
population to be about 40-45,000, Although the figure looks small he was 
surprised by the high density of the settlements. The 1984 census put the figure at
40 Afaworq Mangistu v. Tiro Jabo, DACCA, 105/53 (Dilla, 1953 E.C.).
41 Dessalegn Rahraato, Agrarian Reform in Ethiopia (Trenton, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 1985), 
19; He said that insecurity o f  tenure was the main cause o f  disputes, and he drew his conclusion 
from the perspective o f  the northern Ethiopian land tenure system.
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453,099 and showed the density of Gedeo’s population to be among the highest in 
Ethiopia.42
These factors all impacted upon the competition for the available land.43 
As access to land in the core areas became restricted the land in the qalad areas 
began to absorb the newcomers who were also lured by the prospect of better land; 
this was one of the reasons why land in the qalcid area was much more contentious 
than in the outiba area.44
Scarcity is cited as a major reason for land to be intensely contested, and it 
is certainly likely to have been the driving force behind most of the disputes. 
However it may not give us a complete explanation as to why land litigation was 
so endemic among Ethiopian society at large 45 The question here should be seen 
in a much broader setting which requires us to place the issue within the larger 
framework of property rights.46 The lack of a clear and unambiguous definition 
and delineation of property meant that there was always an opportunity for dispute. 
It was not surprising therefore that disputes arose in some parts of Gedeo more 
than others, especially from the qalad areas rather than the outiba. The Gedeos 
never fully accepted the way qalad land was partitioned and distributed solely to
42 Interveiw with Worera C'umburo, Shegado, 6 July, 2004; Shalo Dube, Shegado, 6 July, 
2004; and Shat'at'o Bariso, Shegado, 6 July, 2004. Guidi,5We/ Sidamo Orientate”, 377; Office of  
the Population and Housing Census Commission, Population and Housing Census 1984, 35.
43 For a similar argument see Sara Berry, Chiefs Know Their Boundaries : Essays on 
Property, P ow er and the P ast in Asante, 1896-1996  (Oxford: James Currey, 2000), xix-xxi.
44 McClellan, "Coffee in Centre-Periphery Relations”, 194.
45 According to Cohen and Weintraub “The lack o f  adequate measurements, the chaos o f  
the present registration system, and the general combativeness o f northern and southern peasants 
over claims and boundaries, create much insecurity and litigation.” Cohen and Weintraub, Land 
and Peasants, 57.
46 For a discussion o f  property rights and issues with security o f  rights see David L. 
Weimer, "The Political Economy o f  Property Rights," in The Political Economy o f  Property Rights: 
Institutional Change and Credibility in the Reform o f  Centrally Planned Economies, ed. David L. 
Weimer (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1997), 1-19.
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naft annas. This was reflected indirectly in many land disputes and more directly 
in the 1960 conflict at Michele which resulted in the death of many peasants and 
the destruction of much property,47
The fact that in the pre-1941 period lands were acquired or transferred 
under loose or ill-defined agreements left openings for opportunistic would-be 
owners to start litigation as the competition for land intensified. Hence disputes 
over land became a very important feature of this period, as a means to gain 
access to this increasingly important resource. Although it is difficult to present 
statistics in support of this contention it is clear that land litigation increased
48significantly in later years, from the late 1950s until the end of our period.
The way courts were structured and operated within the Ethiopian context 
is also worthy of consideration. A hierarchical structure existed from the highest 
court in Addis Ababa presided over by the Emperor, down to the local level; the 
at’bya danha (local judge) court was at the bottom of the hierarchy. The view of 
the government was that citizens would be better served by accessing courts at a 
village level.49 However, due to a system of appeal and counter appeal a simple 
case which started at the bottom of the hierarchy might eventually be heard in the 
highest court. This was advantageous in instances of injustice or dissatisfaction 
with the outcome of lower courts, but gradually became problematic especially for 
people who had limited resources, because by using the appeal system cases were 
perpetuated for years before they were resolved. This was also compounded by the
47 See chapter five for a detailed discussion o f  the uprising.
48 Dessalegn, Agrarian Reform in Ethiopia, 19.
49 Aberra, The Legal History o f  Ethiopia, 219-241.
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government’s limited ability to enforce the courts’ decisions; thus individuals 
were unable to break out of an endless cycle of dispute and litigation.50
The plaintiff was usually required by the court to estimate the size of the 
land in question and its equivalent in money (e.g. 1 gasha. = 5,000 birr, the 
standard Ethiopian monetary unit). This was in order to help determine at which 
level of court the case should first be heard.51 On initiating a land dispute some 
plaintiffs intentionally overestimated the size and value of the land to make it an 
expensive and difficult process for the defendants, as it would incur major 
expenses to travel for every hearing, notwithstanding the payment of the expenses 
of several witnesses. In most cases defendants simply gave their response to the 
main issue but at times, especially if  they were economically fortunate and had 
acquired professional help or representation, they might argue about procedural 
issues or the estimate of the land’s value and claim that it should be higher or 
lower.52
Supporting evidence was the key to winning court battles.53 However the 
production of evidence in itself did not mean that a satisfactory conclusion was 
reached in court disputes; how such evidence was interpreted also mattered. The 
most common types of evidence which were presented to the court were
50 There were abundant stories o f  land litigation whereby families “inherited” 
unconcluded court cases. People had been locked into a cycle o f litigation for generations; most o f 
these cases were only resolved by the revolution and subsequent land reform.
51 For the court structure o f  Ethiopia in both the pre -and post-liberation period see Aberra, 
The Legal History o f  Ethiopia, 219-241.
52 This is among the few cases where procedural knowledge was used to win a dispute. 
Mintdsnot Kabade v. Dana Shartu, DACCA, 61/63 (Dilla, 1963 E.C.).
53 Heinrich Scholler, The Special Court o f  Ethiopia, 1920-1935, Athiopistische 
Forschungen  (Stuttgart: F. Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1985), 89-90; According to Scholler the 
issue o f  proof, which is built into the traditional law o f  Ethiopia, is very important.
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1. Tax receipts, particularly land assessment receipts. Land assessment 
receipts were given high importance because government officials usually 
assessed land fertility at intervals of some years by classifying the land 
according to different levels of fertility [lam (fertile), lam-t q/'(semi-fertile) 
and t ’a f  (uncultivated)].54 This was considered to be the most reliable 
information for use in court. The main function of this assessment was for 
taxation purposes; however it contained other important information about 
the land, i.e. its location, the name of local governors, the tenure type, the 
size and fertility, the name of people who owned adjoining land etc. From 
the available court archives it is possible to tell that land assessment had 
taken place in 1942 E.C. (1950), 1945 E.C. (1953) and 1955 E.C. (1963). 
As well as the fertility level of the land the person who owned or owns the 
land was registered according to the tenure system on that land, hi the case 
of land which was considered to be rest land the person who was 
responsible in paying taxes was registered as the alaqa (chief or head) and 
others (usually brothers) as mimir (followers). However courts did not 
always accept land assessment receipts at face value, because as was 
revealed in some disputes, people were discovered to be illegally 
registered as the rninzir of a piece of land.55 There were instances where 
such registration was challenged by opponents and as a result the court 
nullified their registration as fraudulent. The registration of land tax in line 
with the northern Shawan type of system {alaqa and minzir) was 
interpreted by some researchers as a move towards the Amhara form of
54 G&bra-Wald, "Ethiopia's", 302-339.
55 For a historical explantion o f  these terms see Mantel-Niecko, The Role o f  Land Tenure, 105.
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land tenure. 56 From the government’s viewpoint it had practical 
importance in terms of reducing the burden of tax collection by giving 
some responsibility to the alaqa.
2. The second most common kind of evidence was that of personal witnesses. 
These were people who knew about the land, or who were present when 
the land was sold. If it was an inheritance and the relevant document was 
lost, people who were present at the time served as witnesses. In some 
cases a written document was not in itself be considered to be credible 
unless reinforced by eye witnesses’ accounts.
3. Any other written document, such as sale agreements, wills, and so forth. 
As noted earlier, land disputes cases could be grouped into two major divisions, 
interpersonal and government vs. individuals. Although the cases in which the 
government was involved were not numerous, they are however significant. By 
becoming involved in disputes the state attempted to use the legal system it had 
erected not only to protect its own interests and the interest of others but also as a 
demonstration that it was not above the law. Since the bulk of the archival 
material falls in the first category i.e. interpersonal land disputes, this chapter will 
be mainly devoted to this group of cases.
Interpersonal land disputes
At what point did individual disputants decide to take legal action to resolve their 
differences? Taking a case to court was a last resort when other forms of conflict 
resolution had failed. Most legal documents do not show what efforts were made
56 TekaIign,"A City and Its Hinterlands", 239.
57 According to Gabra-Wald this system was abolished by Emperor Haile Selassie. See Gabra- 
Wald, "Ethiopia’s", 311.
157
preceding the presentation of the case to a government court. Attempting to settle 
disputes privately through mediation or in other traditional ways was not seen as a 
precondition for disputants before entering into a court battle, but such a step 
could be taken by the individuals involved at any time including during the court 
proceedings, and courts imposed no restrictions in this regard.58
The interpersonal land disputes which came before the courts were widely 
varied. Archival documents reveal the kind of land dispute cases that government 
courts dealt with and the way in which the disputants presented their arguments to 
the courts, as well as how the courts weighed evidence and reached their verdict. 
However their varied and complex nature also means that they pose 
methodological problems such as how they should be approached in order to 
extract the most useful information for historical reconstruction. When a plaintiff 
lodged a case the courts usually registered it according to the issue he/she 
presented. However, interpersonal land disputes appeared in court under very 
general and vague titles. For example all inheritance cases were given a similar 
title, and if the dispute was about erbo the document would be labelled 
accordingly. This was a misleading approach because there are a number of court 
cases which originated as an erbo dispute and later evolved into a land dispute.59 
As a result of this it is difficult to establish even the basic issue behind any dispute; 
thorough investigation is needed to discover whether the issue was a land or 
tenancy dispute.
Interpersonal land disputes which came before the courts in Gedeo could 
be grouped broadly into the following categories
5SAfaworq Mangistu V. Tiro Jabo DACCA, 105/53 (D illa,1953 E.C.).
59 Worq Yit'aru Dubale v. Dinge Bushe, DACCA, 307/50 (Dilla, 1950 E.C.).
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1. Land sale
2. Inheritance (viwra)
3. Other varied issues, but were grouped under the general title of land dispute.
1. Land sale
Land sale was one of the most common methods of land transfer between 
individuals in Gedeo both before and after 1941.60 We do not know whether there 
was a marked difference in terms of the volume of transactions for the two periods. 
However based on the impression of informants as well as information from the 
archives we can safely assume that it was widely practiced after 1941.61 The 
improved economic situation and demographic pressure meant that accessing land 
by various means intensified. We have only limited information about land sale 
during the pre-war period, but court archives used for this study indicate that land 
sale was practiced on a limited scale. However we cannot identify the factors 
which motivated individuals to become involved in such transactions. McClellan 
claimed that due to the introduction of qalad, land became available and as a 
result Dcijjzacmach Balcha, the regional governor of Sidamo, sold land to 
individuals; however McClellan does not provide evidence in support of this.62 
The local archives only referred to land acquisition during Balchas’ time as a gift 
to soldiers and other functionaries of the government in the form of madaria and 
samon lands; there is no mention of any purchase from the state. In contrast the 
few archives of the post-war period show that land sale was common. These
60 For a history o f  land sale in Ethiopia see Crummey, Land and Society, 182-187.
61 Asaged Endala V. Tirunase Tassama, DACCA, 17/42 (Dilla, 1942 E.C.); Interview 
with Badesse Rufo, Grissa, C'abicha, 9 July 2004; and Gobana Latiti, Grissa, 15 July 2004.
62 McClellan, State Transformation, 90.
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sources referred to land sale during the pre-war period as well but only mentioned 
individual transactions, and therefore in this section we shall focus on disputes 
which arose in connection with such transfers.
Land dispute documents do not give much information about the 
individuals involved in the transaction and therefore it is difficult to identify 
whether a particular group or class of people were actively pursuing the 
accumulation of land by purchase. Land transfer appeared to take place among 
individuals regardless of their social, political and economic position within the 
community. In addition, although court dispute cases provide some background 
history about the land, there is very little information regarding the details of the 
transactions. Some of the case studies which will be examined shortly show that 
the selling of land was not a smooth process and the transaction rarely seemed to 
have happened by following simple market principles such as supply and 
demand.64 Contention appeared to have been an intrinsic part of any land sale; 
however, it is not easy to establish the reason why there was a high degree of 
correlation between lands which were transferred by sale and the eruption of legal 
disputes 65
Conflict could start from the early phases of the transaction, although as 
can be seen from the case studies given below disputes tended to take place at two 
different stages, either at the time of the initial transfer or many years after the 
transfer had taken place. In both cases the challenge usually came from close 
family members. The main objective of contention during the initial stages was to
63 Asaged Endala V. Tirunase Tassdma, DACCA, 17/42 (Dilla, 1942 E.C.).
64 Adam Habib v. T'aqabo Bela, DACCA, 742/57 (Dilla, 1957 E.C.).
65 Fayessa Araresso v. Bonja Dukale, DACCA, 25/61 (Dilla, 1961 E.C.). This dispute 
started in court before the land was even transferred to the buyer.
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block the sale of land to a person outside the family. It seems that family members 
made a persistent attempt to avoid the placing of land outside their own control, hr 
the two cases presented below disputes took place at a later stage, many years 
after these lands were transferred by sale to the new owners.66
The first case, which illustrates many of the above points, was initiated at 
court in 1942 E.C (1949) between the plaintiff Asaged Endala and the defendant, a 
woman named Emdt (Mrs) Tirunash Tassama. The land which was the subject of 
this dispute was initially transferred by sale from the previous owner in 1921 E.C. 
(1929). This land appeared to have been a subject of dispute for a long period of 
time until the case came to the Darassa (now Gedeo) Awraja court. In this latest 
dispute the plaintiff first presented a short history of the land in question and how 
the land had been transferred from his father to himself and his other brothers. 
This case was initiated as a simple land dispute but the details provided both by 
the defendant and the plaintiff and also by witnesses’ statements illustrate other 
issues around the subject of land tenure.67
The plaintiff, Asaged Endala (son of the first buyer) initiated a legal action 
on September 20th 1949, at the Awraja Court in Dilla against the defendant named 
Emdt Tirunash Tassama over half a gasha of land (one gasha is approximately 40 
hectares), claiming that the estimated value of the land was equivalent to 300 birr. 
He stated his case as follows;
My father Balambaras (a traditional title given to low level 
administrators) Endala Wondimagnahu bought one gasha of 
land from a woman called Wayzaro (a title equivalent to Mrs) 
Balynesh Sede in a place called Bonde qabale in 1921 E.C.
66 Mintasnot Kabade v. Dana Shartu, DACCA, 61/63 (Dilla, 1963 E.C.).
67 Asaged Endala V. Tirunase Tassama, DACCA, 17/42 (Dilla, 1942 E.C.).
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(1929) The price of this gasha of land was 450 Mari Theresa 
taller (Austrian currency). 8 Later my father allowed A to Bahru, 
who was also responsible for the sale, to use the land. Then later 
my father took over the land himself and had been paying all
taxes until the Italian occupation. Before his death in 1935 E.C 
[1943] my father divided the land among the five sons and since 
he favoured me I was given half a gasha and the other half was 
divided among my four brothers. Now in my absence for some 
unknown reason the defendant accused my brother at Jamjam 
Awraja Court and took over the land. I am now presenting my 
case to this court to consider the issue before the land is 
completely transferred to the defendant.69
The above statement by the plaintiff not only concerns the relevant land 
dispute but also illustrates a number of points about land tenure in pre- and post­
war Gedeo. It shows that there had been a great deal of continuity over decades. 
As the plaintiff claimed, the land was passed to him from his father and as a
favoured son he was given half of the gasha while the rest of his brothers
distributed the remaining half gasha among themselves. This kind of inheritance 
of land passed down from father to son or sons was very common practice. It 
appears however that the decision to favour one son over the other was peculiar to 
the plaintiffs father rather than a rule established by the indigenous tenure 
systems. Informants also pointed out that sometimes fathers would give an extra 
share of land to a son whom they believed was more responsible and caring, 
which shows that there were varied practices of land distribution.70
Returning to the main issue of this particular dispute, it is evident that the 
case was the continuation of a long standing battle. The reason the case came to
68 This had been a common currency in Ethiopia until it was fully replaced by Ethiopian birr 
which is the official currency.
69 Asaged Endala V. Tirunase Tassama, DACCA, 17/42 (Dilla, 1942 E.C.).
70 Interview with Bagajo Bonja, C'i c'u, 28 November 1999; Badecha Leko, Tumticha, 29 
April 1999; and Gobana Sole, Tumticha, 29 April 1999.
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Dilla, from Jamjam, a neighbouring Awraja, was because of a new arrangement in 
the administrative structure which took place in the early 1940s; since the land 
now fell within the jurisdiction of Darassa (Gedeo) it had to be heard in that 
Awraja.
The statement by the plaintiff fails to tell the full story concerning the loss 
of his land to the defendant. According to him his inability to defend the case 
personally at the previous hearing had caused this to happen.71 Although his 
brother on that occasion had appeared in court, his inability to provide an effective 
defence meant that the court decided the land should be awarded to the defendant. 
Although he did not provide details he felt that his brother had deliberately 
intended to inflict damage upon him by sabotaging the case. It is clear from the 
plaintiffs statement that he and his brother were not on good terms, possibly 
because the plaintiffs original share of land was larger than his other brothers. 
The defendant’s main argument was that the decision made at the previous court, 
at Jamjam, should be respected as final and binding, and she felt that the case 
should not start afresh. This argument was not accepted by the court, and the case 
proceeded with the hearing of evidence.
It was the usual practice for both the plaintiff and the defendant to present 
evidence of their right to a particular piece of land. Usually the court required both 
sides to present evidence either as verbal statements or written documents. (It was 
rare to present a written document of any kind concerning land transactions which 
took place before the war, however.)72 Usually, therefore, the evidence of
7iThe plaintiff did not make it clear why he was unable to defend the case in person in the 
previous court hearing. It appears however that his absence was deliberate as his strategy was to 
spoil his brother’s chance o f  winning the case.
12 In another court case the court turned down the appeal o f a defendant because the defendant 
asked the plaintiff to present a written agreement which showed that he had bought the land from
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witnesses was verbal and consisted of statements from people who were familiar 
with the region who had participated in that particular transaction, or were 
personally present when the land sale took place,73 In this case the plaintiff 
presented four witnesses, one of whom had known the history of the land since the 
time of Dajjazmach Balcha. Although most of the witnesses testified in a similar 
manner, one gave additional historical details which had not been mentioned by 
the plaintiff or the defendant and which make the story more interesting. 
According to his statement;
I know both the plaintiff and the defendant and I also know the 
land about which there is a dispute. This land first belonged to 
Emdt Balaynash and a man called A to Kabtyimar looked after it.
A to Bahru, who married the daughter of Emdt Balaynash, 
borrowed money from Balambaras Endala and I was a guarantor 
for that. Then later he could not pay back the money he had 
borrowed from the defendant’s father, and I was imprisoned. 
Therefore he sold the land to Balambaras Endala to bail me out.
I was also present when he sold the land to Balambaras Endala.
From that day until now the land was in the hands of the 
plaintiffs father and their sons. Since I also have land which 
borders on this land I am familiar with the issue.74
The defendant also claimed that the way the father of the plaintiff 
Balambaras Endala acquired the land in the first place was inappropriate and 
therefore she wanted witnesses to be heard. From the above testimony the land 
was sold outside the family to the father of the plaintiff because of pressure of 
debt, in contradiction of established practice.75
him. The court considered this to be an unfair manoeuvre on the defendant’s part as he had asked 
this question intentionally knowing that all documents belonging to the pre-war period had been 
burned during the Italian occupation. Esate Minwalkulat V. C'aka Name, DACCA, 325/41 (Dilla, 
1942 E.C.).
73 Ashagre Takla Maryam v. Shabo Dukale, DACCA, 145/52 (Dilla, 1952 E.C.).
74 Asaged Endala V. Tirunase Tassama, DACCA, 17/42 (Dilla, 1942 E.C.).
75 Eshate Minwalkulat v. C'aka Name, DACCA, 325/41 (Dilla, 1942 E.C.).
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As can be judged from the above discussion land sale was a fraught area. 
Transferring land by sale was not a straightforward process from the point of view 
of either sellers 01* buyers. When considering selling land to anyone interested 
sellers were expected to give priority to family members. When preparing to 
purchase land buyers had to ensure that the seller took all the necessary steps to 
avoid future disputes before engaging in the transaction; protecting what they had 
acquired at a later date would not only be complex but also could cost them dearly 
both financially as well as in terms of time. As the above case has shown the land 
was bought by the father of the plaintiff, Balambaras Endala, after the previous 
landowner had financial problems. Hence the attempt by one member of the 
family of the sellers to render the sale illegal did not succeed. Unfortunately the 
written account is so brief that we cannot establish exactly why it failed. However 
we know that the buyers remained in control of the land and it was confirmed by 
statements of the witnesses that the land had been in their possession for an 
uninterrupted period of time.
A superficial understanding of the transfer of land by sale gives the 
impression that it was a well established and efficient medium of property transfer. 
However, as the following case shows, acquiring land by purchase remained 
problematic.
In a similar land dispute case the land in question was initially offered for 
sale to an outsider. This potential sale was blocked by one of the members of the 
seller’s family, who unlike in the example above succeeded in interrupting the 
transaction and bought the land themselves. We do not know what actual legal 
basis was used to stop sales to outsiders but nevertheless the practice was common
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as we can see both from this and the previous case. However what is not clear is 
whether the sellers would be financially disadvantaged by selling their land to a 
family member or kin as opposed to an outside person. This seems likely; the 
available sources do not provide detailed information, but close inspection of 
individual cases suggests that vendors gained financially when they sold their land 
to non family members and kin.
In the following case the main aim of the plaintiff was to regain control of 
land which had been sold by his mother many years ago. The dispute was between 
Eshate Minwalkulat and three defendants.76 When the plaintiff initiated the case 
he stated that the dispute was about erbo, a common trigger for land disputes in 
Gedeo during this period, and he accused the defendants as his tenants who of 
failing to pay the land rent due to him. The real motive of the plaintiff was not 
apparent until later during the course of the dispute. When the defendants 
appeared in court they responded to the charge by saying that they had no 
knowledge of the plaintiff as their landlord and asked the court to pass the case to 
their wabi,77 to whom they had been paying rent. Hence a man called Wayassa 
Dabala appeared in court by invitation from the accused tenants. Now the case 
evolved from an erbo dispute to a land ownership conflict between the plaintiff
no
and the wabi.
In the middle of the dispute another person entered the game, a second 
wabi, Kassaye Zamilcaele, who according to the defendants owned the land jointly
76 Eshate Minwalkulat v. C'aka Name, DACCA, 325/41 (Dilla, 1942 E.C.).
77 A person who may be allowed by the court to intervene in land or tenancy dispute upon 
the invitation o f  o f  either o f  the parties. See chapter four for more discussion about the 
involvement o f  wabis.
78 Walata Gabrael v. Tero Adayo, DACCA, 31/50 (Dilla, 1950 E.C.).
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with Wayassa Dabala. Now the truth began to emerge. The land which the 
plaintiff Eshate claimed to be his initially belonged to his mother, but later was 
bought by the two defendants. After Kassaye and Wayassa confirmed their 
purchase of the land, these two further added that their wives were sisters of the 
plaintiffs mother. Thus by buying the land from Eshate’s mother it had remained 
within the family.
The plaintiff argued that his mother had not actually sold to the two wabis 
and hence contested the sale. When he was challenged as to how the defendants 
were able to use the land as their own property, he claimed that she gave them the 
land on a walad-aged (lease) basis. The court asked both sides to present their 
evidence. When the defendants were unable to produce a written agreement about 
the sale, the plaintiff, Eshate, demanded that without such evidence the sale should 
not be recognised by the court as legitimate. The court considered this to be an 
unfair manoeuvre 011 the part of Eshate because he had made this stipulation 
knowing that all documents belonging to the pre-war period had been destroyed 
by fire during the Italian occupation. Under these circumstances the court felt that 
personal witnesses would be sufficient to decide the case, and nine of them 
testified. However none of the statements of the witnesses supported Eshate and 
therefore he lost his attempt to win back land which his mother had sold legally 
many years ago.79
This case illustrates two major points about land dispute in Gedeo. One is 
that a dispute could be initiated on many grounds; it demonstrates clearly that 
initiating a land dispute on spurious grounds was not difficult at all. This case was 
not unusual in that the apparent cause of dispute (erbo non-payment) was initially
79 Eshate Minwalkulat v. C'aka Name, DACCA, 325/41 (Dilla, 1942 E.C.).
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used to mask the real dispute which centred around Eshate’s attempts to regain 
land his mother had actually sold. The defendants, who had bought the land 
legally, were forced to endure a lengthy and expensive court battle without 
sufficient reason. Even though the court decided in their favour by reaffirming 
their rights to the land once they had had produced evidence, this case illustrates 
the high degree of insecurity associated with land ownership rights. Both the 
plaintiffs evidence and his argument were weak, but in spite of that he was able 
to engage his opponents in a lengthy court dispute. The other important point is 
the centrality of evidence to the outcome of court battles. As can be seen from this 
case the dispute was not won by procedural knowledge, but by the defendants’ use 
of strong verbal evidence in their favour.80
As we have seen in these two examples people who acquired land by 
purchase did not find it easy to protect their property from challenges from other 
contenders.81 This suggests that land sale, although a common practice, might not 
necessarily have been the preferred option when the individual wanted to meet 
other social and economic obligations. Although the system continued, 
transferring land through sale became increasingly less important compared to 
other modes of transfer as we will see in the next section, hi the meantime there 
was a gradual regulation of the procedures of transfer, and particular attention was 
given to the provision of written sales agreements, which would provide greater 
security for buyers. Despite such clarification, disputes about land continued to 
dominate court proceedings and people were able to find a multiplicity of excuses 
for initiating a case, with the overall aim of blocking land transfer.
80 Tamana Darsahe v. Zanabach Fulase, DACCA, 42/62 (Dilla, 1962 E.C.).
81 Tafassa Makuria v. Adula Worba, DACCA, 12/61 (Dilla, 1960 E.C.).
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In fact one case which came to court many decades after the sales 
transaction took place shows that written sales agreements, which were given 
central importance in land disputes, began to be challenged retrospectively by 
claiming that the agreement had been the result of fraudulent activity on the part 
of the defendants. The case below illustrates how a well-written sales agreement 
might not be sufficient to protect one’s ownership rights, and how an individual 
might have a difficult task to ensure that the land was their legitimate property. 
The following case was the most protracted of all the cases I examined because 
the dispute reached the Zufan Chelot (Crown Court) at Addis Ababa, which was 
the pinnacle of Ethiopia’s court system, normally presided over by Emperor Haile 
Sellassie himself or other leading judges.82
The case was initiated by a woman named Emat Warqnashe Walda Mikael, 
who accused the tenants who were cultivating the land of non-payment of erbo, 
although the case proved to be infinitely more complex. The accused tenants did 
not reply to the main charges, they simply passed the case to the people they 
themselves identified as the owners of the land, through what was known as the 
wabi system.83 Two women appeared at court as wabis for the tenants, Emdt 
Falaqach Saboqa and Emdt Elfnashe Gabra Sellassie. The relationship between the 
two landladies was not stated in the case file; however, they claimed that they 
were joint owners of the land. According to the defendants they had bought the
82 Aberra, The Legal H istory o f  Ethiopia, 219-228 ; Dassalane Korojo V. Borqo Ginje, 
DACCA, 285/54 (Dilla, 285/54).
83 There w ill be further discussion about the wabi system in the next chapter in relation to 
tenancy disputes, because it featured widely in relation to such disputes. Tafara Endala v. Huqa 
Shongola, DACCA, 228/56 (Dilla, 1956 E.C.).
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land from the father of the plaintiff, a transaction which had taken place twenty 
years before this case came to court.84
The two women argued that the plaintiff was aware of the sale especially 
as there had been previous contention about this which had resulted in a mediation 
effort which was settled in their favour. Despite this the plaintiff remained 
dissatisfied and thus started a fresh court dispute. The defendants claimed that the 
mediation effort was concluded by the signing of a binding agreement in the 
presence of her brother which they had both signed and which recognised that the 
land belonged to the defendants. They claimed that the reason why her brother had 
not appeared himself in court was because he knew that the land belonged to them 
and had been acquired legally. When they produced written evidence the plaintiff 
then changed her strategy and argued that such evidence was not genuine and 
wished to challenge them on these grounds. As a result of this counter-claim by 
the plaintiff the dispute centred around the process of verifying the authenticity of 
the evidence, and a lengthy court battle ensued.85
As she refused to accept the authenticity of the written evidence presented 
by the defendants the plaintiff asked the court to send it to technical examiners. 
This manoeuvre seemed to have worked very well in terms of prolonging the case, 
and since there was no facility to handle the examination in Gedeo or in the bigger 
towns such as Yirga Alam or Awassa, the court had to send it to Addis Ababa. 
However, when the results arrived the examination was found to be inconclusive 
which suited the plaintiff. The court then felt that the case should be settled by
84 Worqnashe W/Mikael v. Falaqach Stiboqa and Elfenaashe G/Sellassie, DACCA,
102/55 (Dilla, 1955 E.C.).
85 Worqndshe W/Mikael v. Falaqach Saboqa and Elfenaashe G/Sellassie, DACCA,
102/55 (Dilla, 1955 E.C.).
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hearing the accounts of personal witnesses, as a result of which the ownership 
right of the defendants was finally confirmed. Unfortunately despite 
overwhelming evidence the plaintiff had been able to prolong the case far longer 
than was warranted by appealing to the higher courts. In fact when she made her 
first appeal to the regional court, the court felt that since the technical report was 
inclusive the land should be awarded to the plaintiff. That was however short lived 
because the case was again overturned by the counter appeal made by the 
defendants, which resulted in the witnesses’ verbal evidence being heard.86
Thus the Court o f Appeal at Addis Ababa overturned the decision of the 
High Court of Sidamo and ruled that the decision of the Awraja Court at Dilla in 
favour of the defendants should stand. The plaintiff remained unsatisfied and 
therefore she decided to appeal to the Zufan Chelot. 87 Here the case was initially 
reviewed by a group of judges to determine whether there were sufficient grounds 
for a further appeal to take place. A committee of three judges who reviewed the 
case wrote a letter to the plaintiff stating that the first decision made by the 
Awraja Court and later confirmed by the Court of Appeal at Addis Ababa was 
after all appropriate; therefore the case would not be taken further.88
This case is significant from a number of points. Regarding the 
transactions made in earlier times, it was very difficult for the owners to support 
their claims to the land because documents were either destroyed during the war, 
or the transaction had been made verbally, and because of the length of time
86 Worqnashe W/Mikael v. Falaqach Saboqa and Elfenaashe G/Sellassie, DACCA,
102/55 (Dilla, 1955 E.C.).
S7Redden, The Legal System o f  Ethiopia, 43.
88 WorqnSshe W/Mikael v. Falaqach Saboqa and Elfenaashe G/Sellassie, DACCA,
102/55 (Dilla, 1955 E.C.).
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which had elapsed it was problematic to find witnesses who were present at the 
time. We know also that there was no government authority which was 
responsible for recording land transactions and which could provide authoritative 
evidence so that such disputes could easily be averted or settled. Land property 
rights could be subjected to contention at any time irrespective of how the land 
had been acquired. Owners frequently had to pass through a gruelling legal 
process to confirm that the land belonged to them. Initiating a case was not after 
all difficult; in the above case for example it was enough for the plaintiff to say 
that the documents were not genuine to justify considerably prolonging the legal 
battle. Although the plaintiff lost the case the punishment was far less significant 
than the trouble she had caused the defendants, in view of the effort and the 
expense involved. Courts normally awarded compensation to victorious litigants 
but most of the time the amount was nominal, for example the plaintiff in this case 
only had to pay 15 birr per head in compensation to the defendants. It is not clear 
how the amount was calculated, but nevertheless the winners seemed to have been 
satisfied with the bigger prize, which was the land, and did not query the amount 
offered.
Hardly surprisingly land acquisition through purchase did not show signs 
of increasing, even in the later decades when it was generally believed that the 
economic environment was more secure. This does not mean that land transfer 
between individuals was totally abandoned. On the contrary it seemed to have 
been intensified; however, land sale seems to have given way to other modes of 
transfer as we shall see in due course. The court system appeared to be 
encouraging rather than discouraging disputes, especially when we consider the
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endless appeals and counter appeals which were used as a delaying tactics in all 
types of cases whatever their magnitude.
In such an insecure environment it is doubtful whether individuals engaged 
in such transactions casually without taking extra precautions or opting for 
another safer method of property transfer, as will be discussed shortly. Meanwhile 
since the buying and selling of land could not totally be avoided some individuals 
took additional precautions by legalizing their transactions in court. Therefore a 
dual approach began to be used to counter the problem; the first was that the 
person who intended to sell their land officially invited any potential claimants to 
state their case in court, before the sale was finalised. The second method was for 
both buyers and sellers to go to court with the intention of seeking confirmation of 
a transaction already made so that future disputes could be avoided.
The first point mentioned above can be illustrated by the following case 
whereby the buyer and seller agreed to go to court and officially invite any 
individual who might object to the transfer to stake their own claim. This case was 
presented in court as an inheritance case but in fact a study of the documents 
revealed it to be a land sale.89 The owner of the land was Alamayahu W/Masqal. 
Alamayahu stated that his intention was to either sell or bequeath the land to any 
person he wished, but before he did that he wanted to make sure that 110 one stood 
in his way.
I Alamayahu W/Masqal possess land in Darassa Awraja gizat, 
within the Balabatinat of Balambaras Assafa Chumburo, and 
the C ’iqa Shumenat (local head man) of Badecha Oudo, at a
89 The overlapping nature o f  land sale and inheritance will be discussed in the next section; 
the example here is used as a land sale agreement rather than an inheritance one. It is also possible 
to view this particular case from an inheritance point o f  view, but the main point made here is that 
due to the proliferation o f  disputes buyers urged vendors to go to court to legalise the transaction 
so that future conflict could be averted.
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place called Daqo. My seven other siblings and I inherited this 
land from my mother Emat Get’e W/Tsadiq, but now I want to 
bequeath or sell [emphasis my own] my own share of land 
including all plants on it to any person I wish. Before 1 signed 
this agreement I asked them to state at Gedeo Court if  they 
opposed the sale or had an interest in buying it themselves. But 
none expressed interest.90
The person who wished to acquire land also appeared in court, and he was 
identified as Ato Baqala Sintayahu. The transaction had not yet taken place and 
therefore it was with the intention of forestalling those who were likely to cause 
disruption of the sale that this case came to court. In the final judgement it was 
stated that Ato Alamayahu retained the right to bequeath or sell the land, all his 
siblings having been sent notice to appear in court if  they objected, but none 
having appeared.91 Thus in this case the transfer could only take place after the 
court had clarified the matter.
In a slightly different scenario court rulings were used to prevent future 
disputes from occurring even after the transaction had taken place.92 When the 
parties in a land sale sought to legalise the transaction in court they would also 
demand that the court invite anyone who had an interest in the land or opposed the 
transfer. In one such case which was presented to the Gedeo Awraja Court in 
T’iqmet 21, 1949E.C. (October 31, 1956) the two sides applied jointly and asked 
the court to recognise and legalise the transaction. As shown clearly in the 
agreement the land was first bought by Ato Taddassa Alecham for birr 700. He 
decided to share the land with a man called Ato Zawdie Habta Gyorgis, who was 
required to pay half of the price. Ato Taddassa stated that “I sold half of my at’sma
90 Taddassa Alcam V. Zawde Habta Wold, DACCA, 103/49 (Dilla, 1949 E.C.).
91 Al&mayahu W alda Masqal and Baqala Sintayahu, DACCA, 634/45 (Dilla, 1945 B.C.).
92 Fayesa Arariso V. Bonja Dukale, DACCA, 25/61 (Dilla, 1961 E.C.).
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rest, to Ato Zawdie, so that we could use the land together.” The term at’sma rest 
was common terminology in the core rest areas of northern Ethiopia such as Manz. 
The words at’sma rest (literally “bone of my ancestors”) implied that the land had 
been inherited from forefathers. In fact he had bought the land himself from 
someone else, and it was not an at’smd rest, but he probably used this term to 
indicate that the land was his indisputable property. It was specifically stated that 
if at some future date one partner wanted to sell their share they should give 
priority to the other man rather than to an outsider, and all financial obligations 
such as tax were to be met together. Thus legalisation was used to clarify matters 
and avoid future litigation.93
2. Inheritance
Inheritance was probably the oldest and the most widely used mode of land 
transfer which also continued to be practiced in the period under discussion.94 
From the court dispute documents we can see how inheritance was used in two 
different contexts. The first one was the most straightforward type where parents 
bequeathed their property, mainly land, to their offspring, as illustrated in the first 
case discussed above. We have seen that the land about which Asaged Endala was 
disputing was inherited from his father and as he pointed out he managed to 
receive a larger share than the rest of his brothers. The principles of inheritance 
and how their land was to be divided among their children depended largely on 
the personal decision of the parents. Asaged said that as a favoured son he was 
allowed to receive a bigger share of the land. While confirming that this practice
93 Taddassa Alcam V. Zawde Habta Wold, DACCA, 103/49 (Dilla, 1949 E.C.).
94 Crummey, Land and Society, 189-190; Dage Bunshe v. Debo Busho, DACCA, 392/53 
(Dilla, 1953 E.C.).
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was common, informants also pointed out that equal sharing as well as 
disinheriting (though rare) of offspring were also practiced.95
The other type of “inheritance” which was found in greater abundance in 
land dispute documents was the one which was used as a convenient means of 
transferring land to non-family members.96 “Inheritance” in this situation differed 
from the traditional concept as it meant an alternative form of sale and was not 
dependent upon the death of the previous landowner. In theory such transfer of 
land should not be different from land sale; however, an increasing number of 
people used inheritance as a preferred alternative to transfer of land by sale and 
this method became more common than other modes of land transfer during this 
period.97 At least with this method possible competition for the ownership of the 
land in question was limited to the current owner’s family members.98 The greater 
insecurity which was associated with land sale encouraged people to resort to this 
type of land transfer.99
However, even in inheritance cases disputes could arise. The most 
straightforward inheritance-related disputes happened when disagreements arose 
among inheritors or when they interpreted the will left by their parents differently 
and subjectively. One case which can illustrate the point regarding disagreement 
about a will was the case of Lagassa Saboqa (plaintiff) and Badane Sheto (tenant
95 Asaged Endala V. Tirunase Tassama, DACCA, 17/42 (Dilla, 1942 E.C.); Interview 
with Bursa Danbobe, Bula, 3 December 1999; and Badecha Leko, Tumticha, 29 April 1999.
96 Eshate Minwalkulat v. C'akaName, DACCA, 325/41 (Dilla, 1942 E.C.).
97 B&qla Oda v. Dango Dalo, DACCA, 52/62 (Dilla, 1962 E.C.).
98 Interview with Bursa Danbobe, Bula, 3 December 1999.
99 Goody, "Inheritance, Property and Women”, 1-9; for example Jack Goody discusses 
inheritance as a mode o f property transfer only between family members as was practiced in 
Europe 1200-1800.
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and defendant).100 This case originated at the Waradct Court as an erbo dispute 
between a landlord and a tenant and moved to the Awraja Court at Dilla as an 
appeal. However, as gradually emerged, the case was a result of sibling rivalry 
rather than a dispute about erbo rent. The tenant, who was accused for no apparent 
reason and had been paying erbo in full, summoned the plaintiff’s brother as his 
wabi, Lagassa’s brother appeared in court as the tenant’s wabi and it became clear 
that Lagassa’s real motive was to use the cover of a spurious erbo dispute to try to 
take the land from his brother.
When asked by the court what evidence he had he presented a copy of 
their father’s will which stated clearly how the land was to be divided among his 
children. The issue was not an erbo dispute as the plaintiff had initially claimed. 
Rather it was a disagreement based on the way the will was interpreted by the two 
brothers and there was nothing relevant to the tenant in this dispute. The main 
argument of the plaintiff was that the land should be his and the tenant should pay 
rent to him rather than his brother.101 He argued that the will left by their father 
clearly indicated that. When both sides disagreed over the content of the will, the 
court ordered that it should be read out in court in the presence of the other 
inheritors, and in addition the two copies of the will which had been kept by the 
two independent individuals, Emat Warqinash Danbalo and a cleric, Mamere 
Asagede.102 The crucial evidence in the above case was the will left by their father 
and all copies including the one which the wabi brought to court showed that there
100 Lagassa Saboqa v. Badane Shito, DACCA, 28/59 (Dilla, 1959 E.C.).
101 Lagassa Saboqa v. Badane Shito, DACCA, 28/59 (Dilla, 1959 E.C.); there was also similar 
argument in the dispute between Warq Agannahu Walda-Yas V, Gobana Robe, DACCA, 57/59 
(Dilla, 1959E.C.).
102 Lagassa Saboqa v. Badane Shito, DACCA, 28/59 (Dilla, 1959 E.C.).
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were no contradictions. Additional supporting testimonies were also heard from 
the two neutral persons who had safeguarded copies of the will. The court ruled 
that it did not discover any anomalies in the way the will had been implemented, 
and therefore the case was dismissed and the wabi freed. Significantly, copies of 
the will had been lodged with different people, a precaution which was a 
testimony to the fact that disputes were frequent, even among siblings, and 
therefore their father sensibly took the precaution of lodging copies of the will 
among various individuals.
As indicated above, acquiring land in the name of inheritance rather than 
purchase became more popular, and in fact when we study the available sources 
especially in the 1960s and early 70s, immediately before the land reform, land 
sales appear to have been eclipsed by inheritance, which offered a higher level of 
security. When both parties agreed to transfer land by inheritance they also agreed, 
as in the case of land sale, how much money should be paid for the land. This was 
the value of the land if  it were to be sold on the open market. Since their 
relationship was only based on the need to engage in the transaction it is safe to 
assume that the land might not fetch a better price than if  it was transferred by a 
straightforward sale. As the agreements show, individuals who acquired land 
either by purchase or inheritance were both concerned about making their land 
more secure once it had been transferred to their possession.103 Therefore the first 
precaution was to make the inheritance agreement as watertight as possible; this 
was done by including in the agreement a heavy penalty to be imposed on the 
landowner if  it was challenged at any time in the future.104 This means that if the
103 Walata Yohannis W/Maryam V. Negatwa Dasta, DACCA, 97/56 (Dilla, 1956 E.C.).
104 Malasa Lama v. Dayamo Yama, DACCA, 68/51 (Dilla, 1951 E.C.).
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bequeather broke the agreement or if anyone challenged the inheritor of the land 
after the land was transferred, it was the responsibility of the legator or first owner 
to deal with such problems. This aptly illustrates how concerned individuals were 
about land security.
The example below elaborates the above points. A person called Ato Malasa 
Lama made an agreement with four individuals, who were brothers, to inherit their 
land after an agreed amount of money had been paid. Let us examine the content 
of the agreement;
Rest inheritance agreement
Bequeathers (awrashoch): 1. Ato Mamo Yame, 2. Ato Dayamo Yame,
3. Ato Lalimo Yame and 4. Ato Kana Yame
Inheritor (warcisK): Ato Malasa Lama
.... The rest land which is found in ... [details of location]... which was 
handed down to us from our grandfathers and fathers, we now 
bequeath to the person mentioned above, including the crops on it. For 
this we have received 330 birr which is sufficient for our pensions. If 
we are found to be breaking this agreement we will be penalised by 
paying 500 birr to the government and we will also compensate the 
inheritor for his loss. We made this agreement not with weak 
consciences or under any other influence such as alcohol. We give Ato 
Baqala Gabra-Madhen as our guarantor.. .105
As this agreement shows the transfer was made under the name of 
inheritance and for that Ato Malasa had paid 330 birr to the four brothers which 
had been agreed to be the value of their land and the crops on it.106 From this 
agreement we can surmise that the three individuals who bequeathed the land to 
the inheritor were probably approaching retirement because it was stated that the 
money was sufficient to cover their pensions. The amount of money to be paid to
105 Malasa Lama v. Dayamo Yame, DACCA, 68/51 (Dilla, 1951 E.C.).
106 Mogas Ababa V. Masalach Abara, DACCA, 4/56, (Dilla, 1956E.C.).
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the government as a penalty if they broke the agreement was 500 birr, more than 
the value of the land and the crops at the time of the transfer. This clearly shows 
that security was a major concern and as a result, the inheritor Ato Malasa seemed 
to have gained everything which he wanted from this agreement. What is 
surprising is that no reprisals were mentioned against him if similar transgression 
took place on his part i.e. if he himself broke the agreement for whatever reason. 
The agreement was one sided and this raises questions concerning who had the 
upper hand in this kind of land transfer; the landowners or individual buyers with 
money? Was the agreement made without them understanding the responsibilities 
and risks entailed? In addition to the heavy financial penalty if they renegued on 
their agreement they provided a personal guarantor in the form of Ato Baqala 
Gabra-Madhen. There were also witnesses who were present when the two sides 
exchanged the inheritance. Later the agreement was endorsed by the local court 
where the land was located.107
Despite such precautions, trouble started a few months after the transfer was 
completed involving one of the four brothers, Ato Dayoma Yama. From the 
charges brought by Ato Malasa Lama, who was now the legal owner of the land, 
Dayoma had illegally harvested coffee from land which was no longer his, thus 
breaking the above agreement which he had signed with his other brothers. Since 
the first dispute between the two was seen by the local court we do not have the 
details of the story, but we leam that the Warad court found Ato Dayoma guilty 
and fined him 200 birr to be paid to Ato Malasa in compensation. However the 
dispute did not end there because Malasa again claimed that in 1959 E.C. (1966/7) 
Dayoma had committed a similar offense which led to a further court hearing.
107 Malasa Lama v. Dayamo Yame, DACCA, 68/51 (Dilla, 1951 E.C.).
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Although this case was abandoned when both agreed to finalise the matter through 
mediation, it however shows that disputes could not be avoided completely 
despite having a well written agreement. Nevertheless the agreement served the 
interests of Ato Malasa well because he won the first battle easily by using it as 
evidence. Why Dayoma initiated a second dispute is not clear. In his defence he 
wrote to the court denying the very existence of an agreement and claiming that 
the court should not take the agreement into account without hearing personal 
witnesses. It seems that Dayoma was trying to fight a losing battle, and in fact at 
one point he said that he was threatened by Malasa to force him to sign the 
agreement. He felt that his ignorance had led to him signing such an unfair 
agreement.108
A well-written agreement was given utmost importance in many land 
transfer agreements especially during the last two decades of our period. 
Nevertheless as court disputes could not be avoided with any degree of certainty 
on the basis of good agreements alone, buyers or people who wanted to acquire 
land in a variety of ways increasingly looked for extra protection. Litigation was 
complex by nature, costly and could continue for an indefinite period of time. This 
can be illustrated by one case which originated in court as an inheritance 
dispute.109 Dispute erupted soon after the inheritance agreement was concluded, 
while the parties were in the process of legalising the inheritance agreement in 
court. The main reason for using this court case as an example is that both parties 
agreed to the inclusion of an additional clause, which was not included in many
108 Malasa Lama v. Dayamo Yame, DACCA, 68/51 (Dilla, 1951 E.C.).
109 Sagaye Tafaia and Waqo Ddnbe V, Alamu Tora and Kifle Boru, DACCA, 43/59, (Dilla, 
1959 E.C.).
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other agreements, such as the one discussed above.110 It related to potential 
disputes which might well arise in the future and stated who should take 
responsibility for dealing with such disputes if they occurred and what penalty 
should be paid were this task not to be fulfilled. It shows a high degree of 
apprehension on the part of the inheritors because disputes were extremely likely 
to start at some stage after transfer. Hence they hoped that by addressing their 
concerns clearly and unambiguously in the written agreements they would gain 
protection from one of the major problems for landowners who acquired land in 
this way. This is how it read;
I Ganale owned land within the Goro Mildtle Warada (an 
administrative unit below warada), the Balabatnat of Balambars 
Oudo Bare, and within my aldqinat, in a place called Munit qabale.
The land is bordered by [details of people who owned land on all 
sides]... I have bequeathed this land which has coffee and ensat trees 
to Ato Kifle Boru, and I received 500 birr for that.
If any one comes to claim this land as theirs I will defend and 
repel them, and if not I will replace it with similar land from my 
own found nearby [emphasis my own]. The agreement shall be 
enforced as of today.11
Although this agreement has not been quoted in full it however contains all 
the usual details which agreements of such nature were required to contain. The 
children who could potentially claim this land were named and an additional 
statement was added to help dispel the worry of the heir Ato Kifle Boru. They 
stated that the agreement was read out for them in the presence of witnesses and 
that they would not in future raise any issue in relation to the transfer of the land. 
The penalty was again high; Ganale agreed to pay 500 birr to the government and
1,0 Alamayahu W/Masqal V. Baqala Sintayahu, DACCA, 634/45 (Dilla, 1945 B.C.).
111 Sagaye Tafara and Waqo Danbe V. Alamu Tora and Kifle Bom , DACCA, 43/59, (Dilla, 
1959 E.C.).
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200 birr to Ato Kifle if  clauses of the agreement were broken at some future 
time.112
We will conclude this section by highlighting important points concerning 
land sale and inheritance as modes of land transfer between individuals. Although 
inheritance as a method of land transfer did not provide complete protection 
against disputes, it eclipsed land sale as a preferred option. Inheritance was 
advantageous compared to sale in two ways, both of which benefited the new 
owner rather than the person who transferred their land in exchange for money. 
The first was that the landowners had more control over who was potentially 
likely to stake a rival claim 011 their land. Hence when an individual who was not 
a family member wanted to acquire land by inheritance they could ask the 
landowner to list all potential claimants and preferably could demand that all of 
them to be present when the agreement was signed. By including those potential 
claimants in the agreement they felt that it was possible to gain better protection 
for their land.113
Secondly inheritance was more efficient than land sale; when parties 
concluded an inheritance agreement the procedures were simpler and usually 
straightforward as demonstrated by the examples above. This is clearer if we 
compare it with land sale, because in the case of sale transactions, if one wanted to 
make sure that the land was safeguarded from any future claim by family 
members and kin groups, the sellers and buyer had to make their intention 
manifest, preferably by giving priority to anyone within the family or kin group 
who might be interested in buying the land. This shows that acquiring land by sale
112 Sagaye Tafara and Waqo Danbe V. Alamu Tora and Kifle Boru, DACCA, 43/59, (Dilla, 
1959 E.C.).
113 Chaicho Titera v. Bura Gale, DACCA, 540/56 (Dilla, 1956 E.C.).
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was not only a lengthy process but was also an intrinsically insecure arrangement 
which discouraged an increasing number of people from acquiring land by 
purchase. However in order to have a broader understanding of the contentious 
nature of land rights in Gedeo it is important to see beyond that which has been 
discussed above. As levels of land insecurity increased land owners were forced to 
rely more heavily on the courts in their struggle to establish control over their own 
land. As the following section shows, contention about land was boundless and no 
land was immune from this phenomenon.
3. Other causes of land disputes
Disputes about land could come to court in diverse ways; in the above discussion 
we considered disputes in relation to land transfer. Below we will see examples of 
how contention about land could start without the land changing hands. A variety 
of factors could trigger litigation over land issues and it is not practical to address 
them all.114 Nevertheless by discussing some concrete examples it is possible to 
illustrate how land ownership was a highly precarious phenomenon.115 Disputes 
shaped the life of the community as much as other aspects of day-to-day existence 
and give some insight into how the community functioned in all walks of life. 
This might also lead us to raise questions about the various institutions which 
underpinned society for a long period of time.
As we move further towards the last phase of our historic period the 
strategies of disputants became sophisticated. The heavy reliance of courts on 
evidence, particularly written, was exploited by individuals who acquired
114 Wote Ejo V . Falaqa Yizbat'e, DACCA, 133/44 (Dilla, 1944 E.C.).
115 M amere Asged W / Takele v. Zawde W/ Aragaye, DACCA, 232/54 (Dilla, 1954 E.C.).
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documents such as tax receipts on a fraudulent basis; this can clearly be detected 
from the archives especially of the later period. Opportunistic conspiracy with 
government officials was rife. For example when officials came to the area to 
cany out land measurement, mainly for taxation purposes, people who were 
occupying land on a tenancy or contract basis managed to get their names 
registered as landowners and later used such documents as crucial evidence in 
land dispute cases.
As seen from various examples the main cause of insecurity did not come 
from the government but rather was a result of contention among fellow 
individuals.116 hi fact as more examples in the next section show, it was 
individuals who intensified the competition for this scarce resource rather than the 
state. The sources demonstrated unambiguously that some individuals had the 
desire as well as the time and resources to use every possible avenue available to 
take over another’s land.117
The example given below particularly focuses on three major points 
concerning land disputes in Gedeo. Firstly, it demonstrates how easily crucial 
evidence such as tax receipts or land assessment receipts were acquired. Secondly 
it shows how some sectors of the population, particularly women, were vulnerable 
to such kinds of attacks; and thirdly how the intensification of competition for 
access to land led to the breakdown of trust and personal relationships.
In this example one of the main protagonists in the dispute, Halake 
Baresso, had been a tenant for a long period of time before he claimed the land as 
his own private property. In fact because of his good relationship with the
116 Teshale, The Making o f  M odem Ethiopia, 33-37.
117 Jusso Kudo v. Shanto Woke, DACCA, 2/42 (Dilla, 1942 E.C.).
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landlords this tenant had been given special status as the leader of the other 
tenants who fanned the land. Due to this special relationship with the landowner 
he was even entrusted with the collection of rent from the other tenants and given 
the task of dealing with problems which might arise in relation to the land. 
Nothing happened until the death of the main landlord, but after he died and the 
land was transferred to two women the situation began to deteriorate and problems 
surfaced between this head of the tenants and the women who had inherited the 
land.
Being unable to control the head tenant, the women felt that taking the
case to court was their best option; the plaintiff of this case was Aya Dube. She
represented both herself and her sick mother Dulcu Aboye. She accused the head
tenant, Halake Baresso, and eight other male defendants of failing to pay the erbo
owed on two gashas (one gasha = 40 hectares) of land. Her father had shared the
two gasha of land as balarest (landlord) with her uncle until his death in 1945 E.C.
(1953). With the death of the plaintiff’s father her uncle Ato Kassaye Kulundu
became responsible for the family and their land. Since the Gedeo practiced what
was known as “wife inheritance” her uncle married her mother after the death of
his brother and thence the land was fully controlled by Ato Kassaye. While the
land was under his control, Ato Kassaye also made a future arrangement regarding
how the land should be shared between mother and daughter, which accorded
them one gasha each. This agreement was made some time before his death. He
also added that since both of the heirs were women he entrusted to Ato Halake
Baresso the task of collecting dues from the tenants and paying taxes to the
110
government accordingly.
1,8 Aya Dube V. HalSko Biiresso, DACCA, 3/64 (Dilla, 1964 E.C.).
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This agreement was signed and a copy was given to an elder (Ato Guye Buie) 
who was present at the time as an observer. When Ato Kassaye, the plaintiffs 
uncle died in 1952 E.C. (1960). Ato Halake Baresso continued to act as the 
women’s representative until 1955E.C. (1963). hi that year a land assessment took 
place in their area, after which the plaintiff and her mother lost their rights to the 
land when the head of the tenants and others registered their own names as the 
balarests of the two gasha of lands. The plaintiff marshalled the following 
supporting evidence:
1. The 1942 E.C. tax receipt which showed that her father was minzir to the 
rest and her uncle alaqa for the two gasha of land they are claiming as 
theirs.
2. The agreement signed by her uncle which showed that one gasha of land 
was given to the plaintiff and the other to her mother.
3. Three witnesses who could testify for herself and her mother in court. 
These people were present when her uncle signed the will in which he 
granted them the lands. One witness had been entrusted with the 
responsibility of keeping a copy of the signed will, hi addition the plaintiff 
claimed that the three witnesses had always known the land to be the 
property of her father and later her uncle.
4. She also presented a court document which showed that she was the legal 
heir to her father’s property.
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Of these four pieces of evidence the one which is of particular interest here is 
number 2. It read as follows;
I Ato Kassaye ICulundu gave the upper gasha of land which 
was her father’s [his brother] before his death, and also the 
lower gasha o f land to both Aya Dube [daughter of his brother] 
and her mother Duku Aboye. Duku Aboye is my sister-in-law, 
whom I married after the death of my brother according to our 
culture. Both lands are in Sare qdbdle and I assigned Ato Halake 
Baresso the task of being their representatives as both are 
women. He collects rents from the tenants and pays tax to the
119government accordingly.
The three witnesses were invited to the court to testify. They all reiterated 
the facts as they had been presented by the plaintiffs. The court stressed that the 
defendants had annexed the land illegally and the judges ruled unanimously that 
they should restore it to the plaintiffs. Kassaye Kulundu had married his sister in 
law specifically to avoid loss of the land in the event of an outsider marrying her. 
The defendants had been reaping the benefits from someone else’s land for a long 
time and they were ordered to make repayment, including 100 birr compensation 
in damages to the plaintiffs. Sadly this decision by the court was not implemented
* » 1 j r \because of the revolution, although it had taken years to arrive at a judgement.
The above case demonstrates how the acquisition of useful fake evidence 
such as tax or land assessment receipts was made easy because the system lacked 
stringent rules concerning the registration of landowners. The procedure was not 
only lax but also open to fraud on the part of the government officials, which 
contributed significantly to the proliferation of disputes. The judges themselves
119 Aya Dube V. Halako Baresso, DACCA, 3/64 (Dilla, 1964 B.C.).
120 Aya Dube V. Halako Baresso, DACCA, 3/64 (Dilla, 1964 E.C.).
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stated that as women they were particularly vulnerable but made no special
I 9 1allowances for that.
Access to farming land was organised in a variety of different ways, such 
as by gifting, mortgage and through tenancy.122 Some of these arrangements were 
initially made through good will, but later ended up in bitter disputes and lengthy 
court wrangling, as exemplified by the following case where the father gave his 
son land to use although he specified no details especially concerning the intended 
duration of this arrangement. When the father, Fotossa Kutula, asked his son, 
Hordofa Fotossa, to return the land he had loaned him some years ago, the son 
refused by saying that he had been given the land on a permanent basis and did 
not therefore intend to return it to his father after such a long period of time. The 
son claimed that he had rights to the land for two reasons. Firstly, he argued that 
because the land had been under his control for so many years it should remain his; 
however he failed to cite any relevant article from the civil code which supported 
his position. The second argument was that since he had been fanning the land he 
had improved it by planting many coffee and ensat plants and would lose a long 
term investment were it to be returned.123
This case first started at Warada where the court decided in the son’s 
favour; however since his father was unhappy about the outcome he appealed to 
the Awraja Court at Dilla. The decision of the Warada Court was overturned by 
the Awraja Court’s decisions 011 two grounds; the first was that the son did not 
possess any supporting evidence, whether written or personal to verify that the
121 Bizunashe Lencho v. Batyo Meje, DACCA, 31/59 (Dilla, 1959 E.C.).
122 Bayana Abdi v. Guyo Abdi, DACCA, 121/44 (Dilla, 1943 E.C.).
123 Fotossa Qetala v. Hordofa Fotossa, DACCA, 66/59 (Dilla, 1959 E.C.).
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land had been given to him on a permanent basis. Secondly, it was discovered, 
and confirmed by witnesses, that his father had planted the crops. In addition the 
son had never paid tax on the land in his name so the father easily won the case. 
This would have undoubtedly created a strain on the father-son relationship but 
land disputes were a familiar part of the peasants’ life and therefore there was 
nothing unusual about such conflicts.124
Although kinship and family ties enabled cooperation and mutual support 
they also fostered rivalries and conflict. This point can be illustrated by one court 
case; the case was initiated by two women who lost their land to one of their 
cousins. According to the two plaintiffs, Tanssa Danbobe and Waji Danbobe, the 
land belonged to their father who was partially blind and as a result unable to 
work on the farm. Since he did not have a son himself his brother offered to 
provide the services of one of his own sons who would perform work 011 the farm 
and other tasks. 125
Problems started immediately after the death of the landowner because his 
brother’s son Alako Korma, who was now the defendant in this case, and who had 
been in the service of the plaintiffs father until his death, felt that he should be 
allowed to retain the land. Rather than returning the land to his cousins he 
continued to use it after his uncle had died. The two women felt that their only 
means of regaining their land was to go to court, and hence a dispute was initiated 
between the two daughters and their cousin. The plaintiffs charged the defendant 
011 the grounds that he had illegally obtained land which belonged to their father
124 Fotossa Qetala v. Hordofa Fotossa, DACCA, 66/59 (Dilla, 1959 E.C.).
125 Court documents unfortunately do not give information about the details o f  the 
arrangement, for example the amount paid to the son in return for the services he rendered. Tanssa 
Danbobe v. Alako Korma, DACCA, 65/51 (Dilla, 1951 E.C.).
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who had been weak and blind and was now deceased. They claimed also that 
Alako did this knowing that they were women and had little power, and with the 
deliberate intention of acquiring land which should have been returned to them. 
They particularly stressed their own vulnerability, perhaps with the intention of 
gaining sympathy from the judges. 126
The defendant argued that since he was the one who had been working on 
the land for a long period of time he deserved to continue to do so, especially as 
he felt that it was he who had developed the land through his own labour. He also 
argued that although he had admittedly never paid tax on this land, the services he 
had provided to the deceased owner entitled him to own it. This case was easily 
won by the plaintiffs, because the defendant lacked the appropriate evidence 
which would have enabled him to contest the case effectively.
This case illustrates the central role possession of evidence played in land 
disputes in court as well as the way in which land dispute cases were initiated in a 
variety of ways. The defendant lost the case because of a lack of evidence and 
thus a weak argument. It was unlikely that the court would decide in his favour 
without him producing a will or other strong evidence. In addition the judges 
sympathized with the two women, because they felt that the defendant had 
attempted to take their land having identified their vulnerability.
In conclusion, land litigation was commonly regarded as a useful 
mechanism for accessing and distributing land; however, as demonstrated above, 
litigation did not necessarily lead to a successful outcome for the individual. 
Individuals also became involved in litigation to protect what they already had. 
Property rights were very fluid and open to varied interpretations. So far land
126 Tanssa Danbobe v. Alako Korma, DACCA, 65/51 (Dilla, 1951 E.C.).
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litigation has been discussed on an individual level; however as the following 
section will show, the state also involved itself in the process.
Government vs. individuals
Land disputes in Gedeo were not necessarily restricted to disagreements between 
private individuals; the government also took part in some land dispute cases, 
usually with the objective of recovering land which had been lost to individuals on 
various grounds.
The two government bodies which were actively involved in land disputes 
were the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Land Reform and 
Administration (MLRA). The former was mainly involved in tax matters whereas 
the latter dealt with individuals who were thought to have owned lands without 
having the necessary legal basis for their ownership rights. The MLRA assumed 
that during the time of land measurement by qalad mistakes were made which 
resulted in some individuals owning more land than their just entitlement. The 
problem was partly one of inaccurate measurement,127 and also some individuals 
had annexed land without permission from the government due to the inefficiency 
of the system. In addition, when the government undertook subsequent corrective 
measures to recover some of the lost lands, these individuals again failed to 
declare the exact amount of land they possessed and were thus able to avoid 
paying the appropriate tax.
In reality both ministries had a very limited capacity; they had neither the 
necessary information about each individual’s holding nor the resources in terms 
of finance and professional expertise to deal with highly complex issues such as
127 Mahtama-Sellassie, Zekra Net gar, 106.
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land ownership and taxation matters, hi spite of their limitations however they 
became involved in disputes with some success. Some of the cases were initiated 
in conjunction with an individual who had an interest in gaining rights to the land; 
in other cases these government departments were acting independently. However, 
in both types of case personal interest was a motivating factor, as one example 
demonstrates. A s'ir alaqa Shanqut'e Dajane and the Awraja Ministry of Finance 
went to court against a person called A to Balaw Ashene, alleging that the 
defendant simply took over land which belonged to the plaintiff. Although the 
Ministry of Finance representative presented the first charge against the defendant 
the department was not represented for most of the hearings and the case later 
became an issue between the two individuals.128
The objective of the Ministry of Finance was to make the defendant liable 
for unpaid taxes on land he was using which belonged to the co-plaintiff, without 
his informing the government treasury. From the co-plaintiffs viewpoint, his own 
case was likely to be strengthened by the support of the Ministiy of Finance. 
Shanqut'e began summarising the history of the ownership of the disputed land by 
going back to the time of qalad measurement of land which was the most common 
point of reference in any land disputes in Gedeo. Shanqut'e claimed that when the 
area was measured the land in question was situated within the gasha of a person 
called Mako Anno. The plaintiff claimed that this land had been overlooked when 
officials assessed land in 1942 E.C. (1950) for taxation purposes, but when 
another land assessment took place in 1955 E.C. (1963) this land was recovered 
with the help of the local C'eqa Shum,129 Following this the government gave him 
the land as rewards for his services (baldwulata in Amharic) and it was identified
12S Yas'ir Alaqa  Shanqut'e Dajane V, Balat'e Ashine, DACCA, 19/62 (Dilla, 1962 E.C.).
129 Markakis, Ethiopia, 312-315.
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by assessment receipt number 28535. Since the 1955 E.C. (1963) land assessment 
he had paid all taxes in his own name. However the defendant Ato Balaw had 
simply continued to use the land illegally.
The court ordered all parties to present their evidence. In the middle of the 
dispute the Ministry of Finance lost motivation and ceased to participate in the 
litigation. According to the defendant the land had initially belonged to a person 
called Malco Anno, and was known to be his land both before and after qalad was 
introduced in the area. The land was not therefore registered as extra land when 
the rest of the qalad lands were later remeasured and reassessed after the 
discovery that in the initial qalad measurement some land had been given to 
people erroneously.130 However, this particular land was not t ’cif (uncultivated) 
and surplus, as it belonged to Mako. It was later transferred from Mako to the 
defendant by inheritance (which might mean by purchase). The defendant also 
presented a tax receipt in his name for the years 1955 to 1959 E.C. (1963 to 1967); 
the plaintiff however presented a similar receipt for those years.
Witnesses claimed that they had known the land since before the time 
qalad was imposed on the area and that it belonged to Mako Anno. Latterly the 
defendant had inherited the land from him and it had been his since then. The 
court had little trouble in deciding that the land should remain in the hands of the 
defendant due to the strength of the witnesses’ evidence. However, the court did 
not proceed to investigate the means whereby the main plaintiff had somehow 
managed to acquire a land assessment receipt in his name while the owner also
130 Mahtama-Sellassie, Zekra Nagar, 105-107.
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produced similar receipts which showed that the land had been assessed with 
himself as the named owner.131
The MLRA was another government body which became actively 
involved in land dispute cases around a wide range of issues, and had been 
established for this purpose. As the examples below demonstrate the MLRA had 
been concerned to recover land which it believed had been occupied and used by 
individuals without legal sanction. On Hamle 18, 1962 E.C. (July 25, 1970) a 
legal representative of the Sidamo MLRA charged a man called Ato Baraqo Aba 
Ganji at Darassa Awraja Court, Dilla in a land case over one gasha of land in 
which the value of the land was estimated to be the equivalent of 6500 Ethiopian 
birr. The land concerned was located in Buie warada and this man was accused 
with 11 other individuals of allegedly illegally occupying 12 XA gasha of 
government land between them. The hearing was at Sidamo High court because 
the case involved people from other neighbouring Awrajas as well. The verdict 
favoured the MLRA because the 12 individuals had not produced the required 
evidence to justify their occupation of the land; the court believed that they had 
concealed their possession of it and as a result had never paid tax on it. They were 
accused of deliberately hiding the exact amount of land they possessed when land 
assessors came to their area on two occasions, in 1937 E.C. (1945) and in 1942 
E.C. (1950). The MLRA representative said that the primary reason why he 
charged Baraqo on this occasion was the failure on the part of the government to 
enforce the previous decision given by the High Court of Sidamo on T ’iqmit 5, 
1958 E.C. (October 15, 1965) He further explained that after losing the land by 
court decision Baraqo had never appealed. The land which had been under his
131 Yas'ir A laqa  Shanqut'e Dajane V. Balat'e Ashine, DACCA, 19/62 (Dilla, 1962 E.C.).
195
illegal possession was then given to a lady called Wayzdro Tisame Gabrayes as a 
substitute for land which she had somehow lost (the reason was not given). 
Following the decision of the court the local balabat handed the land over to her, 
the land was assessed for tax as her rest, and the tax liable to be paid assessed 
accordingly.132
However when Wayzdro Tisame asked Baraqo to pay compensation for 
benefitting from the land during the time the land had been awarded to her by the 
government, he refused. She took him to court for the alaba (benefit) from the 
land and the court ordered him to pay all the alaba of the land due to her. 
However he appealed to the Sidamo High Court by stating that the Awraja Court’s 
decision was inappropriate and claiming that he was the balarest himself. When 
he appealed to the High Court of Sidamo he produced the 1955 E.C. (1963) tax 
assessment receipt as evidence of ownership of the land on which it was shown 
that the land was assessed in his name as his personal rest. The Court accepted his 
claims because he had supported his appeal with a tax assessment receipt; but 
what the court did not realise was that the same individual had lost his right to the 
land as a result of a decision by the same court four years previously. When the 
court allowed him to proceed with his appeal Wayzdro Tisame returned to the 
MLRA and asked them to fight the case 011 her behalf. At this juncture the MLRA 
agreed to intervene and stated clearly to the Awraja Court that the case had 
already been settled previously, after a decision had been given by the High Court 
of Sidamo four years previously. The court was asked to reacquaint itself with the 
matter before allowing the case to proceed.
132 Sidamo Region MLRA v. Baraqo Aba Gauge, DACCA, 119/62 (Dilla, 1962 E.C,).
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We have examined the previous dispute between the 12 individuals and 
the MLRA in some detail because it provides an insight into the way land 
assessment exercises were used as an opportunity by some to gain access to the 
increasingly important resource, land. In addition this particular dispute reveals 
how individuals were prepared to use all possible strategies in order to protect and 
maximize their chances, whether by finding the loopholes within the system or by 
manipulating government officials to their own advantage.
The case of the 12 individuals started after two men named Asir Alaqa (lit. 
head of the ten) Wubeshat Maldconen and A to Ayala Tibabu managed to convince 
the MLRA that about 12 V% gasha of land was being illegally occupied by them, 
which had resulted in a long term loss in taxes by the government. The motive of 
the two individuals was not actually to address the tax loss suffered by the 
government but rather to pursue their own personal goals because the government 
had already promised them to give them land as a reward for their services in a 
different capacity, but had failed to do so as suitable land had yet to be found. 
Therefore rather than waiting for an indefinite period of time until the 
government’s promise was fulfilled, the two people used their own knowledge to 
help in uncovering “hidden” lands. This type of “intelligence” had been used by 
the government quite successfully to achieve both its own objectives as well as the 
objectives of people who were in need of land, 134
From this case as well as from many other land dispute cases it is clear that 
when land assessments took place, especially in 1937 E.C. (1945) and 1942 E.C.
133 An individual called Aba  Jazoge Dido was also implicated as he promised the government 
to expose those individuals who were occupying government land illegally, and his name was 
mentioned in connection with the uncovering o f the undeclared 12 Vi gasha  o f  land.
134 Seme WaldS Yohannis V. Seme NSgaya, DACCA, 14/61 (Dilla, 1961 B.C.).
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(1950), many people managed to conceal the amount they really owned to avoid 
paying taxes. However, in the 1955 E.C. (1963) tax assessment the process 
became more stringent and as a result lots of “hidden” lands were found. The main 
reason for this was that the number of people who were seeking land had soared, 
partly as a result of the government’s own miscalculated policy; the government 
had already promised land to a large a number of people but the majority were 
disappointed as there was insufficient land to be awarded. Thus the government 
adopted a strategy which encouraged people to involve themselves in helping to 
search for “hidden” lands as in the event of a successful court outcome they stood 
a strong chance of being granted the land themselves. However there seemed to 
have been an exaggerated assumption regarding the amount of the so-called 
“hidden” lands, as charges tended to be made without there being sufficient 
grounds to prove the case. 135
Regarding the above case, four of the 12 defendants charged had already 
lost their rights to their respective land as a result of investigations made in the 
area,136 Although they claimed that the land each of them had occupied was their 
rest, due to their inability to substantiate their claims with evidence of ownership 
rights their right of occupation was terminated. The land was not taken away from 
them immediately, however instead they agreed to continue to use their respective 
holdings as before and pay all the taxes to the government treasury. They 
confirmed that the land actually belonged to the government and if the 
government in the future wanted to take it away from them for its own purpose
133 For a similar process in Southwestern Shawa (Bacho) see Tekalign, "A City and Its 
Hinterlands”, 239-247.
136 Sidamo Region MLRA v. Baraqo Aba Gange, DACCA, 119/62 (Dilla, 1962 E.C.).
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they would not offer opposition. To that effect they signed a document which was 
later attached to their file as evidence. What happened after that was confusing, 
because in the same year in which the land was claimed to have been uncovered it 
was found to be registered as the rest of these individuals. Later the court 
discovered that some government officials had helped them by illegally assessing 
the land as their rest. The court found out that the two officials were government 
employees, one being the Head of the Warada Ministry of Finance (A to Yirdaw 
Giram) and the other the Vice Governor of the Mikitile Warada (Ato Makuria 
Ayala). Thus the court found that both officials had clearly colluded with the four 
defendants in their illegal occupation of government land.
Two individuals, Ato Sera Robe and Ato Guyo Robe were mentioned 
separately as their case was different to the others in that these two defendants 
managed to present some legal basis for their occupation of the five gasha of land 
which they were accused of owning illegally. They claimed in court that the five 
gasha had originally been their rest, but during the Italian occupation of the 
country they fled the area fearing that they would be attacked by enemy planes, 
and after liberation they had been unable to pay the tax on the land due to ill 
health. When they applied to the Warada Gizat in 1945 E.C. (1953) this stoiy was 
found to be sufficiently acceptable to gain them a legal right to the land they had 
occupied, and the then secretary of the Warada Gizat Ato Adinaw Hailu allowed 
them to have the land assessed in their own names and to pay taxes accordingly.
However, the High Court of Sidamo noted that in both cases government 
officials had inappropriately played a role in helping these individuals to provide 
legal grounds for taking over former government land. The court then clearly 
indicated the correct legal procedure. Initially, the individual should apply to the
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appropriate court. Then the court would serve notices in the newspaper to enquire 
whether anyone had an interest in the land, and then if there was no objection the 
court could order the property to be registered as the claimant’s legal property. 
The court believed that the way the land had been allocated previously, by the 
personal decision of government officials, was illegal, and it strongly criticized 
some of the bureaucracy who had fraudulently helped individuals and ordered that 
they should be penalised for their actions. The Head of the Warada Finance, Ato 
Yirdaw Girum, was ordered to pay 50 birr penalty to the government, the 12 Vi 
gasha of land was put under the control of a local government representative as an 
area of government land, and all crops harvested from the land were to be 
collected as revenue for the state, 137 A portion of this land which had formerly 
been occupied by Baraqo was given later to Wdyzaro Tisame as a substitute for 
land she had lost elsewhere. 138
The above cases have demonstrated that the involvement of the 
government in land disputes was further confirmation of how land ownership 
rights were highly precarious in Gedeo, The absence of any organised record 
about individual land holdings made things worse and a result the government 
made many land grant promises before it actually knew how much land it had in 
its reserve. Hence it contributed to the proliferation of unnecessary land litigation.
Since individual land seekers knew that the government could not honour 
its promise of finding land to award them, they felt that the best option was to 
accuse other individuals of trying to take over their land, usually without even
137 The court said that they were powerless to punish one o f  the officials who had helped 
the defendants to acquire the land because he was retired when the case was seen by the court,
138 Sidamo Region MLRA v. Baraqo Aba Gange, DACCA, 119/62 (Dilla, 1962 E.C.).
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having the necessary background information. This was illustrated by the case of 
the Malco Anno, who was forced to undergo an unexpected and unnecessary 
lengthy court battle to confirm that the land he occupied was not illegal. Again in 
this case the plaintiff As'ir alaqa Shanqut'e Dajane not only obtained a crucial 
document in a. fraudulent maimer but also had some success in gaining the support 
of a government department to give credibility to his disguised intent to take over 
the land of a genuine owner, Malco Anno. The courts who uncovered most of the 
fraud and inefficiency, appeared to have done their job to the best of their ability. 
However since the problem was overwhelming it is doubtful how much effect 
they had in rectifying the overall trend.
Conclusion
The post-liberation era was a formative period, not only from a national 
perspective but also in terms of developments at a local level. The modernisation 
effort of Haile Sellassie, which was largely focused on establishing an efficient 
bureaucratic infrastructure, enabled the state to extend its influence down to the 
local level. As a result the state managed to extract more revenues than had been 
the case before the war. Such revenues were crucially important to finance the 
modernisation effort of the government. Some of the measures taken by the state 
also had a direct impact on Gedeo especially the one made in relation to 
agricultural taxation. It not only hastened the demise of the naftanna-gabbar 
agrarian relationship, which was dominant before the war, but also reduced 
significantly the power of local officials.
Unfortunately the period also witnessed an unpleasant development 
whereby land ownership became increasingly contentious. As a result disputes
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became fractious and highly protracted in nature and became a burden in the lives 
of ordinary people. A multitude of reasons can be given for the proliferation of 
land disputes in Ethiopia, ranging from the absence of land maps or organised 
land registers to the lack of a government body which was responsible for 
handling these issues adequately. Land disputes were often based on very flimsy 
evidence or sometimes started for dubious or even fabricated reasons.139 Since 
some of the population had the time, resources and desire to indulge themselves in 
such activities even a legitimate owner could easily be challenged and might face 
losing his or her land.140 As land disputes could be initiated 011 spurious grounds 
individuals were motivated to make attempts to annex another’s property. When 
such people failed to win their case the punishment was not damaging, but if they 
won the prize justified the effort, and therefore the system unintentionally 
encouraged lengthy litigation.
The courts were not efficient due to lack of resources in tenns of 
manpower and organisation. This might have impacted upon their ability to deal 
with issues quickly and fairly. Nevertheless there is no evidence to indicate that 
they distorted the law to favour one ethnic group over another. Courts examined 
cases and settled disputes by weighing evidence which was presented by the 
parties involved. As a result many of the reforms or laws introduced by the 
government failed to be implemented by officials themselves, not always with bad 
intentions, but primarily because they lacked the knowledge and expertise to 
interpret the law as required.
!39Kidanoa Walda Gabrael V. Taddassa Dasseta, DACCA, 198/53 (Dilla, 1953 E.C.).
140 W ote Ejo V. Falaqa Yizbat', DACCA, 133/44 (Dilla, 1944 E.C.).
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The proliferation of land disputes shows that land was a highly valuable 
resource for the majority of the people as their livelihood depended on it. It also 
indicates that insecurity of tenure was very high. Although it is difficult to 
measure its impact on productivity it can be assumed that under these 
circumstances it was unlikely for individual landowners to invest in improvements 
on their land to increase its output.
Insecurity of tenure was also made worse by the government providing 
easy access to crucial documents such as tax receipts, which offered opportunities 
for exploitation by corrupt officialdom. Also the government was not able to 
control crucial resources such as land because it was ignorant about who owned 
which land and the absence of a centralised record system meant that there was no 
one with the authority to provide definitive answers when problems arose between 
individuals. In fact the government’s lack of control and inefficiency could easily 
be demonstrated by its own practices such as granting land to an individual which 
was in fact already owned by someone else.
Despite the rampant nature of land disputes, movement of land between 
owners was not halted. Nevertheless their impact on the smooth transfer of 
property particularly through sale should not be underestimated. The likelihood of 
dispute discouraged sale as a method of land transfer which also impacted 
negatively upon the government’s ability to generate revenue from such 
transactions. The evidence shows that land sale existed even before the war when 
money appeared to have been in short supply; however it failed to flourish in the 
post-war period although the general economic atmosphere might have been more 
conducive due to the development of commerce and trade. People were positive 
about land transfers between themselves which might indicate that there was
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economic improvement; however none of the preferred methods of transfer were 
found to provide complete protection from contention and dispute. Therefore they 
seem to have been experimenting and searching for better modes of transfer which 
would ensure them protection. Inheritance as a preferred mode of land transfer 
eclipsed the practice of selling but nevertheless failed to provide complete 
protection. However individuals continued to use it because it enabled them to at 
least to minimise the number of protagonists. However the most sensitive court 
disputes in Gedeo were not about land tenure issues as such but mainly about 
tenancy matters, which is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter Four
Tenancy Relations and Court Disputes, 1941-1974
Relationships between landlords and tenants were difficult throughout this period, 
and due to their problematic coexistence courts were inundated with cases.1 As the 
previous chapter has shown, although land disputes were a major issue in Gedeo, 
tenancy disputes were more prevalent and intense.2 Tenancy dispute has been the 
subject of various analyses especially in Gedeo but also in many other parts of 
southern Ethiopia.3 In northern Ethiopia it was generally believed that both tenants 
and landlords belonged to similar ethnic and social groups; tenancy disputes in the 
south however have frequently been interpreted in terms of ethnic and religious 
differences.4 Thus, when discussing tenancy disputes in the context of Gedeo it is 
important to assess the relevance of these factors in understanding the problem of 
landlord-tenant relationships.5
1 Although there is a lack o f  reliable official statistical evidence to support this claim, 
when I was studying in the Awraja  Court archives for this research the ratio o f  erbo  disputes case 
files to land and other similar issues were roughly 3:1. See Sandra Fullerton Joireman, Property 
Rights & P olitical D evelopm ent in Ethiopia & Eritrea (Oxford: James Currey, 2000), 91; she 
quoted a figure taken from the MLRA (Ministry o f  Land Reform and Administration) that 78% of 
people in Sidamo (including Gedeo) became tenant farmers, See also Marina Ottaway and David 
Ottaway, Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution (New York: Africana, 1978), 16.
2Benti Getahun, Addis Ababa: Migration and the Making o f  a Multiethnic Metropolis, 
1941-1974  (Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea, 2007), 73.
3 Joireman, Property Rights, 98; she claims that “Ethnicity was also an indication that a 
person was a member o f the landlord class.”
4 Cohen and Weintraub, Land and Peasants, 50; they said that issues connected with 
tenancy were not a major problem in the north because the tenure system allowed peasants to 
access land. “Where tenancy does appear, it is associated with submerged caste groups, religious 
minorities, or young restagnas who seek more land.” See also Ghelawdewos Araia, Ethiopia: The 
Political Economy o f  Transition (London: University Press o f  America, 1995), 9.
5 Presenting any evidence either in support or against such a view  is very hard. In the 
archives there is no single reference about ethnicity either in relation to tenancy or other forms o f  
dispute in court. There is however a feeling among a sizeable number o f  Gedeos that past 
inequalities were largely drawn along ethnic lines and that they were subjected to exploitation 
mainly because they belonged to a different ethnic and religious group to their landlords and the 
people in power.
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This chapter also draws evidence from local court documents but its main 
focus is on aspects of tenancy, and it especially seeks to understand the nature of 
the landlord-tenant disputes which came before the courts. It examines how the 
courts dealt with tenancy disputes and whether tenants were treated differently 
landlords. As mentioned above, dispute between landlords and tenants has 
traditionally been interpreted in ethnic terms, i.e. that landlords and tenants were 
from distinct and different ethnic groups, and their relationship was governed by 
their allegiance to a certain ethnic group. As a result previous research has made 
few attempts to understand the nature of the conflict other than from a mainly 
ethnic perspective, hi contrast, this chapter approaches tenancy problems 
essentially from the perspective of the disputes themselves rather than by 
investigating the social or other backgrounds of the disputants. The aim was not to 
ignore those variables but to understand the root causes of disagreements, which 
did not necessarily emanate from ethnic or social differences.
Tenancy had become the dominant form of agrarian relationship in the 
qalad region of Gedeo from 1941- 74. It had existed on a limited scale before the 
war but did not evolve ftilly until later in the post-war period.6 There are a 
number of reasons for this. The number of peasants who entered into tenancy 
relationships increased substantially in this period, mainly in direct response to the 
expansion of agriculture in the qalad area. The land in this part of Gedeo had 
already been occupied mostly as madaria (land given in lieu of salaries) by 
naft’annas and other civilians well before the war, but was not fully developed 
until the post-liberation period.7 The prospect of fanning land superior to that in 
the outiba areas meant that tenants were no longer as hesitant as previously to
6 McClellan, "Perspectives on the Neftenya-Gabbar System", 439-440.
7 See chapter two for a more detailed discussion about madaria  land.
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work for landlords. The increasing difficulty of accessing family land in the 
outiba areas also meant that young people who wanted to form their own 
households were forced to look for new opportunities and a sharecropping tenancy 
was the obvious solution.8
hi general this period witnessed the gradual decline of the naftanna- 
gabbar relationship which was the dominant form of agrarian relationship before 
the war;9 at the same time it also manifested the growing importance of landlord- 
tenant relationships, though the latter was not a direct successor to the former.10 
These two relationships existed separately depending 011 the nature of the land 
tenure system; under the naftanna-gabbar relationship land was owned by 
peasants and not naftanna, whereas under the landlord-tenant relationship the land 
was owned by the landlords {naftanna).11 Thus these two forms of agrarian 
relationship were distinct from each other; the naftanna-gabbar relationship was 
a feature of the outiba or core areas of Gedeo whereas the landlord-tenant 
relationship was prevalent in the qalad areas of Gedeo.12
Landlord-tenancy disputes soon became a common feature of 
sharecropping tenancies in Gedeo. After the war with the modernisation and
in terv iew  with Shat'at'o Bariso, Shegado, 6 July, 2004.
9 McClellan, "Perspectives on the Neftenya-Gabbar System", 439.
10 Bahru, "Economic Origins o f the Absolutist State ", 12.
11 The literature lacks unanimity in regards with the demise o f  naftanfia-gabbar 
relationships after 1941. Some feel that it continued until the revolution, while McClellan claims 
that the Italians abolished gabbar  and landlord-tenancy relationships came into being after the war. 
McClellan, "Perspectives on the Neftenya-Gabbar System", 439-440; See the following for a 
discussion o f  these two issues. Eshetu, "Towards a History o f the Fiscal Policy", 88-106; Bahru, 
"Economic Origins o f  the Absolutist State ", 1-29.
l2McClellan has shown that the two agrarian relationships had evolved separately. 
However he did not recognise that the fundamental reason behind the existence o f  two forms o f  
relationship was land tenure. See the following chapter, McClellan, "Coffee in Centre-Periphery 
Relations”, 175-195.
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bureaucratisation of government departments it became the prerogative of courts 
to deal with tenancy disputes. This chapter will show that although disputes 
between landlords and tenants were complex and pervasive, at the core of their 
differences was the desire to take control of land, the vital resource. Ethnic, 
linguistic and religious differences might have contributed to the conflicts to some
I Tdegree, as depicted in the literature; however, the particular sources examined in 
this study suggested that, whatever other factors might have played a small part, 
the main focus of disputes was a struggle for land.14 Before examining actual 
tenancy cases in detail the chapter first outlines the evolution of sharecropping 
tenancy, and then describes the nature of tenancy relationships which were 
prevalent in Gedeo until the revolution.
The Evolution of tenancy relations in Gedeo
The most common form of tenancy in Gedeo was erbo, a system by which tenants 
were expected to give a quarter of their produce to the landlord after completion 
of assessment.15 The landlord only provided the land; the tenant was responsible 
for everything from the daily running of the farm to organising labour, seed 
acquisition and buying tools. The tenant was usually expected to give additional 
free labour services to the landlord, such as helping with agricultural work on land 
which the landlord might own elsewhere, constructing houses and fences, or the
13 For a very through discussion o f  the ethnic makeup o f the naftannas see McClellan, 
State Transformation, 51.
14 Most o f  my informants tend to describe the period before 1974 as the time o f  the 
balarest, or naftannas and despite their resentments about the period most o f  them believe that 
access to land and the control over this vital resource was at the centre o f  their discordant 
relationships. Interview with T'eko Jabo, Grissa, 16 July 2004; and Shao Robe, Qome, 30 June 
2004.
15 Gabra-Wald, "Ethiopia's", 313.
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supply of firewood on a weekly basis. In some cases if the landlord resided in the 
same village as the tenants he could also access the labour of the tenant’s family if 
he wished.16
However, as this chapter demonstrates, tenants were not only burdened 
with a multitude of obligations, but also their relationship with the landlord was 
marred by conflict. As some of the written tenancy agreements show, the 
condition of tenants was little different from that of gab bars. 17 Landlords also 
used such written tenancy agreements to support an erbo claim in a government 
court, which demonstrates that exploiting free labour services, although abolished 
officially by the government, was not illegal. Therefore although tenancy was 
viewed as an improvement on the “evils” of the gabbar system, in reality tenants 
were subjected to a great deal of coercion and exploitation.
The basic issue which needs to be underlined here is that, unlike the 
gabbar system, tenancy was not imposed, but rather evolved out of the particular 
set of circumstances which arose in the qalad areas of Gedeo. 18 Gabbar, as 
indicated earlier, was instituted by state order on Gedeo farming households, but 
tenancies were forged independently between tenants and landlords without the 
involvement of the state. Therefore, tenancy required at least the willingness of
’^Interview with Gobana Latiti, Grissa, 15 July 2004. Gobana believes that tenancy 
started in Gedeo only after dajazmach  Balcha introduced qalad.
17 N o wonder some writers confused gabbar and tenancy. Consider this; “Tenancy was 
harsher in such areas as A rsi,.,. Especially Amhara naftannas in Kambata were noted for their 
untold cruelty. Some o f  them were so notorious that they yoked their gabbars like oxen and 
farmed with them.” Therefore for this author there is no distinction between a gabbar  and a tenant. 
Benti, Addis Ababa, 12>.
18 G abbar was predominantly the status o f  many peasants in Gedeo until 1935; however 
in the post-liberation period due to the gradual erosion o f the gabbar  system, many o f  them 
became free from the gid t holders and transformed into an independent peasants paying tax 
directly to the government treasury. The development in the qalad  region was different because 
land was owned in this part o f  Gedeo by the naftannas, therefore peasants took up tenancy as an 
alternative method o f  gaining access to land.
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the landlord to rent the land to a tenant; likewise a tenant had to be interested in 
entering into a sharecropping agreement with a landlord.19 Tenancy was not 
introduced due to the need to replace the role of the gcibbar,2® as free labour 
services were not abolished altogether, but survived within the tenancy system. It 
also meant that those landowners who had cultivated their land by exploiting free 
labour from their gabbars or landlords who did not have gabbar rights had to find 
a tenant who would agree to work on their land in a sharecropping arrangement. 
As tenancy gradually assumed greater importance tenants found themselves giving 
free labour services and discharging many other obligations to their landlords such
as the supplying of fire wood, perhaps with little or no distinction from their
• 0 1previous role as gabbar peasants.
Given the highly polarised naftanna-gabbar relationship, from whose 
shadow the tenancy system emerged, it is not surprising that tenancy was initially 
unable to take root in G edeo.22 Before 1935 peasants had no incentives to take up 
tenancy as an opportunity until they were overwhelmed by the pressure for land 
which had become prevalent in the highland areas. However as agriculture later 
developed in the qalad areas, the land in this part of Gedeo became more desirable 
and peasants saw the opportunity for diversifying their production by growing 
food as well as cash crops which had been impossible in the upland areas. Thus a 
combination of “push factors” in the highland areas and the “pull factors” in the
19 The term landlord is used in a general sense to loosely describe all kinds o f  
landownership rights in Gedeo. Since the way people owned land in Gedeo varied considerably 
during this period, using the term landlord for this diverse group will hopefully avoid confusion 
and simplify the discussion. Unlike landlords the position o f tenants was much more 
straightforward, and therefore there is no need for further qualification.
20 McClellan, "Coffee in Centre-Periphery Relations", 192.
21 Dama Waqo V. Kurabachaw Walda Michael, DACCA, 12/62 (Dilla, 1960 E.C.).
22 McClellan, "Coffee in Centre-Periphery Relations", 189.
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qalad areas had contributed to the growth of tenancy relationships in Gedeo 
during the post- war period.23
As some informants state, even those tenants who lived in the qalad areas 
and who had no land in the outiba areas were gradually forced to give up any 
potential claim to outiba land because of the increasing difficulty of accessing 
land in Gedeo.24 If they were on good tenns with their kin they might possibly 
reach some kind of deal whereby they (the kin) would restrict their claims to lands 
which they effectively occupied. 25 However, in most cases conflicts and 
disagreements were rife. This point is illustrated by the case of Warera who settled 
in Shegado after the war. He claimed that he came to Shegado from Grissa in the 
core highland area, where land was apparently in short supply, and pointed out 
that the amount of land which his father was able to provide was very small and 
that he and his brother were in disharmony as a result. Then he added that “when 
an Amhara landowner offered me a chance to farm in Shegado I decided to take it. 
In fact later on I abandoned all claims to my parents’ land in Grissa”. He claimed 
that he made this move because he wanted his other brothers to have a better share 
of the land. Many informants interviewed claimed that the reason they came from
23 For a similar development in northern Ethiopia see James McCann, Household 
Economy, Demography, and The "Push”Factor in Northern Ethiopian History, 1916-1935, 
Working P apers in African Studies; (Boston, Mass.: African Studies Center, Boston University, 
1983), 1-29.
24 Interview with Shalo Dube, Shegado, 6 July, 2004; and Kole Solale, Sugale, 15 June
2004.
25 Interview with Shalo Dube, ShegSdo, 6 July, 2004. Shalo said that the land his brother 
received was so small that he moved to the south during the resettlement programme in the 1960s, 
which is described in the following chapter.
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the core highlands to the qalad zone was in search of bigger and better land, and 
as a result they took up tenancy as a means to access such lands.26
Nevertheless the available evidence shows that tenants in the earlier period 
especially in the 1930s and early 40s were sceptical about the tenancy relationship 
because they were not sure whether it was a workable solution. Therefore in most 
cases they preferred to enter into tenancy agreements whilst retaining some of 
their outiba land from the highland areas. This was because o f the high degree of 
uncertainty over the outcome of the newly emerging tenancy arrangements, and in 
some cases tenants became disillusioned and simply abandoned their tenancies.27
The case of Balambaras Kidane Abesie shows that he and his tenant Guyo 
Gabi entered into a tenancy agreement during the time of Dajjazmach Balcha 
concerning the qalad land which he had been given by the government for his 
services. Balambaras Kidane claimed that the tenant was not a resident tenant on 
his farm, but rather used to come from his place (not specified) to farm his qalad 
land in C'ebecha qabale.
Before this tenant took over my farm it was very well cultivated and 
there were plenty of coffee trees; but he neglected the farm because he 
had land in another place, therefore I demand the court to order the 
tenant to appear at court and pay me 500 birr of erbo payment 
including all other expenses I incurred to hire a solicitor (tabaqa in 
Amharic) and court fees.28
26 Interview with Warera C'umburo, Shegado, 6 July, 2004; Bursa Danbobe, Bula, 3
December 1999; andTuri Boko, C’ic ’u, 29 April 1999.
27 Interview with Alako Wadari, Grissa, 16 July 2004; Gote Badasse, Andida, 28 April
1999; and Gashu Badasse, Grissa, 22 July 2004.
28 Balam baras Kidane Abessie V. Gayou Gabi, DACCA, 157/57(Dilla, 1944 E.C.).
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Unfortunately this particular court document does not reveal much about the 
tenant other than that he owned land elsewhere. Without knowing fully this 
tenant’s situation it is difficult to establish without doubt that tenancy and gabbar 
did overlap at some point, but he had begun his tenancy 011 the land well before 
the Italian invasion and appeared to have continued his tenancy until he left the 
farm in 1944 E.C. (19 52).29 This was the most common strategy adopted by 
tenants in Gedeo during the early phases of tenancy relationships. Informants 
interviewed near Dilla town also corroborated that most had settled in the qalad 
zone on their landlord’s land in gradual stages without totally abandoning their
O A
outiba land.
However as both the economic and the political activities of Gedeo began to 
centre on important towns which sprang up along the Addis Ababa-Dilla main 
road, tenants also began to settle in large numbers in the downland areas where 
these towns flourished. The more fertile soil available in the downland areas 
which enabled greater crop diversity appeared to have been important in this 
regard, and in addition, as one informant recalled, the Christian missionaries who 
started their activities in the Dilla area in the late 1940s played a significant role in 
attracting many people. The medical services they provided to the local people 
especially in combating malaria made the area more attractive.31
In general informants agree that the Gedeos, who had traditionally been 
accustomed to living on top of the highlands, began to settle in significant
29 Balam baras Kidane Abessie V. Gayou Gabi, DACCA, 157/57, (Dilla, 1944 E.C.).
30 Interview with Gobana Latiti, Grissa, 15 July 2004; and Alako Wadari, Grissa, 16 July
2004,
31 Interview with Hordofa Gadico, Wonago, 24 November 1999.
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numbers in the lower zone after 1941.32 As tenants began to show a willingness to 
settle in these areas landlords encouraged them to construct their houses near their 
farm so that they could start to lead a normal life. The details of arrangements 
between the tenant and land owner varied greatly depending on many other factors. 
Some landlords might also have their own home near their farm especially in 
southern Gedeo where a great deal of landlords lived on their land. This gave them 
easy access to the family labour of the tenant household. In other cases the tenant 
simply lived and worked on the land of the landlord and paid erbo of a quarter of 
their produce either directly or through the qalad wakil (a person who represented 
a holder of qalad land).33
Understanding the nature of landlord-tenant relationships is challenging due 
to the varied ways in which they interacted.34 Although the demand for land 
increased over years, particularly after liberation, it is difficult to capture the 
evolving nature of tenancy in full solely from the court archives from which the 
bulk of the information for this study is derived. However it is still possible to 
gain a reasonable overview by close study of some examples of written tenancy 
agreements.
32 Intervew with Hat'essa Ganale, Buc'issa, 5 December 1999; Hayicha  Danbela Abe, 
Andida, 30 April 1999 and Morkate Jarsso, Andida, 28 April 1999.
33 Interview with Hirba Kalecha, Grissa, 14 July 2004, he told me that his father was 
ydqa lad  tawalcy for one gasha  o f  land.
34 The literature dealing with landlord tenancy relationships reveals how the nature o f  
their relationships was multi-dimensional. This section deals only with areas which were 
problematic and became the trigger for court disputes. For further discussion see Anjan Kumar 
Datta, Land and Labour Relations in South-West Bangladesh: Resources, P ow er and Conflict 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), 65.
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Tenancy agreements
Conflict was endemic to landlord-tenant relationships in Gedeo.35 Because of this 
the majority of court cases in Gedeo were concerned with tenancy problems, and 
as will be examined later in this chapter, a very large amount of these documents 
concerned erbo disputes. Why were tenancy relationships so problematic? There 
is no simple answer to this question.36 Tenants and landowners needed each other; 
tenants needed access to land in order to gain a living, and likewise landowners 
required labour in order to develop and exploit their land. Both parties depended 
greatly on the land and what it produced, but their mutual need for each other did 
not improve their relationship.
Tenants seemed to have refused to accept the rights of the landlord to the 
land, and used every possible opportunity to avoid paying rent.37 In the landlords’ 
view the land had been acquired by “legitimate” conquest and not by “alienating” 
it from local people as was normally assumed.38 They considered themselves to be 
the first settlers (aqm) on the land, a view which was also deeply embedded in the 
concept of land tenure systems of both in south as well as the north.39 In reality 
most of the landlords (a great deal of which were na ff annas) were government 
employees who were providing services to the state, and despite their peasant 
background the political system which awarded them the privilege of access to
35 Hoben, Land Tenure, 137-13; Hoben showed that tenancy relationships in Daga Damot 
(Gojjam) did not involve the kind o f  subordination which was common in other agrarian systems. 
This is a very interesting contrast to cases in southern Ethiopia.
36 Schwab, Decision-M aking in Ethiopia, 8.
37 Meju Aba Siro v. Jarsso Bariso, DACCA, 393/53 (Dilla, 1953 E.C.); Interview with 
Badecha Leko, Tumticha, 29 April 1999.
38 See chapter two for the controversy surrounding the imposition o f  qalad  which enabled 
most landlords to access land.
39 McClellan, "Coffee in Centre-Periphery Relations", 175-195.
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free labour reinforced the pursuit of an easy life whereby their land was developed 
for them by local people.
Whatever perceptions both held regarding their relationships, in general 
they operated in a climate of suspicion, deception, intimidation, and exploitation, 
and therefore they were far from being partners in the activity of production. 
Although we have not yet examined the effect this unhealthy relationship had on 
productivity and agriculture in general, it seems that the absence of a clearly 
defined agreement which stipulated the rights and obligations of both the landlord 
and the tenant might have played a significant role.40
Tenancy agreements in Gedeo were generally imprecise and verbal.41 
Only a few landlords produced written tenancy agreements in their legal disputes 
with their tenants. Given the low level of literacy among the population in general 
and the tenant population in particular, written agreements were very rare.42 The 
absence of a written tenancy agreement is often cited as a major cause of tenancy 
problems. However having such an agreement did not necessarily serve as a 
safeguard for tenants against arbitrary exploitation by landlords.43 Courts tended 
to pass their verdict on the basis of the tenancy agreement which was presented 
without questioning it, even if it was unsound. This was compounded by the fact
40 Interview with Alako Wadari, Grissa, 16 July 2004, Alako suggested that during the 
bald rest time productivity was very high and he added that even leaving land fallow was not 
allowed unless the landlord believed in the procedure.
41 Verbal tenancy agreements appear to be a veiy common practice in many societies. For 
example in a recent study in the Assam region o f  India, Kuri found out that most o f  the villagers 
did not have any written tenancy agreement, and the author concluded that the absence o f  a written 
agreement did not affect relationships between landlords and tenants. Pravat Kumar Kuri, Tenancy 
Relations in B ach vard  Agriculture: A Study in Rural Assam  (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 
2004), 120.
42 Zanabach G/Maryam V. Malas Assefaw, DACCA, 60/63 (Dilla, 1963 B.C.).
43 Benti, A ddis Ababa, 73; Benti believed that the reason landlords did not want to have a 
written tenancy agreement was to enable them to evict tenants easily.
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that most judges, especially in the lower offices, were not trained; given the fact 
that modem bureaucracy was at its nascent stage in Ethiopia at this time, these 
offices were maimed by people who had only basic levels of literacy and perhaps 
some experience in service to the government.
In general government institutions did not involve themselves in the 
formalising and regulating of landlord-tenant relationships. Hence the best and 
most straightforward option for peasants was to make an agreement directly with 
the landlord and from the tenant’s points of view it did not matter greatly whether 
the agreement was written or verbal because it would be in a language which they 
did not understand. As the son of one tenant (who had inherited his tenancy) 
pointed out, although his father had signed the very first binding agreement with 
the landlord a long time ago, he might have queried the terms before accepting 
them had he been able to read and understand the conditions of the tenancy.44 It 
appeared also that tenants did not see the importance of such agreements as a 
crucial factor in their relationships with landlords, although some landowners felt 
differently.45
An example of a written tenancy agreement is given below. This tenancy 
agreement was shown in court in 1960 to support an erbo claim by a landlord. It 
also underscores how tenancy relationships were shaped not only by local 
conditions but also by the individuals involved. It represents one of a variety of 
ways in which tenancy agreements were made and operated in Gedeo. This 
particular tenancy agreement was originally signed between the landowner Walda
44 Dama Waqo v. Kurabachaw Walda Michael, DACCA, 12/62 (Dilla, 1960 B.C.).
45 Interview with Alako Wadari, Grissa, 16 July 2004.
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Michael and his tenant Waqo Oudo and was used as evidence in court by the 
landowner’s son in his case against the original tenant’s son.
Agreement in respect of tenancy46
Hidar 17, 1951 E.C. (November 26, 1958)
I Waqo Oudo, a tenant (c'isahhd) on the rest of Ato Walda Michael 
Taganna which is found in Sarbasare, planted firstly coffee trees, and 
secondly ensat and agreed to pay 200 birr yearly according to the erbo 
benefit of the previous agreement [which was made Tiqmit, 18, 1947 
E.C. (October 28, 1954)] Secondly I agreed to deliver two bundles 
(shakim) of fire wood every week, and finally I agreed to construct 
houses and fences, and to work on his coffee land (hudad).A11 agreed 
with my due interest according to this agreement.
However, as I am weak and old I asked Ato Walda Michael Taganna 
to permit my son Dama Waqo to pay all taxes (gibir) [probably erbo] 
owing to him according to my previous agreement. I Dama Waqo in 
place of my father Waqo Oudo agree to pay taxes (gibir) to Ato Walda 
Michael Taganna according to the above agreement. I signed the 
agreement after it had been read out to me. Secondly if I violate any of 
the clauses, I will pay twice according to the previous agreement. I 
will pay 200 birr every year in the month of Yakatit (February). If the 
value of any of the crops increases, if asked, I will promptly increase 
the amount of erbo according to our agreement. To this effect we 
signed with the witnesses of our signature.
Witness who were present during the agreement:
1 .A to  Dayo Waqo
2. Kallo Hirbate and
3. Heto Mando
Regarding fetching firewood, house and fence construction, and coffee 
harvesting (from the private land of the balarest) Bajaso Waqo and 
Shabo Waqo agree to be responsible. I Bajaso Waqo and Shebo Waqo 
will deliver two bundles (shakim) of firewood on every eighth day. 
We will also construct fences and houses. If we fail to fulfil this 
agreement we agree to recompense him financially. We will also pay 
50 birr to the government as a fine. We have agreed and sealed this 
agreement with our signatures.
Witnesses:
46 Dama Waqo V. Kurabachaw Walda Michael, DACCA, 12/62, (Dilla, 1960 E.C.).
47 Mantel-Niecko, The Role o f  Land Tenure, 91-92.
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1. Dama Waqo
2. Kallo Hirbate and
3. Heto Mando
This tenancy agreement cannot be regarded as either a representative or unique. 
It cannot be claimed that most tenants who needed to make verbal agreement were 
treated similarly. This particular example however was clearly dictated by the 
landowner Walda Michael Taganna as all terms and conditions were in his favour 
with little regard to the interests of the tenant. It established the land ownership 
rights of Walda Michael but failed to mention any obligation on his part as the 
landowner, only specifying what should be fulfilled by the tenant. It also contains 
enforcement measures in the event of failure to comply, but this again was made 
against the tenant and entailed harsh punishments such as double payments if he 
failed to fulfil any element of the agreement. We also do not know the size of the 
land from this agreement; it merely states that the tenant agreed to pay 200 
Ethiopian birr as erbo, and thus it is difficult to know whether this fixed erbo 
payment was fair. Also, as in most tenancy agreements, erbo was to be calculated 
every year depending on the success of the harvest; but there was no mention of 
what might be the outcome if there was a crop failure for any reason. In addition 
the tenancy agreement included a raft of other obligations which the tenant Waqo 
Udo agreed to fulfil, namely;48
1. To supply him with two bundles of firewood every week
2. To harvest the coffee from his hudad (land he owned separately)
3. To construct fences
4. To construct houses
48 Dama Waqo V. Kurabachaw Walda Michael, DACCA, 12/62, (Dilla, 1960 E.C.).
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This agreement was again renewed after four years. During the renewal it was 
stated that Waqo Udo, who was the first tenant, was unable to continue his 
tenancy because of ill health and old age. Therefore it was confirmed that his son 
Dama Waqo was to take over the tenancy from his father and continue to be Ato 
Walda Michael’s tenant. However, the agreement failed to include any 
improvements for the tenant, merely highlighting that Dama would continue to 
fulfil the obligations as his father had done.
Moreover, there is a separate section which deals with additional obligations 
such as free labour services. From the names given it is possible to see that Waqo 
Oudo’s sons, Bajeso and Shobo Waqo were also included in this agreement and 
were exclusively responsible for house construction, supplying the weekly 
firewood, and the harvesting of coffee from the landowner’s hudad. There is also 
a penalty clause to enforce this second part of the agreement, which was also 
signed by witnesses. The above tenancy agreement is unusual in that it gave more 
power to the landowner than most cases which were seen in court which were 
typically a disagreement about erbo payments.49 However, the general view of 
the period is that tenants were normally exploited harshly regardless of the 
presence or absence of a written tenancy agreement.50
Despite the onerous nature of tenancies, they tended to be long-standing as in 
the above case.51 In addition although tenancy was very problematic the evidence
49 Dama Waqo V. Kurabachaw Walda Michael, DACCA, 12/62, (Dilla, 1960 E.C.).
50 Interview with T'et'o Ganale, Buc'issa, 5 December 1999; and Taddassa Jibicho, Sisota, 7 
July,2004.
51 For a historical discussion o f  sharecropping see T. J. Byres, Sharecropping and  
Sharecroppers, The L ibraiy o f  Peasant Studies (London: Cass, 1983), 7-41; See also Timothy J. 
Keegan, Rural Transformations in Industrializing South Africa: The Southern H ighveld to 1914 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987), 51-95; See also Gareth Austin, Labour, Land, and Capital in 
Ghana: From Slavery to Free Labour in Asante, 1807-1956 , Rochester Studies in African H istoiy
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does not support the theory that eviction was a major problem in Gedeo. On the 
contrary despite disagreements in the landlord tenant relationship they rarely 
reached the point where a landlord would terminate the agreement and make the
52tenants landless. Tenancy disputes were more like a “cat and mouse” game 
whereby after finally exhausting all possible ways of avoiding 01* delaying erbo 
payment tenants agreed to the terms dictated by the landlord or reached a 
compromise. Tenants were reluctant to precipitate the termination of the 
agreement because their chances of accessing land elsewhere were limited and 
therefore they tried to remain in the relationship even if they felt that it was unfair 
and burdensome. Thus in general tenancies were quite stable despite the difficult 
relationships both sides generally experienced.53
In fact in spite of an acrimonious relationships tenancies appeared to have 
frequently lasted more than the first tenant’s lifetime as indicated in the preceding 
example. Tenancy relationships were not only long lasting but also passed down 
from father to son.54 One tenant who replied to charges brought against him by the 
landlord’s rest-wdltil (a person who represents a baldrest 01* landlord) said “I have 
known this land and its owner Ato Walda Sanbat ICabtyemar since the time my 
father became his tenant. He paid all the gibir (tax) until his death. After he died, 
as his son I inherited the tenancy and I have paid all the gibir due to the baldrest
and the D iaspora, (Rochester, NY: University o f  Rochester Press, 2004), 401- 430; Wondimu 
Habeta Maryam v. Kassa Banjaw, DACCA, 10/61 (Dilla, 1961 E.C.),
52 Tamana Waba v. Gadicho Tolo, DACCA, 3/42 (Dilla, 1942 E.C.).
53For example Pearce has shown that sharecropping tenancy is still pervasive and persistent in 
some parts o f  Asia and Africa because o f  the failure o f  capitalism. R.Pearce, "Sharecropping: 
Towards a Marxist View," in Sharecropping and Sharecroppers, ed. T. J. Byres (London: Cass, 
1983), 43-65.
54 Shifaraw W/Gabre’el v. Gurarra Shora, DACCA, 324/56 (Dilla, 1956 E.C.).
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(landlord) through their wcikil (agent) until now.” 55 Also, from the practical 
viewpoint, mobility was not a feasible option for tenants because in the context of 
Gedeo agriculture fanning trees is a long-term investment of labour and money.56 
Population growth also meant that fewer resources were available, competition for 
land became more intense, and therefore despite the heavy handed nature of their 
landlords tenants preferred to remain on the land rather than attempt to move 
elsewhere.57
However individual tenants might be treated by their respective landowners, 
one common factor was that erbo had to be paid regularly. Whether it was fixed or 
variable deepened upon the agreement.58 The general assumption is that 
landowners preferred payments of erbo in cash rather than in kind (although there 
appears to be little evidence to support such a claim); nevertheless it is evident 
that there was little interest in pressing tenants to enforce a particular kind of 
payment. Concern was focused more on the ability to pay on a regular basis, 
preferably without going to the lengthy process of court disputes.59 However, it is 
clear from examining court archives that erbo assessment and payment triggered a 
large amount of conflict and as a result, as we shall see below, the process of the 
assessment of erbo and of collecting payments underwent substantial changes 
during this period.60
55 Tasfaye Tassama V. Mamo Bore, DACCA, 15/61 (Dilla, 1961 E.C.),
56 Interview with Butecha Biliqe, Sugale, 15 June 2004; and Dakale Dogoma, Grissa, 14 July 
2004.
57 Interview with Alako Wadari, Grissa, 16 July 2004; and Dado Galgalu, Grissa, 21 July 2004.
58 Dassaldne Korojo V. Borqo Ginje, DACCA, 285/54 (Dilla, 1954 E.C).
59 Zawditu Worq Agannahu V. Gamade Shalo, DACCA, 249/56 (Dilla, 1956 E.C.).
60 Interview with BaqtUd W alda S'adiq, Shegado, 6 July, 2004.
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The problems of erbo assessment
Erbo was only part of a tenant’s burden of obligation towards his landlord. 
Despite the fact that tenants had many and varied duties in addition to the payment 
of an annual erbo at harvest time, erbo payment was the main subject of dispute 
between landlords and tenants and the cause of the majority of court cases.61
Erbo consists of one quarter of the produce whether it might be enscit, 
coffee or any other crop and it was given as a form of rent to repay the landlord 
for the use of his land by the tenant. Although there were different types of 
tenancy in other parts of Ethiopia, erbo seems to be the only form of tenancy that 
existed in Gedeo.62 This may be due to the fact that agriculture in Gedeo is highly 
labour intensive. The landlord only contributed land; the other essential elements 
to maintain the production process had to be provided by the tenants. This is 
probably the reason why erbo became a dominant feature of the Gedeo tenancy 
system.63
Leaving aside for now a discussion of the other burdens placed upon 
tenants such as the provision of free labour seivice, the supply of firewood, and 
performing construction tasks for the landlord, the way erbo was assessed and 
paid needs to be considered. The available evidence indicates that there was no 
uniformity concerning how a figure for the payment of erbo was calculated. It 
might be fixed or vary according to the amount of the harvest. In theory, although 
available sources do not comment about this, a fixed rent (erbo) appears to be
61 P, Gilkes claims that 98% o f the tenants in Sidamo at this time had been paying land tax for 
their landlords in addition to rent and other obligations; however there is no other way o f 
corroborating this statement. See Gilkes, The Dying Lion, 117.
62 The most common forms o f  tenancy arrangements were siso, (1/3) and equel (1/2). See also 
Cohen and Weintraub, L and and Peasants, 50-55.
63 For a different types o f  tenancy arrangements in Ethiopia see Gabra-Wald, "Ethiopia's ",
313.
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highly exploitative because it fails to take into account the annual fluctuations of 
harvest and payment for produce. Court documents however state simply that the 
tenant had failed to pay erbo, but do not show whether or not this was because of 
a poor harvest and as a result we cannot determine how burdensome it had been 
for the tenants.64
The two most important products were enscit and coffee. They were 
assessed at the same rate annually, i.e. payment of a quarter of the harvest. Enscit 
was usually accepted in its qoc'o form, but transporting the heavy qoc'o to where 
the landowner chose was the responsibility of the tenant. In the case of coffee, if 
the tenant was required to pay in kind coffee beans were acceptable but the grade 
and to what stage the coffee should have been processed had to be determined 
between the two, and was mainly dependant 011 the nature of the harvest.65
It is difficult to find evidence to support the claim made for example by 
McClellan that tenants were required by their landlords to grow coffee because of 
its value in the market.66 Neither oral nor archival sources show that this was the 
case; in fact the court cases examined for this study show that tenants grew all 
types of crops and the interference of the landowners appears to have been 
minimal or non-existent.67 hi fact landlords would accept erbo in any form which 
the tenant offered. As both coffee and ensdt took some years to mature to the 
harvesting stage, landlords might in the interim collect some unusual types of land
64 Surprisingly only a few cases were initiated due to disagreement on the amount o f  erbo. In 
this dispute the tenant felt that the amount o f  erbo he was asked to pay was too high. Yashi 
Tassama V. Giibra Madhin Taro, DACCA, 61/59 (Dilla, 1959 E.C.); Nagashe Qoricho v. Aronku 
Tulu, DACCA, 247/54 (Dilla, 1954 E.C.).
65 Baqalach AMra V. Mit'e Loko, DACCA, 387/53 (Dilla, 1953 E.C.).
66 McClellan, "Coffee in Centre-Periphery Relations", 191-192.
67 Like McClellan, Donham also felt that tenants gradually lost control o f  the production 
process, see Donham, "Old Abyssinia”, 41.
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rent as the example below shows. In a court case concerning tenancy the plaintiff 
presented his claim in court through his solicitor (tabaqa) as follows;68
.. .the defendant should pay the erbo payment to the plaintiff who had 
been given the land by the government for his services (balawulata).
The defendant as a tenant on this land had beehives, enscit, etc. He 
paid a wood erbo [emphasis mine] to the plaintiff until the land was 
developed; if he denies this I will prove my case and if found guilty he 
should make reparation according to the assessment.
As the above statement demonstrates, in most cases landowners had to wait 
years before reaping the benefit from their land and for that reason this particular 
landowner had been collecting erbo in a different form, showing the flexibility 
and adaptability of erbo payments in the face of the variable resources of 
individual farms.69
One example of the growing tension and lack of trust between tenants and 
landowners was the process of erbo assessment.70 Informants claimed that in the 
1930s and early 40s it had been simpler and more straightforward, but gradually 
they had been obliged to make the process very formal, even requiring the 
introduction of a committee with representatives from both sides, hi fact the 
increasing lack of trust between the two meant that local officials such as the 
balabat wakil (representative) and the at'by a danna (local judge) were also 
required to serve on the committee. As the committee constituted between five 
and seven individuals the tenant was responsible for providing food for them
68 Fulas Birbirssa V. Kifele Zena, DACCA, 11/56 (Dilla, 1956 E.C.)
69For a detailed discussion and analysis o f  theories o f  land rent see Utsa Patnaik, "Classical 
Theory o f  Rent and Its Application to India: Some Preliminary Propositions, with Some Thoughts 
on Sharecropping," in Sharecropping and Sharecroppers, ed. T. J. Byres (London: Cass, 1983), 
71-76.
70 Yashi Tassama v. Gabrii Madhin Taro, DACCA, 61/59 (Dilla, 1959 E.C.).
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when they carried out the assessment.71 An informant in Sisota told me that they 
had to pay some kind of nominal fee (ydt'eza margafia) to the landlord or his 
agent if they wanted to have a speedy and sympathetic assessment process.72 
Concluding the assessment process without problems was vital in preventing 
conflict with the landlord ([balarest) which could easily lead to a court conflict, the 
very thing which the tenants wanted to avoid.
When landlords resided in the village where their farm was located, both 
assessment and the collection of erbo was much simpler. However, when a 
number of them became urban residents the tenant had to transport erbo payments 
to the landlord’s home. To counter the problem of distance most absentee 
landlords delegated the task to an agent who was known locally as the yarest 
wakil ([wakil in short).73 The wciltil was responsible for dealing with all tenancy 
issues which arose as well as representing the landlord when an erbo assessment 
was made. The wakil was himself one of the tenants who was normally granted 
various exemptions from the burdens of tenancy in return for carrying the 
responsibility of the role, hi Sisosta one such wakil who was called Mohammed 
told me that as a wakil of the balarest he was instrumental in officiating in a 
number of tenancy agreements in the Sisota area and was also responsible for 
visiting each of the landlord’s farms to asses erbo payments.74
The presence of such an agent was useful in dealing with any immediate 
problems which arose because the wakil lived locally and as such gained an
71 Interview with Interview with Baqala Walda S'adiq, Shegado, 6 July, 2004; Mohammad 
Nuer, Sisota, 29 June, 2004. For the role and appointment o f the at'bya daiifia see Aberra, The 
Legal History o f  Ethiopia , 231.
72 Interview with Damaro Shabora, Sisota, 9 July 2004,
73 Interview with Atara Hirbaye, Wonago, 24 November 1999.
74 Interview with Mohammad Nuer, Sisota, 29 June, 2004.
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enhanced status and additional benefits such as exemption from free labour 
services to a landlord.75 Therefore, unsurprisingly, some of them behaved badly. 
Some informants in fact pointed out that the wakil could be more arrogant and 
bullying than the actual landlord who had delegated him to act 011 his behalf, and 
many wakils were unpopular among the tenants. Wakils could also turn against 
landlords when they saw an opportunity.76
In one land dispute case which came to court in 1961 E.C. (1969) a tenant 
was caught up in conflict between the wakil and the landlord’s wife, who had 
inherited the land from her deceased husband. The wakil had been responsible for 
many years for collecting the erbo from the tenants both before and after the death 
of the landlord. According to the tenant, Mamo Bore, the wakil had been in the 
habit of collecting erbo payments from him and the other tenants on the land and 
had also asked them to sign a document to declare that they had paid erbo to the 
balarest However, as the tenant stated, “we did not know at the time that he 
intended to use this document to take over the rest.” This particular tenant claimed 
that because he was illiterate he did not know what exactly he had signed, but he 
knew that he had signed a document in good faith with the assumption that all the 
erbo payments would go to the rightful owner Walata Michael who was the wife 
of the balarest Walda Sanbat Kabtihyimar.77 This shows how a landlords’ position 
could at times be precarious. Such challenges were not necessarily limited to
75 Interview with Wordofa Qumbi, Mechele, 5 December 1999; W/ Gabre’el Mangasa V. 
Dube Kalo, DACCA 301/50 (Dilla, 1950 E.C.).
76 Interview with Taddassa Jibicho, Sisota, 7 July, 2004; Wordofa Qumbi, Mechele, 5 
December 1999; W/ Gabre’el Mangasha v. Gobana Abe, DACCA, 232/56 (Dilla, 1956 E.C.).
77 Tasfaye Tassama V. Mamo Bore, DACCA, 15/61 (Dilla, 1961 B.C.).
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wakils; ambitious tenants might also pose a serious danger to landlords once a 
dispute had escalated.
Tenancy disputes in court
Unlike land disputes, one of the peculiar features of tenancy disputes in Gedeo 
was that it was landlords rather than tenants who sought a legal resolution to the 
conflict. It is not clear whether this was due to a lack of knowledge about the 
courts on the part of tenants or a lack of trust in the system, in which case tenants 
might have felt that courts were irrelevant as a means of redressing their 
grievances. However, as will be illustrated, courts were not as powerful as 
normally assumed, particularly in the area of enforcing decisions, and therefore 
tenants might have felt that the courts did not have sufficient authority and that it 
was a waste of time to involve them in decision making. Tenants also possessed 
the ultimate weapon; in times of conflict they could cease to pay their erbo to the 
landlords.79
The highly generalised view of the landlord-tenant relationship is derived 
from the fact that landlords shared much in common with the people in power; 
and therefore the courts as government institutions helped them to achieve control 
over their tenants.80 This view ignores the circumstances of individual landlords 
because all landlords were seen as being the same, without any effort to make 
distinctions between them. In reality, however, landlords were not a homogeneous
78 Worq Yit'aru Dubala V. Dinge Buse, DACCA, 307/50 (Dilla, 1950 B.C.); Asnaqaw 
Wube v. Befo Buju, DACCA, 3/50 (Dilla, 1950 E.C.).
79 McClellan suggested that about 20% o f his informants went to court mainly in relation 
to land disputes. McClellan, State Transformation, 143.
80 For such views see Addis Hiwot, Ethiopia, 15-48.
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group. Wealthy and influential landlords had the opportunity to protect their 
interests by using the various means available to them.81 This could range from 
buying professional support in court disputes to being able to sustain the financial 
and other burdens which court disputes normally incurred. The situation was 
different for poorer landlords, because they had neither the financial resources to 
pursue longstanding conflicts nor the manipulation and the leverage to handle 
their tenants. In general the existing evidence shows that powerful landlords had 
much better control over their tenants while women and other poorer landowners
had difficulties in maintaining even a minimum level of landlord-tenant
82relationship.
The role of the courts in tenancy dispute has also been analysed in terms of 
the social status of the disputants rather than the issues they presented, and it is 
necessary to reconsider these assumptions by examining the available sources. For 
example Sandra F. Joireman suggested that, “Though there was no perceivable 
bias in the court system due to the status or ethnic group, there was a bias of 
decisions for the plaintiff and there was a far greater percentage of titled Amhara 
who were engaged in litigation as plaintiffs than as defendants.”83 This author 
actually contradicts herself, because if there was no ethnic or other bias in courts’ 
decisions how then did the courts tend to make a decision favourable to the
QA
plaintiffs, who according to her own findings were mostly Amharas. She did not
81 See the case o f  Princess Tananna Warq Haile Sellassie, in chapter five, who had a Rest 
office which operated down to village level in many parts o f the country.
82 See the case o f  Aya Dube and her mother with eight o f their tenants in chapter three. 
Aya Dube V. Halako Baresso, DACCA, 3/64 (Dilla, 1964 B.C.).
83 Joireman, Property Rights, 98.
84 Joireman, Property Rights, 98; Infact McClellan has shown that most o f  the settlers or 
naft'ahhs were not Amharas but “semi-assimilated” Oromo and Gurages, see chapter two o f his 
book for more details, McClellan, State Transformation, 37-56; See also Charles Schaefer,
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provide any other explanation to show why the plaintiffs won most of the cases. 
This was one of the issues this chapter sets out to address, because none of the 
case studies examined for this dissertation showed that plaintiffs won the case 
because they were plaintiffs and belonged to a particular ethnic or social groups, 
but rather that courts made their decisions based 011 evidence presented to them.85
Since court documents do not normally supply the disputants’ ethnic or 
other forms of identity (other than names) there is no way to confirm that a certain 
dispute was for example between an Oromo and a Gedeo, unless of course one 
hazards a guess by looking at the participants’ names, which can be misleading.86 
From the available sources we can surmise that people became involved in land or 
tenancy disputes mainly to advance their own personal goals and protect their own 
interests.87 The courts played the role of an arbiter rather than favouring one side 
over the other because of differences in their ethnic or religious orientation.88
However, this does not mean that the legal system was free from problems. 
Since courts are part of a whole infrastructure, scrutinising their practices in 
isolation does not help us to understand their role in society. In Gedeo courts 
operated within an environment where some individuals already had obvious
"Review o f  State Transformation and National Integration: Gedeo and the Ethiopian Empire, 
1895-1935, by Charles W. Mcclellan," African Studies Review  35, N o .l (1992), 158-160.
85 Ashagre Takla Maryam v. Shabo Dukale, DACCA, 145/52 (Dilla, 1952 E.C.).
86 Joireman, Property Rights, 98; Joireman’s analysis o f  disputes from an ethnic 
perspective was probably affected by the timing o f her interviews which were conducted when it 
was fashionable to provide an ethnic interpretation o f all events.
87 Worq Yit'aru Dubale v. Dinge Bushe, DACCA, 307/50 (Dilla, 1950 E.C.); Mesfin 
Wolde-Mariam, Suffering under God's Environment: A Vertical Study o f  the Predicam ent o f  
Peasants in North-Central Ethiopia (Bern: African Mountains Association and Geographica 
Bemensia, 1991), 80-81.
88 Joireman absurdly concludes that the reason why many Amharas involved themselves 
in land litigation was because o f  the coffee trade. In fact, land litigation in the south was as 
endemic as in the north regardless o f  what crop was grown. Joireman, Property Rights, 98-99.
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advantages over others in terms of language, power and privileges. For instance 
land owners who resided in towns, where most courts were located, did not 
experience the inconvenience suffered by tenants who travelled from distant 
places to every hearing. The Amharic language was used in courts and this was a 
disadvantage for the Gedeos who had to struggle to familiarise themselves with it, 
although from the limited information which was available it appears that 
translators were provided by courts themselves.89 As in any other society bribes 
or a personal relationship with the judges might have influenced outcomes; 
however this is the impression given by informants which cannot easily be proved 
or disproved.90
However study of actual cases shows us is that endless litigation was the 
norm due to a failure to implement and enforce legal decisions; and therefore 
landlords might not have benefited as much as assumed from these institutions.91 
That was why those who depended heavily on the courts alone had more difficulty 
in protecting their interests than those who were prepared to take the law in to 
their own hands when the system failed to deliver. Landlords who acted 
independently through the use of various threats and sanctions were more 
successful in making their tenants conform to their demands.92
89 Donham pointed out that missionaries in Maale had been involved in the teaching o f  
Amharic to the local people to help them to succeed in their court disputes. Donham, Marxist 
Modern, 32.
90 Interview with Hordofa Gadicho, Wonago, 24 November 1999; Hirba Wojega, 
Tumticha, 29 April 1999.
91 See below the case o f  QdnnaZmach BaqalaKidana Maryam V. Gale Wone & four 
others, DACCA, 44/66 (Dilla, 1966 E.C.); and also Badesso Shamana v. Fayi'ssa T'eko, DACCA, 
68/63 (Dilla, 1963 E.C.).
92 See below the case o f  Wube S ’ahai V. Shebara Lole, DACCA, 11/61 (Dilla, 1961 E.C.).
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The above view show tenants as helpless victims; nevertheless there are a 
number of examples which will be discussed in both this and in the following 
chapter that will cause us to rethink those assumptions. The tenancy case studies 
will show that not only did tenants have a thorough grasp of the way power 
politics operated but also made best use of it to achieve their goals when it suited 
them.93 There were many exploited and badly treated tenants but there were also 
defiant ones who made the life of their landlords difficult by refusing to be bullied 
and by putting up a persistent fight in court.94 Some of the case studies discussed 
below show that landlords not only sometimes lacked control over their tenants 
but at times some even struggled to re-establish their own rights over the land that 
their tenant had been cultivating for them.95 Some tenants were cunning and 
introduced a third party as an ally with their own agenda to pursue which 
complicated to the landlord’s struggle to assert his or her rights.96
Conflict between landlords and tenants was not necessarily resolved solely 
in court. Using both the government courts and the traditional shimgelena 
institution (mediation by elders elected jointly) was a well established practice.97 
The courts also encouraged disputants to use mediation as much as possible, and 
landlords used court procedures to bring rebellious tenants to the negotiating
93 Worq Yit'aru Dubala V. Dinge Buse, DACCA, 307/50 (Dilla, 1950 E.C.); Soko Bale v. 
Bot'a Shate, DAAC, 199/53 (Dilla, 1953 E.C.).
94 Haile Dugeda v. Shage Alaka, DACCA, 38/42 (Dilla, 1942 E.C.); Taye Makonnan v. 
Benagna Hirbaye, DACCA, 8/42 (Dilla, 1942 E.C.).
95 Kidanoa Walda Gabrael v. Taddassii DSsseta, DACCA, 198/53 (Dilla, 1953 E.C.), This 
case for example came to court because the tenant sold the land to another landlord. The previous 
owner was a woman and she said that the tenant had been difficult throughout their tenancy 
relationships and had finally sold the land.
96 Interview with Alako Wadari, Grissa, 16 July 2004.
97 N igusse Abaguchi v. True Nutu, DACCA 41/59 (Dilla, 1959 E.C.).
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table.98 Tenants on the other hand employed the tactics of shuttling between 
government court and private mediation to buy tim e.99 In some situations 
traditional mediation, if  respected by both sides, had a greater chance of being 
implemented. It could also be more efficient than government courts because the 
parties could reach agreeable settlements within days, unlike court hearings which 
normally took several months or even years.100
This section provides examples of detailed court disputes between tenants 
and landlords, as understanding the common pattern of tenancy disputes in Gedeo 
is essential. Crucial issues include how courts dealt with tenancy disputes as 
opposed to land disputes, and whether tenants were treated differently from 
landlords because of their status as tenants and vice versa. As the available 
tenancy court dispute documents show, the majority of cases came to the courts 
due to the tenants’ refusal to pay e r b o  to their respective landlords. As indicated in 
the preceding chapter, an e r b o  claim against a tenant was also used as a pretext to 
initiate various types of disputes;101 however the number of genuine e r b o  disputes 
were also significantly higher than other types of disputes.102 There were also a 
few cases where landlords accused their tenants of failing to fulfil labour and other 
obligations. Another common type of tenancy case was where tenants were caught
98 Abaru Yimar v. Dado Haro, DACCA, 173/55 (Dilla, 1955 E.C.); and also Masqale 
Danbala v. Lama Tagaiine, DACCA, 257/54 (Dilla, 1955 E.C.),
99 Qdnnazmach Baqala Kidana Maryam v. Gale Wone & four others, DACCA, 44/66  
(Dilla, 1966 E.C.).
100 Interview with Morkate Jarsso, Andida, 28 April 1999.
101 See this and many other land dispute cases illustrated in chapter three. Worqnase 
Walda Mika’el V. Mamire Tulu Baruda, DACCA, 102/55 (Dilla, 1955 E.C.). This case, which 
came to court as a tenancy dispute was dismissed by the judges because it was a land issue. The 
plaintiff was advised to restart the case. Mintasnot Kabade v. Dana Shartu, DACCA, 61/63 (Dilla, 
1963 E.C.).
102 Cohen and Weintraub, Land and Peasants, 50-55.
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in the cross fire in the fight between landlords.103 In this situation the status of 
tenants did not change as a result of the courts’ resolution although there might be 
a change of land ownership from one landlord to the other; however, tenants 
would have been obliged to endure complex court battles, either by providing 
their testimonies or by being charged by an aspiring landlord who hoped to collect 
erbo directly from them. Some landlords bullied weaker tenants into handing erbo 
rent over to them, which in itself would be used as evidence of ownership in their 
attempt to take over the land.104
However before examining some of the complex tenancy dispute cases we 
will start the discussion with what can be regarded as a typical tenancy dispute. 
This case illustrates how landlords presented their charges against tenants and also 
how tenants replied to those charges. A landlord called Girazmach Taldlu Daboc'e 
accused his four tenants of refusing to pay the erbo due to him. This landlord gave 
few details about the sort of tenancy relationship they had, why it had collapsed 
and what efforts had been made to resolve the matter outside court. The plaintiff, 
Gerazmach Taldlu, briefly stated his case by saying;
I accuse the defendants [four in this case] on their failure to pay 
the erbo share of the crop due to me. The land in question is 
found within Sidamo province, under Fitawrai Mandafro rest a 
gull 105 The size of the land is one gasha. I obtained the land 
from the government as my rest. However the defendants, who 
are my tenants, failed to pay my land rent which is why I came 
to this court.105
103 Alameshet Waldayasus V. Qahnazmach Mazamir Hailu, DACCA, 89/58 (Dilla, 1958
E.C.),
104 Amado Walya V. Kifle Walda S'adiq, DACCA, 94/60 (Dilla, 1960 E.C.).
105 A hereditary right o f collecting tribute; see Mantel-Niecko, The Role o f  Land Tenure,
111 .
106 Gerazmach Takilu Daboc'e V. Wot'e Aba Bushe and three others, DACCA, 234/46  
(Dilla, 1946E.C.).
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The defendants replied as follows;
We defendants admit that the land is within the resta gult of 
Fitawrari (lit. commander of the front) Mandafro; a man called 
A to Kutu Litu bought this land as his rest, and we did not know 
that this land was given to the plaintiff by the government. 
Accordingly we have been paying all rents to A to Kutu instead. 
Therefore he should charge Kutu Litu who is the owner of the 
land; we are only his tenants and he should be asked for
107reparation, not us.
The plaintiff was an important person as his title shows, and he clearly 
stated that he obtained the land from the government. He used the term rest to 
describe his tenure but the land was probably originally given to him as madaria 
land and had probably been converted to rest later, although this can not be 
ascertained from the details provided. However, he did clearly identify the land 
which was the subject of dispute.
Other than mentioning Kutu Litu as their landlord, the defending tenants 
did not ask the court to summon him as their wabi.m  The plaintiff said that he 
accused the tenants not in connection with Kutu’s land but of failing to pay erbo 
on the land which was his, and later he gave the precise location of the land by 
naming all the landowners who owned adjacent land. He mentioned Kutu as one 
of the landowners who shared a border with him. After this the High Com! gave 
the order that both parties should adjourn to where the land was situated and 
identify the exact location which was the subject of contention. In order to 
facilitate the process the local C ’eqa Shume was to be present, also any relevant 
witnesses.109
107 v'
Gerazm ach  Takilu Daboc'e V. Wot'e Aba Bushe and three others, DACCA, 234/46 
(Dilla, 1946E.C.)
108 Wondimu Habeta Maryam v, Kassa Banjaw, DACCA, 10/61 (Dilla, 1961 E.C.).
I09Aberra, The Legal H istoiy o f  Ethiopia, 219-241.
235
In the judges’ final verdict it was pointed out that the plaintiff had 
managed to obtain three supporting witnesses who had testified on his behalf 
during the identification process and confirmed that the land was his. However 
there was no mention of the presence of counter witnesses to support the 
defending tenants. When asked about the amount of erbo they had been paying to 
the landlord they all said that it was 20 birr each. The plaintiff on the other hand 
said that since they had not allowed him access to the farm he had no idea how 
plentiful their harvest had been. Therefore he asked the court to decide on an 
appropriate payment. The plaintiff did not press for the maximum reward although 
he had the opportunity to do so; rather he wanted to settle the matter based on the 
information given by the tenants themselves, being more interested in long term 
results. He did however state that “they can stay on the land if they suit me; if  not 
I will uproot them”.110
Although the plaintiff suggested an initial figure of 3000 birr for 
reimbursement, the final decision of the court was far less than this and the 
defendants did not challenge the amount. The court finally established that the 
four tenants should pay 60 birr each (three years erbo), a total of 240 birr. In 
addition they were ordered to pay 100 birr in compensation to the plaintiff. 
Despite the difference between the initial estimate and the final outcome of the 
dispute it was nevertheless a significant victory for the plaintiff.
This case illustrates a number of points about evidence, tactics and court 
procedures. It came to court immediately after the war, and it did not contain the 
voluminous lists of evidence and pages of witness statements of the later periods
110 Gerazmach Takilu Daboc'e V. Wot'e Aba Bushe and three others, DACCA, 234/46
(Dilla, 1946E.C.).
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when court documents tended to be thicker. Even the judges’ verdict in this case is 
very brief, about a paragraph in length. In spite of that it typified court documents 
within the context of tenancy disputes in Gedeo. More importantly it shows the 
sort of tactics which were employed by the tenants. Their intention in deciding to 
bring Kutu Litu into the game was to primarily to create conflict between Kutu 
and the plaintiff, but that was dependant upon ICutu’s acceptance and willingness 
to intervene in the case a as a wabi. If that failed their other intention was to buy 
themselves more time; however for unknown reasons he did not appear in court 
and their strategy failed. Nevertheless as will be demonstrated by many other 
examples this was one of the well established tactics used by tenants.
The other important point is that the court simplified the procedure by 
allowing part of the case to be heard where the land was located. This was 
beneficial especially for the tenants because it saved them from having to travel to 
the regional capital, Yirgalem, where the case was initiated. Informants pointed 
out that such methods were effectively used by many landlords. They claimed that 
some landlords purposely exaggerated the figure owed, as in the above example, 
in order for the case to be heard in a court which was easily accessible to them. 
Sometimes they also used this method to punish their tenants, as demonstrated in 
the erbo dispute above where the four tenants had to make at least a couple of 
long journeys from Gedeo to Yirgalem. This was especially difficult immediately 
after the war when modem transport infrastructure was non existent. Even in later 
times when things were improved, the tenants’ position was hardly better due to of 
their relative poverty in comparison to landlords, and thus travelling to distant 
courts for every hearing was not an attractive option.
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The inability of tenants to defend themselves successfully contributed to
making things easier for landlords.111 However this does not mean that landlords
were always victorious. The tenants’ lack of court knowledge and their failure to
make the best use of the legal system did not necessarily mean that the courts
always passed a verdict favouring landlords. When a tenancy dispute was
presented they examined cases based on the evidence presented by the disputants,
and tenants did not receive unfair treatment merely because they were tenants; nor
was a landlord guaranteed success in court dispute because he/she was a landlord 
* • 112and a plaintiff. The above point can be illustrated by considering one erbo 
dispute at the Awraja Civil Court Dilla, between a landlord and a tenant. A 
landlord called Balambaras Kidane Abessie accused his long term tenant, Guyo 
Gabe, of refusing to pay erbo for six years. He did not give any reason why he had 
been unable to collect the erbo for so long, but presented his charge as follows;
 He (Guyo Gabe) has been my tenant since the time of
Dcijjazmach Balcha. He had been paying erbo for using the land as my 
tenant. But for the last six years from 1939 E.C. to 1944 E.C (1947 to 
1952) he has refused to give me the erbo which was due to me from
1 1 Tthe coffee harvest.
The court ordered a copy of the charges to be sent to the defendant, who 
however, failed to appear in court on the day of the hearing despite having been 
handed a letter summoning him in the presence of witnesses. The court decided to 
continue to hear the case in the absence of the defending tenant and since there 
was no statement from the defence, evidence was heard on the plaintiffs behalf.
1,1 Nagashe Qorcho V. Heda Ganale, DACCA, 41/50 (Dilla, 1950 E.C.).
112 Nagashe Qorcho V. Heda Ganale, DACCA, 41/50 (Dilla, 1950 E.C.).
113 Balam baras Kidane Abessie V. Gayou Gabi, DACCA, 157/57 (Dilla, 1944 E.C.).
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The plaintiff produced three witnesses; however some of their testimonies did not 
help the plaintiff as he would have wished. Although all testified that the land 
belonged to him and also that the tenant had been cultivating the land for him for a 
long time, they also stated that during the six year period in question the tenant 
had ceased his tenancy on the land.
The plaintiff gave no reason as to why the tenancy agreement had been 
terminated and neither did he explain why his tenant had left the land in the first 
place nor mention whether they had had any binding agreement. The essence of 
the plaintiffs argument was that the tenant should be liable for the erbo payment 
because he had terminated the tenancy without informing him. As this case shows, 
neither the provision of evidence nor being a plaintiff automatically guaranteed 
success in court battles, and the defendant was successful.114
The tenant’s decision not to offer a defence or appear in court was wise on 
this occasion as he saved himself the cost as well as the rigours of court litigation. 
However, the case below demonstrates that deciding not to defend a charge at 
court is not always the best choice. A landlord called Mamere Hayla-Michael 
Gabra-Michael, who was a priest in one of the churches in Gedeo, accused his 
tenant of failing to pay the erbo payment owed to him for the year 1951 E.C. 
(1959). The plaintiff presented the claim through his representative and the erbo 
was estimated to be 110 birr. Unlike the preceding example the tenant’s inability 
to defend the charges at court was disastrous. This was how the tenant was 
charged by the plaintiffs representative, Ato Dasse Haylii Michael, at Darassa 
Awraja Court on Magabit 11, 1951 E.C. (March 20, 1959);115
114 Damessie Mulu Shawa v. Galagaye Zalaqe, DACCA, 102/56 (Dilla, 1956 E.C.).
115 M amere Hayla Michael G/Michale v. Wade BSqate, DACCA, 195/51 (Dilla, 1951 E.C.).
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Plaintiff: Mamere Hayla-Michael Gabra-Michael
Defendant: Wade Baqate
Charge; Erbo debt amounting to 110 birr
The defendant resides on the rest of my client, located within Fisha 
Ganant Mikitel Worada Gizat in Dabo qabale, within the balabatnat 
of Fitawrari Zalaqa Galata, bordered on the east by Qonga water, on 
the west by the land of A to Abtayas Mogas, on the north by the land of 
A to Gabrayas Gasassa. On this land he planted the following, 1. 
Coffee, 2. Ensat, 3. Bdqolo (maize), 4. Yd Gesho (a plant used for 
preparation of traditional beer) plants 5. Tobacco. When I asked him 
to pay me 110 birr for the use of the land, he was unwilling to pay.
Let the defendant appear in court to respond to the charges; if he 
admits that he did not pay me the erbo for the year 1951 E.C., let the 
court order him to pay the erbo as well as other expenses I incurred for 
employing a solicitor (t’dbdqa) and for court fees. If he should deny 
the charges I can provide evidence against him.
When the court summoned the tenant to reply by appearing in court on the 
date of the next hearing the tenant failed to appear. The court was forced to 
adjourn the hearing on four occasions as he failed to appear without providing a 
reason. The court therefore proceeded in his absence and the plaintiff was asked to 
present additional evidence. Witnesses were called by the plaintiff and all three 
witnesses testified in support of the landlord. Since the case was heard without the 
presence of the accused tenant there were no counter witnesses or evidence 
against the plaintiffs claim. When the court finally gave its decision it was 
decided that the full erbo of 110 birr should be paid by the tenant. In addition the 
tenant was also liable to pay 20 birr in compensation to the plaintiff and the court 
made it clear that the tenant should not be allowed to appeal against this decision 
before these payments had been made.116
Disputes between tenants and landlords did not always have to be settled in 
court. Despite the heavy reliance of landlords on court proceedings to resolve
116 M amere Hayla Michael G/Michale v. Wade Baqate, DACCA, 195/51 (Dilla, 1951 
E.C.).
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problems they had with their tenants, they did not necessarily reject other ways of
117settling disputes. The most common alternative was through mediation. 
Mediation could take place at any stage of the disagreement, including while the 
case was being heard. In fact courts normally encouraged disputants to settle their 
differences through mediation as some of the cases examined demonstrated.118
A landlord called Lama Taganne accused his tenant Kurse Dulcale of failing 
to pay erbo for the years 1951 E.C. and 1954 E.C. (1959 and 1962). However 
before the accused tenant was due to appear in court to defend himself against the 
charge he died, and therefore the case was temporarily suspended.119 However 
after a few months the plaintiff accused the deceased tenant’s widow on the same 
charge, as she had inherited the tenancy and was also responsible for the children 
and the running of the household. The widow, named Wayzaro Masqala Danbala 
appeared in court to provide her own account of the dispute. She said that she had 
not been adequately informed by the plaintiff or by the court as to the nature of the 
charge against her. She further said that this was a deliberate tactic on the part of 
the plaintiff, because he wanted to take the land which provided a livelihood for 
herself and her children away from her. Therefore she asked the court for 
sufficient time to study the terms of the charges before giving her reply at the next 
hearing.
The hearing was adjourned according to her request and she was also asked 
to bring evidence in support of her claims; but at the next hearing both the 
plaintiff and the defendant expressed a desire to resolve the matter through
117 Abfini Yimfir v. Dado Haro, DACCA, 173/55 (Dilla, 1955 B.C.).
1,8 Gobana Badasso v. Makonnen Ginbo, DACCA, 90/58 (Dilla, 1958 B.C.).
119 Masqale Danbala V. Lama Taganne, DACCA, 257/54 (Dilla, 1955 E.C.).
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mediation. Then the court accepted the request and stipulated that after settling 
the matter they should attach a copy of the agreement to their case file. A decision 
was achieved through mediation with the help of three witnesses who were 
appointed jointly by both sides.
Bearing in mind the outcome of the case and the way she handled the court 
dispute from the start, it is possible to surmise that the defending tenant wished to 
settle the matter this way knowing that she had a weak bargaining position.120 The 
final settlement was actually very harsh for the tenant and it shows that this 
particular household was in a difficult position after the death of the head of the 
household.
In the agreement it was stated that the landlord was allowed to collect all the 
due erbo directly from the farm. The arrangement was unusual because the 
tenant’s household agreed to hand over control of the farm to the landlord himself 
from 1956 to 1958 E.C. (1964 to 1966), until he had collected 270 birr. After the 
harvest of 1966 they agreed that he would return the farm to the tenant and the 
previous tenancy relationship would be resumed. This particular agreement was 
not only harsh but also very risky for the tenant, because it might be difficult for 
the tenant’s household to recover the land from the landlord; the defendant herself 
said that the landlord was looking for an excuse to evict them. Since this landlord 
had a long term problem with this particular household, he might have used a 
shortfall in erbo as an excuse to give the land to another tenant. Tenancy dispute 
documents show that tenants did not give their land back to their landlords unless 
they were desperate.121 As explained above unpaid erbo payments were a frequent
120 Baqalach Abara v. Mit'e Loko, DACCA, 387/53 (Dilla, 1953 E.C.).
121 Zawditu Worq Agannahu v. Gamade Shalo, DACCA, 249/56 (Dilla, 1956 E.C.).
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reason to start disputes, but in those circumstances tenants were normally given 
time to pay the unpaid erbo at the next harvest time.122
An interesting aspect of the above tenancy dispute was the fact that the 
conflict was between a man and a woman. The landlord, who previously had an 
agreement with the head of the tenant household, recognised the deceased tenant’s 
widow as the inheritor. Since the tenant household was dependant on the land for 
their livelihood they were anxious to inherit the tenancy initially agreed by the 
head of the household, but the way in which this was done is not recorded by the 
court documents, or how aware the tenant’s widow was of the details of the 
agreement. There were only few cases where women were involved in tenancy 
disputes, and this occurred, as the example above shows, due to death of a 
husband or as a result of other adverse circumstances.
In Gedeo society accessing land for the household was considered to be the 
responsibility of men. Women were not expected to form their households on their 
own or before marriage, which explains the almost total absence of women from 
tenancy dispute documentation except in cases such as that of Masqala Danbala, 
who was forced to perpetuate a previous agreement despite difficulties due to the 
death of her husband. She was obliged to accept the settlement even though it was 
unfavourable to her household because her overriding concern was to retain the 
land.
However, there are still a few examples from the archives which give us a 
glimpse of the role of women in tenancy disputes in Gedeo during this period. In 
the example given below the dispute happened to be between two women, as both 
the landlord and the tenant were women. The plaintiff Abara Yemar accused her
122 Masqale Danbala V. Lama Taganne, DACCA, 257/54 (Dilla, 1955 E.C.).
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tenant Dade Haro of failing to pay erbo. The plaintiff estimated the erbo to be 400 
birr; in her reply to the charge the defendant confirmed that she was the plaintiffs 
tenant, but said that she contested the estimated erbo, because she felt that it was 
too much. The court felt that the matter would be best resolved through 
mediation.
After accepting the ruling of the court they selected five elders according to 
the traditional practice to assess the amount of erbo payable to the plaintiff. The 
task of overseeing and facilitating the process was entrusted to local officials. The 
five elders carried out an assessment of the haivest and agreed that the tenant 
should pay 115 birr to the plaintiff as erbo. Although the plaintiff accepted the 
estimate, which was below than what she had originally demanded, the conflict 
was far from being resolved because of two issues; at one point they even returned 
to court because of disagreement over the way the assessors had earned out their 
work. The plaintiff claimed that the assessors had failed to complete the task 
because they did not include some of the crops in the estimate, for unknown 
reasons. Also the death of the defendant occurred during the course of the dispute. 
In fact she had been unable to attend many of the previous summonses and 
mediation efforts due to ill health and her husband had represented her on many 
occasions.
The husband of the deceased tenant, Ato Anyo Amante, was recognised as 
the inheritor of his wife’s land and the custodian of their children but he decided 
that he did not want to carry on with the court dispute, preferring to settle the issue 
through mediation. An agreement was reached whereby Ato Anyo agreed to pay a 
total of 140 birr both for the estimated erbo and as compensation to the plaintiff.
123 Abaru Yimar V. Dado Haro, DACCA, 173/55 (Dilla, 1955 E.C.).
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The plaintiff made some concessions by agreeing not to pursue him concerning 
unpaid labour services. A time was agreed for the completion of the payment. In 
addition a clause was inserted which emphasised that if he failed to settle all 
payments within the agreed time, he agreed to pay a 100 birr penalty charge. Five 
witnesses were present when this was finalised. The agreement was prepared in 
three copies, the first copy to be submitted to the Awraja Gizat Office, the second 
and the third copy to be given to the plaintiff and the defendant respectively.
There is a parallel in both of the above examples. The defendants in both 
cases died while the case was being heard, and both disputes were subsequently 
settled through mediation.124 The decision to reach a decision quickly through 
mediation was probably the best option from the tenants’ point of view because 
neither was able to continue the dispute after the death of their partners. However 
the second case differed in that the female defendant was presented as the official 
tenant, not as a wife of a man who was unable to come to court for any reason. 
Unfortunately due to the vagueness of court documents there is no information 
concerning how she had become a tenant in the first place, which would have 
provided a better understanding of the role of women in tenancy relations and 
disputes. It is possible however to reconstruct some of the missing information 
from what we know about tenancy relations within Gedeo. This woman was more 
likely to have inherited the tenancy from her first husband who might also have 
died before the case came to court. It was probably her second husband who 
represented her in many of the court appearances.
The above examples have demonstrated that landlords did not always use 
litigation to achieve maximum gain but rather as a last resort to force a rebellious
124 Meju Aba Siro v. Jarsso Baiiso, DACCA, 393/53 (Dilla, 1953 E.C.).
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tenant to come to the negotiating table, landlords having no alternative way of 
forcing tenants to pay their erbo. Also, landlords normally readily accepted 
mediation as the best way of resolving a dispute even if they had a good choice of 
winning the case because a decision from the court was not likely to be very 
different from that gained through mediation.
The inability of landlords to impose any other kind of sanctions rendered 
them powerless in the face of their tenants.125 Therefore even when a settlement 
was agreed through the mediation process, if it was broken by the tenant another 
cycle of conflict would start and the landlord had no choice other than to chase the 
tenant until he had collected his rent. The above points can be illustrated by 
example. Qannazmach Baqala Kidana Maryam accused his five tenants at the 
High Court of Sidamo of failing to pay the erbo due to him.126 The tenants had 
agreed to pay 3400 birr to the plaintiff and he accused them of failing to fulfil 
their agreement within the agreed time limit.127 According to the High Court they 
had only managed to pay 1000 birr; therefore he demanded that the court enforce 
the payment of the balance of 2400 birr.
The court accordingly summoned the accused to appear in response to the 
charges, which was the beginning of a “cat and mouse” game. They did not deny 
the charge but expressed a willingness to settle the dispute through mediation. The 
landlord did not oppose this despite the failure of the previous agreement, and in 
fact agreed to reduce the amount of erbo by 500 birr, as a gesture of good will on 
the assumption that the matter might be settled quickly. A date was set to finalise
125 Ayalach Ambaye v. Jasso Ada, DACCA, 104/66 (Dilla, 1966 B.C.).
126 Qannazmach  Baqala Kidana Maryam V. Gale Wone & four others, DACCA, 44/66 (Dilla, 
1966 E.C.).
127 Alamu Male v, Hoqa Gucha, DACCA, 201/51 (Dilla, 1951 E.C.).
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the remaining payment. However the dispute was far from over, as again the 
tenants failed to fulfil their agreement within the agreed time, only managing to 
pay 360 birr. The dispute over the remaining money continued until the plaintiff 
sought much tougher action from the court, which reached a final verdict by 
stating that the accused should make the remaining payment to the landlord 
immediately, and if  they failed to do so their property and land should be sold at 
auction to pay him. In addition the court ordered the defendants to pay 
compensation of 100 birr to the plaintiff who had had to come from Addis Ababa 
to Sidamo on many occasions for court hearings.128
Landlords were frustrated at times by the impotence of the state to enforce 
the courts’ decisions and on occasion took the law into their own hands in order to 
collect their erbo from a rebellious tenant. The following illustrates how 
sometimes landlords preferred to resort to their own method of enforcement rather 
than to use established legal procedures. One landlord who was the head of one of 
the churches in Gedeo had a long-standing dispute with one of his tenants. The 
landlord, Alaqa S’ahai was in possession of a piece of madarici land which 
according to him had been awarded by the government. Since he was a priest it 
was likely be a sdmon land (land which was awarded to ecclesiastical people for 
their services to the church). The tenant who had been cultivating the Aldqa’s land 
was Lole Dita, who had been loyal to him until his death sometime after the war. 
However, when his son took over the tenancy from his father problems arose, and 
Alaqa S’ahai was forced to go to court several times to sue his tenant. When the 
new tenant continued to delay the erbo payments Alaqa S’ahai took action himself.
128 QanriaZmach Baqala Kidana Maryam V. Gale Wone & four others, DACCA, 44/66 (Dilla, 
1966 E.C.).
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According to the statement of an eye witness who was called to give his testimony 
concerning the dispute between Alaqa S’ahai and Lole’s son, at one point the 
landlord {Alaqa S’ahai) brought with him the armed retainers of another landlord, 
Fitawrari Dammisse, and rounded up Lole Dita’s cattle because he had repeatedly 
failed to pay erbo. He added that after that Lole’s wife came out and paid the 
money and the cattle were released.129
Problems between the tenant and landlord continued in later years and it 
became worse after the death of Alaqa S’ahai. With his death the land was 
inherited by Alaqa's two daughters. These two women found it particularly hard 
to collect erbo regularly from their tenant, which triggered further litigation 
between the daughters and their tenant. Now the tenant challenged the daughters 
of the Alaqa concerning their legal status as landlords, asking them to establish 
what right they had to possession of the land, and claiming that they should not 
have been allowed to inherit the land because it was not rest land but madaria. In 
order to establish their claim on the land the two women took the case to the Zufan 
Chelot Addis Ababa. Finally they achieved a ruling which confirmed their legal 
inheritance of the land from their father, and they were able to win the case after a 
long dispute.130
The tenant’s attempt to gain ownership of the land by challenging the
status of his landlords was not successful, because he was unable to produce a
legal document which showed that he was the rightful inheritor of the land. This is 
an example however of how tenants also attempted to play the legal system when 
it suited them; they should not always be regarded as simple victims, and despite
529 Wube S ’ahai V. Shebara Lole, DACCA, 11/61 (Dilla, 1961 E.C.).
130 Wube S ’ahai V. Shebara Lole, DACCA, 11/61 (Dilla, 1961 E.C.).
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their lack of trust in the courts and the legal system in general at times they did
challenge landlords’ claims. The landlords in this case were forced to undertake 
endless procedures in order to reaffirm their rights to own the land.
So far the discussion has been mainly focused on erbo disputes and 
although erbo was the main benefit that a landlord claimed from tenants, there 
were additional services which a tenant might be obliged to perform. Free labour, 
the supply of firewood, and constructing houses and fences for the landlord were 
among the duties which tenants needed to fulfil as part of their tenancy agreement. 
Disputes on these matters rarely came to court, unlike those relating to erbo, 
which was normally paid either in cash or as a portion of the harvest.
One of the few cases which listed which additional chores were expected 
was that o f Kurabachaw Walda Michael against his tenants, who were from the 
same family. The plaintiff Kurabachaw accused his tenants, named Badessa Waqo, 
Dama Waqo and Shebo Waqo, of failing their erbo as well as non- erbo 
obligations, and he stated his case as follows;
  the defendants settled as my tenants on my rest land in a place
called Sirbasore. One of the tenants agreed to pay me 200 birr every 
year as an erbo payment. The second tenant called Badessa Waqo with 
his brother agreed to supply me with two bundles (shakem) of 
firewood every eight days. His brother agreed to harvest my coffee 
beans from my hudad (a land the plaintiff owned separately). In 
addition they agreed to construct fences and houses for m e.... They 
had been doing all these until the death of my father A to Walda 
Michaleal according to the agreement they signed with him. After the 
death of my father they had been paying my erbo satisfactorily in cash 
and also working for me according to the agreement. Now one of the 
defendants has paid only 130 birr out of the 200 birr he agreed to pay.
He owes me 70 birr now and also 200 birr for the year 1958 E.C. 
(1966). The second defendant owes me 80 birr for the labour services 
he has failed to carry out and also he should pay me 60 birr for the 
firewood he has failed to supply. I will not accuse their brother 
because he fulfilled all his obligations according to our agreement.131
131 Dama Waqo v. Kurabachaw Walda Michael, DACCA, 12/62 (Dilla, 1960 E.C.).
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In this instance the plaintiff clearly stated all his claims, and therefore we 
can easily understand the details of the tenancy agreement the landlord had with 
his tenants. Firstly the land was transferred from Walda Michael to Kurabachaw 
on the death of the former. However in this case the tenancy was inherited from 
father to sons along with the land and the tenancy agreement they had signed with 
Kurabachaw’s father continued to be a binding agreement.
From the plaintiffs statement it is clear that the tenancy of the land was held 
by several members of the same family. The first agreement was signed between 
the father of the tenants and the father of the plaintiff. In 1958 E.C. (1966) the 
agreement was renewed because the tenant’s father Waqo Oudo felt that he could 
not continue with the tenancy due to his age and ill health, and in this second 
agreement it was stated that it would pass to his sons. There appeared to be no 
changes regarding the terms.
Kurabachaw produced the tenancy agreement signed between the tenants 
and his father Walda Michael but did not present other supporting documents such 
as a will to show that he had inherited the land from his father. The tenants did not 
use this, as they might have done, as grounds to present a challenge. The court 
also did not query the agreement as possibly illegal and did not question the free 
labour services which the tenants were expected to provide for their landlord. The 
judges mainly focused on the written agreement and the accused tenants were
132asked whether they recognised the agreement as valid.
They did not deny the charges but presented receipts for erbo payments, 
which however were disallowed as they related to a different year. The court 
finally ruled that the tenants were liable to pay about 360 birr erbo and other
132 Ktirse Bades v. Wote Anjare, DACCA, 55/59 (Dilla, 1959 E.C.).
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obligations as claimed by the plaintiff. In addition since they were also ordered to 
pay 40 birr compensation for the inconvenience they had caused.133
The above account is inevitably one dimensional, being biased towards the 
landlord’s viewpoint, and it fails to reflect the tenants’ viewpoint. Also our 
knowledge is very limited regarding the relationship between tenants themselves 
and how they interacted with each other. Knowing in some detail the kind of 
horizontal relationship which existed between the tenants could furnish us with a 
broader perspective which would help us see beyond the stereotypical image of 
landlord-tenant relationships. Despite this some court cases provided clues to 
some aspects of relationships between tenants which do not necessarily conform 
to the predominant view.
In the following example, although the landowner was presented as a 
defendant the main struggle was between two tenants and their motive was to 
determine who had tenancy rights. As the details of this case show, before it came 
to the Awraja Court at Dilla the two tenants had disputed between themselves at a 
lower court without involving the owner of the land. When the initial litigation 
failed to achieve the tenancy rights she sought, the claimant felt that accusing the 
landowner was the right move towards becoming a tenant on her land. The case 
was initiated by a woman named Emat Woletu Waqjira, and she was the wife of 
the tenant who claimed to have bought the tenancy rights from a deceased 
tenant,134
133 Dama Waqo v. Kurabachaw Walda Michael, DACCA, 12/62 (Dilla, 1960 E.C.).
134 In tenancy disputes women normally came to court when their husbands were unable to 
attend hearings, either due to ill health or death. In this case it was not clear why the wife became 
the main participant rather than her husband, who appeared to have bought the tenancy rights from 
the former tenant.
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She accused the landlady, Emat Asnaqach Bogale on the grounds that after 
the former tenant died she had acquired another tenant herself; this according to 
the plaintiff was illegal because her husband and herself had had a joint tenancy 
on this land with the former tenant who was now dead. The new tenant was Waqo 
Bobe who was the brother of the deceased tenant. According to the plaintiff, the 
balarest of the land assigned Waqo as her new tenant knowing full well that her 
husband, Ato Haile Doc’e, inherited (i.e. bought) the tenancy rights for half of the 
land from her former tenant Ganale Bobe two years before his death for 315 birr. 
When they paid the money to Ganale Bobe their intention and agreement was to 
benefit from the crop jointly and they had done so for two years according her 
claim. Therefore the plaintiff initiated this case to contest Waqo Bobe’s tenancy 
rights.135
When replying to the court through her solicitor the defendant (landlady) 
said that the enscit and coffee crops on her rest were planted by the father of 
Ganale and Waqo and later transferred to both of them. However when these two 
tenants failed to pay their erbo she took the land away from them. She claimed 
that she did this well before the death of Ganale, and that she had no knowledge of 
any arrangement made between her former tenant and the plaintiffs husband, and 
she denied all other charges. The plaintiff insisted that the defendant not only 
knew about the transaction between her husband and Ganale, the deceased tenant, 
but also had been receiving erbo payment from her husband. She claimed that 
they had been doing this for two years before Ganale died. She further added that 
in fact her husband, Haile used to go to her house to pay erbo accompanied by
135 Woletu Waqjira V. Asnaqach Bogale, DACCA, 366/53 (Dilla, 1953E.C.)
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Ganale. The plaintiff claimed that she could produce a written agreement made 
between her husband and Ganale.
The defendant was asked to comment on the written evidence produced by 
the plaintiff. The defendant said that since she had no knowledge of it she would 
like to challenge the document’s legality, arguing that it had not been approved by 
a recognised legal body; therefore she requested the court to discount it as 
evidence. The court conceded that, as the document was not endorsed by any 
government authority, the plaintiff should produce personal witnesses to 
corroborate it. The five people who were called to testify failed to support the 
claim made by the plaintiff, and therefore the court in its final verdict ordered that 
the charges against the defendant should be dropped. This case provides a rare 
opportunity to glimpse the kind of rivalry which existed among the tenants 
themselves, which is unlikely to be alluded to in conventional sources. Both oral 
and archival sources tend to depict an unhealthy relationship existing only 
between landlords and tenants, whereas there was also a degree of acrimony 
between the tenants themselves.
“Caught in the cross fire”; the role of wabi in tenancy disputes
The main objective of this section is to show how tenants became involved in 
disputes between landlords despite having successfully discharged their tenancy 
obligations according to the terms and conditions which they had accepted.136 This 
happened when tenants were falsely accused of failing to discharge some or all of 
their obligations, especially the payment of erbo; however the real and the hidden 
motive of the accuser was to gain access to somebody else’s property by using a
136 Seme W alda Yohannis v. Seme Nagaya, DACCA, 14/61 (Dilla, 1961 E.C.).
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tangential approach. For such people tenants were considered easy prey and 
therefore when initiating a case there was an assumption that the tenant would be 
unlikely to offer a vigorous defence, and thus the chance of winning such a case 
was much higher. This was partly because the land was not his property, but also 
because involving himself in such dispute would not earn the tenant anything 
other than to precipitate a change of hands between different owners.137 In 
addition the landlord-tenant relationship in Gedeo was overwhelmingly 
characterised by mistrust and conflict, and some sought an opportunity to 
capitalise on this provided that they could successfully prove their case in court. 
Therefore strategically it was sensible for the plaintiff to start the case by accusing 
the tenant even if he was aware of who the owner of the land was, or at least the
n o
person who was in receipt of the erbo.
It is not uncommon to find the term wabi139 in the majority of tenancy 
dispute case files, whether the case was a genuine erbo dispute or a disguised plot 
designed by an ambitious person to annex another individual’s land. As many of 
the cases consulted for this study show, and from the examples presented in the 
previous section, tenants did not normally reply directly to the charges brought by 
the plaintiff against them.140 Rather they responded to the court by saying that 
they had a wabi to whom they had been paying erbo. The next step was for them 
to ask the court to allow their wabi to offer a defence on their behalf which would 
release them from involvement in the dispute. This was illustrated by the case of
137 Tafasa Engida v. Digicha Baresso, DACCA, 87/59 (Dilla, 1959 E.C.).
138 Lagassa Saboqa v. Badane Shito, DACCA, 28/59 (Dilla, 1959 E.C.); Asafa Dhgefe v. 
Jamanashe Yiglat’u, DACCA, 330/53 (Dilla, 1953 E.C.).
139 Hoben, Land Tenure, 137.
140 See this case above GeraZmach Takilu Daboc'e V. Wot'e Aba Bushe and three others, 
DACCA, 234/46 (Dilla, 1946E.C.).
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Gerazmach Takilu Daboc'e and his four tenants which was examined in relation to 
an erbo dispute at the beginning of this chapter. In this particular case the 
defending tenants answered the charges by saying that they did not know the 
landlord who accused them at court, claiming that they had another landlord to 
whom they had been paying erbo. The man was Kutu Litu; however, other than 
mentioning his name as their surrogate landlord they did not ask the court for 
permission to invite him to give evidence as their wabi and Kutu’s name in fact 
did not appear in the court records after that. However in many other court cases a 
wabi was deeply involved and the nature of the evidence which the wabi produced 
in court was crucial. As we shall see later in this section there were also 
circumstances where the court refused to allow wabis to involve themselves in a 
dispute despite having produced the required evidence.141
First though let us consider the most common ways in which wabis 
became involved in litigation, and in this example as in many others tenants were 
simply caught up in the crossfire without any apparent gain.
Kifle had originally first started the case against Amado Walaya, who 
resided on the land as a tenant, at a lower court where he appeared as the plaintiff. 
When the charges were made against him Amado responded to the Warada Court 
by saying that he had no knowledge of the plaintiff and he had never paid any 
erbo to Kifle for using the land, but asked the court that he should be allowed to 
pass the case on to his wabi Balambaras Endasahw Wudessa. Amado gave 
additional information regarding his tenancy, saying that when he took over the 
land from Balambaras Endashaw on a tenancy agreement it was originally 
uncultivated forest, which he had cleared and planted with coffee and enscii. He
141 W / Gabre’el Mangasha v. Gobana Abe, DACCA, 232/56 (Dilla, 1956 E.C.).
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said that he felt that should not be accused but asked the court to allow his wabi to
142come to court on his behalf. Balambaras Endashaw appeared in court and was 
asked if he had any evidence of his occupation of the land. He produced a tax 
assessment receipt for the year 1955 B.C. (1963). The problem was that similar 
evidence was also presented by the plaintiff Kifle to show proof of ownership of 
the same land; moreover Kifle had also produced additional supportive evidence 
which showed that he was given the land by a man called Doyo Baresso, and also 
the testimony of a local official called Boku Adola from the Fisha Ganat Warada 
Gizat office which showed that that one gas ha of land had been given to A to 
Kifle.143 The Warada Court gave its verdict by stating that the land belonged to 
Ato Kifle and all outstanding erbo payments should be made to the plaintiff and 
not the wabi.144
The next stage in the litigation was for the wabi supported by the tenant to 
appeal against this decision to a higher court, at the Awraja Court at Dilla.145 
After reviewing the case the Awraja Court ruled that the decision given by the 
lower Warada Court was inappropriate in view of the tenant’s claims that he had 
been paying all erbo to his wabi over ten years, and this fact combined with the 
wabi’s evidence of ownership justified an appeal. The Awraja Court overturned 
the decision of the Warada Court and said that the case should be reopened.146
142 Amado Walya V. Kifle Walda S'adiq, DACCA, 94/60 (Dilla, 1960 E.C.).
143 See chapter three for a similar case where crucial documents such as tax receipts were 
acquired in various ways. Yas'ir Aleqa  Sanqut'e Dajane V. Balat'e Asine, DACCA, 19/62 (Dilla, 
1962 E.C.).
144 Amado Walya V. Kifle Walda S'adiq, DACCA, 94/60 (Dilla, 1960 E.C.).
145 Getahun Walda Maryam v. Alako Ganale, DACCA, 59/59 (Dilla, 1959 E.C.).
146 Amado Walya V. Kifle W alda S'adiq, DACCA, 94/60 (Dilla, 1960 E.C.).
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We do not know the outcome of the case but what we do know serves to 
illustrate the circumstances under which wabis became involved in tenancy 
disputes, and has shown how tenants were unnecessarily caught up in wars 
between landlords. Whatever the outcome of the case, the tenant’s position was 
unaltered as he remained a tenant, and had no claim himself 011 the ownership of 
the land. Thus court disputes were far more complex than normally assumed and 
as the above case and additional examples below show, erbo disputes were used 
as a useful excuse to start a dispute over ownership.147 If a wabi failed to secure 
the right to present his evidence in court, whether he had failed to convince the 
court it was appropriate to do so or the court disallowed him for any other reason, 
the tenant would be directed by the judges to make erbo payments to whoever 
they deemed appropriate, and the wabi’s claims to the ownership of the land 
would be invalidated.
The following case shows a different way of attempting to take over land 
which belonged to another landlord. In this dispute the tenant was again unfairly 
involved because he had in fact been discharging his responsibility without fail, 
and therefore the plaintiff initiated this case with the clear motive of accessing 
another person’s land. The tenant had paid erbo rent regularly on the land 
belonging to a man named Qannazmach (lit. commander of the right flank) Walda 
S'adiq C'abude which he had occupied for a long time. After he died the land was 
inherited by his son Ato Kabada Walda S'adiq who later let it to another person 
called Qannazmach Mahamar Hailu and the tenant was ordered accordingly to pay
148erbo to this leaseholder. When the lease was terminated the tenant was told to
147 Baradade Falaqa v. Tikse Ako, DACCA, 130/53 (Dilla, 1953 E.C.).
148 Jabo Dama v. Qagnaimach Eshete Tafesse, DACCA, 322/53 (Dilla, 1953 E.C.).
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pay the erbo to the balarest Ato Kabada. When the balarest and the leaseholder 
entered into dispute the leaseholder, Qannazmach Mahamar Hailu, claimed that 
the land still belonged to him and he accused the tenant of failing to pay the erbo 
despite paying previously, using this as evidence of his ownership of the land. The 
tactic worked in the short term, because the Warada Court felt that as the tenant 
had been paying erbo to the plaintiff (the contractor) he was the rightful owner of 
the land, and it passed its verdict in his favour. The case was later reversed after 
an appeal at the Awraja Court.149
As some of the case studies demonstrate individuals used their evidence as 
a wabi as an opportunity to attempt to gain access to land if  the chance presented 
itself. Production of evidence was the main strategy because courts were likely to 
give weight to written evidence, and gaining access to such crucial evidence as tax 
assessment receipts had becoming increasingly easier as observed in some of the 
court cases. Having to face court charges when in fact the tenant had fully fulfilled 
his or her obligations added an extra strain to the already polarised nature of 
landlord-tenant relationships. The wabi or the plaintiff might reap rewards 
themselves depending on the outcome of courts’ decisions, but for the tenant there 
was no significant gain and in the process tenants were pawns who suffered in the 
struggle. The lack of efficiency of the endless appeals, counter-appeals and 
adjournments on various grounds meant that court procedures did not serve the 
needs of tenants.
149 Alameshet Waldayasus V. Qannazmach Mazamir H ailu , DACCA,89/58, (Dilla 1958 
E.C.). .
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Conclusion
This chapter has shown that although the tenancy system emerged on a limited 
scale before 1935 it only evolved fully in the post-war period, as a result of 
economic and demographic changes. In addition the chapter has also shown that 
there were fundamental differences in the way the two systems evolved in Gedeo. 
While the gabbar system was imposed by order of the state, tenancy evolved due 
to a combination of economic realities. Tenancy, like the gabbar system, was 
exploitative. Unlike gabbar, tenancy was the result of a voluntary arrangement; 
however, it was unable to operate smoothly and efficiently in the context of Gedeo. 
Its efficiency was hampered by conflicts and endless court litigation. Tenancy 
disputes were frequent, and dominated court proceedings.
The chapter illustrated how such disputes were handled by the courts. 
Most of the sources for this chapter were derived from court archives, and 
therefore particularly useful in understanding litigation and the role courts had in 
such conflicts; nevertheless the sources also showed that the existing knowledge 
and assumptions about landlord-tenant relationships were unbalanced and 
inadequate. Our understanding has largely focused on landlord-tenant divisions 
where previously emphasis had been given to the ethnic, political and social group 
to which the disputants belonged rather than to investigating underlying 
differences between them. Close study of land dispute cases show that the 
substantive issue was in fact competition for resources, and in the process 
individuals might have used whatever ploy was available to them if  they felt that it 
would give them an advantage. The same principle also applied in tenancy 
disputes, and although the case studies are few, at least one case has shown that
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competition also existed among tenants themselves in their attempt to win tenancy 
rights, a crucial issue ignored by previous research.
Assumptions about the role the courts played in tenancy disputes were 
neither objective nor based on a through investigation of the sources, because the 
sources do not support the view that a positive verdict was granted to plaintiffs, 
because of their social, economic, political status in society. The main premise of 
that view was that there was ethnic inequality which manifested itself in 
landownership rights as well as in relation to the law. However, the data used did 
not support this premise. The discussion both in this and the preceding chapters 
has shown that the ethnic background of the litigants was irrelevant.150 What 
mainly concerned the courts was facts and the production of evidence. The case 
studies also demonstrated that the courts were scrupulous in those matters. As the 
next chapter will show in greater detail the problem between landlords and their 
tenants was not caused by an unfairly biased court system but was more 
fundamental, being connected to access to vital resources.
The court documents do not show us why tenants rarely took the initiative 
themselves in starting a legal dispute; neither do they enlighten us as to why 
landlords relied heavily on the courts, hi fact in my own judgment courts 
performed their role reasonably fairly. Tenants might not have used the courts as 
much as landlords; however it is doubtfiil if doing so would have made a great 
difference, or if the landlords themselves benefited as much as is normally 
assumed. We have seen from the case studies presented how some landlords were
150 For a very good discussion o f the diverse and complex ethnic makeup o f  the 
ndft'dnnas see McClellan, State Transformation, 50-53.
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unable to control their tenants as much as they would have liked, especially in the 
case of women or other less powerful landowners.151
The reason why the landlord-tenant relationship was so problematic in 
Gedeo has to be sought outside of the courtroom; they were not discriminated 
against for ethnic, political or religious reasons. However, for ordinary tenants the 
courts were unwelcoming places and provided an intimidating environment. There 
were undoubtedly some disadvantages for Gedeos. One was perhaps language, 
since as the court language was Amharic their inability to spealc directly to the 
officials made them feel alienated and distant. Informants did not mention this as a 
major hindrance; rather they emphasised more substantive ones, such as 
unobjective local government officials who had an interest in the land themselves 
and made their lives difficult by manipulating the law to suit their own ends.
Tenants did not normally acquire professional support unless it was 
essential, which curtailed their chance of winning a case. From some of the 
tenancy dispute accounts we can detect that the tenants’ attitude was half-hearted 
and they did not exploit the system as much as they might have. This may have 
been due to lack of knowledge; however it benefitted the landlord provided that 
he/she could produce sufficient evidence.152 In addition the legal system by its 
nature was painfully slow, hence once a dispute had started it could take several 
months or even years and it was not uncommon in Ethiopia for disputes to be 
continued over generations.153
151 Kassa Habta Maryam v. JaraFisso, DACCA, 13/61 (Dilla, 1961 E.C.).
152 Mulatu Tizazu v. Jigso Alako, DACCA, 36/59 (Dilla, 1959 E.C.).
153 Interview with Baqala Walda S'adiq, Shegado, 6 July, 2004,
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Also, lodging an appeal was more difficult for the Gedeo peasant because 
of the distance of the higher level courts from the peasants’ villages. If they lost a 
case and wished to appeal they would have to face a long journey to take their 
case to the higher courts which were located in the regional capital town such as 
Yirga Alam and later Awassa, In most cases they travelled on foot as modem 
transport was costly and in its infancy. If they wished to appeal further they would 
have to travel to Addis Ababa, which posed a serious problem for most peasants, 
both in terms of distance and geographical and cultural unfamiliarity.
Therefore, as the next chapter will show, the tension between landlords 
and tenants continued unabated as Gedeo entered the 1960s, with courts failing to 
provide adequate solutions to the fundamental problem of landlord-tenant 
relationships. The worsening relationship between landlords and tenants gradually 
descended into rural unrest, and anarchy and chaos forced the government to 
intervene more directly than previously. In the next chapter I will illustrate this 
issue more broadly and explain how a rural peaceful protest which was initiated 
by tenants escalated into violence largely because of the action of a belligerent 
landlord.
262
' M E S l
\ r  |
- K,
\  • V
Map 4. Mechele (showing the location o f  the 1960 peasant uprising) 
(Source: EMA, Dila (Addis Ababa, 1979).
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Chapter Five 
From Crisis to Revolution, 1960-1974
In 1960 the long-term tensions between landlords and tenants finally escalated 
into violent confrontation.1 The so-called the Mechele War {yamechele t'orndi), 
which started as a non-violent movement by tenants in an area known as Mechele, 
was in reality far smaller in scale than many other peasant uprisings which took 
place in Ethiopia during this period (Tigray, Bale and Gojjam).2 Unlike its 
counterparts, the Mechele revolt was restricted to a limited geographic area and 
was suppressed within a matter of days. As far as can be judged from the demands 
of the protestors, the uprising had no specific ideological underpinning and there 
was no attempt to elicit support from other areas of Gedeo, where tenancy 
relationships were as problematic as in Mechele itself.3
There were both long-term and immediate causes of the peasant rebellion. 
The long-term origins can be traced back to the early years of the incorporation, 
and in particular to the introduction of the unpopular qalad measurement and the 
distribution of land by the state. Resentment related to this was not restricted to 
Mechele, however, but existed throughout Gedeo.4 Although it might have been a 
contributory factor, it was not the only cause. There were important local 
developments in the late 1950s which almost certainly served as triggers. These
1 The 1960s was a crucial period in terms o f  opposition to the government o f  Haile 
Sellassie. In December 1960 a major coup d’etat was foiled. One o f  the casualties o f  this incident 
was Afanegus Eshate Gada who had been delegated by the Emperor to resolve the Gedeo peasant 
rebellion. Gada was murdered by the instigators o f the coup. Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia , 93.
2 For a detailed study o f  post-war peasant uprisings in Ethiopia (Tigrai, Bale and Gojjam), 
see Gebru, P ow er and P rotest, 87-193.
3 Getnet Bekele, "The Peasant Rising o f 1960 in Gedeo" (BA thesis, Addis Ababa 
University, 1983); See also Lap' iso, Yaetyop’ya, 169-179
4 McClellan, State Transformation, 87.
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created the conditions in which confrontation could swiftly escalate into deadly 
violence. Even so it is very difficult to give a full explanation of the causes of the 
conflict. This is because the rebellion occurred in a small area (mainly Mechele 
and to some extent Dama) and involved few peasants, while other parts of Gedeo, 
where tenancy was as problematic as in these areas, remained indifferent 01* at 
least did not show any signs of rebelling. There was no attempt to galvanize 
support from other parts of Gedeo, where conditions were similar or even worse. 
The location o f Mechele does not offer an explanation as to why a peasant revolt 
should have occurred there, the area being strategically unsuited for an uprising as 
it is located in northern Gedeo near Dilla town, where local government power 
was concentrated. The tenants consequently lacked the advantage of geographical 
distance to conceal their activities.
Relations between landlords and tenants had always been tense, but they 
worsened in the late 1950s. Control over resources was at the heart of the conflict, 
rather than religious or ethnic differences. The people who owned land in this part 
of Gedeo were commonly identified as naft'anns and Amharas.5 They felt that by 
claiming membership of those groups, to which they did not necessarily belong in 
reality, they could enhance the legitimacy of their claims over local resources. In 
addition, they considered themselves as aqni (first settlers), who had originally 
made the area suitable for cultivation.6 Having such a history, they believed, 
would confirm their right to maintain control of the land in qalad areas of Gedeo, 
which had been in their possession since the 1920s. The two sides, landlords and
5 McClellan, State Transformation, 87.
6 The concept o f  aqni is a fundamental notion in many land tenure systems o f  Ethiopia. In 
most cases a right to inherit could be firmly established by tracing one’s ancestors back to the first 
settlers o f  the land. This term was crucial in the rest system o f northern Ethiopia. A similar 
concept also existed among the Gedeos.
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tenants, were differentiated mainly by the degree of access which they had to 
power and resources (mainly land), but they also remained apart in social and 
religious spheres. The violent confrontation that erupted in Mechele in 1960 was 
essentially about access to the vital resource of cultivatable land.
Peasant rebellion in post-liberation Ethiopia did not only occur in the south 
of the country.7 hi fact the most devastating uprisings happened in the north, the 
only well-known large scale uprising in the south being the Bale peasant uprising 
of 1963-1970. The Tigri peasant uprising of 1943 and the Gojjam peasant 
rebellion in 1968, both in the north, were not only large scale rebellions but also 
the most difficult for the government to suppress. (There were also lesser-known 
peasant protests in various parts of the country.) Each of the three major uprisings 
were quite different from the situation in Mechele in terms of causes, organisation, 
and the scale of the protest.8 This chapter will attempt to place the Mechele 
peasant uprising within the context of Gedeo, detailing the specific conditions 
which caused the uprising to take place at that particular time and place, whilst 
appreciating that it had similarities with its counterparts in other parts of Ethiopia 
between 1941 and 1974.
In addition, the present chapter will also examine the role and position of 
the government during the crisis. When the conflict broke out the government was 
faced with two conflicting views. On the one hand it was felt that the problem had 
nothing to do with its own policies and that consequently its role should be
7For examples o f  peasant rebellion in the pre-1935 period see James McCann, The 
Political Economy o f  Rural Rebellion in Ethiopia: Northern Resistance to Im perial Expansion, 
1928-1935 (Boston, MA: African Studies Center, Boston University, 1984). See also McCann, 
From Poverty> to Famine, 146-168.
s Gebru discusses several revolts, Wello (1928-30, 1958); Tigrai (1943); Hararge (1944, 
1947, 1958, 1963); Gojjam (1942-43, 1951, 1968-69); Sidamo (1960) and Bale (1941-42, 1947, 
1963-70) Gebru, P ow er and Protest, 18,
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restricted to maintaining social order. At the same time others felt that the 
authorities should play a greater role than merely suppressing the rebellion by 
force. The final section of this chapter discusses the task force formed by the 
government with the responsibility not only of resolving the crisis but also of 
producing solutions to prevent future conflicts arising.
Before discussing the Mechele peasant uprising itself it is essential to 
understand the general conditions which led to the peasants’ outrage and 
ultimately to rebellion. Since peasant revolts appear to have been commonplace in 
many pre-capitalist economies, much effort has been expended in attempting to 
understand the causal factors behind them across different places and times. 
Peasant uprisings have attracted a great deal of academic interest, especially in 
Asia, and social scientists have produced a number of theories in an attempt to 
understand and explain them. It is not easy to determine which of the available 
theories of peasant rebellions and their causes can throw light on the Gedeo case. 
Next we briefly examine two of the most influential theories of peasant uprisings 
and the reasons why they occur to see what insight they can provide into the 
Mechele peasant rebellion.
Theories of peasant rebellion
There have been many attempts to study the various peasant rebellions which took 
place in Europe and Asia in order to formulate a universal explanation which 
would enable us to understand the general nature of peasant insurrection 
regardless of where or when it occurs,9 Although African peasant uprisings do not
9 Most peasant movement theories prefer to understand peasants from the class viewpoint. 
Young for example found this approach problematic in his case study, see John Young, Peasant 
Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray P eop le’s Liberation Front, 1975-1991 (Cambridge: C.U.P., 
1997), 20.
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conform to these theories as neatly as their counterparts in Asia and elsewhere,10 
these studies provide some basic concepts that can help to analyse and understand 
the nature of peasant rebellions in Ethiopia.11
The two most influential theories are the “moral economy” and the 
“political economy” approaches.12 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to give a 
detailed account of the analyses and arguments of these comprehensive theories. 
However it will be helpful to outline the main points. The chief proponent of the 
moral economy theory is James Scott. Since his seminal 1976 work, The Moral 
Economy o f the Peasant, Scott's ideas have gained a wide currency across many 
disciplines in the social sciences, including history.13 Scott based his study on 
peasant rebellions in Burma and Vietnam in the 1930s. He claims that through a 
careful understanding of peasant life and its norms it is possible to comprehend 
the circumstances under which rebellion occurs. Scott also tried to understand 
rebellion from the wider perspective of peasant life, by examining issues such as 
patron-client relationships, the role of charity, and the role played by village and 
political institutions. The moral economy theory characterises peasant protests as a 
defensive reaction against threats to their traditional institutions. In consequence it 
sees peasant protest movements as by nature restorative. An important feature of
10Alten Isaacman, "Peasants and Rural Social Protest in Africa," African Studies Review  
33, N o.2 (1990), 1-120.
11 For a through discussion o f different approaches to the study o f  peasant movements 
including the moral economy and political economy see Daniel Little, Understanding Peasant 
China: Case Studies in the Philosophy o f  Social Science (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1989), 14.
12For an understanding o f  peasant rebellion from the viewpoint o f  the millenarianism 
tradition, in pre 20th century Ethiopia see Merid W. Aregay, "Millenarian Traditions and Peasant 
Movements in Ethiopia 1500-1855" (paper presented at the Proceedings o f  the Seventh 
International Conference o f Ethiopian Studies, University o f Lund, 1982), 257-262.
13 Scott, The M oral Economy o f  the Peasant; For a moral economy argument see also E.P. 
Thompson, "The Moral Economy o f  the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," Past and  
P r e s e n t s .  50 (1971), 76-136.
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the moral economists’ views is their emphasis on the patron-client nature of the 
landlord-tenant relationship. Moral economy assumes that patron-client 
relationships are “self-reinforcing, dyadic relations beneficial to both parties”.14 
Scott argues that “any claim on the peasants by elites or the state could have no 
justice when it infringes on subsistence needs.” 15According to Scott countless 
peasant rebellions were the consequence of such “moral indignation” among the 
poor, the French Revolution being a prime example. Therefore “the minimal 
formulation was that elites must not invade the subsistence reserve of poor people; 
its maximal formulation was that elites had a positive moral obligation to provide 
for the maintenance needs of their subjects in time of dearth.”16
Above all, Scott maintains that subsistence is the key to understanding the 
peasants’ political behaviour. He claims that peasants evaluate the advantages and 
disadvantages of institutions, persons and family from the perspective of their own 
need for subsistence and that this is their overriding concern. In this theory the 
peasant lives close to subsistence level. If production falls below this level the 
consequence for the household is catastrophic and therefore peasants gear their 
strategies towards the avoidance of risk taking. Hence the moral economists 
believe that subsistence crises are more likely to lead to peasant rebellions than 
any other causes. Factors which can threaten to push peasants below the 
subsistence level and consequently lead to eventual rebellion include fluctuations 
in production (ecological vulnerability), market instability, and major variations in 
the price of a mono-crop upon which the peasants rely heavily.
14 Popkin, The Rational Peasant, 27.
15 Popkin, The Rational Peasant, 27.
16 Scott, The M oral Economy o f  the Peasant, 53.
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The political economy approach by contrast assumes that peasants are 
rational and that they make decisions based on both their long- and short-term
17 *interests. The main proponent of the rational peasant approach is Samuel Popkin, 
who bases his argument on an empirical investigation of rural Vietnam since the 
mid nineteenth century. Popkin’s study, which was a major criticism of the works 
of the moral economists, was a thorough analysis of the effect of colonialism and 
commercialisation on rural society. Popkin also extended his analysis to the 
twentieth century by focusing mainly on anti-colonial movements, including 
Communist movements. Popkin’s central argument is that peasants are rational 
maximizers of both personal and family welfare, and this is their chief motivation 
rather than moral values or group interest. 18 Popkin challenges the moral 
economy view by questioning the main premise upon which its proponents built 
their argument, i.e. that a fall in production to below subsistence level leads to 
indignation and a violent outpouring of anger. He asked what determines 
subsistence level. How does one determine whether a man who had a bad crop this 
year and an excellent crop last year is better or worse off than a man with an 
average crop for both years? Popldn drew his conclusions from four peasant 
movements in Vietnam, showing through a number of examples that a subsistence 
crisis does not necessarily lead to peasant rebellion.19 In addition the political 
economy approach claims that peasant movements are not restorative by nature
17 For a critical review o f  both these and other theories, see Theda Skocpol, "What Makes 
Peasants Revolutionary?" in P ow er and Protest in the Countryside: Studies o f  Rural Unrest in Asia, 
Europe, and Latin Am erica , ed. Robert P. Weller and Scott E, Guggenheim (Durham, D.C.: Duke 
Press Policy Studies, 1982), 157-179.
18 Popkin, The Rational Peasant, 245-267.
19 For a similar argument and a critical review o f  J. Scott’s work see Elizabeth J. Perry, 
Review o f  The Moral Economy o f  the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia, by 
James C. Scott. The American Political Science Review  Vol. 73, No. 2 (June 1979), 657-659,
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but rather anti-feudal and that, in economies where there was significant capitalist 
presence, the aim of peasants was not to go back to pre-capitalist times but to tame 
capitalism.20
When we shift the focus from general theory to the case of Ethiopia, it is 
evident that there was an abundance of rural crises during the post-war period, and 
that most of these rebellions were interpreted as growing signs of general 
opposition to the ruling regime.21 This probably was the case, but looking at 
peasant rebellions from only one perspective understates the complexity of the 
local factors which contributed to generating them.
Although Ethiopian peasant rebellions have not been studied extensively 
through the lenses of either the moral economy or the political economy theories, 
there is one work, Gebru Tareke's Ethiopia: Power and Protest: Peasant Revolts 
in the Twentieth Century (1991) which is devoted specifically to the study of 
Ethiopian peasant revolts. Gebru studied the three well-known peasant uprisings 
of the Tigri, the Bale and the Gojjam. He believed that all three revolts were 
similar in terms of both their origins and outcomes, hi addition Gebru argued that 
all three revolts displayed the inherent limitations that peasant revolts have in 
common. He contended that responsibility for the rebellions lay with the social 
order which prevailed at the time, which was exploitative, coercive and iniquitous. 
Localism was the other defining characteristic of these three rebellions. Hence, 
peasants seemed to have directed all their animosity against local officials, while 
the Emperor himself was largely free from accusation. Gebru concluded that the 
peasants wanted to restore their “violated rights”, using the famous term coined by 
moral economists. He added “what they [the peasants] demanded were those
20 Popkin, The Rational Peasant, 245.
21 Bahru, A H isto iy o f  Modern Ethiopia, 215.
271
things which they believed the king or his government was capable of delivering: 
better administration, fewer or lower taxes, respect for communal autonomy, 
reduction of corruption and repression, and the return of stolen lands.”22
However, if  we examine them in the light of some of the theories used 
both by himself and other writers,23 some of the conclusions drawn by Gebra are 
questionable. Although Gebm is not explicit about which theory he adopted in his 
study, he has clearly been influenced heavily by the views of the moral 
economists. For instance he argued that the Bale peasant demand for land was 
restorative.24 He felt that when peasants demanded ownership of their own land, 
this indicated a desire to go back to the old practices whereby they were 
landowners in their own right before the arrival of the naft'anna landlords. There 
were similar demands in Gedeo. However, although the peasants there raised 
issues about land ownership rights and the inequalities and injustices associated 
with it, this does not necessarily imply that they wanted to go back to the old ways, 
rather that they simply desired to be free from exploitation by landlords. For 
instance, in the Mechele crisis the tenants put their demands quite unambiguously 
to both the authorities and the landlords, stating that they wished to be 
independent landowners like their counterparts who owned land in the outiba zone 
of Gedeo. Gebra’s model implies a romanticized and mythical past where 
everyone enjoyed access to land without any restrictions.25
22 Gebru, Pow er and Protest, 199,
23 T. David Mason, Caught in the Crossfire: Revolutions, Repression, and the Rational 
Peasant (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 31.
24 Gebru, P ow er and Protest, 199.
25 See chapter one for a discussion o f scarcity o f  land.
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The peasants were tactical and pragmatic in that they deliberately avoided 
raising issues which would have created conflict with the government, such as 
unfair taxes, as their objective was take issue with the landlords rather than the 
government.26 The peasants are sometimes portrayed as naive and lacking in an 
understanding of the identities and objectives of their immediate enemies. The 
strategies the Gedeo peasants employed did involve some risks, in contradiction to 
the assumptions of the moral economy theory.27 But when taking risks, they 
sought to minimise the unwanted consequences. Although what Gebru claimed 
regarding Bale or Gojjam might not apply to the Gedeo peasants’ conditions and 
demands, the main objective here is to gain a wider perspective about different 
peasant uprisings both in Ethiopia and elsewhere. However, without the necessary 
empirical evidence, the above theories lack credibility. In the next section, I will 
first consider what I believe were general grounds for discontent. In the 
subsequent section I will deal more specifically with the crisis in Mechele.
26 Interview with Ararsso T'arro, Mechele, 16 December 1999.
27 Risk avoidance is a popular theme in agrarian literature, whether in relation to conflict 
with landlords or choice o f  crop to produce for the market. However the peasants made many 
decisions involving large risks. One informant told me that he uprooted all his ensdt plants and 
replaced them with coffee, because the market for coffee was so promising. For a few  years he 
enjoyed the benefit o f  his decision; however after a decade there was a downswing and he and his 
family almost starved. Thus his gamble did not pay o ff  in the long term and, after he had recovered 
from his losses, he went back to his old and safe practice o f  diversifying. He has now got both 
ensat and coffee plants on his farm. Interview with Doye Biftu, Sisota, 24 July, 2004
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Conditions for the uprising
Does exploitation alone lead to peasant rebellion?28 According to James Scott, 
“growing exploitation of the peasantry may well be a necessary cause of rebellion, 
but it is far from a sufficient cause.” He further added that “if exploitation alone 
were a necessary and sufficient condition of rebellion, much o f ... the Third World 
surely be in a semi-permanent state of civil war.”29 The tension which had shaped 
agrarian relationships in many parts of Gedeo for many years finally reached 
breaking point and erupted into violent clashes in 1960. Sources do not suggest 
anything unique about the exploitation of peasants in this year compared to 
previously. To understand the root causes of Gedeo peasant rebellion we have to 
look beyond a history of exploitation. The question is, if exploitation alone does 
not explain the insurrection of that year what other factors do? Secondly, why did 
it happen in 1960 and not before, and why in Mechele, since tenants in this part of 
Gedeo were not subjected to a worse kind of exploitation than that which was 
common throughout the qcilcid areas of Gedeo? To answer these questions it is 
necessary to look back briefly to analyse from a long-term historical perspective 
the specific conditions which triggered the particular violent uprising in Mechele.
In order to examine the issue in greater depth, the first point of departure is 
to look inside the Gedeo community itself. Gedeo in general was a more deeply 
divided community in 1960 than ever before. These divisions, which were 
manifested clearly throughout society, had started to take shape since the time of
28 According to Crummey “In nineteenth-century Christian Ethiopia peasants were 
generally drawn into banditry and rebellion as followers o f indvidual nobles”. Donald Crummey, 
"Banditry and Resistance: Noble and Peasant in Nineteenth-Century Ethiopia," in Banditry, 
Rebellion and Social P rotest in Africa, ed. Donald Crummey (London: Currey, 1986), 135;
Timothy Fernyhough has also shown the relationship between banditry, rebellion and official 
status in the context o f  northern Ethiopia. Timothy Fernyhough, "Social M obility and Dissident 
Elites in Northern Ethiopia: The Role o f Banditry, 1900-69," in Banditry, Rebellion and Social 
Protest in Africa, ed. Donald Crummey (London: James Currey, 1986), 165-169.
29 Scott, The M oral Economy o f  the Peasant, 193.
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the incorporation. However, in saying this it must be stressed that despite the 
presence of ethnic, religious and other differences the issue of land and access to
o n
this vital resource was the principal cause of conflict.
Land ownership was crucial. As indicated in chapter one, even before the 
incorporation land had never been abundant in Gedeo.31 Two facts are sufficient to 
show that this had always been an important issue. First, as explained in chapter 
one, conflicts between clans in Gedeo as well as with neighbouring communities 
such as the Sidama and the Guji were principally motivated by land disputes. 
Secondly, due to the scarcity of land the Gedeos built barriers into their system 
which restricted many people from entering into the land sharing mechanism. One 
example was the exclusion of women from having a major role in property 
ownership.32 Women were not only excluded from owning land; they could also 
be claimed in marriage by one of the brothers of a deceased husband, especially if 
a large amount of land was at stake. This custom was not necessarily designed 
with the intention of denying women the right to own property. It was more likely 
intended to prevent land being passed to an outsider through marriage; ownership 
of land was given the utmost importance in this society.33
However, the main source of friction between the landowning naft’anns 
and the local Gedeos can be traced back to the imposition of qalad in the 1920s. 
The early opposition to qalad, although not directly related to the 1960 crisis, 
nevertheless showed that from the beginning the Gedeos, especially members of
30 Interview with Wordofa Qumbi, Mechele, 5 December 1999.
31 Interview with T'et'o Ganale, Buc'issa, 5 December 1999.
32 Interview with Aragashe Hojamessa, Grissa, 20 July 2004.
33 Aya Dube V. Halako Baresso, DACCA, 3/64 (Dilla, 1964 E.C.).
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v  1^1 the elite such as C'umburo Shunde, were displeased. The granting of land
exclusively to the naft'anns led to C'umburo openly opposing the action of the
local governors. His humiliation as a result of his stand against the qalad later
became a source of inspiration for many tenants in I960.35 Although it was not
introduced with the intention of creating schisms with the community, the qalad
was divisive.
Except for the few members of the elite who held positions within the state 
structure, most Gedeos were excluded from the governing process. In making the 
naft'anns landowners, the qalad system created the conditions for labour 
exploitation through tenancy. In the early years was not felt as a great burden 
because land was relatively abundant. In fact, the main issue for the landlords 
before the war was shortage of labour. However, things began to change in the 
post-liberation period when demographic pressure forced many people into a 
landlord-tenant relationship.36 As tenancy evolved gradually after the war, 
disputes between tenants and landlords became commonplace, worsening their 
relationships.37
The preceding two chapters have demonstrated that tenants’ relationships 
with their respective landlords were not only difficult but actually marred by 
conflict. As some informants pointed out, not all landlords were bad; some were 
considerate and had relatively good relationships with their tenants. Others
34McClellan, State Transformation , 88-89.
35 Interview with Bagajo Bonja, C'i c'u, 28 November 1999.
36 Interview with Gote Badasse, Andida, 28 April 1999.
37 See chapter four for a detailed discussion o f  landlord-tenant disputes.
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however were bossy oppressive and arrogant.38 For many Gedeos, though, it was 
not the economic exploitation which was most difficult to bear. The erbo payment 
was not mentioned by tenants as a major issue in their relationships with 
landlords.39 The labour obligation, however, which was more difficult to regulate 
and quantify than the erbo, was onerous and intrusive, and thus tenants felt that 
the best solution would be to become land owners in their own right.40
Landlords put a great deal of pressure on tenants by imposing various 
demands beyond those prescribed in their tenancy agreements, whether verbal or 
written. Normally when disagreements arose tenants preferred to take direct action, 
for example by refusing the payment of erbo. Then landlords would attempt to 
intimidate them. If the tenant persisted, the next stage was to take legal action at a 
government court, and a long-standing dispute would be initiated. 41 The
increasing polarisation of the relationship meant that the chances of its being
either mended or improved over time became more remote, and the presence of 
social and cultural barriers did not help in this regard.42
As landlords disparaged their tenants, tenants for their part tried to avoid 
contact with landlords. Rather than being shaped by mutual interest, their 
relationship was maintained by force.43 Tenants felt that landlords took much from 
them and gave nothing back to justify their status as patrons. Since the peasants
38 Gule Dayo v. Alamu W ara , DACCA, 92/59 (Dilla, 1959 E.C.); T'hqabo Shota, Sisota, 29 
April 1999 and Baqala W alda S'adiq, Shegado, 6 July, 2004.
39 Balejigu Bahru v. Biflu Qilt’u, DACCA, 108/60 (Dilla, 1960 E.C.).
40 Interview with Shalo Dube, ShegSdo, 6 July, 2004,
41 Amakalach Daseta v. Koto Sagaro, DACCA, 300/53 (Dilla, 1953 E.C.),
42 Interview with Baqala Walda S'adiq, Shegado, 6 July, 2004.
43 Afawarq W/Maryam v. Malase Gurara, DACCA, 737/59 (Dilla, 1959 E.C.).
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were unable to perceive the advantage to themselves of such a parasitic situation, 
they never worked to improve their relationship with their landlords, while the 
landlords felt that power and coercion were essential in maintaining their 
relationship with their tenants, rather than treating them as important partners in 
the production process.44
Religious and cultural differences between landlords and tenants, however 
fundamental, did not play a major role in the conflict. There is no doubt that the 
Ethiopian Orthodox Church was supported by the state as an important ideological 
tool to create a society unified under one faith.45 There may be some parallels here 
with the way Europeans used Christianity in their colonial enteiprises in Africa, 
but there are also differences as I will show below 46 From the govennnent’s point 
of view, the Ethiopian brand of Christianity was favoured in various ways in order 
to promote the interest of the state.47
A number of churches were built in Gedeo following the incorporation. 
Some of the churches grew to prominence, the most famous being Cucu Gabre’el 
on the outskirts of Dilla town.48 The Church, like the naft'anns and other state 
functionaries, was supported by resources generated from local areas and as a 
result it was one of the most important landlords in Gedeo until 1974. The extent
44 J. C. Scott, Weapons o f  the Weak: Everyday Forms o f  Peasant Resistance  (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1985), 29.
45 For a historical discussion o f  the expansion o f  the Ethiopian state and evangelization 
see Taddesse, Church and State, 156-205.
46 For a detailed history o f  missionaries in south Ethiopia see Donham, Marxist Modern, 
83-101; For relations between the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and Missionaries in an earlier 
period see Donald Crummey, Priests and Politicians: Protestant and Catholic Missions in 
Orthodox Ethiopia 1830-1868, Oxford Studies in African Affairs, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 
1-13.
47Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia, 180; Trimingham claims that the chiefs o f  the pagan 
states in Sidama only nominally accepted Christianity.
48 For Church establishment dates in Gedeo see McClellan, State Transformation, 87.
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to which the Church made an impact on local society and brought the two groups 
closer is debatable. The Church’s primary objective was to fulfil the spiritual 
needs of naft’anns who did not have easy access to churches, and if one examines 
church foundation dates and locations closely it is clear that they were strongly 
linked to the movement of the garrisons. Because of this, any evangelising work 
among the Gedeos was earned out less aggressively than the Western missionaries 
had done in the early days of colonialism in Africa,49
However the monopoly of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in Gedeo did 
not last long, due to the arrival of competing Christian missionaries in 1946.50 The 
missionaries were given state approval to operate in the southern half of the 
country, where they believed that most of the people were “pagan” and non- 
Christian. Although the Ethiopian Orthodox Church had been evangelising in the 
south, the missionaries believed that there was nevertheless a niche for them to 
operate successfully and gain more followers than they would by working in the 
already Christianised areas of old Ethiopia.51
The missionaries’ main focus was on converting the local people, and their 
version of Christianity soon came to be seen as the faith of the oppressed. The 
missionaries’ approach to evangelism was very different from that of the 
Ethiopian Orthodox Chinch, which relied heavily on the support of the state. As a 
consequence differences along religious lines became more accentuated as the
49 Raphael Chijioke Njoku and Chima J. Korieh, "Introduction: M issions, States, and 
European Expansion in Africa". In Missions, States, and European Expansion in Africa ed. Chima 
J. Korieh and Raphael Chijioke Njoku (New York & London: Routledge, 2007), 1-10; See also 
Adrian Hastings, The Church in Africa 1450-1950 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 408-417.
50 Interview with Bagajo Bonja, C'i c'u, 28 November 1999; McClellan, State 
Transformation, 145.
51 Oyvind M. Eide, Revolution & Religion in Ethiopia: The Growth & Persecution o f  the 
Mekane Yesus Church 1974-85  (Oxford: James Currey, 2000), 36.
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missionaries made an impact on the peasants.52 The missionaries used additional 
benefits as leverage to achieve their religious objectives; converts were 
particularly attracted to the power of modem medicine for example.53
The missionaries did not restrict their work to evangelisation and the 
provision of medical services. There were many occasions when they involved 
themselves in the local struggles between landlords and tenants. 54 The 
missionaries helped tenants by providing legal advice when they were involved in 
litigation with their landlords. Their support remained covert, however, due to fear 
of expulsion by the local authorities, who had their own interest in the land.55 
Education was another area in which missionaries made an impact on the local 
people, although in the case of Gedeo they were not as successful as they were, for 
example, in Wolaita.56 hi general, however, the missionaries exploited the social 
gulf successfully in order to exert their influence on the local people.
The Gedeos also felt that the naft'anns looked down on them and they 
blamed the Amharas for breeding such attitudes. This is a more complex issue 
than appears at first sight, as cultural degradation and suppression are 
problematical to define. Control over the crucial resource of land and the manner 
in which it was made available for a certain group, in this case, exclusively to the 
naft'anns, undoubtedly created a feeling among the Gedeo peasants that there was
52 J. Spencer Trimingham, The Christian Church and Missions in Ethiopia: (Including 
Eritrea and the Somalilands) (London: World Dominion Press, 1950), 31-41.
53 Donald Crummey, "The Politics o f  Modernization: Protestant and Catholic 
Missionaries in Modern Ethiopia," in The Missionary Factor in Ethiopia, ed. A. Lande and S. 
Rubenson Getachew Haile (Lund University: Peter Lang, 1996), 85,
54 Lap’iso Yaetyop'ya, 174.
55 Interview with Bagajo Bonja, C'i c'u, 28 November 1999.
56For a parallel example o f  missionary activity in south Ethiopia see Donham, Marxist 
M odern , 97-101.
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ethnic inequality,57 The Gedeo still have bad memories of their stressful living 
conditions in the pre-1974 period. However, what is referred to as "cultural 
suppression" in some of the secondary sources was an issue that exacerbated 
tensions rather than a fundamental problem that made violent conflict 
inescapable.58
The Mechele uprising of February 1960
The Mechele peasant uprising was not a highly organised peasant rebellion in 
which a clear leadership emerged with a sense of political direction; rather it was a 
collective action with a certain level of organisation and discipline. Although 
Gedeo in 1960 was more exposed to markets and outside influences than 
previously, it is debatable to what extent those influences contributed to shaping 
the peasants’ reaction against the landlords. There was no evidence to suggest that 
exposure to external markets made the Gedeo peasants vulnerable to subsistence 
crises which finally pushed them into rebellion. In the following discussion an 
attempt will be made to show how the uprising by the Gedeo peasants in Mechele 
differed from the type of peasant revolts which can be analysed in terms of the 
moral economy theory.
Firstly, when we examine the demands of the Mechele peasants, they are 
not restorative but aimed against the landlords whom they felt were the source of 
their misery. Secondly, contrary to the assumption of the moral economy theory, 
there was no link between the Mechele peasant uprising and a subsistence crisis.
57 Interview with T'aqabo Shota, Sisota, 29 April 1999.
58 Bahru, A H istory o f  Modern Ethiopia, 218.
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No famine or market collapse triggered the peasant uprisings in I960.59 Thirdly, 
the peasants in Mechele were not against paying taxes or other dues to the state; in 
fact, they stressed that what they would prefer was to pay their own taxes directly 
to the government treasury.60
The political economy approach provides a much more useful analytical 
framework for understanding the root causes of the Gedeo peasant uprising. 
Before detailing the nature of the conflict, though, it is important to have an 
awareness of the geographical location of Mechele, the centre of the uprising. In 
many ways Mechele, which is no more than an hour's walking distance from Dilla 
town, the capital of Gedeo, was not an ideal location for a peasant rebellion. From 
a strategic point of view its closeness to the town, where most of the landlords 
(balarests) lived, was a great disadvantage. It was precisely because of its 
proximity that the landlords in Dilla town were able to receive information on the 
activities of their tenants on a daily basis.61 Also Dilla, a small town with few 
shops and no more than two regular markets, had little industry capable of 
employing the peasants in less agriculturally demanding seasons. Therefore the 
closeness of Mechele (the centre of the rebellion) to the urban centre did not play 
any role in shaping the consciousness of the peasants.
Although there were similarities to various areas of rural Gedeo where the 
tenancy system was a major feature of agrarian relationships, there were some
59 For a critique o f  the moral economy theory see Yung-fa Chen, Gregor Benton, and 
Ralph Thaxton, M oral Economy and the Chinese Revolution: A Critique (Amsterdam; University 
o f Amsterdam, 1986), 1-11.
60 Interview with Shalo Dube, Shegado, 6 July, 2004.
61 Interview with Wordofa Qumbi, Mechele, 5 December 1999.
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differences which made Mechele more of a focus of unrest than other places.62 
Violence was precipitated as a result of squabbles between landlords with smaller 
and larger holdings in the Mechele and Dama areas. These started when mounting 
pressure was applied on the smaller landlords, which prompted them to tighten 
their grip on landownership. Mechele and Dama, as predominantly qalad areas, 
had been largely cultivated by tenant fanners.63 Landlords in these two areas 
ranged from smallholders with a couple of plots to wealthier landowners with 
large amounts of land and gult rights at their disposal. Most importantly though, 
the tenants felt that they received fairer treatment from the bigger landlords than 
the smaller ones. Reflecting this, as will be discussed below, there was a concerted 
effort by many tenants to switch to the big gult holders such as Princess Tananna 
Warq Haile Sellassie. The small madaria holders or balarests were usually poor 
landlords who had no other source of income and who as a result made 
unreasonable demands 011 their tenants; the bigger landlords were less exacting.64
Peasants in Mechele repeatedly stated that the main objective which had 
brought them together for collective action was to seek fairer treatment from the 
local landlords, especially the smaller ones who had been making increasingly 
impossible demands on them, hi the late 1950s and early 1960s local landlords 
had themselves come under pressure because the big and powerful landlords had 
made their positions insecure. The main threat to smaller landlords came from 
Princess Tananna Warq. Tananna Warq Haile Sellassie was one of the most
62 Factors which the peasants who took part in the protest had in common outweighed 
their differences; for simplicity I treat them here as a homogeneous group. For a discussion o f this 
issue see Eric R. W olf and W illow Roberts, Peasant Wars o f  the Twentieth Century (Norman: 
University o f  Oklahoma Press, 1999), 290-291.
63 Interview with Worera C'umburo, Shegado, 6 July, 2004.
64 Interview with D oye Biftu, Sisota, 24 July, 2004.
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powerful female landowners in Ethiopia; in Gedeo alone she owned a substantial 
amount of mainly gult. rights which enabled her to enjoy a large income in the 
form of tribute.65 Due to the immense size of her property she even had an office 
known as Princess Tananna Warq’s Rest Office. The main function of the office 
was to administer her property across the country, and to expand her domain 
wherever opportunities were available.
Tananna Warq did not acquire any land rights in Gedeo in her own name 
until the death o f her husband Ras Daseta Damfaw, the Governor of Sidamo from 
1930-1935. As Gedeo was within the Sidamo administrative structure, he had 
acquired a large amount of gult there during his governorship.66 Ras Daseta 
Damfaw, who was the commander of the southern fronts during the Fascist 
invasion of Ethiopia, had fought the Italians in the south until he was captured and 
executed by them. After his death, the gult and other properties he owned in 
Gedeo were transferred to his wife; however, the transfer of the gult, as will be 
discussed later in this section, was not accomplished without difficulties. Tananna 
Warq's representatives were obliged to become involved in disputes with local 
landlords in order to reaffirm that the gult belonged to her. Later her Rest Office 
acquired more gult rights in Gedeo. One of Tananna Warq's most significant 
acquisitions during the post-war period was that of about 80 gashas of gult 
transferred from a Gedeo balabat known as Gerazmach Assafa C'umburo. This 
takeover by Tananna Warq caused much anxiety and insecurity among the local
65O um m ey, Land and Society, 8-12; Crummey argues that rest and gult are property 
rights. Rest according to him included the ordinary peasant whereas gult was for the ruling class.
66 DAAA, 60/52 (Dilla, 1952 E.C.).
67 Sbacchi, Legacy o f  Bitterness, 173-176.
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landlords. As a result, Mechele and Damma in particular became hotbeds of 
dispute between landlords and tenants.68
The gult belonging to Assafa had been inherited from his father C'umburo 
Shunde. C'umburo, who was regarded as a hero of the people of Gedeo, had been 
immortalised for his firm stand against the imposition of the qalad in Gedeo.
C'umburo not only opposed the implementation, but was also imprisoned 
as a result of it and humiliated and lashed in public for his cause, though achieving 
very little in the process. Unlike his father, Assafa was reputed to be immoral and 
self-interested but nevertheless as the successor to his father and balabat of the 
Gedeo people there were expectations that he should attempt to help to reduce the 
suffering of tenants at the hands of n a ff anna landlords. There are conflicting 
accounts of the manner in which Assafa passed the gult on to Tananna Warq. 
According to one version, he felt that it was impossible to fight the local landlords 
who were deeply entrenched in the local power structure, so that the best and most 
practical way to achieve anything was to create an alliance with powerful people 
like Tananna Warq. Contrary to the above, a second version claims that the 
transfer was made without the knowledge of the local people and that Assafa did 
this purely for his own personal advantage. From Tananna Warq’s viewpoint, her 
office was anxious to acquire the land because by expanding her domain she was 
able to benefit from the increasingly lucrative Gedeo coffee trade.69
Whatever the reason behind the transfer of this vast amount of gult from 
Assafa to Tananna Warq, the situation for the peasants became increasingly 
difficult due to the spiralling disputes. Tenants were caught in the crossfire
68 Interview with Morkate Jarsso, Andida, 28 April 1999.
69 Some claimed that the gult should not have been transferred in the first place because it 
was outiba land, which by Gedeo tradition should not have been passed onto a non-Gedeo.
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between the small landlords, who were in turn also threatened and made insecure 
by the action of big landlords, and the rest, office of Tananna Warq which was 
expanding her domain aggressively. Local landlords posed the greatest danger 
since they were very well comiected with the local power structure. In addition, 
the life of tenants was made more difficult by the fact that most o f the government 
employees were landlords themselves, as a result of which the protection from the 
big landlords which tenants were hoping to gain was not forthcoming.70
This was the situation in 1949, when a group of local landlords accused 
twelve tenants on the grounds that the tenants had failed to pay the erbo which 
was due. Some of the landlords who became involved in this particular dispute 
were important local officials holding government office. For instance one was a 
judge in Gedeo Awraja Court.71 When this formidable group of people, mainly 
local government officials, accused their tenants at the local court, six of the 
accused tenants appeared in court to respond to the charges.72 On the day of the 
summons the tenants were put into prison, after being told that they should either 
have appeared in court together (all 12 of them) or pay the erbo.72
The accused tenants stated their version of the story on September 29, 1949 
(Maskaram 19, 1942 E.C.) as follows;
... We the poor, who are imprisoned concerning this land, have been 
suffering a great deal as a result and what we want to ask is to end our 
plight. This land was given to Ras Daseta Damfaw as an inheritance 
before 1928 E.C. (1935) and subsequently all the erbo had been paid.
After 1933 E.C. (1941) by reaffirming the previous arrangement, the
70 Interview with Hayicha Danbela Abe, Andida, 30 April 1999.
71 Taye Makonen V. Sera Wote and eleven other tenants, DACCA, 5/42 (Dilla, 1942E.C.).
72 Goba Baransso V. Balambaras Tafara W/Maryam, DACCA, 15/45 (Dilla, 1945 E.C.).
73 D AA A, 60/52 (Dilla, 1952 E.C.),
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land was transferred as inheritance to Princess Tananna Warq Haile 
Selassie. Thenceforth the erbo has also been paid to her representative; 
we have all the receipts in our hands. We tenants, by our efforts, 
cultivate the land and pay the erbo to the balarest; we do not have the 
desire to fight the balarest, we would like to state to the court that this
. . 7 4is our position...
However the tenants were aware of the possibility of duplicity and 
corruption and rather than all of them appearing at court, the remainder of the 
group had gone directly to Addis Ababa to present their demands to the higher 
authorities.
This was a common strategy developed by tenants in response to the 
challenges they faced as a result of local bureaucracy, as they felt that the higher 
authorities would be more sympathetic. In addition, they put increasing pressure 
on the private offices of Princess Tananna Warq to take action to alleviate their 
problems. According to Fitawrari Gabra Hiwot who was the endarassie 
(plenipotentiary to Princess Tananna Warq) and secretary of her Rest Office, the 
number of complaints from tenants in her gult in Mechele was substantial and the 
volume increased during the 1950s. He even complained in one of his letters that 
despite repeated efforts to liaise with authorities in Sidamo and Gedeo 110 remedial 
action was taken to ease the suffering of the tenants and that he felt powerless in 
the face of the mounting pressure. The tenants’ expectations of the Rest Office 
were not matched by reality and tenants failed to gain the protection they 
needed.75
Some of the local landlords went further, not only harassing the tenants but 
also challenging Tananna Warq’s office at court, which further exacerbated the
74 DAAA, 60/52 (Dilla, 1952 E.C.).
75 Interview with T'hqabo Shota, Sisota, 29 April 1999.
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tenants' plight. The dispute continued for some time before the case was finally 
referred to the Emperor himself (who was also Tananna Warq’s father). The 
Emperor did not wish to make any decision on the matter himself and instead 
referred the case to a commission which was formed especially for this purpose. 
The commission’s brief was to study the matter and reach a final decision in the 
best interest of the tenants. There is scant information concerning the composition 
of the commission and how they investigated the problem; but arriving at a 
resolution was made simpler than expected by the tenants’ own inclination to 
choose big landlords over smaller local ones. Therefore it was unsurprising that 
the commission finally decided that the land should be placed in the hands of 
Princess Tananna Warq, and that the tenants should cany on paying their erbo to 
her as normal, and not to the madaria right holders. No information is given in the 
report regarding any alternative arrangements for the madaria land holders who 
would have lost their rights to the land. It appears that they were given no other 
options and hence used all possible means to continue attacking the tenants. Thus, 
the problem was far from resolved, as confirmed by a letter written by Fitawrari 
Gabra Hiwot, who was in charge of the Rest Office. Gabra Hiwot wrote the 
following letter to the High Court at Addis Ababa in order to complain about the 
continued imprisonment of their tenants by the Awraja Court at Dilla.76
76 D AA A, 60/52 (Dilla, 1952 E.C.).
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Tahesasll, 1942.C. [30thDecember, 1949]
To the High Court 
Addis Ababa 
Dear Sir
In the Region of Sidamo, in Darassa Awraja there was a dispute 
between Princess Tananna Warq Haile Selassie and the madaria land 
holders. The Emperor had given orders for a commission to be set up 
to study the matter and as a result the commission made a decision 
that the land should be placed under Princesses Tananna Wiirq’s 
ownership. [Emphasis mine] To that effect the High Court wrote a 
letter to the Ministry of Interior, reference number 6366, Ginbot 7, 
1941 E.C. [May 15, 1949].
Now 13 individuals including the Judge of the Darassa Awraja, 
violating that which has been decided before, illegally imprisoned our 
tenants against their will in order to make them to pay erbo to them. 
This act has caused a great deal of suffering to our tenants and, 
therefore, based on the letter cited above we ask that an order be sent 
to the Darassa Awraja Court so that our tenants might be released and 
their money reimbursed.
Plenipotentiary to Princess Tananna Warq Haile Sellassie 
Fitawrari Gabra Hiwot
The local landlords had made the life of tenants untenable but the bigger 
landlords of their choice failed to improve their circumstances.
However, important changes had begun to take place for tenants within the 
gult of Tananna Warq which were to have wider implications for tenants generally. 
Tenants within her gult were allowed to own the title of the land they had been 
farming if they could afford to pay 4000 birr per gasha of land.77 Although details 
are lacking as to why this measure was introduced, it was not widely received as a 
popular measure, even by the tenants. Poorer tenants were unhappy because they 
felt that the price was too high, though it was not as prohibitive as it initially
77 Getnet, "The Peasant Rising", 30.
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seemed as most tenants did not farm a gasha (40 hectares) of land on their own 
and therefore the cost per head was smaller than it might seem. Also, for some 
well-resourced tenants the opportunity furthered their ambition to become 
independent landowners.
Opposition to this measure on the part of the small landlords was 
understandable; madaria landholders in particular became threatened and alarmed 
by this development. Their response to was to cany out land re-registration, so 
that any speculation about granting land rights to tenants would be clarified. When 
land re-registration was initiated by the landlords in Mechele tension reached new 
heights.78 Tenants were asked to fill in a form which involved stating the names of 
their landlords. This was seen by them as a move to strengthen the power of the
79balarests. They felt that once they had formally accepted that the land belonged 
to the landlord, he/she would have the right to evict them whenever there was 
disagreement. This might seem an insufficient reason for tenants to rise against 
landlords, since they had already been recognised as such, but the tenants felt that 
if they collaborated with landlords and allowed the re-registration process without 
objection, their chances of becoming independent landowners would become 
more remote than ever.80 Therefore, according to the views of some informants, 
the land assessment and re-registration exercise in Mechele, prompted by actions 
within the gult of the Princess Tananna Warq, was designed as a tough and 
adversarial response to the tenants.81
78 Interview with Morkiite Jarsso, Andida, 28 April 1999.
79 Interview with Taqabo Shota, Sisota, 29 April 1999.
80 Interview with Badesse Rufo, Grissa, C'abica, 9 July 2004.
81 Peasants’ aspiration to become landowners in their own right is a highly motivating 
factor as shown by a number o f  African case studies. Witness for example the case o f  the 
Zimbabwean peasants and how the issue o f  recovering their lost land from the whites was very
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Rather than waiting to see the outcome of the re-registration process, the 
tenants were galvanised to put up as much resistance as possible. Both sides were 
now poised for a more intense and organised dispute. The tenant population, both 
within and outside the gult of Tananna Warq began to consider waging a more 
consolidated struggle, though not at the local government offices. This was 
because they felt that, as landlords and local officials had so much power, the only 
way to challenge them was to send delegates to Addis Ababa, preferably 
presenting their grievances directly to the Emperor himself. Representatives were 
selected and sent to present their case at both the regional office at Yirgalem and 
at Addis Ababa.82
However, the tenants’ bypassing of the local authorities did not bring the 
desired results, and was in fact damaging to their cause. Despite the positive 
responses the tenants received from the Emperor, the landlords, who had 
relationships and a great deal of common interest with local government officials, 
were perfectly aware of how the system worked. In addition, they knew that they 
were capable of inflicting more damage than the tenants had anticipated. The 
tenants’ hopes were dashed when representatives who had been sent to present 
their grievances to the higher authorities at Yirga Alain against what they called 
the injustice of local officials were imprisoned. Although the group which was 
sent to Addis Ababa managed to gain some sympathy, it was far short of what 
they had hoped to achieve. The authorities from Addis Ababa, as expected, sent
central to their struggle both before and after Independence. T. O. Ranger, Peasant Consciousness 
and Guerilla War in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study (Oxford: James Currey, 1985), 284-288; 
Interview with Taqabo Shota, Sisota, 29 April 1999; Morkate Jarsso, Andida, 28 April 1999, and 
Badesse Rufo, Grissa, C'abica, 9 July 2004.
82 Getnet, "The Peasant Rising", 30.
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letters to officials in Dilla, which helped the tenants to free their imprisoned 
colleagues. In terms of their demands however nothing changed or improved.
The lack of progress for the tenants and the painful slowness of the 
bureaucratic system can be demonstrated by looking at the following letter written 
ten years after Gabra Hiwot’s letter quoted above but concerning the same issue. 
Dajjazmach Baqala Bayana, who was the parliamentary representative for the 
Sidamo region, wrote this and many other letters after being inundated with 
similar complaints from the Rest Office of Tananna Warq under the secretary of 
Gabra Hiwot. Dajazmach Baqala’s letter was written on 7th of October 1959, five 
months before the outbreak of the Mechele crisis.83
Reference: 576/2165 
Maskaram 26, [19]52 E.C. [October 7, 1959]
To the High Court of Sidamo 
Yirga Alam
Regarding the dispute between Princess Tananna Warq Haile 
Sellassie and the madaria land holders, the dispute is now being 
arbitrated by the Office of the Prime Minster for a final decision. In 
spite of that it is known that the madaria land holders have been 
accusing tenants who reside on the land of non-payment of erbo at 
various courts. Case files concerning the tenants should now be closed 
and passed to the Office of the Prime Minster. To that effect the letter 
I wrote you, reference number 4964/3/h, has not been enforced. We 
passed an order on Maskaram 6, 1952 E.C. [September 17, 1959] with 
reference 3/52 in respect of the many written reminders which we 
have been receiving on a regular basis from the Property Office of 
Princess Tananna Warq Haile Sellassie. In spite of that nothing has 
been done for them.
It was inappropriate to hear of the court dispute of the madaria land 
holders which resulted in delays and imprisonment of the tenants. 
Therefore I repeat that I am notifying you that if there are still case 
files about the tenants, they should be closed, as per the previous order, 
and referred to the Prime Minster’s Office where the main dispute is 
being considered.
83 D AA A, 60/52 (Dilla, 1952 E.C.).
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With regards!
Dajazmach Baqala Bayana
Endarassie [Parliamentary Representative]
As this letter shows, the madaria land holders continued to harass their 
tenants in court despite the fact that it was illegal to do so, and the tenants’ hope of 
gaining anything positive from the legal process looked increasingly bleak.
The realisation on the part of the peasants that the legal route would not 
bring about the changes they wanted meant that they had to pursue alternative 
means to make their demands heard. Nevertheless, what is important to emphasise 
here is that at this stage they were not contemplating violent methods of pursuing 
their aims but rather were actively discussing what possible forms of resistance to 
offer when their landlords came to cany out the land measurement exercise.84 By 
taking collective action, the tenants felt that they would attract the support of 
higher officials so that their demands would be recognised and met.85
Already frustrated by the whole process, the tenants decided to escalate the 
crisis by forbidding the balarests or their agents from entering their farms to carry 
out an assessment o f the erbo due to them. They were hoping that a crisis would 
force the government to convince the landlords that tenants should be allowed to 
purchase the land which they had been cultivating for long time. This shows that 
the tenants were not interested in restoring the old order but wanted more security 
and property ownership rights, bringing to an end their plight as insecure tenants. 
The peasants demonstrated prudence and shrewdness when presenting their 
demands to the government officials. They clearly stated what they wanted and
84 Interview with Hayicha  Danbela Abe, Andida, 30 April 1999,
85 Interview with Gote Biidasse, Andida, 28 April 1999.
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pointed out that their problem was not with the government but with the local 
landlords (<balarests) and local government officials. These officials, most of 
whom were already involved in acquiring land by various means,86 made the 
peasants' lives intolerable through their collaboration with the landlords.
From the tenants’ perspective the legal means of bringing about change 
had failed. The next step was to choose the right time to create the kind of crisis 
they hoped would help them get heard in Addis Ababa. The only time that the 
balarests were motivated to come to their villages was during harvest time when 
the coffee beans were about to be collected from the farm and they wished to 
assess the harvest to determine the amount of erbo owed to them. The tenants 
chose this particular time to orchestrate a crisis.87 Their plan was to harvest coffee 
beans without first notifying their respective balarests. This was a major breach of 
the well established tenant -balarest agreement. Normally assessment was made in 
the presence of representatives from both sides, and a local official might also 
come if  the two had had a history of disagreement.88 This procedure had evolved 
due to a long-standing lack of trust between the two sides. By violating this 
arrangement, the tenants sent a clear message to the balarests.
The tenants were perfectly aware that this would cause upset and show the 
balarests that the tenants were determined to confront them. They were not 
reckless though and they took precautions to minimise the possible risks. They 
decided to harvest the coffee beans at night, under the cover of darkness, so that a 
violent confrontation would be difficult for the balarests, if not totally impossible. 
The tenants felt that harvesting the coffee beans in darkness would be safe and
86 DAAA, 60/52 (Dilla, 1952 E.C.).
87 Interview with Taqabo Shota, Sisota, 29 April 1999.
88 See chapter four for more details about erbo assessment.
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that it would be difficult for the balarests to stop them as they would have to come 
from Dilla. This demonstration of caution shows that the peasants knew their 
limitations, as well as the power of their enemy. In addition, they planned that 
each farm would be harvested separately and that instead of using only family
* * • RQlabour, as was usually the case, they would join forces for mutual protection. 
They drew up a timetable arranging when the beans of each of the tenants 
involved in the uprising would be harvested. This way if  balarests came to the 
farm the tenants would have the support of the group rather than having to 
confront them in isolation. In addition, since a large number of tenants took part in 
the harvest, the task could be accomplished more quickly. In general the tenants 
appeared to have made as much preparation as they possibly could to deal with 
unexpected eventualities, although it was difficult for them to anticipate exactly 
what reaction they would provoke in the balarests.
Lap'iso has suggested that the reason the tenants rebelled at this time was 
that they had greater access to guns than previously.90 According to this theory, 
sale of coffee provided cash that enabled the peasants to purchase firearms easily, 
from which they gained the courage to confront their oppressors. This is far from 
convincing however. Possessing firearms does not necessarily initiate rebellion, as 
is clearly shown both from the incident in Gedeo and other parts of Ethiopia. Here 
peasant uprisings arose due to many other complex factors, and peasants rebelled 
whether or not they had access to guns provided other conditions leading to an 
uprising were in place. In Gedeo some ambitious peasants might have acquired 
guns but there is no real evidence that they did this in direct preparation for a
89 Interview with Morkate Jarsso, Andida, 28 April 1999,
90 Lap'iso, Yaetyop'ya, 175.
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crisis. The role firearms played has been highly exaggerated. Informants pointed 
out that although a few tenants had bought guns, guns did not play a major role 
during the confrontation and that whatever guns had been acquired were no match 
for the firepower of the landlords when violence brolce out.91
The importance of firearms as a symbol of power from the landlords’ 
perspective should not be underestimated however. It should be remembered that 
most of the landlords were naft'anns or had connections in some way to this 
institution {naffanna). They therefore may well have been familiar with the use of 
guns, especially in the context of their relationship with tenants. In fact, even in 
their day-to-day relationships with their tenants the landlords had never fully 
relied on the government to protect their interests. They used their guns to 
intimidate whenever tenants refused or failed to fulfil their obligations.92 The 
landlords were familiar with the concept of taking the law into their own hands, 
and therefore when the actual confrontation happened they were quick to use their 
firepower against the poorly armed and ill-prepared tenants. Unlike on previous 
occasions however, this time many tenants with similar demands had joined forces 
and were organised and determined, making them more of a threat to the landlords, 
whom they also greatly outnumbered.
The landlords, notorious for their arrogance towards their tenants, refused 
to countenance the thought that tenants might have the ability to act against them 
in a well-disciplined and collective manner. When the rural area became 
increasingly dangerous the landlords decided to focus 011 the core areas of the
91 Interview with Taqabo Shota, Sisota, 29 April 1999; and Badesse Rufo, Grissa, C'abica, 
9 July 2004.
92 As one example in chapter 4 illustrates, due to the lack o f  efficiency on the part o f  the 
court there were occasions when the balarests used their armed retainers to subdue rebellious 
tenants.
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rebellion, Dama and Mechele. Since these two localities are within a short 
distance from Dilla town, reports soon began arriving about the activities of the 
tenants. Accordingly, the landlords in Dilla town began to discuss what action 
they should take to stop the situation slipping out of their control.
As they had planned the tenants began harvesting the ripe coffee beans 
from their farms without notifying their respective landlords. As this was a major 
violation of their tenancy agreements, it was sufficient to trigger the crisis. The 
first incident happened on the night of 5th of February 1960 when a group of 60-
9390 tenants gathered at the farm of a man called Guja Gurarcha to carry out their 
clandestine harvesting task. The landlord of the farm where this activity took place 
was named Baqala Gada. An informer leaked the information to his son that the 
tenants had started to harvest the coffee secretly. As soon as he received this 
information Baqala Gada passed it to fellow landlords in Dilla town and other 
nearby areas. A group of armed landlords decided to take immediate action 
against what they called an illegal action by their tenants. They marched to 
Andida in Mechele around midnight, where they found that a sizeable number of 
tenants from the local area were picking coffee beans at the farm. A landlord 
began to exchange angry words with the tenants and, according to informants, 
received an unexpected reply. He asked a tenant “How dare you to harvest the 
coffee from the rest o f Baqala Gada without my knowledge?" To which the tenant 
replied “The land is mine and the coffee is the fruit of my labour. Therefore I have 
the right to harvest it without telling anybody.” This man, who came forward to 
confront the balarests, was killed instantly by a bullet fired by the landlord.
93 There is no accurate data regarding the number o f people who lost their lives on either 
side. Estimates vary from one informant to another. According to Hayicha Danbela the number o f  
tenants who died was 84, while 4 or 5 landlords were killed. Interview with Hayicha Danbela Abe, 
Andida, 30 April 1999.
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Informants said that his name was Gabyhu. He is still remembered among the 
local people as the hero of the Mechele uprising.94
The violence continued for some time, until it became obvious to the rebel 
tenants from the damage sustained on them that their preparations had been 
inadequate to withstand the scale of response shown by the landlords. The 
landlords had many advantages over the tenants. Apart from the advantage 
conferred by their own weapons, they had also managed to gain the support of the 
government security forces as the tenants’ action was immediately classified as 
illegal.95 The tenants were held responsible for what had happened and regarded 
as criminals. Their effort to cany on fighting the landlords was a last attempt to 
express their desperation. It was an unequal confrontation, which was easily 
quashed by the combined firepower from landlords and the intervening 
government forces. In addition, the Mechele landlords had been supported by 
fellow landlords from areas where there was no crisis, but who had doubtless 
sensed that a similar situation might arise in their own backyards. The 
sympathisers came from areas within Gedeo such as Buie, Wanago, and Yirga 
C’afe and also from distant places such as Shashamane, Yirga Alam, Alata Wando, 
C’alalaqetu, and Hagara Maryam to fight in support of the Mechele landlords. As 
a result the Mechele and Dama tenants’ uprising was over in a matter of days.96
94 Interview with Gote B&dSsse, Andida, 28 April 1999; and Taqabo Shota, Sisota, 29 
April 1999.
95 Eric R. W olf, Peasants (Englewood Cliffs (USA): Prentice-Hall, 1966), 106-109.
90 Interview with Bora Hessa, Grissa, 13 July 2004,
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The suppression and settlement of the crisis
The rebellion was short-lived and the final engagement lasted no more than three 
homs. The government was involved in the conflict in two different capacities, 
firstly in using its security forces to suppress the rebellion, and secondly in 
attempting to find a long-term solution to the problem. Compared with other 
peasant rebellions which took place in other parts of Ethiopia during the same 
period, the Gedeo peasant uprising did not raise any major concerns for the 
government, even though the level of destruction of life and property was 
considerable. The next task facing the authorities was to assess the damage and to 
determine where responsibility for the crisis lay. By doing this, the government 
had already made its position clear, i.e. that it regarded the conflict as a local 
problem between tenants and landlords and that therefore a solution should be 
sought in accord with this fact. The government also felt that this crisis had not 
been due to its own failure to address the issue before it got out of hand; rather it 
was the result of a particular land distribution policy, namely the introduction of 
qalad, which had taken place much earlier.
Immediately after the rebellion was quashed, the government established a 
task force with the objective of studying the root causes of the problem and 
providing a solution, which would address demands from the tenants and avert 
future conflict.97 The task force was led by an important government official, Afd- 
negns (lit. mouth of the king) Eshate Gada, who was delegated by the Emperor 
himself.98 Although Eshate Gada's immediate task was to stabilise the situation, 
by the time he arrived in Dilla the destruction of rural villages and lives had
97 For similar approach by the government in other peasant uprsings in Ethiopia see Gebru, 
P ow er and P rotest, 180-193.
98 Interview with Hayicha Danbela Abe, Andida, 30 April 1999.
299
already reached huge proportions. His orders did however bring the violence to an 
immediate end. In addition to the destruction caused by government security 
forces and the landlords, villages which had not even taken part in the rebellion 
were sacked and looted by hooligans from nearby Dilla town. The peasants 
suffered indiscriminately and severely."
The task force started its work by assessing the scale of the damage in 
terms of both human life and property. Although there were conflicting figures the 
number of peasants killed by both government forces and the landlords was 
certainly over 100. No statistics were gathered as to how many people were 
wounded, either severely or slightly. The most visible consequence of the 
destruction was that peasants whose homes and property had been destroyed 
flocked to Dilla in the hope of getting government aid as well as help from the 
urban residents.100
The task force started its work by announcing that the peasants should go 
back to their villages and resume normal life. In addition, an amnesty was granted 
to those who were still in rebellion and in hiding, since continuing to hunt them 
down would gain them sympathy from other tenants which eventually might lead 
to the uprising spreading to other parts of Gedeo. The taskforce’s approach in this 
regard worked very well and as a result most tenants capitulated and agreed to 
present their demands once again through the legal channels. The taskforce 
imposed the condition that both sides have legal representatives so that their issues 
could be handled in a fair and transparent manner. Accordingly, the tenants 
appointed a man called Ato Balay Walda Kidan and the landlords were
99 Interview with Morkate Jarsso, Andida, 28 April 1999.
100 Interview with T'aqabo Shota, Sisota, 29 April 1999.
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represented by A to Taddassa Dilnasahu. Both sides were asked to present their 
account of the events which had led to the conflict and the particular demands that 
they wished the government to address.
Some informants also recalled that a traditional mediation effort was also 
launched in tandem to the legal one. In this informal reconciliation attempt both 
sides were required to send representatives. According to the informant the 
representatives were selected along ethnic lines, i.e. Gedeos (tenants) and the 
Amhara (landlords). In addition, both sides agreed that some input was necessary 
from another neutral ethnic group. Gurage representatives agreed to take part for 
this purpose.101
The objective of the mediation was to try to heal the wounds caused by the 
conflict. Both sides agreed to try to make some changes so that the established 
landlord-tenant relationship could resume as normal without conflict. The tenants’ 
representatives asked the landlords to lift some of the burdens 011 the tenants. 
Tenants particularly wanted landlords to stop charging them what was known as 
yat’eza margafia, a nominal fee which tenants were normally requested to pay to 
the assessors when they entered in their farm to calculate the erbo.m  In addition, 
the tenants also demanded that landlords should limit the amount of free labour 
services they required from them, and they proposed that the landlords should 
abolish practices such as using them for building work. However the mediation 
effort did not achieve much, mainly because the tenants also proposed a number 
of other changes which the landlords did not wish to address. For instance, among 
the issues which caused a major rift was a demand from the tenants that, since
101 Interview with Hayicha Danbela Abe, Andida, 30 April 1999; and Jibicho Galano, 
Darna, 30 April 1999.
102 Interview with Gote Badasse, Andida, 28 April 1999; and Morkate Jarsso, Andida, 28 
April 1999.
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they were the ones who had suffered more damage in the conflict, the landlords 
should pardon them erbo payments for four years. This was immediately 
dismissed by the landlords, who felt that if they granted such a concession the 
tenants might never pay erbo again in the future. The mediation effort collapsed 
over such disagreements. The only option left was to await the outcome of the 
legal process.103
Following the rebellion, the task force started its main work by gathering 
vital information about Mechele and Dama, focusing especially on the landlords 
of these two areas. All landlords were asked to give information about their land 
holdings. The task force felt that by studying the history of land tenure systems in 
the areas where conflict had occurred they could understand the root cause of the 
problem. They also felt that such an approach would help them to provide a better 
blueprint for future decision making. The document produced by the task force 
contained valuable information about the nature of land tenure in those particular 
areas. The information gathered contained the following key data: the balabat of 
the rest, the balarest, the type of tenure, the date of the first occupation, and 
evidence which showed that the land belonged to that person (most people 
produced their tax receipts as evidence of land ownership). This provided an 
information resource containing names of hundreds of landlords in the area, most 
of whom were affected by the uprising.104
This piece of evidence clearly shows the nature of land tenure (ydtiklue 
aynai). Entries were either maddria or rest and no other form of tenure was
105mentioned. In addition there was another crucial column in which the holders of
103 Interview with Hayicha Danbala Abe, December 25, 1996.
104 DAAA, 60/52 (Dilla, 1952 E.C.).
302
the land had to declare from where it had originally been obtained. (This reveals 
that the government did not have a centralised record system for land ownership, 
making it is hardly surprising that land had always been the subject of controversy 
and disputes.) Nearly 75 percent of the registered landlords declared that their land 
was originally given to them by Dajazmctch Balcha, while a few claimed that they 
had been given to them by Ras Daseta. The rest claimed that they had inherited 
from their parents; these were second generation landlords, as some of them 
indicated that the land had been originally given by to their parents by Balcha.106 
Landlords were also asked to state the year in which they had acquired their land; 
in this respect the information shows a great deal of variation. The earliest date 
given was 1902 E.C. (1910) but the most common year was 1909 B.C. (1917). 
This tallies very well with two important events in the histoiy of Gedeo, the years 
for the introduction of qalad and also of the governorship of Balcha who was the 
chief architect of qalad in Gedeo.107
Another aspect of the register was that each of the registered balarests was 
asked about the size of their land, in gasha units of measurement. Out of 
approximately 200 balarests, about six individuals owned 2 gashas of land. More 
than 80 percent owned only one gasha and a few balarests owned less than one 
gasha of land.108
After registering all the landlords of the area, the next duty of the task 
force was to assess the scale of destruction. Each tenant household named their
105 Interview with Worera C'umburo, Shegado, 6 July, 2004.
106 Interview with T'aqabo Shota, Sisota, 29 April 1999.
107 D AA A, 60/52 (Dilla, 1952 E.C.).
108 DAAA, 60/52 (Dilla, 1952 E.C.).
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landlord. Then the task force imposed what they believed was a proportionate 
penalty on both landlords and haychas (i.e. office holders; the title is traditional) 
according to the degree of their involvement in the conflict. It is evident from the 
size of the fines imposed on landlords, as well as what was stated by the task force, 
that the landlords were held responsible for escalating the crisis and that their 
violence against the tenants was felt to have been disproportionate. However, they 
were not held individually responsible. Rather, the penalties were levied equally 
without any attempt to identify individual culpability. The logic was very crude 
and the payment was 1000 birr from each landlord on whose land destruction 
occurred no matter the number of people killed or houses burnt. It was paid to the 
government as a penalty. Landlords were not individually questioned as to what 
sort of role they had played in the conflict, but were all made equally 
responsible.109
Since the tenants were the ones who had suffered the greater loss, both 
materially as well as in terms of human life, additional penalties were not imposed 
on them. Tenants were not regarded as being liable for any of the action they had 
taken, but the haychas were forced to cany the blame. Each haycha was made to 
pay 500 birr. The haychas were made responsible in accordance with the number 
of deaths caused and houses burnt. The task force justified their making the 
haychas responsible for the action of tenants by stating that it was that within their 
power to prevent and forbid tenants from taking part in such a violent uprising. 
This was rather unfair, because there was no evidence to show that they had 
played a role in the crisis; it was another blatant example of shifting the blame.110
109 Interview with Banjaw Kassa, Andida, 30 April 1999.
110 The haycha had no power to stop tenants taking action because even before the 
incorporation this office did not have any executive power. As one haycha said, his title was purely
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All the haychas within the rest a gait of Princess Tananna Warq were made 
responsible at the beginning, but later some of the haychas of villages not 
destroyed appealed against the indiscriminate decision of the committee. However, 
due to the involvement of a large group of people in the insurrection it was 
impossible for the government to charge individuals separately according to their 
personal level of involvement.111
In its final phase the task force examined the causes of the uprising and the 
demands presented by the peasants. The tenants did not change their demands but 
reiterated them to the task force, saying that their problem was the oppression of 
the landlords, and that they wished to own the land they had been cultivating for 
years and to pay taxes directly to the government. The task force reached the 
conclusion that the main source of the problem was land shortage rather than 
exploitation or the landlords. It produced the proposal that, in order to avoid future 
crises, the best solution would be to devise a resettlement scheme in an area where 
land was abundant. According to this proposal, tenants who were willing to leave 
their home areas would be given a generous amount of land. As a result of this 
they could achieve their dream of being independent landlords in their own right. 
The government chose not to challenge the landlords {balarests) who were 
powerful and had close connections with the hierarchy.
Although the tenants had been defeated, their action had at least prompted 
the government to find a solution to the crisis. The government wanted to resolve 
the crisis by finding a solution which would offend neither side. In this spirit the
traditional, and the only benefit he had as a haycha was to be offered free coffee when he passed 
through the villages. Interview with Hayicha Danbela Abe, Andida, 30 April 1999.
111 For instance the haycha Shalo Godana was penalised 500 birr, as were the other 
haychas where destruction had been caused due to the uprising, but he was later pardoned after he 
successfully appealed against the decision when it was discovered that the village for which he was 
responsible had not been affected by the conflict.
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tenants were told that the government would not issue a new law which would 
allow them to take over land from their landlords, but rather would be urged to 
accept the task force’s proposal. Informants claimed that the proposal originated 
from the Emperor himself. It was sent in the form of a personal message to the 
tenants; “I will give half a gasha of land to each of you in Hagara Maryam which 
you can settle and cultivate, so that you can be balarests, like the Agamjas (people 
from Agamja, Balcha’s place of origin) who were given land by Balcha; likewise 
you can proudly say that we have been given land by Haile Sellassie”. My 
informants recalled that about 500 gashas of uncultivated land was allocated for 
resettlement by the victims of the Mechele and Dama uprising.112
The resettlement was not welcomed initially, because it was not in the 
interest of the Gedeos to relocate.113 It had been proposed by the government as a 
solution to the crisis, but the tenants had never been consulted as to whether such 
an option was acceptable or viable. It was difficult for them to accept a 
compromise solution that had never been part of their initial demands. It can 
therefore be said that there were fundamental differences between the way the 
government and the peasants viewed the crisis. Since the peasants who protested 
against the balarests had not identified their problems as being related to land 
scarcity, the proposal seemed alien and unrelated to their concerns. There was a 
great deal of ambivalence about this offer on the part of the tenants and the 
differing views about the origins and resolution of the crisis made the 
implementation even more problematic. The desire to own a large piece of land
112 Interview with Jago Jilo, Grissa, 22 July 2004; Bora Hessa, Grissa, 13 July 2004 and 
Morkate Jarsso, Andida, 28 April 1999. For a discussion o f resettlement programme from the 
perspective o f  settlers see Alula Pankhurst, Resettlement and Famine in Ethiopia: The Villagers' 
Experience (Manchester: Manchester U.P., 1992), 18.
113 Cohen and D ov Weintraub, Land and Peasants, 58-61.
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and to be independent was an obvious attraction,114 but the decision to move to a 
place where there had been no previous history of Gedeo settlement was a very 
difficult one to take. Informants told me that the tenants were given the chance to 
make their own decision and that if  they felt ready to leave, they could go to the 
Awraja Gizat Office at Dilla to fill in a form and await authorisation. In order to 
encourage more people to opt for resettlement the government added some 
incentives, such as allowing them to keep their households in Gedeo as a second 
home.115
However, settlers who opted for resettlement soon began to express their 
disappointment with the manner in which the scheme was handled. Above all they 
felt that what the government had promised failed to materialise. They blamed the 
officials in charge of the scheme. Some said that after voluntarily choosing 
resettlement, they were forced to return home because they were given land 
unsuitable for fanning.116 Despite reluctance on the part of the peasants to take 
part in the scheme, a sizeable number of people finally decided to settle in the new
117areas. Ironically, my interviews with the peasants revealed that in retrospect 
they felt the scheme had been generally successful, and they admitted that had it 
not been for a programme of this kind Gedeo would by now be inundated with 
inhabitants. As one informant said, Gedeo by now would have been overwhelmed 
by a population surge and finding a place to farm or even burial spaces for the
114 Interview with Ararsso T'arro, Mechele, 16 December 1999. This informant also told 
me that other tenants from M echele who did not take part in the conflict but who wanted to resettle 
in Agaramaryam were given the same opportunities as tenants who had been directly affected by 
the conflict.
115 Interview with Jago Jilo, Grissa, 22 July 2004; Worera C'umburo, Shegado, 6 July, 
2004; and T'aqabo Shota, Sisota, 29 April 1999.
116 Interview with Shalo Dube, Shegado, 6 July, 2004.
" ’interview withBadesse Rufo, Grissa, C'abica, 9 July 2004.
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dead would be a serious challenge. Many other peasants are currently buying land 
in this area because they are concerned about the future of their children on 
account of the intense competition for land in Gedeo.118 From what peasants are 
beginning to observe with regard to their ecology, this concern appears to be well 
founded. Although not as seriously threatened as neighbouring territories such as 
the Guji Oromos, Gedeo, which has never before been vulnerable to natural 
calamites such as drought and famine, now shows increasingly signs of fragility.
The current government has initiated a new round of resettlement for the 
Gedeo peasants, whom they believe cannot be helped except by providing land 
elsewhere, to alleviate continuing land shortage. The current programme has been 
less successful because although people are no longer strongly against 
resettlement programmes as they were previously, the peasants were not consulted. 
Under the new proposals peasants have been also asked to settle in areas where 
there was no history of previous Gedeo settlement.119 According to one informant, 
if the current resettlement scheme had been in Agara Maryam, where a sizeable 
and success fill Gedeo community already existed, there would be huge demand, 
so much so in fact that the government might not be able to satisfy it.120
118 Interview with Tafara Ayise, Grissa, 14 July 2004; and Aliimayahu Baqate, Grissa, 15 
July 2004.
119 This was one o f  the consequences o f the ethnic boundary drawn by the then 
government in 1991. According to the new scheme as people o f  Southern Nations and 
Nationalities Peoples Administration (SNNPA) the Gedeo were not allowed to settle on the land 
which belonged to the Oromos. Consequently any land which could be given to the landless 
Gedeos had to be found within the boundaries o f SNNPA. Ironically, a great deal o f  Gedeos are 
still purchasing land in the Oromya region where the 1960s settlement o f  Gedeos has been 
successful,
120 Interview with Bfigajo Bonja, C'i c'u, 28 November 1999.
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Conclusion
Based on my reading of the source materials and from the reminiscences of 
peasants who participated in the movement, at the outset the Mechele peasant 
protest was not intended to be violent. The peasants' goal was very clear: they 
wanted the government to intervene and take action. However, all efforts made to 
have their grievances redressed by officials were to no avail. Local officials, who 
had a vested interest in safeguarding their own livelihoods and those of people in 
similar situations thwarted every one of the tenants' efforts. Although the higher 
officials in Addis Ababa showed sympathy and an understanding of the peasants’ 
demands, they were nevertheless unable to enforce their orders. Although it is 
clear that the system was slow and inefficient, officials never anticipated that this 
would have such grave long-term consequences. Thus, the problem had been 
brewing for many years. Failure on the part of the system to address this clearly 
contributed to the crisis.
Judging from the issues raised by the protestors both before and after the 
rebellion, it can be seen that the tenants had a large number of objectives, although 
it is doubtfi.il whether they planned it this way from the start. Their major 
objective was to improve their lot by becoming landowners themselves. If 
everything went as planned these demands would have been met; however after 
the rebellion was crushed forcefully they knew that they had been overly 
ambitious, and were forced to compromise. Later they raised secondary demands 
when they were offered an opportunity to mediate with their enemy through a 
traditional mediation effort (shimglena) launched in parallel with the legal process. 
In their manifesto the tenants pointed out that it was possible to continue with 
their previous landlord-tenancy relationships by ameliorating at least some of its
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bad practices, such as the nominal fee (yat’eza margafia). The mediation effort 
failed because the landlords felt that tenants’ demands were excessive.
The landlords approached the crisis from a different perspective; they did 
not expect the level of violent reaction the tenants had shown, and when it 
happened they panicked. They had underestimated the peasant's organisational 
capabilities as well as their determination to confront their landlords openly; it 
was this misapprehension which turned a peaceful protest into a bloody 
confrontation. Although the tenants knew that the landlords were very pugnacious, 
they felt that by organising themselves they would improve their bargaining 
position and that this might yield some modest results if  not all that they might 
wish for. They felt that by showing defiance and strength they would compel 
either the landlords or the government to do something about their demands.
The above is an attempt to examine the Mechele peasant uprising from the 
perspectives of the two best known theories of peasant rebellion. These theories 
were developed by examination of very different peasant uprisings in other parts 
of the world; the question arises as whether they can shed any light on the 
complex realities behind the peasant rebellion in Gedeo. As already indicated, 
however, the moral economy approach does not greatly help in understanding the 
Mechele peasant uprising in Gedeo. One of the serious weaknesses of this 
approach to understanding the Mechele rebellion is that it places great emphasis 
on the patron-client relationship. Although the relationship between tenants and 
landlords in Gedeo possessed some aspects of the patron-client relationship, the 
basic reality in Gedeo was different. The tenants never regarded the landlords as 
patrons and protectors; rather they wanted to be free of people they saw as 
parasites who simply exploited them.
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For their part, the landlords in Gedeo showed no interest in their tenants’ 
welfare. Moreover, they lacked the knowledge needed to support their tenants in 
maximizing production by offering input such as better seeds and fertilisers. This 
also affected relationships in a negative way. The inability of the landlords to 
actively participate in the production process made peasants feel that the landlords 
were nothing but exploiters. In reality, most of the landlords in Gedeo had no 
leverage either to influence the market or to invest in improving agriculture. From 
the tenants’ viewpoint, if they severed their relationships with landlords, they 
would lose nothing; indeed their condition would be improved. There was nothing 
to bind them to their landlords; in Gedeo landlords had never even held occasional 
feasts to forge relationships and possibly create the feeling that the landlords 
would at least protect them in hard times.
Rural crises, whether from the collapse of the market or the onset of a 
famine, did not occur in the weeks before the uprising. Gedeo did not experience 
any kind of ecological shock or market crash which threatened to push the 
peasants’ standard of living to below what might have been a minimum 
subsistence level according to the moral economy theory. Neither the state nor the 
landlords increased their basic demands from tenants either in the form of tax or 
land rent, which would have affected the livelihood of the tenants and their 
families. According to the moral economy proposition a subsistence crisis is the 
underlying factor in creating rural unrest, but this was not the case in Gedeo.
The political economy theory, by contrast, provides a more adequate 
explanation of the crisis created by the 1960 Mechele peasant rebellion in Gedeo. 
While not eveiy factor suggested by this approach applies to the situation of the 
Gedeo peasants, some points are clearly applicable to their conditions. Firstly, the
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peasants were rational and acted in the best interest of themselves and their 
families. The Mechele peasants acted to protect their interests by confronting the 
landlords. They acted rationally, initially trying all legal avenues to achieve their 
demands, hi addition, the rebellion was in no way a spontaneous protest. The 
peasants made all possible preparations to minimise any violent eventualities, as 
they were fully aware of the nature of the enemy they were confronting and the 
potential force they might bring to bear.
At the time when the peasants of Mechele initiated their collective action 
against the local landlords, other places where a similar agrarian relationship 
existed remained indifferent. If exploitation explained the protests, it should have 
occurred in all of these places or at least have spread easily into those areas, as 
Gedeo is geographically small and communication was not a major problem. 
However the protest was localised even within Gedeo because, although the 
landlord-tenant relationship existed in most of the qalad regions of Gedeo, the 
incident which triggered the Mechele protest was a circumstance peculiar to that 
area. This corroborates the theory advanced by the political economy approach. 
The peasants clearly demonstrated rationality and when they protested it was to 
protect their own individual and family interests rather than for sake of village or 
community.
Did the Mechele peasant uprising achieve anything? Important changes 
were made or at least attempted by the government, but it is difficult to say that 
any of these changes were direct consequences of the uprising. In addition, many 
attempted measures were blocked. For example, the government attempted to 
introduce a tenancy bill in parliament. This undoubtedly came about as a result of 
the growing pressure after several peasant uprisings had occurred across the
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country during this period. However, the bill unsurprisingly was blocked as 
parliament was dominated by landlords.121
The resettlement scheme, which was initially accepted with great 
reluctance by the Gedeo peasants, was the most important, unintended, and 
unpredicted achievement of the uprising. It is now cherished in Gedeo as one of 
the best legacies of Emperor Haile Sellassie’s regime. Eventually the 1974 
revolution and subsequent land reform addressed the tenancy problems of 
peasants in most of Gedeo and indeed of many other peasant communities in the 
south of Ethiopia. However it remains debatable to what extent one can make a 
connection between a small and localised peasant protest in one of the southern 
“peripheries” of the countiy and the Revolution, which was largely an urban affair 
which started in Addis Ababa at the very centre of the empire.
121 Bahru, A History o f  Modern Ethiopia , 195; See also Cohen and Weintraub, Land and  
P easants, 85,
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Conclusion
It has been the premise of this dissertation that, in gaining an understanding of the 
nature of land and tenancy disputes, we acquire insights into the inner workings of 
communities such as that of the Gedeos, In fact, the picture one can gain by 
analysing dispute documents is clearer than that furnished by other kinds of 
historical sources. This is because both land and labour are crucial resources, 
central to the survival of any rural community. Hence, any problem which arose 
in association with these two issues was defended as vigorously as possible by 
deploying every type of evidence which was available to the disputants. The 
sources also have the added advantage of showing the complex nature of the land 
tenure system, the structure of power, how government institutions operated at 
grassroots level and how the resource allocation process was divisive. By utilising 
underused but crucial historical sources, this study has shown that there is an 
immense potential for further micro-level investigation which could serve as a 
cornerstone for theory formation.
Contention about land issues has had a very long history in this part of 
Ethiopia. We have seen how Gedeo has never been a land-abundant society; this 
has been the case not only in recent times, but also during the earlier period, and 
the history of Gedeo in general is characterised by the struggle for this crucial 
resource. When the Gedeo came under direct Ethiopian administration at the turn
fhof the 19 century, the rivalry between the different clans over land reached its 
climax. The advent of the Ethiopian state increased pressure on the local 
communities because of the huge demand for more resources in order to support 
its large army in the area. Despite the strain which the incorporation posed on the
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Gedeos, they managed to support the state and its functionaries, thanks mainly to 
their well developed system of agriculture.
The state imposed the gabbar system with two major objectives in mind; 
to extract resources from the local people, and to administer them in its own way. 
However, it should be remembered that the state did not need to invent a different 
scheme o f administration in the incorporated areas. Rather by recruiting and co­
opting local elites it made many adaptations without disrupting the existing local 
power structure. Despite the crucial role the gabbar institution played, existing 
knowledge about it and how it functioned was limited and one-sided. For example, 
the existing works fail to provide the reason why it was able to operate; the use of 
force alone is not sufficient to explain this. This dissertation has argued that the 
key to the success of the system was its recognition of the land rights of the Gedeo 
households. Since the government was not interested in controlling land at this 
stage it did not abolish outiba, which was the indigenous land tenure system of the 
Gedeos. This helped to reduce opposition against the government and thus 
enabled the state to extract resources which were of crucial importance for empire 
building and consolidation. Undoubtedly the system was coercive and 
burdensome for the Gedeo households upon which it was imposed forcefully. Its 
impact was enormous at individual household level, because the household 
economy whose principal function was to support its members had to generate 
extra resources to meet the demands of the state and its functionaries.
We have also discussed incorporation from the perspective of the local 
people, because the presence of a powerful and well-organised state did provide 
opportunities for some groups. Intra-clan as well as inter-ethnic conflicts were 
more damaging for smaller ethnic groups like the Gedeo than for the Gujis who
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were larger and more powerfi.il. Immediately before the incorporation the Gedeos 
had weakened themselves by internal clan warfare, and in addition, there was an 
increasing threat from their neighbours. Once the state made its presence felt in 
the region, clan warfare was significantly reduced. Some of the conflicts which 
continued after the incorporation, such as Sidama vs. Gedeo, were resolved with 
Balcha’s successful intervention. He not only brought to an end the rivalry 
between the Gedeo and Sidama in the Lagadara River area but also decided that 
the river should serve as a common boundaiy between the two. Balcha’s 
mediation, which was sealed with a traditional ceremony involving the slaughter 
of a large amount of cattle, produced one of the most enduring ethnic boundaries 
in the region and is still respected by both sides. The conflict along the 
Guji/Gedeo boundary was resolved in a different manner, whereby Balcha 
eliminated the contention by labelling that area undesignated land and 
subsequently imposing qalad on it.
The introduction of qalad was another issue which this dissertation 
addressed, because it is not only fundamental to understanding the history of 
Gedeo until the 1975 land reform, but also it provided an opportunity to challenge 
some of the existing assumptions. This dissertation has argued that, contrary to 
widely held views, the state did not involve itself in the wholesale nationalisation 
of land, as this would have had no advantages and would have galvanised 
opposition. The state’s main objective was to provide economic security for its 
functionaries without damaging the existing economic and social fabric. Thus, it 
distributed land which it felt was undeveloped, uncultivated, and economically 
marginal to the local people before the area came under its direct control. From 
the Gedeo perspective, this land was the most natural direction of expansion and
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perhaps the only breathing space which could satisfy their demand for land, as the 
core areas had become increasingly unable to contain the ever-growing population. 
When Balcha imposed qalad he did so because he had no other means of 
rewarding and supporting his functionaries, and the only viable option available to 
him was to rely on the age-old practice of land granting. In addition, the gabbar 
system had already reached its limits and was no longer able to fulfil the needs of 
the state and its dependents.
The imposition of qalad gradually bred a feeling of alienation and 
eventually antagonism on the part of the local people. Disputes therefore became 
very common in Gedeo, in both the pre- and post-liberation period. The Gedeo 
elite opposed the regional governors, feeling that qalad was not only inappropriate, 
but also being conducted without their consent. This was unlike the case of the 
gabbar system, where their services were crucial for its successful introduction. 
Although the regional governors were able to force the imposition of qalad, the 
impact of the struggle shaped local relationships until 1974. It was in this 
atmosphere of animosity and division that Ethiopia entered the most critical phase 
in her long histoiy. When Haile Sellassie faced the threat of Italy in 1935 he led a 
more deeply divided people than Menilelc did in 1896, This disunity suited the 
interests of Italy; the task of administering the south through the “divide and rule” 
principle was easier to achieve than in other areas of Ethiopia during the 
occupation.
The post-war era was the most formative period in the history of Gedeo. 
Many changes took place; there was also, however, a great deal of continuity, 
especially in relation to land tenure. The modernisation effort of Haile Sellassie 
acquired greater momentum during this period. A highly centralised bureaucratic
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structure, which was controlled from the capital, enabled the state to generate 
more revenue than before. However, these changes did little to improve rural 
relationships which continued to deteriorate. Although the successfiil development 
of the coffee economy was a positive attribute of the period, on the negative side 
competition for the available land intensified, and as a result people used every 
available opportunity to gain access to this vital resource. The government mainly 
focused on extracting revenues and showed little interest in dealing with the 
question of land and tenancy problems.
Although land litigation had been an endemic problem in Ethiopia, as 
litigation could be started on the flimsiest of pretexts land ownership rights were 
highly insecure. By being able to access valuable documents, such as land tax 
receipts, easily and fraudulently, individuals managed to initiate litigation on 
spurious grounds. The prevalence of disputes hampered the smooth and 
straightforward transfer of property between individuals. Hence, the transfer of 
land through direct sale became difficult. This was why, rather than using sale as 
a medium of transfer between individuals, they tended to conduct their 
transactions as “inheritance” in the hope of avoiding litigation. Nevertheless, 
security of land ownership remained unattainable.
Despite its prevalence both in Gedeo and in many other parts of Ethiopia, 
the topic of land disputes has not been the subject of a thorough scholarly 
investigation. Scarcity of land has often been cited as a major cause of 
competition for land, but this nevertheless does not yield a complete explanation 
as to why land ownership has always been contentious. Even though this 
dissertation did not aspire to give an adequate answer to this question, it has been
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possible, however, to indicate some of the areas which have the potential to 
provide some answers.
The main one is the question of property rights. Property rights in the 
Ethiopian context were defined broadly {rest, outiba), without clearly delineating 
the rights and responsibilities of the individual land holders. A number of grey 
areas were left, and the ambiguities created openings for manoeuvre and 
contention. The other problem was the presence of multiple forms of land tenure 
systems. This meant that the various indigenous land tenure systems were allowed 
to operate according to their own rules and principles. The government did not 
take any measures to simplify these complex systems, either through major land 
reform or other means; therefore, it was not adequately informed about the types 
of tenure systems which existed in the countiy or how they operated.
Landlord-tenant relationships were another difficult area. None of the 
government’s measures addressed the issue in practical terms, and as a result, a 
highly polarised landlord-tenant relationship continued to be the norm. The 
tenancy bill the government attempted to introduce floundered in a parliament 
which was dominated by landlords. Therefore, tenancy relationships continued to 
be forged privately in uncontrolled and unregulated ways. The assumption has 
been made that the absence of written agreements were a major reason for the 
tenant’s plight. This dissertation has shown however that this was not the case. 
Tenants who had written tenancy agreements were no better off than those who 
had not, as these agreements were not bilateral, but only drawn up to protect the 
interests of the landlord rather than the tenants.
The courts, which were re-organised as part of major bureaucratic reforms 
by the government in the post-war period, played a central role in land and
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tenancy disputes. This dissertation has provided several examples of cases in the 
hope of illuminating how issues were dealt with legally as well as understanding 
the root causes of the problem. The litigation documents show that disputants 
were not discriminated against because of their social or economic status. In fact, 
a close look at the process of litigation shows that even the people who 
theoretically benefited (landlords) did not gain as much as assumed. This is 
particularly true in relation to the lack of effective enforcement of legal decision.
Ultimately the increasing insecurity of land ownership rights in the area of 
Mechele precipitated a major crisis. There were conflicting developments 
preceding the conflict. On the one hand, tenants were expecting to be free and 
independent landowners in their own right, like their counterparts in the outiba 
zone of Gedeo, because some tenants had been allowed to purchase the title from 
their landlord; this was done, for example, by some tenants within Tananna 
Warq’s gidt. On the other hand, because of their own precarious existence, small 
landlords, especially madciria land holders, attempted to tighten their grip on their 
land. Eventually a crisis erupted. The 1960 Mechele peasant uprising, which had 
started as a peaceful protest, was a watershed in the history of the highly polarised 
landlord-tenant relationship. The use of force by the landlords and the security 
forces precipitated a violent conclusion. Intervention by the government did not 
bring about a lasting solution, because the post-crisis period was even worse.
The rural land proclamation of March 1975 finally brought a halt to the 
conflict. By eliminating all pre-revolutionary land and tenancy court disputes, the 
land reform decree improved the status of tenants by allowing them to control the 
land which they had been cultivating for their former landlords. Future research 
may reveal what it achieved and what it failed to achieve because there is a
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deficiency of information on how it was applied at ground level. However, there 
are already indications that the reform was far from complete. For example, it did 
not grant Gedeo women equal rights to own land, unlike their counterparts in 
northern Ethiopia. In addition, since land re-distribution did not occur as it had in 
many other places, some peasants in Gedeo ended up owning more land than 
others, which was contrary to one of the basic principles of the reform.
Despite these anomalies there is no doubt that the proclamation addressed 
many of the longstanding problems faced by the Gedeo peasants and many others 
in different parts of the countiy. The removal of landlords from the contested 
lands had solved one of their problems; however, it did not answer the other 
longstanding issue of Gedeo peasants, i.e. the need for more land.
Gedeo currently faces twin problems. One is an unprecedented population 
growth, and the other is ecological vulnerability. Population growth and the lack 
of access to new land mean that for the Gedeo, the opportunities the incorporation 
had created by the beginning of the 20th century are no longer available. The 
solution of extending the physical space to cater for Gedeo’s growing population 
from land-scarce areas might not be easy, because ethnic boundaries have been 
less likely to be flexible since 1991. The 1997 incident between the Gedeos and 
Guji was the consequence of such an inflexible ethnic boundary. This not only 
resulted in the death of many Gedeos and the destruction of their property, far 
bigger than that caused by the 1960 uprising, but also damaged the history of an 
amicable coexistence between two previously peaceful neighbours, who had not 
had a history of violence, other than a few minor incidents. It appears that 
contention about land will remain for the foreseeable future, as most of the
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measures taken so far have brought only temporary relief rather than lasting 
solutions.
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